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FOREWORD
PATRICK A. SHEA*
The Wilderness Act of 1964 defines wilderness as "an area where
the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man
himself is a visitor who does not remain."' While this legal definition is
entirely fitting, even eloquent, the word "wilderness" evokes emotions
and imagery that go far beyond the language of the Wilderness Act. Wil-
derness is a word rich in its religious, historical, and philosophical asso-
ciations. In the Old Testament, God tests the Israelites in the wilderness;
in the New Testament, Jesus is tempted by the devil in the wilderness.
But, the Bible depicts wilderness areas not only as sites for testing one's
character, but also as places of solitude for quiet reflection. Thus, the
Gospels record that Jesus often withdrew to the "wilderness"2 or went
"out to the mountain"3 to be alone to pray.
Other figures from history have sought solitude in nature to com-
mune with God and meditate on life's meaning. American writer, natu-
ralist, and transcendental philosopher, Henry David Thoreau-who spent
two years (1845-47) in seclusion in the woods near Walden Pond in
Concord, Massachusetts--explained his decision to be alone in his mas-
terpiece Walden: "I went to the woods because I wished to live deliber-
ately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn
what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not
lived.'" This need to get away from the burdens, noises, and distractions
of everyday life is recognized by the Wilderness Act, which states that
one of the characteristics of a wilderness area is that it "has outstanding
opportunities for solitude."
The Wilderness Act also recognizes a principle articulated by con-
servationist Aldo Leopold in his 1949 classic A Sand County Almanac,
namely, that "[w]ilderness is a resource which can shrink but not grow.' '
Consistent with that view, the opening paragraph of the Wilderness Act
declares that it is Congress's intention to "assure that an increasing
* Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land & Minerals Management, Department of the
Interior; former Director, Bureau of Land Management.
1. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-557, § 2(c), 78 Stat. 890, 891 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994)).
2. Mathew 4:1.
3. John 6:15.
4. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 172 (Joseph W. Krutch ed.,
Bantam Books 1962) (1854).
5. WildernessAct§2(c), 16U.S.C. § 1131(c).
6. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 255 (3d ed. 1966).
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population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechani-
zation, does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States and
its possessions, leaving no lands designated for preservation and protec-
tion in their natural condition. 7
Thus, preserving what is left of America's wilderness is of necessity
a "rear-guard action,"8 one that is aimed at preventing the shrinkage of
existing wilderness. That is why it is so important for Congress, as the
designator of federally protected wilderness areas, to make sure it pre-
serves all remaining areas that meet the definition of wilderness. By pre-
serving the remainder of America's wilderness, we can avoid becoming
high-technology drones toiling away in what Western writer Wallace
Stegner called "the Brave New World of a completely man-controlled
environment." As Stegner so cogently argued in his landmark Wilder-
ness Letter of 1960: "We need wilderness preserved-as much of it as is
still left, and as many kinds-because it was the challenge against which
our character as a people was formed."''
The process of wilderness suitability and designation is governed
not only by the Wilderness Act of 1964, but also by the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)." FLPMA established the
process whereby the BLM inventories, studies, and reports on the suit-
ability or nonsuitability of areas for preservation as wilderness." Under
this process, the President-after receiving the advice of the Secretary of
the Interior-recommends to Congress what BLM managed areas should
be designated as federally protected wilderness." No designation can
occur, however, until and unless Congress passes the necessary legislation.
Today, the BLM manages 135 congressionally designated wilder-
ness areas that encompass more than 5.2 million acres. In recent years,
Congress passed two major BLM related wilderness designation meas-
ures. One is the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990, which ensured
protection for 2.4 million acres of wilderness, including 1.1 million acres
of BLM managed land.' The other is the California Desert Protection
Act of 1994, which designated as wilderness some 7.7 million acres ad-
ministered by the BLM and the National Park Service.' In addition,
Congress passed the Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993, which set aside
7. WildernessAct§2(a), 16U.S.C. § 1131(a).
8. LEoPoLD, supra note 6, at 255.
9. Wallace Stegner, Wilderness Leter, in THE WILDERNESS READER 327, 329 (Frank Ber-
gon, ed., 1980).
10. Id.
11. Pub. L. No. 94-579,90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (1994)).
12. See FLPMA § 102,43 U.S.C. § 1701.
13. See Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
14. See Pub. L. No. 101-628, § 101, 104 Stat. 4469, 4469-72 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132
note).




600,000 acres of BLM managed land as wilderness,"' and in 1996 Con-
gress designated the 42,000 acre Bisti/De-Na-Zin Wilderness in New
Mexico. 7
Another significant land management development occurred in
1996, when President Clinton designated the BLM to be the manager of
the 1.88 million acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in
Utah." (A national monument, while not a wilderness area, provides sig-
nificant protection for scientific and historic resources in a specific area.)
Grand Staircase-Escalante is a high, rugged, and remote region, where
bold plateaus and multi-hued cliffs run for long distances. It is the last
place in the continental United States to have been mapped, and it is the
first national monument to be placed under the BLM's management.
The President's choice of the BLM surprised many people, includ-
ing employees of our sister agency, the National Park Service. But, the
BLM viewed the President's selection as a fitting vindication of our
agency's recent years of low profile success in conserving natural, scien-
tific, and historical resources. The creation of the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument raised the profile of the BLM as a con-
server of resources, and it is the BLM's priority to raise that profile even
higher.
The Wilderness Act of 1964 stands out as a visionary piece of leg-
islation that recognizes humanity's need for solitude, reflection, and re-
generation. By protecting these sanctuaries for our minds and souls, we
can bring-as Stegner put it in his Wilderness Leter--"incomparable
sanity.., into our insane lives."' 9
16. See Pub. L. No. 103-77, 107 Stat. 756 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note).
17. See Bisti/De-Na-Zin Wilderness Expansion & Fossil Forest Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
104-333, § 1022, 110 Stat. 4093, 4211 (1996) (enacted as section 1022 of the Omnibus Parks and
Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-333, 110 Stat. 4093).
18. See Proclamation No. 6920,61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996).






On those days when I bicycle home from the law school, I peddle
over the prairie billows trapped under Denver's asphalt and bluegrass. I
turn west onto a residential street and, as I crest a hill, I have spread be-
fore me a slice of the city and, beyond it, the ramparts of Colorado's
front range. Beyond that, I can see the snow-covered flanks, gray shoul-
ders and summit of Mount Evans in the congressionally designated Mt.
Evans Wilderness. This experience is commonplace in the American
West. Residents of Seattle can peer out at Mt. Baker, denizens of Albu-
querque see the Sandia peaks, and citizens of Salt Lake City see Twin
Peaks and Lone Peak, all in designated wilderness. These are not the
nation's largest wilderness areas or its most significant. Yet to millions
of people they represent the more than 100 million acres of land we have
set aside as "area[s] where the earth and its community of life are un-
trammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not
remain."' We see them every day, but we rarely talk about them.
Perhaps the most extraordinary thing about the National Wilderness
Preservation System (NWPS)--which, as Gregory Aplet points out, has
grown "beyond the wildest dreams of the early wilderness advocates '-
is how rarely it enters into our national conversation about the environ-
ment. There are no more than a handful of court cases about wilderness
and wilderness preservation While much ink has been spilt in Congress
about specific wilderness areas in specific states, these debates now
rarely examine the core assumptions of the wilderness system. They
tend, instead, to revolve around specific resource issues, most commonly
water," mining,' roads,6 and questions of how much wilderness we should
designate.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., M.A., Stanford
University 1981; J.D. University of California at Los Angeles School of Law 1986. I wish to thank
Miranda Peterson, Natural Resources Symposium Editor, and Kent Modesitt, Editor-in-Chief, and
all the other members of the Denver University Law Review who made this symposium possible.
1. Wilderness Act of 1964 § 2(c), Pub. L. No. 88-557, 78 Stat. 890, 890 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994)).
2. Gregory H. Aplet, On the Nature of Wildness: Exploring What Wilderness Really Protects,
76 DENv. U. L. REV. 347, 347 (1999).
3. See generally H. Anthony Ruckel, The Wilderness Act and the Courts, 76 DENy. U. L.
REV. 611 (1999).
4. See generally Karin P. Sheldon, Water for Wilderness, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 555 (1999).
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This is, first and foremost, extremely good news. Wilderness makes
sense for the United States in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
century. As Patrick Shea declares, the Wilderness Act "recognizes hu-
manity's need for solitude, reflection and regeneration."7 These qualities
and opportunities are not abundant in the modern world.
In the American West, where wilderness sits prominently on the
landscape, it is fair to say there is some consensus about our need for it.
As Pete Morton points out, we consistently value wilderness for more
than recreation! We perceive it as a scarce resource-far scarcer than the
water, minerals and wood fiber we might have if we dispensed with the
idea of wilderness.9
But though we value wilderness, we cannot easily articulate what it
is. Wilderness is a quicksilver notion defying easy description, reflecting
images of solitary wandering, fruitful introspection" and biological pres-
ervation. More than a century after we began to value it for itself and
thirty-five years after its emergence as a statutory institution, wilderness
remains enigmatic. We have traced its roots through our culture" and
measured its biological significance." We have designed and imple-
mented administrative processes to discover it and reject imposters.'3 We
develop scales for measuring its qualities," but its core remains elusive.
For years, I have shied away from discussions of the meaning of
wilderness. I am not alone in doing this. I feared that the elusiveness of
wilderness may lead good-hearted skeptics to conclude that it was an
illusion, a sham, a sanctimonious pretext for depriving federal land man-
agement agencies of discretion. However, after reading the extraordinar-
ily broad and deep analysis in the articles included in this symposium, I
5. See generally Kenneth Hubbard et. al, The Wilderness Act's Impact on Mining Activities:
Policy Versus Practice, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 591 (1999).
6. See generally H. Michael Anderson & Aliki Moncrief, America's Unprotected Wilderness,
76 DENY. U. L. REv. 413 (1999).
7. Patrick A. Shea, Foreword to Natural Resources Symposium, Wilderness Act of 1964:
Reflections, Applications, and Predictions, 76 DENY. U. L. REv. 331 (1999).
8. See Pete Morton, The Economic Benefits of Wilderness: Theory and Practice, 76 DENv.
U. L. REv. 465 (1999).
9. Cf. id. at 473.
10. See generally JOSEPH SAX, MOuNTAiNS WrrouT HANDRAs (1980) (noting the incom-
patibility of preservationist ideals and those of lay nature enthusiasts and arguing that preservationist
leadership, despite its ill repute, should guide government action respecting National Park Service
management),
it. See generally RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1967) (chroni-
cling the development of wilderness protection and America's steadily increasing appreciation of its
value).
12. See generally Dave Foreman, The Wildlands Project and the Rewilding of North America,
76 DENV. U. L. REv. 535 (1999).
13. See generally Mathew J. Ochs, Note, Defining Wilderness: From McCloskey to Legisla-
tive, Administrative and Judicial Paradigms, 76 DENy. U. L. REv. 659 (1999).
14. Cf Aplet, supra note 2.
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decided that I have been wrong to avoid the subject. We need to talk
about wilderness far more than we have. The concept will bear examina-
tion. Understanding it cannot help but lead us to practical solutions to
many public lands issues and, perhaps, to a deeper understanding of who
we are and what we need.
I. WHAT WE AGREE ON
For most of the 1990s, the epicenter of the "Battle for Wilderness"' '
has been southern Utah. The vast holdings of the BLM in the canyon,
desert, and mountain country drained by the Colorado River and in the
basin and range country on the other side of the state's mountainous
spine, have been the first priority of wilderness champions from Utah,
around the country, and around the world. At the same time, these lands
are the backyard of many people with little trust of or patience with the
federal government and its land management policies. The battle has
been joined in Congress. Utah wilderness has spawned a series of bills,'6
covering the entire state or small portions of it, providing for extensive
wilderness preservation or very little. Nowadays, however, few are ques-
tioning the basic notion of wilderness or the wisdom of wilderness des-
ignation.
On October 7, 1998, the United States House of Representatives
"crushed" an enormous public lands bill by a vote of 302 to 123.'" The
bill, proposed by sixty-seven members of Congress, included provisions
covering park expansions and land exchanges in thirty-six states. Many
of these proposals, including a pact between Utah Governor Mike Leavitt
and Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt that would have traded out state
school-trust parcels surrounded by national forests and parks in Utah,'8
had broad support." However, the bill also included something the vast
majority of the members of the 105th Congress found unacceptable, Utah
Representative Chris Cannon's bill to form a national conservation and
heritage area in Utah's San Rafael Swell." As Representative Sherwood
Boehlert, a leader of moderate, pro-environment Republicans who voted
against the bill observed, the combined bill was like taking medication
15. I borrow the phrase, "Battle for Wilderness," from wilderness scholar Michael Frome. See
MICHAEL FROME, BATTLE FOR WILDERNESS (1997).
16. See, e.g., America's Red Rock Wilderness Act of 1997, S. 773, 105th Cong.; Utah Wil-
derness and School Trust Lands Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 1952, 105th Cong.; Utah Public Lands
Management Act of 1995, S. 884, 104th Cong.
17. Lee Davidson, House Buries Hansen's Lands Bill, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 8, 1998, at AOI;
see also Omnibus National Parks and Public Lands Act of 1998, H.R. 4570, 105th Cong.; 144
CONG. REC. H9870 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (providing roll call for the House vote on H.R. 4570).
18. See H.R. 4570, § 553.
19. See John Heilprin & Brent Israelsen, House Kills Hansen's Lands Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Oct. 8,1998, at Al.
20. See San Rafael Swell National Heritage and Conservation Act, H.R. 3625, 105th Cong.
(1998). The San Rafael Swell bill was included in Title V of the Omnibus National Parks and Public
Lands Act of 1998. See H.R. 4570, §§ 501-555.
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"that is 90 percent penicillin and 10 percent arsenic."2' Cannon's San
Raphael Swell bill was the poison.
Cannon's bill, H.R. 3625, was a wilderness bill, or, to be more accu-
rate, an antiwilderness bill. Its primary sin was eliminating wilderness
study area status-an administrative prewilderness designation afforded
protection under the Wilderness Act-for 140,000 acres of BLM land in
the breathtaking wild country in and around Emery County, Utah.22 Mike
Matz, director of the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, termed the
October 7 vote "a stunning defeat for the anti-wilderness coalition in
Congress and a great victory for the people of Utah who want to see wil-
derness protected."'
It seems reasonable to assume that the San Raphael Swell bill con-
tained the latest word in antiwilderness extremism. It came out of the
wilderness battleground of southern Utah. It could not garner significant
support in the conservative 105th Congress and, indeed, was considered
so repulsive by a solid majority of that body that it sank a raft of other
popular proposals. As a result, it becomes a very useful artifact in deter-
mining where we are in our national conversation about wilderness.
The news, of course, is that the bill was not really that awful. H.R.
3625, introduced in the House of Representatives on April 1, 1998, was
without a doubt a pro-development bill. It referred to the San Rafael
Swell as "one of the country's last frontiers"'2 and remarked on the area's
"notable history of coal and uranium mining."' Yet, in another time, it
would have seemed a conservationist measure. The bill designated a
630,000-acre "San Rafael Swell National Conservation Area."26 The bill
prohibited "all commercial sale of trees, portions of trees, and forest
products located in the conservation area." ' The bill created four (ad-
mittedly modest) wilderness areas within the conservation area, totaling
roughly 130,000 acres," and another 250,000 of wilderness acres outside
21. Davidson, supra note 17, at A01.
22. See Heilprin & Israelsen, supra note 19, at Al.
23. Id.
24. The bill's introductory provisions state:
The San Rafael Swell region of the State of Utah... possesses important historical, cul-
tural, and natural resources that are representative of the central themes associated with
the history of the American West, including themes of pre-Columbian and Native Ameri-
can culture, exploration, pioneering, settlement, ranching, outlaws, prospecting and min-
ing, water development and irrigation, railroad building, industrial development, and the
utilization and conservation of natural resources.
H.R. 3625, 105th Cong. § 101(a)(2). The exact nature of "pre-Columbian and Native American ...
mining.... railroad building [and] industrial development," remains unexplained.
25. Id. § 101(b)(5).
26. Id. § 202(b).
27. Id § 202(e).
28. Specifically, the bill created the following four areas:
(1) Crack Canyon Wilderness Area, consisting of approximately 16,676 acres.
(2) Mexican Mountain Wilderness Area, consisting of approximately 29,953 acres.
(3) Muddy Creek Wilderness Area, consisting of approximately 37,010 acres.
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the conservation area."7 The bill then "released" from further considera-
tion as wilderness all other public lands in Carbon and Emery Counties"
an area of perhaps 1.5 million acres?'
On April 23, 1998, the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public
Lands of the dreaded Committee on Resources of the House of Repre-
sentative held hearings on the ill-fated bill. The hearings were notable for
the absence of wilderness bashing. Utah Governor Michael Leavitt em-
phasized the bill's protective provisions and its designation of 240,000
acres of land "we would all agree should be wilderness." 2 The most
violent attack on wilderness came from Emery County Commissioner
Randy Johnson, who declared, "Wilderness was meant to apply only to
those exemplary lands which truly qualify. It was never intended as a
management tool for all public lands."33
William Meadows, President of The Wilderness Society, while
praising the "the work of many in Emery, Carbon, and Sanpete Counties
who have sought to address the important issues before us," opposed the
bill and pointed out that it did "not address the full range of wilderness
quality lands in Utah" and "actually reduces the level of protection that
wilderness resources currently receive, by eliminating [Wilderness Study
Area] protection for over 140,000 acres."'
Patrick Shea, Director of the Bureau of Land Management at that
time-the agency with land holdings at issue-also weighed in against
the bill. While praising the "genuine concern" of the bill's authors for
"preservation, conservation and interpretation of very significant heritage
(4) San Rafael Reef Wilderness Area, consisting of approximately 46,079 acres.
Id. § 221(a). Acreages for these wilderness areas were updated in the second and final version of the
bill, adding approximately 10,000 acres.
29. These areas were designated as follows:
(1) Desolation Canyon Wilderness Area (Carbon County), consisting of approximately
109,050 acres.
(2) Desolation Canyon Wilderness Area (Emery County), consisting of approximately
119,650 acres.
(3) Turtle Canyon Wilderness Area, consisting of approximately 31,450 acres.
(4) Horseshoe Canyon Wilderness Area, consisting of approximately 16,600 acres.
Id. § 301(a). This provision was subsequently omitted in the second and final version of the bill.
30. See id. § 304(b).
31. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FACTS AND FIGURES
FOR UTAH 62 (1997).
32. The San Rafael Swell National Heritage and Conservation Act: Hearings on H.R. 3625
Before the Subcom,. on Nat'l Parks and Public Lands of the House Comrm on Resources, 105th
Cong. 78 (1998) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Michael Leavitt, Governor, State of Utah).
Consider what Emery County has proposed: Protection of 240,000 acres of wilderness.
Areas we would all agree should be wilderness. Beyond wilderness the bill also proposes
a National Conservation Area that gives statutory protection to the San Rafael Swell. In a
bold step for which they have been widely criticized by many of their sister counties, they
have removed the threat of commercial extractive development by proposing to exclude
oil drilling, mining, and timbering activities from the Swell.
Id.
33. Id. at 69 (statement of Randy Johnson, Chairman, Emory County Board of Commissioners).
34. Id. at 79 (statement of William H. Meadows, President, The Wilderness Society).
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resources present in the San Rafael Swell,"' Shea pointed out that "the
wilderness areas proposed for the region encompassed by the proposal
fall far short of previous wilderness bills considered in this Subcommit-
tee."' He went on to state, "Given these deficiencies, if passed in its pre-
sent form, the Secretary would recommend that the President veto H.R.
3625."37
On October 7th, the House voted a complete victory for Meadows
and Shea and a complete defeat for the proponents of H.R. 3625. Back in
Utah, representatives who had supported the bill had already taken their
lumps in the press. On October 1, the Salt Lake Tribune ran an opinion
letter remarking "how flagrantly Utah's politicians disregard public
opinion about environmental issues. ' On October 4, a similar letter in
the Deseret News declared, "It is incomprehensible how out of touch our
congressional leaders are with the desires of their electorate," pointing
out that, "[a] recent survey... found that the average Utahn wants 9.25
million acres as wilderness [designated in the state]."39
The impression one takes away from the short and unhappy life of
H.R. 3625 is that wilderness and support for wilderness protection have
sunk deep roots in Utah and throughout the West. Wilderness meets a
need, or satisfies a demand, that will be satisfied. When the worst thing
that a county commissioner from southern Utah can say about wilder-
ness-in a public forum-is that it should not replace other public land
management tools, we have reached a place that Bob Marshall, Howard
Zahniser, Stewart Udall, and Aldo Leopold could only dream about.
This transformation is not limited to Congress and county govern-
ment. John Baden and Pete Geddes's article, Environmental Entrepre-
neurs: Keys to Achieving Wilderness Conservation Goals?,' shows us a
new brand of conservative thinker-one who cites David Quammen' and
Michael Bean 2 and describes a class of "environmental entrepreneurs"
who fimd methods of extending many of the virtues of wilderness man-
agement onto private land.
35. Id. at 74 (statement of Patrick A. Shea, Director, BLM, U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Real Conservatives, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 1, 1998, at A14.
39. Utah Delegation Out of Step, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 4, 1998, at AA2.
40. John A. Baden & Pete Geddes, Environmental Entrepreneurs: Keys to Achieving Wilder-
ness Conservation Goals?, 76 DENY. U. L. REv. 519 (1999).
41. See id. at 529 nn.59, 60 (citing DAVID QUAMMEN, THE SONG OF THE DODO: ISLAND
BIOGEOGRAPHY IN AN AGE OF EXTINCTIONS (1996)).
42. See id. at 530-32 nn.62, 63, 68. (citing Michael J. Bean & David S. Wilcove, The Private-
Land Problem, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1 (1997); Robert Bonnie & Michael Bean, Habitat
Trading for Red Cockaded Woodpeckers: Enhancing Recovery, Reducing Conflicts, ENDANGERED
SPECIES UPDATE, AprJMay 1996, at 7; Michael J. Bean, Environmental Economics and Policy
Analysis: A Seminar for Professors of Environmental Law, Address at the Foundation for Research
on Economics and the Environment Seminar (July 17, 1998)).
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Ed Quillen, a veteran of Colorado journalism, encountered the same
development when he filled in for the publisher of the Wet Mountain
Tribune in Westcliffe, Custer County, Colorado, at the eastern foot of the
Sangre de Cristo Mountains and the recently designated Sangre de Cristo
Wilderness. "I expected the usual hollering about 'locking up resources'
and consequent economic disaster if mining or logging were forbidden in
much of the Sangres."' 3 Quillen heard instead an "almost ecstatic" repre-
sentative of the chamber of commerce who "cited some study that pre-
dicted a three-fold increase in visits to the Sangres with formal wilder-
ness designation."" Quillen concluded, "The rabid rural denunciations of
wilderness designation, so familiar during my years editing the
Kremmling newspaper 20 years earlier that I could recite them as easily
as the alphabet, had vanished from public discourse, at least in Custer
County."' Custer County is not alone.
It's time to face the truth. The NWPS exists, it is large, and it will not
go away. Indeed, as Robert Glicksman and George Coggins suggest, the
trend for wilderness designation, both nationally and internationally, may
be nowhere near its culmination.' We need to talk about it, talk about our
need for it, decide publicly what we will and will not allow within it, and
how we will undertake the daunting task of preserving it-as we need
it-for future generations.
II. WHAT WE MUST DISCOVER
Unfortunately, just because we all seem to agree that wilderness has
value, that it satisfies a need many, many of us feel, does not mean we
agree about what wilderness is or how to preserve it. Obviously, our fail-
ure in comprehending what it is we value may frustrate our ability to
preserve what we need. This flaw in the foundation may slowly destroy
the architecture no matter how attractive we find the structure.
On May 27, 1998, the Office of the Chief of the United States For-
est Service issued a four-page response to an administrative appeal filed
by George Nickas of Wilderness Watch concerning a Forest Service
decision about the use of "fixed anchors" left by rock climbers in the
Sawtooth Wilderness in the Sawtooth National Forest. The decision
document applies straight-forward logic to find that permanent climb-
ing aids are permanent "installations" and therefore prohibited by the
Wilderness Act:
While rock climbing is an authorized activity in wilderness areas,
providing rock climbing opportunities where equipment or installa-
43. Ed Quillen, Wilderness Also Obeys the Law of Unintended Consequences, DFNV. POST,
Sept. 1, 1998, at B09.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Wilderness in Context, 76 DENY.
U. L. REv. 383, 383 (1999).
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tions is required that violates the Act's prohibitions is not permissible
under the Act. Administration of wilderness areas pertains primarily
to the Forest Service's responsibility to care for and protect the wil-
derness resource, not for wilderness users to undertake their recrea-
tional activities by whatever means necessary. 7
The decision loosed an avalanche of criticism that forced the Forest
Service to beat a hasty retreat, pursued by angry Senators from Wash-
ington State, in unlikely alliance, and REI.' The rockslide unearthed one
of many wilderness issues we still need to resolve.
Much of the abuse directed at the Forest Service threw back ver-
sions of the values that underlie the concept of wilderness and inspired the
NWPS. In the Denver Post, Alison Osius offered this personal narrative:
One July day, two good friends and I were a few hundred feet up a
remote thousand-foot cliff when we got slammed by a storm we never
saw coming. From behind the mountain top, a black cloud plowed
overhead, and below us the valley slopes lighted up creepy yellow. To
the north, purple-lined clouds scudded together, lightning gleaming
behind them. As we shouted for the third person on the rope to hurry,
a white wall of rain swung around the skyline buttress, and then over
the summit swept another wall, this one of hail, white marbles against
the charcoal sky. A curtain, it moved in front of us and hung there, 50
feet wide, rippling and swaying and sometimes gaping to reveal the
green hillsides opposite; in spots, hail blew upwards. On our ledge,
ropes whipped through our hands, and hailstones piled around my feet.
Thick, newly formed waterfalls blew and splashed all around us. Yet
Dan Lepeske's voice was gentle as he checked each rappel set-up by
our friend Jeff Brewer. We were all getting cold and clumsy. I kept
thinking, 'This is when bad stuff happens--do everything right." I had
known someone who got killed in rain and chaos like this, slipping off
a ledge. Doubling our ropes through slings tied to old pitons at stations
150 feet apart, we rappelled, freezing brown water spurting from the
ropes down our legs. And then we reached the ground, and the storm
was over, and water sliced down the wall in a billion tiny ripples, and
we three were laughing and closer even than we had been before.49
47. Darrel L. Kenops, Discretionary Review of April 13, 1998 Appeal Decision on Sawtooth
Wilderness Management Direction (visited Dec. 5, 1998) <http://www.fs.fed.us/recreation/climbing
anchor frame.html> (correspondence from Darrel L. Kenops, Reviewing Officer for the Chief of the
Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, to Sam Davidson, The Access Fund).
48. See Terry Richard, It's a Break for Fixed Anchors, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 30,
1998, at F03. As Richard reported:
Enlisting the help of Washington's senators, Republican Slade Gorton and Democrat
Patty Murray, climbers have received a reprieve from the June decision by the Forest
Service to ban fixed climbing anchors in wilderness areas.... At the urging of the Seat-
tie-based outdoor sports industry, Washington's senators, who seldom agree on anything
about the environment, have come to the climbing community's rescue.
Id.
49. Alison Osius, Forest Service Push to Ban Fixed Anchors Is Off the Wall, DENV. POST,




In climbing, anything can happen, including retreat. That, however, is
an option the Forest Service in June virtually banned on many routes
at over 40 climbing areas. And uncertain retreats mean much more
dangerous climbing-if you're willing to go to these places at all."
In the Idaho Statesman, Armando Menocal recalled:
My skin still tingles when I recall our helplessness as the thunder and
flash of lightning struck simultaneously. My rock-climbing partner
and I had just reached the summit of a long climb in California's High
Sierra, when a fast-moving thunderstorm broke over us,
I yelled to my partner to start climbing down and gripped the rope that
would hold her if she fell. A short way down the back side, the moun-
tain became less steep, and we started to scramble toward the bottom,
unroped and unanchored.
But we hadn't counted on the hail. In moments, our escape route was
buried in slippery ball bearings. My metal climbing gear buzzed as I
put a nylon loop, or sling, around a rock jammed in a crack. We fed
our rope through the sling, then rappelled to safety."
Menocal continues:
That narrow escape was six years ago. Today, the experience would
be a federal crime: We had left the nylon sling around the chockstone,
an act the U.S. Forest Service now says defiles federally protected
wilderness. 2
In the Los Angeles Times, Edward Everett Vaill joined the pack:
The climber was nearing the top of a difficult rock-climbing route on
one of the polished granite domes above Tuolumne Meadows in the
high country of Yosemite. These routes are known for their long run-
outs-unprotected sections where the lead climber is in danger of a
long fall. The climber was 50 feet out from her last "protection," a
three-eighths-inch-wide expansion bolt and a two-inch-long bolt
hanger placed in the crackless face, to which her climbing rope was
secured through a snaplink called a carabiner. A 100-foot fall, which
climbers call a "screamer," was likely if she didn't find the next bolt.
Suddenly, like a golden nugget nestled in a stream bed, she spotted
the bolt and carefully climbed over and clipped her rope into it.
Breathing a huge sigh of relief, she thanked the climber who years be-
fore took the time to drill the hole for that bolt in the seamless face. 3
50. Id.
51. Armando Menocal, Restrictions on Climbers in Wilderness Go Too Far, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Aug. 24, 1998, at 9B.
52. Id.
53. Edward Everett Vaill, Environmental Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1998, at M5.
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Vail, predictably, continues by declaring that the Forest Service's deci-
sion on fixed anchors has made this sort of experience impossible or life
threatening.
The apparently spontaneous development of this genre of editorial
memoir during the summer of 1998 tells us something. These stormy,
sweaty polemics suggest that, for some people, the Forest Service bal-
ancing of the "wilderness resource" against rock climbing makes no
sense because rock climbing helps us satisfy the needs that lead us to
protect wilderness in the first place.
In August, James Lyons, Undersecretary of Agriculture, in charge
of the Forest Service, reversed the "no anchors" decision and announced
that the Forest Service would undertake a rulemaking on the subject."
The analysis and comment associated with that rulemaking, if and when
it happens, will contribute to developing a national consensus about what
wilderness is. George Nickas suggests the issue may finally be resolved
in federal court." Litigation will continue to shape our notion of wilder-
ness. In his article for this symposium, George Nickas identifies this pro-
cess of defining wilderness as a "step toward its enduring preservation."'
Nickas also, identifies many of the issues around which we will shape the
process of definition.
On October 9, 1998, U.S. District Court Judge Lawrence Kahn in
Albany, New York, applied the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)57
to wildlands-New York's "forever wild" Adirondack State Park. In
Galusha v. New York State Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion,8 Kahn ordered the state to issue special permits to use motorized
vehicles on roads in the wildlands park.' The ruling was the fruit of a
modest campaign by activists for the disabled to gain motorized access
to the Adirondacks. '
The Adirondacks State Park is not part of the Federal National Wil-
derness Preservation System and the presence of maintenance roads
would preclude much of it from being included in that system. Further,
Federal laws like the ADA preempt state laws like the ones protecting
the Adirondacks. Nonetheless, the question of disabled access to wilder-
54. See Richard, supra note 48, at F03.
55. See id.
56. George Nickas, Preserving an Enduring Wilderness: Challenges and Threats to the Na-
tional Wilderness Preservation System, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 449,449 (1999).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
58. 27 F. Supp.2d 117 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); see Police Conduct Requires Reversal of Convic-
tions, 220 N.Y. L.J. 73 (1998).
59. See Galusha, 27 F. Supp.2d at 125. Judge Kahn observed: "Given the state's extensive and
often unnecessary current use of motorized vehicles on Forest Preserve roads, extending necessary
motorized access to a limited number of persons with disabilities on those very same roads can
hardly be said to 'fundamentally' alter the Park program." Id.
60. See Disabled Seek to Expand Vehicle Use in State Park, BuFFALo NEws, Aug. 3, 1998, at A9.
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ness is another important issue about what wilderness is and how we can
satisfy our need for it. While no one would wish to deprive disabled peo-
ple of wilderness experience, the plaintiff, disabled Theodore Galusha,
and his six-wheel all terrain vehicle--"It'll go in water; it'll go up trees;
it'll go through trees-it'll go anywhere" 6-would send chills down the
spine of many wilderness advocates.
I could continue to catalogue the variety of significant issues that
touch on the 'meaning of wilderness, but the authors of the articles that
follow do a far better job of it than I could. My point is simple. We should
overcome our fear of talking about what wilderfhess is and begin an ener-
getic conversation to help solve a host of practical problems. Strikingly,
few of the authors in this symposium offer off-the-shelf solutions to the
problems associated with wilderness. Instead, they initiate a rich, multi-
layered discussion which may, eventually, lead toward solutions.
Even at this early point in the conversation, it doesn't take much
perception to realize that solutions to the problems wilderness raise may
exceed the bounds of the wilderness frame of reference. For example,
Robert Glicksman and George Coggins use wilderness as a springboard
to advocate a complete reorganization of federal land management agen-
cies-with a National Park and Wildlife Service to deal with preserva-
tion and recreation and a National Forest and Range Service to oversee
resource extraction.' The National Wilderness Preservation system is
big, but the conversation is bigger.
The wilderness we see shapes how we think about wilderness. Most
of the days I encounter Mt. Evans, on my bicycle, it looks like a moun-
tain. Occasionally, some demented turn of mind compels me to project
some other image upon it: the haunch of some enormous beast or the fin
of a rolling whale. But most often, on those days, I see a castle-a citadel
against the onslaught of human stupidity and insignificant human time.
The sturdier I perceive that citadel to be, the happier I am in my journey
across the transformed landscape of the city. I am still happy when my
path dips down toward the shopping center and the mountain disappears.
I cannot tell you why. But I am willing to talk about it.
61. LId.








Hunting in the wilderness is of all pastimes the most attractive, and it
is doubly so when not carried on merely as a pastime. Shooting over
a private game-preserve is of course in no way to be compared to it.'
Theodore Roosevelt, 1897
In the more than a century since Teddy Roosevelt reflected on its
value, wilderness has become a prized possession of the American public
and is now valued for a host of contributions, including utilitarian, cul-
tural, and conservation purposes.2 With wilderness now well established
as an American value thirty-five years after the passage of the Wilder-
ness Act of 1964,3 we enter the next century with the National Wilder-
ness Preservation System standing at over 104 million acres,' beyond the
wildest dreams of the early wilderness advocates.' The popularity of wil-
* Forest Ecologist, The Wilderness Society. B.S., University of California, Berkeley, in
Forestry; M.S., University of California, Berkeley, in Wildland Resource Science; Ph.D., Colorado
State University, in Forest Ecology.
1. Theodore Roosevelt, The American Wilderness: Wilderness Hunters and Wilderness
Game, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE 63, 74 (J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson
eds., 1998).
2. For detailed discussions of wilderness values, see JOHN C. HENDEE ET AL., WILDERNESS
MANAGEMENT 7-11 (2d. ed. rev. 1990); Michael McCloskey, The Meaning of Wilderness, in
MANAGING AMERICA'S ENDURING WILDERNESS RESOURCE 22, 22-25 (David W. Lime ed., 1990);
Michael P. Nelson, An Amalgamation of Wilderness Preservation Arguments, in THE GREAT NEW
WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note I, at 154, 156-93.
3. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994)).
4. Peter Landres and Shannon Meyer of the Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute in
Missoula, Montana, recently completed a comprehensive inventory of the National Wilderness
Preservation System and found it to contain 104,571,344 acres in 624 units in 44 states. See P.
LANDRES & S. MEYER, NATIONAL WILDERNESS PRESERVATION SYSTEM DATABASE: KEY
ATTRIBUTES AND TRENDS, 1964 THROUGH 1998, at 1, 9 (Forest Service General Technical Report,
RMRS-GTR-l 8, 1998).
5. Early in his career, Aldo Leopold wrote: "Several assumptions can be made at once with-
out argumenL First, such wilderness areas should occupy only a small fraction of the total National
Forest area--probably not to exceed one in each State. Second, only areas naturally difficult of
ordinary industrial development should be chosen." Aldo Leopold, The Wilderness and Its Place in
Forest Recreational Policy, 19 J. FORESTRY 718, 719 (1921). In 1935, Robert Marshall and Benton
MacKaye wrote in the founding platform of The Wilderness Society: "All we desire to save from
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derness continues to escalate, as poll after poll show that people want
more land protected as wilderness.'
Despite its popularity, wilderness has come under attack of late.
Some question whether wilderness is something real or simply a creation
of the human mind Others believe the idea of wilderness to perpetuate an
ultimately self-destructive separation of humans from nature, to ignore or
subjugate aboriginal people, and to assume stasis in natural ecosystems."
While most of the debate's antagonists do not criticize (indeed, they actu-
ally celebrate) wild places, they suggest that the time has come to move
beyond "the received wilderness idea!"9 to focus less on wilderness protec-
tion and more on sustaining the wildness that is all around us.
invasion is that extremely minor fraction of outdoor America which yet remains free from mechani-
cal sights and sounds and smells." About TWS, The Wilderness Society's Roots (visited Oct. 25,
1998) <http://www.wildemess.orglabouttws/history.htm> (emphasis added).
6. A July 1998 poll conducted for The Wilderness Society by the firm of Lake, Snell, Perry
& Associates demonstrated overwhelming support for wilderness protection. Two-thirds (67%) of
the 862 registered voters surveyed responded that they opposed the building of roads in national
parks or protected areas, especially if such development threatens the "wilderness character" of those
places. See The Wilderness Society--Eye on Washington (visited Nov. 6, 1998)
<http.//www.wilderness.orgtpoll.htm>. Where people are more familiar with wilderness, support
may be even higher. In Colorado, a June 1997 poll conducted for the League of Conservation Voters
showed that 80% of Colorado voters favor a proposal to protect about one-sixth of Colorado BLM
land as wilderness. See The Wilderness Society-Four Comers-Coloradans Support Wilderness
(visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.wildemess.orgtccc/fourcomerstpoll.htm>. The popularity of
wilderness preservation is also manifest worldwide. The Sixth World Wilderness Congress, held in
Bangalore, India, in 1998, examined and celebrated wilderness in its many forms around the globe.
See 6th World Wilderness Congress (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www.worldwilderness.org/
6/6a.html>.
7. Roderick Nash concluded: "There is no specific material object that is wilderness."
RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND I (3d ed. 1982). Environmental historian
William Cronon wrote: "Far from being the one place on earth that stands apart from humanity,
(wilderness] is quite profoundly a human creation-indeed, the creation of very particular human
cultures at very particular moments in human history." William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilder-
ness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: TOwARD REINVENTING
NATURE 69, 69 (William Cronon ed., 1995).
8. Wilderness philosophers J. Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson recently compiled a
broad array of previously published and original works into a book entitled The Great New Wilder-
ness Debate, which explores early conceptions of wilderness as well as more recent critiques and
rebuttals. It includes 39 different essays and provides virtual "one stop shopping" for diverse con-
ceptions of wilderness. See THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 1.
9. J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson, Introduction to THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS
DEBATE, supra note 1, at 1, 2. The "received wilderness idea" was coined by environmental phi-
losopher J. Baird Callicott to describe what he believes to be the essential notion of wilderness as
Americans understand it. See id. at 1-20. Callicott asserts that early wilderness thinkers handed
down a conception of wilderness in which pre-Columbian America is held to have been in a "totally
wilderness condition," and any alteration of that condition degrades "pristine nature." The only way
to protect nature, therefore, is to prevent its occupancy and use. Callicott believes this conception
separates people from nature, ignores aboriginal people, and holds nature static. This caricature
forms the basis of Callicott's and others' critiques of the wilderness idea; however, a more careful
reading of the early writers shows that they were well aware of many of the points raised by the
"new" critics. William Cronon stops short of such caricature but fears that
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Thus far, this reexamination of the wilderness idea has largely been
limited to academics and a few wilderness defenders, but the policy im-
plications are huge. The current attack on wilderness has the grave po-
tential to undermine support for the popular practice of wilderness pro-
tection. Alternatively, policies that embrace wilderness as "the place for
nature" risk devaluing nature outside of wilderness, ultimately dimin-
ishing our obligation to care for the earth as a whole.
Pundits impugn or defend wilderness from widely divergent under-
standings of the term. Critics attack wilderness as the figment of an im-
perialistic, misogynistic imagination; defenders point to the one hundred
plus million acres in the National Wilderness Preservation System as
undeniable proof of the validity of the construct. But both sides miss a
critical point: wilderness is neither simply an idea nor a place. It is a
place where an idea is clearly expressed-the idea of wildness. The Wil-
derness Act seeks to identify and protect those lands on the federal estate
where wildness is best expressed.' Critics seek to ensure that nonwilder-
ness wildness is appreciated wherever it is expressed. In an effort to
bridge the chasm that has developed between the critics and defenders of
wilderness, this Essay examines the qualities of a place that confer wild-
ness and explores some of the implications of treating wildness as a
quality best expressed in the places we call wilderness, but also infused
in special places closer to home.
I. WILDERNESS VERSUS WILDNESS
I believe that mistaking wilderness for wildness is one cause of our
increasing failure to preserve the wild earth . . . we are confused
about what Thoreau meant by wildness, we aren't sure what we mean
by wildness, and we aren't clear how or what wildness preserves."
Jack Turner, 1986
There is an interesting contrast between the words wilderness and
wildness brought to light by Thoreau's most famous observation, "in
Wildness is the preservation of the World."'2 Often misquoting or appro-
priating it as "in Wilderness,"'3 the conservation community has not been
bothered by the difference, for it has been easy enough to reconcile the
two: wilderness is wild; therefore, preserving wilderness preserves the
wilderness embodies a dualistic vision in which the human is entirely outside the natural.
If we allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild, then our very
presence in nature represents its fall... . We thereby leave ourselves little hope of dis-
covering what an ethical, sustainable, honorable human place in nature might actually
look like.
Cronon, supra note 7, at 80-81.
10. See Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
11. JACK TuRNER, TE ABsTRAcr WiLD 81 (1996).
12. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walking, in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 592, 609 (Carl Bode ed.,
1977).
13. For a discussion of the clich6 usage of "wilderness," instead of "wildness, " see TURNER,
supra note 11, at 92.
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world. But Turner, a philosopher, makes a good point: wilderness is a
place; wildness is a quality. They are not equivalent, yet we have allowed
them to be confused.
This confusion would pose no problem if what Thoreau had meant
was that wilderness was the place of wildness, but this was not exactly
his intent. Instead, Thoreau intended to point out the wildness in all
things. As Jack Turner observes in The Abstract Wild:
Thoreau understood wildness as a quality: wild nature, wild
men, wild friends, wild dreams, wild house cats, and wild literature.
He associated it with other qualities: the good, the holy, the free. In-
deed, he equated it with life itself. By freedom he meant not rights
and liberties, but the autonomous and self-willed; and by life, not
mere existence, but vitality and life force.
14
An alternative expression of this notion is offered by the poet Gary Sny-
der in his book, The Practice of the Wild, a book Jack Turner considers
the only serious treatment of the relationship between nature, wildness,'
and wilderness:
[W]ildness is not limited to the 2 percent formal wilderness areas.
Shifting scales, it is everywhere: ineradicable populations of fungi,
moss, mold, yeasts, and such that surround and inhabit us. Deer mice
on the back porch, deer bounding across the freeway, pigeons in the
park, spiders in the corners.... Wilderness may temporarily dwindle,
but wildness won't go away. 5
If wildness is a quality infused in all things, not just wilderness, how
do we distinguish between wilderness and nonwilderness? Here, for the
moment, we are on familiar ground: wilderness consists of those places
that are most wild. As Gary Snyder says, wilderness is "a place where
the wild potential is fully expressed."'" Historically, we have sought rules
to help us make this determination-section 1131 (c) of the Wilderness
Act provides the most familiar set:
[Amn area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval charac-
ter and influence, without permanent improvements or human habita-
tion, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural
conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work sub-
stantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude
or a primitive and unconfimed type of recreation; (3) has at least five
14. See id. at 107.
15. GARY SNYDER, The Etiquette of Freedom, in TiE PRACTICE OF THE WILD 3, 14-15
(1990).
16. Id. at 12. Snyder's use of the term "fully expressed" suggests that he might view wilder-
ness as an absolute condition. Elsewhere, however, he reveals that his true sentiments are just the
opposite: wilderness exists in relative opposition to development. See infra text accompanying note
45.
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thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable
its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also
contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educa-
tional, scenic, or historical value.
7
The Wilderness Act was the result of debate and compromise that
took place over more than eight years." It defines wilderness as an area
of federal land larger than 5,000 acres with no people or artificial struc-
tures and providing outstanding recreation or other values. 9 This pro-
vides a political/legal definition that can be used to identify places that
qualify for wilderness designation under the Act, but it still does not di-
rectly address the question: "What are the qualities of a place that make
it wild?"
To begin to answer this question, one may start with a dictionary.
The American Heritage Dictionary defines wild as "occurring, growing,
or living in a natural state; not domesticated, cultivated or tamed."' This
is consistent with Gary Snyder's observation that "[w]ild is largely de-
fined in our dictionaries by what-from a human standpoint-it is not
[e.g., wild land is uninhabited and uncultivated]."2' Others have described
wilderness as "unkempt,"' "unconfined, ' . "self-willed,"' and "outside
of human control"-in other words, free.
Freedom, an essential ingredient of wildness and an essential quality
of wilderness, was beautifully captured by the drafters of the Wilderness
Act in the word "untrammeled."' This obscure word, which has come to
be almost synonymous with wilderness, does not mean "untrampled
upon," as is commonly misunderstood; instead, it means unshackled,
allowed to run free.27
But what does it mean for land to be "untrammeled?" The image of
land in shackles does not easily come to mind. Environmental historian
Michael Cohen writes, "I am troubled by the term 'untrammeled.' At
what point have we caught and trapped the wilderness? I would presume
that a process of capturing or trapping begins when men try to 'open out
17. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. §1131(c) (1994).
18. See Mark Woods, Federal Wilderness Preservation in the United States, in THE GREAT
NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 1, at 131, 149 n.2.
19. See Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. §1131(c).
20. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2041 (3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE].
21. SNYDER, sUpra note 15, at 9.
22. NASH, supra note 7, at 47.
23. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC at xi (1966).
24. TURNER, supra note 11, at I 11.
25. REED Noss, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND CANADA, MAINTAINING ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY IN
REPRESENTATIVE RESERVE NETWORKS 27 (1995).
26. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1994).
27. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1960 (3d ed.
1992).
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routes' among the mountains."' Thus, the construction of roads dimin-
ishes the freedom of the land, but there are other ways. By extinguishing
lightning-caused fires, eliminating keystone predators, damming rivers,
tilling soil, and other more subtle actions, we have brought vast parts of
the landscape under human control or influence. Indeed, our very pres-
ence in large numbers diminishes the freedom of the land, as we inevita-
bly put it to use for our purposes (e.g., transportation, recreation, hy-
giene). With air pollution and climate change altering basic ecological
processes and modem transportation extending human reach to the most
distant comers of the earth, it is clear that absolute freedom of the land
no longer exists; all we have left is relatively free land.
For some, freedom is the key quality of wilderness. The postmodern
philosopher Jack Turner believes that anything we do as humans to in-
tervene in wilderness diminishes its wildness:
Why not work to set aside vast areas where we limit all forms of
human influence: no conservation strategies, no designer wilderness,
no roads, no trails, no satellite surveillance, no over-flights with heli-
copters, no radio collars, no measuring devices, no photographs, no
GPS data, no databases stuffed with the location of every draba of the
summit of Mt. Moran, no guidebooks, no topographical maps. Let
whatever habitat we can preserve go back to its own self-order as
much as possible. Let wilderness again become a blank on our maps.2
To authors like Turner, it is the expression of the will of the land ("its
own self order"), not the will of people, that confers wildness; the essen-
tial requirement of wilderness is that it be set free."
28. MICHAEL P. COHEN, THE PATHLESS WAY: JOHN Mum AND AMERICAN WILDERNESS 86
(1984).
29. TuRNER, supra note 11, at 120.
30. Id. In 1930, Robert Marshall wrote: "There is just one hope of repulsing the tyrannical
ambition of civilization to conquer every niche on the whole earth. That hope is the organization of
spirited people who will fight for the freedom of the wilderness." Robert Marshall, The Problem of
the Wilderness, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note i, at 85, 95-96. Though
Marshall may have been referring to the will of the land in this case, much of his concern with
wilderness protection was to ensure that there would always be places in which people could be free.
In a famous passage from Walking, Thoreau says, "I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute
freedom and wildness, as contrasted with a freedom and culture merely civil .... THOREAu, supra
note 12, at 592. The Romantics of the nineteenth century championed wilderness as a place to escape
the stranglehold of civilization. Roderick Nash notes: "[Wilderness] not only offered an escape from
society but also was an ideal stage for the Romantic individual to exercise the cult that he frequently
made of his own soul. The solitude and total freedom of the wilderness created a perfect setting for
either melancholy or exultation." NASH, supra note 7, at 47. Throughout the history of the idea,
wilderness as a place in which to be free has been a recurrent value. In contrast, the Wilderness Act
speaks of wilderness as "an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by
man," suggesting that it is the land itself that is the object of the verb. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16
U.S.C. § 1131(c). While wilderness will remain highly valued as a place where people can be free, it
is this second sense, the freedom of the land itself, that is the focus here.
In a spirited rejoinder to the postmodemist attack on wilderness, Marvin Henberg writes:
"Whatever final form a pancultural view of wilderness takes as it is negotiated among nonauthori-
ON THE NATURE OF WILDNESS
Taking this to the extreme, it would seem that any land, set free,
would be wilderness. The most burned-out inner city tenement could be
wilderness if set free. This, of course, does not match any but the most
eccentric definitions of wilderness. The essential quality of wilderness
missing from this definition is something best described as "naturalness."
This notion recurs in all discussions of wilderness throughout time, even
those, like Turner's, that stress freedom as the essential quality.'
Natural, primitive, pristine, presettlement. These words have been
associated with wilderness since the dawn of the idea. Even the diction-
ary cited above identifies "a natural state" as integral to the definition of
"wild."32 Generally, natural has two connotations. First, it can mean an
intact biota, as in "the community of life untrammeled by man" that ap-
pears in the Wilderness Act.3 Ecologist Reed Noss defines natural as
"the condition of a landscape before substantial alteration by modem
human activity."' This meaning is comparable to that of Gary Snyder
when he says: "To speak of wilderness is to speak of wholeness." '3
The other connotation of "natural" is the lack of human modifica-
tion, as in Bob Marshall's reference to conditions that "preserve as nearly
as possible the essential features of the primitive environment."3 The
Wilderness Act referred to wilderness as being "in contrast with those
areas where man and his works dominate the landscape."37 Whether it is
the presence of intact ecosystems or the absence of human imprint, the
quality of naturalness is critical to ideas of wildness and wilderness.
The first definition of natural offered by the American Heritage
Dictionary is "[p]resent in or produced by nature,"38 meaning not artifi-
cial or man-made. As many philosophers have noted over the years,
however, people themselves are natural, and therefore, so are their prod-
ucts. Even wilderness philosopher and poet Gary Snyder prefers to think
of nature as "[t]he physical universe and all its properties."" Conceiving
of nature as simply the absence of man is problematic, especially given
the important role that aboriginal people have played in shaping the
composition and structure of some ecosystems.40
tarian cultures, I believe freedom will be its ultimate value. For nonhuman life, freedom can only be
based on the spontaneity of wildness." Marvin Henberg, Pancultural Wilderness, in WILD IDEAS 59,
68-69 (David Rothenberg ed., 1995).
31. See TURNER, supra note 11, at I11.
32. AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 20, at 204 1.
33. Wilderness Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
34. Noss, supra note 25, at 27.
35. SYNDER, supra note 15, at 12.
36. ROBERT MARSHALL, THE PEOPLE'S FORESTS 177-78 (1933).
37. Wilderness Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (c).
38. AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 20, at 1204.
39. SNYDER, supra note 15, at 9.
40. William Denevan attacks the idea of wilderness for failing to acknowledge the extensive
influence of indigenous people in North America through hunting, burning, agriculture, and con-
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Defining natural as the condition of North America at the time of
European settlement has also been criticized, since ecosystems are dy-
namic and are constantly changing." Though the Yellowstone fires of
1988 were not unnatural, there can be no disputing that Yellowstone in
1989 was a much different place than it was over a century earlier when
it was established as a national park. The dynamic character of ecosys-
tems makes it difficult to identify a particular state called "natural."
Despite these criticisms, the need to describe naturalness persists.
The National Park Service Organic Act requires the National Park Serv-
ice "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and wild
life therein," 2 and the Wilderness Act requires that wilderness be "pro-
tected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions."'3 These two
mandates require that the definition of naturalness not merely be the
subject of academic debate; managers on the ground have been charged
with its protection and need a meaningful definition.
Wilderness ecologist David Cole of the U.S. Forest Service has ex-
plored the naturalness mandate of the Wilderness Act and concluded that
it provides conflicting direction. On the one hand, natural conditions may
struction. See William Denevan, The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in 1492, in THE
GREAT NEw WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 1, at 414, 414-16. Callicott takes this information to
what he believes to be its logical conclusion:
Since Darwin's Origin of Species and Descent of Man... we have known that man is a
part of nature .... If man is a natural, a wild, an evolving species, not essentially different
in this respect from all the others .... the works of man, however precocious, are as natu-
ral as those of beavers, or termites, or any of the other species that dramatically modify
their habitats.
J. Baird Callicott, The Wilderness Idea Revisited: The Sustainable Development Alternative, in THE
GREAT NEw WLDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 1, at 337, 350. In rebuttal, philosopher Holmes
Rolston argues:
Not so... because the human presence is so radically different, humans ought to draw
back and let nature be. Humans can and should see outside their own sector, their species
self-interest, and affirm nonanthropogenic, noncultural values. Only humans have con-
science enough to do this.... To think that human culture is nothing but natural system is
not discriminating enough.
Holmes Rolston El, The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE,
supra note 1, at 367, 369. Based on his research on the historical ecology of Yosemite National Park,
geographer Thomas Vale simply rejects the myth of the humanized landscape:
Village sites were substantially humanized by the everyday life of Indians; groves of oaks
or stands of bracken fern may have been modified in form or extent, for variable lengths
of time, by native peoples; some areas of low-elevation meadows and forests could have
been altered by Miwok burning, although lightning fires seem adequate to account for the
pre-European fire regime; the middle and higher elevations, by contrast, were changed
only superficially by native peoples. Even given the most generous interpretation of what
was "humanized," much of the park was "natural"--in the sense that its landscape char-
acteristics were determined by natural processes.
Thomas Vale, The Myth of the Humanized Landscape: An Example from Yosemite National Park, 18
NAT. AREAs J. 231,234 (1998).
41. See Vale, supra note 40, at 231.
42. National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, ch. 408, § 1, 39 Stat. 535, 535 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)).
43. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
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be thought of as untrammeled or unmanipulated; on the other, natural
conditions may be thought of as a "pristineness" or "what would have
existed in the absence of post-aboriginal humans." The Wilderness Act
is clear in providing both natural and untrammeled conditions as goals
for wilderness. Cole argues that when naturalness is defined as both un-
trammeled and pristine, conflicts arise, as manipulation is needed to re-
pair damage caused by overuse, exotic species invasions, and fire exclu-
sion. If, however, untrammeled is equated with freedom from human
control, then natural can be defined independently as pristine or "preset-
tlement."
Unfortunately, defining natural as pristine does not address the
problem of dynamism in ecosystems. If ecosystems are dynamic, then
any presettlement date, such as 1492, is an arbitrary reference point. In-
stead, natural conditions have to be described as the range of conditions,
or bounded behavior, of ecosystems over a period of time during which
the major factors controlling those ecosystems (i.e., climate, organisms,
soils, and disturbance) remained relatively constant. In North America,
this amounts to the two thousand or so years prior to the arrival of mod-
em technological man. In other parts of the world, where aboriginal
technologies continue to exert their traditional influences, ecosystems
may remain natural even in the presence of significant human popula-
tion. It is the bounded condition of ecosystems, dynamic and in the pres-
ence of aboriginal man, that we may consider "natural" or "pristine."
Again, as is the case with freedom, the effects of pollution, recent ex-
tinction, and widespread species introductions assure that no place re-
mains truly pristine, only relatively so.
Thus, it is possible to conceive of wildness as increasing in two di-
mensions: from the controlled to the "self-willed" along a gradient of
freedom, and from the artificial to the pristine along a gradient of natu-
ralness (Fig. 1). At the most controlled and artificial ends of the spectra
are the least wild lands-the built environment of the city. Where free-
dom and naturalness are highest is the wilderness. In between, lands can
possess any combination of freedom and naturalness and intermediate
wildness. For example, Washington D.C.'s C&O Canal would have to
44. David N. Cole, Ecological Manipulation in Wilderness: An Emerging Management Di-
lemma, INT'L J. WILDERNESS, May 1996, at 15, 15 (1996). Cole is not alone in equating "natural" and
"untrammeled." In a recent review of the implementation of the Wilderness Act, Mark Woods writes:
For the sake of brevity, I shall call the existence of naturalness in wilderness, as legally
interpreted, the untrammeled condition of wilderness. The term "untrammeled" is a less
precise way to say that wilderness areas are undeveloped "without permanent improve-
ments or human habitation" that retain a "primeval character and influence."
Mark Woods, Federal Wilderness Preservation in the United States: The Preservation of Wilder-
ness?, in THE GREAT NEW AMERICAN WILDERNESS, supra note 1, at 131, 135. Thomas Vale agrees:
"A landscape can be labeled pristine, or natural, or 'in a wilderness condition' if the fundamental
characteristics of vegetation, wildlife, landform, soil, hydrology, and climate are those that result
from natural, nonhuman processes, and if these conditions would exist whether or not humans are
present" Vale, supra note 40, at 232.
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rate low on the scale of naturalness; it is an artificial waterway choked
with exotic species. Nevertheless, it receives little direct manipulation
and functions according to its own-now artificial-processes. It, there-
fore, may be said to be free from control and, therefore, more wild than
the city.
p 1
C& 0 Canal Chesape Arctic
Bay




o Downtown lantation Prairie
Artificial Pristine
Naturalness
FIGURE 1. WILDNESS IS A FUNCTION OF BOTH FREEDOM AND NATURALNESS
In contrast, Curtis Prairie is a restored prairie patch at the University
of Wisconsin arboretum. Because it consists almost entirely of native
species on native prairie soils, it can be thought of as highly natural. On
the other hand, it is under the direct control of arboretum staff. Seed dis-
persal is a human function, and the fires that maintain species composi-
tion are set and controlled by people. Curtis Prairie is not "self-willed"
and is, therefore, not as wild as wilderness. For different reasons, both
the C&O Canal and Curtis Prairie are more wild than the city but less
wild than wilderness. All lands fall somewhere along this two-
dimensional continuum of wildness.
Examples abound of places that we think of as wild that are under
some degree of control. The flow of water through the Everglades is
controlled by a massive artificial plumbing system. The Colorado River
through the Grand Canyon is controlled by Glen Canyon Dam. Many of
our national wildlife refuges maintain rare wetlands in agricultural land-
scapes through the artificial impoundment of water. Indeed, the increas-
ingly popular practice of ecological restoration is a matter of bringing a
landscape under tighter control in order to increase its naturalness (Fig.
2). Ideally, once naturalness is restored, a landscape can be released to
function on its own, but in many cases, restoring naturalness will require
continuous control.
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FIGURE 2. WILDNESS WILL CHANGE As FREEDOM AND NATURALNESS INCREASE
OR DECREASE
HI. WILDERNESS VERSUS WILD LANDS
So, we have identified freedom from control and naturalness to be
the primary determinants of wildness. But we have also recognized that
wildness permeates all places and beings. How, then, do we recognize
wilderness, and how do we identify other wild lands if they are not the
same as wilderness? The answer is that these classes are marked by
points on a continuum of wildness; from exclusively crafted and tame, to
raw wilderness. This idea of wilderness as one end of a continuum of
wildness is a recurrent theme among wilderness thinkers. As Gary Sny-
der explains:
Every region has its wilderness. There is the fire in the kitchen,
and there is the place less traveled. In most settled regions there used
to be some combination of prime agricultural land, orchard and vine
land, rough pasturage, woodlot, forest, and desert or mountain
"4waste." The de facto wilderness was the extreme backcountry part of
all that. The parts less visited are "where the bears are." 'Me wilder-
ness is within walking distance-it may be three days or it may be
ten. It is at the far high rough end, or the deep forest and swamp end,
of the territory where most of you all live and work. People will go
there for mountain herbs, for the trapline, or for solitude. They live
between the poles of home and their own wild places .4
Thus, it is clear that wilderness represents one end of a continuum
of wildness. Wilderness encompasses those places on the landscape that
are most wild. In this context, rules for identifying wilderness become
more problematic, and a debate ensues over the minimum criteria for
wilderness. The history of this question suggests that the answers are
45. GARY SNYDER, The Place, the Region, and the Commowns, in THE PRAMTCE OF THE WILD,
supra note 15, at 25, 28
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complex. Arguments over purity standards, sufficient size, etc. continue.
Also, history shows that minimum criteria for wilderness are context
dependent. The battle over eastern wilderness on the national forests
showed that wilderness is valued wherever it occurs, even if the criteria
change depending on land use history and societal expectations.' It
would be unwise to try to resolve the debate here; all that can be said is
that wilderness occurs at the most wild end of the land spectrum.
But, what about nonwilderness wild lands? Given the continuum,
how can we draw a line between wild land and nonwild land? Arthur
Carhart, one of the icons of the wilderness movement, answered the
question this way:
[P]hysically "wildlands" begin wherever we face away from the man-
dominated landscape of farm, town, city, or any landscape grossly
modified by human occupancy maintained for any purpose. From this
spot the wildlands extend in graduated degrees of lessening human
influence in the natural landscape, outward, to reach their type climax
in the wilderness. Thus the term "wildlands" is more than a synonym
for the term "wilderness"; wildlands are the wilderness plus all the
surrounding lands that lie between genuine wilderness, as exemplified
by the totally natural landscape, and those landscapes where man's
control and manipulations are immediately evident.7
For the moment let it suffice that, in general terms, we all know
what "wilderness" means. It is land lacking permanent facilities and
conveniences of any kind needed for human occupancy. Its natural
attributes remain practically undisturbed by transient and imperma-
nent human visitations. Wilderness should be readily classified by
most of us as the wildest sort of country in the entire gamut of areas
that might be called wildlands. There is no "wilder" wildland to be
classified as beyond the ultimate wilderness.
Now, where can you draw a line across a map or landscape, so on
one side are wildlands and on the other are lands that should be called
rural or urban? How much must someone have dug, plowed, axed,
graded or otherwise imposed his works on land that was wild before
the "wild" environment has been tamed?
46. Congress specifically included lands in the eastern United States in the National Wilder-
ness Preservation System that did not meet the standards for wilderness described in the Wilderness
Act of 1964. Congress through this action, known most commonly as the Eastern Wilderness Act,
stated its intent that the most wild federal lands of the East be included in the wilderness system,
even though they were small and had experienced significant human impact. See Act of Jan. 3, 1975,
Pub. L. No. 93-622, 88 Stat. 2096 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994)). For a detailed history of the
fight for eastern wilderness, see DENNIS M. ROTH, THE WILDERNESS MOVEMENT AND THE
NATIONAL FORESTS: 1964-1980, at 38-48 (Forest Service History Series No. 391, 1984).
47. ARTHURH. CARHART, PLANNINGFORAMERICA'SWILDLANDS 1(1961).
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Until we need a more exact definition, we may use something like
this as our rule-of-thumb in deciding which may be wildland and
which is not:
Wildland would be a portion of the earth's surface on which it is
readily evident that the topography and ecological associations living
thereon exist in relationships determined predominantly by natural
laws and forces.4
Carhart was a very practical man. The poet Gary Snyder explained it this
way:
Between the extremes of deep wilderness and the private plots
of the farmstead lies a territory which is not suitable for crops. In ear-
lier times it was used jointly by the members of a given tribe or vil-
lage. This area, embracing both the wild and the semi-wild, is of criti-
cal importance. It is necessary for the health of the wilderness be-
cause it adds big habitat, overflow territory, and room for wildlife to
fly and run. It is essential even to an agricultural village economy be-
cause its natural diversity provides the many necessities and ameni-
ties that the privately held plots cannot.49
This continuum of wildness can be represented as bands across the
two-dimensional space created by freedom and naturalness (Fig. 3).
Where freedom and naturalness are low, we find the "man-dominated
landscapes of farm, town, [and] city.'"" Beyond these areas are the lands,
from semi-wild to wilderness, that are highly natural, free, or both. As
with the line between wilderness and nonwilderness, the line between
wild land and nonwild land is inexact and context-dependent but is nev-
ertheless meaningful.
Thus, it is safe to say that parking lots and laser-leveled fields are
not wild lands; however, mountains are. But, what about city parks, rural
woodlots, and ski areas? This question raises the issue of scale. Wild
places are recognizable only in the context of a larger whole, and which
lands we recognize as wild depends on the scale of analysis, or the size
of the landscape being considered. As Gary Snyder observes, in every
region, no matter what the size, "[tihere is the fire in the kitchen, and
there is the place less traveled."sI Every landscape, whether urban, rural,
or remote, will have its places where, as Carhart says, "[we] face away
from the man-dominated landscape."'"5 These are the wild lands and they
are valued for their wild character wherever they occur.
48. Id. at 15-16.
49. SNYDER, supra note 15, at 30.
50. CARHART, supra note 47, at 19.
51. SNYDER, supra note 15, at 28.
52. CARHART, supra note 47, at 19.
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FIGURE 3. WILD LANDS ARE FOUND ALONG THE CONTINUUM OF WILDNESS
WHEREVER WE FACE AWAY FROM THE MAN-DOMINATED LANDSCAPE
In his 1997 speech accepting The Wilderness Society's (TWS)
highest honor, the Robert Marshall Award, author and TWS Governing
Council member Tom Barron described the importance of these places:
My guess is that every one of us is here today, doing whatever
we can to protect wilderness, because at some point in our lives we
discovered a strikingly wild place-both on the land and in ourselves.
It could have been a canyon, a marsh, an alpine meadow, or a simple
tuft of moss clinging to a stone. For me, I think, it was an old ponder-
osa pine tree that grew beside a steep-walled creek on my parents'
ranch in Colorado.53
He then proceeded to recount the story of Kate, the heroine of his book
The Ancient One,' who found shelter and communion in the hollowed-
out heart of an ancient tree, inspired by that old ponderosa pine." After
the story, he continued:
I share with you this little story of a youngster and a tree, and the
passage it inspired, because I know that each of you have been
touched by a place like that in your own past. I have often wondered
what a gash would have been torn in my life if that old ponderosa had
been cut down for another telephone pole, or if that land had been
paved over for another shopping mall.
That spot would never have qualified as a national park, let alone
as designated wilderness. Already, it has been surrounded by shop-
53. T.A. Barron, A Passion for Wild Places, Address at the Robert Marshall Award Dinner,
Springdale, Utah (Sept. 18, 1997), transcription available at (visited Oct. 29, 1998)
<http:l/www/wilderness.orgprofiles/barronspeech.htm>.
54. T.A. BARRON, THE ANCIENT ONE (1992).
55. See id.
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ping malls. Yet, not so very long ago, it still possessed enough wild-
ness to qualify, for one youngster at least, as a sacred place.,
Wilderness scholar Michael Frome puts it this way: "[L]arge areas
are desirable, but wilderness embraces a sample of the primitive in any
degree. It may be as small as one's backyard or a clump of wild plants
and grass that provide a feel for the original landscape."57 Frome uses the
term wilderness as we would use wild land, but the point is the same-
the wild can be experienced anywhere. The recognition of the role of
scale allows for variability in the way people perceive wildness in the
landscape without diminishing the importance of large wilderness areas.
The ever-practical Carhart explains:
[T]here are several gradations from the absolute wilderness, toward
the semi-suburban picnic zone of our wildlands, that can deliver to
many people approximately the full impact of the absolute wilderness.
These zones in wildland classifications may have in them old wagon
roads, dilapidated sawmill structures, abandoned mines, even fresh
jeep tracks and still supply many people a true wilderness experi-
58ence.
Aldo Leopold recognized the importance of scale when he wrote,
"[W]ilderness exists in all degrees, from the little accidental wild spot at
the head of a ravine in a Corn Belt woodlot to vast expanses of virgin
country.... Wilderness is a relative condition." 9
Figure 4 illustrates this sentiment by showing that the wild land
continuum does not exist only at the scale of large landscapes from city
to wilderness. Within the portion of the land that we call rural are land
uses ranging from agribusiness to ranch. We may determine that tilled or
developed land is not wild, but that a large ranch is. Even on the nonwild
farm landscape, land can range from developed home-sites to unculti-
vated pasture and forest. Within this landscape, these uncultivated areas
provide a glimpse of the natural and free and are highly prized for their
wildness.
56. Id.
57. MICHAELFROME, BATn FOR THE WILDERNESS 12 (rev. ed. 1997).
58. CARHART, supra note 47, at 39-40.
59. Aldo Leopold, Wilderness As a Form of Land Use, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS
DEBATE, supra note 1, at 75, 77.
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FIGURE 4. AT EVERY SCALE, THERE EXIST WILD LANDS AND NONWILD LANDs
III. WILDERNESS: IDEAL OR REAL?
So far, this Essay has argued that two qualities, freedom and natural-
ness, contribute to the wildness of any piece of land and that wilderness
exists at the most wild end of the continuum of wildness in any land-
scape, at any scale. This may help clarify the meaning of wilderness, but
it does not address one of the main criticisms of wilderness: that it is an
idea, rather than a place. The question remains as to whether any actual
place can be considered wilderness.
The notion that wilderness is an idea more than a place is often cred-
ited to historian Roderick Nash, who opens his seminal and classic work,
Wilderness and the American Mind: "Wilderness has a deceptive con-
creteness at first glance. The difficulty is that while the word is a noun it
acts like an adjective. There is no specific material object that is wilder-
ness." Almost thirty years after Nash, Max Oelschlaeger devoted 477
60. NASH, supra note 7, at 1. Interestingly, Nash notes in the preface to the third edition that
his idea to write on wilderness was not originally well-received by the academic establishment:
Assuming, quite logically, that wilderness had nothing to do with man, Professor Curti
gently suggested I consider reorienting my graduate program to geology or biology. But
we continued to talk, concluding that if wilderness was a state of mind-a perceived
rather than an actual condition of the environment-why not write a history of the wil-
derness idea?
Id. at ix. It thus appears that Nash's most famous contribution to wilderness scholarship (that wil-
derness is an idea) was a prerequisite condition of his approval to write on the subject, not a finding
derived from his substantial research.
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pages of philosophical discourse to the idea of wilderness."' Indeed, that
wilderness is as much a matter of experience as it is a physical place has
been a recurrent theme in wilderness literature. To Thoreau, walking and
the "certain roughness of character" it produced were as important as the
character of the wilderness itself.2 Bob Marshall sought "physical inde-
pendence" in a "harsh environment,"'6 while Sigurd Olson pursued
"sweat and toil, hunger and thirst, and the fierce satisfaction that only
comes with hardship."' Nature writer David Quammen was extolling the
experiential, rather than the physical, aspects of wildness when he wrote:
"Wildness ... inheres in any geographical or emotional context that re-
mains unpolluted by absolute safety and certainty." Even Theodore
Roosevelt, in the quotation that opened this Essay, was celebrating the
experience of hunting in wilderness, rather than the land itself.'
Thus, there is clearly an experiential component to wildness. Differ-
ent people will experience the landscape in different ways. Some may
experience wilderness in a landscape marked by human presence. For
others, freedom and naturalness can only be experienced on much larger
scales. Jack Turner dismisses the wildness of all of North America out-
side of Alaska and Canada.' Michael Frome sees wilderness in a clump
of grass." This kind of subjectivity creates problems for anyone trying to
identify wilderness or wild lands on the ground. There is no question that
experiences of adventure, danger, surprise, spiritual renewal, and other
values are cherished aspects of wilderness, but as we have seen, there is
also a tangible aspect to wildness, inherent in the land itself, that can be
observed and objectively described. As Michael Frome notes, "While the
state of wilderness exists in the mind, it does so only to the degree it ex-
ists somewhere on the ground. It becomes worthy of description as wil-
derness because of its character, not because of any particular purpose it
serves."' This realization is critical to our understanding of wilderness.
Wilderness is clearly not simply an idea. It is a place-a place where an
idea is clearly expressed: the idea of wildness.
61. See MAX OELSCHLAEGER, THE IDEA OF WILDERNESS: FROM PREHISTORY TO THE AGE OF
ECOLOGY (1991) (tracing the story and idea of wilderness through the ages with reference to the
current "age of ecology").
62. THOREAU, supra note 12, at 596-97.
63. Marshall, supra note 30, at 88.
64. Sigurd Olson, Why Wilderness?, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 1,
at97, 100.
65. DAVID QUAMmEN, WILD THOUGHTS FROM WILD PLACES 12 (1998).
66. See Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 74.
67. See TURNER, supra note 11, at 84 ("Why isn't our wilderness wild, and why is there so
little experience of wildness there? Well, first of all, the wilderness that most people visit (with the
exception of Alaska and Canada) is too small-in space and time.").
68. FROME, supra note 57, at 12.
69. Id. at 11.
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The recognition of wilderness as one end of a continuum of wild-
ness at many scales, has profound implications for how we view wilder-
ness. It has been said that when the first Europeans reached North
America, they encountered a vast unsettled continent: "wilderness coast
to coast." In fact it was not. It was already inhabited by people who, in
some places, greatly modified their surroundings in order to control the
land. But it was a continent with far fewer people than it now has, using
technologies far less capable of dramatic and widespread ecosystem
modification. In the past 500 years, we have inverted the relationship
between wild and nonwild land along the continuum. What was once a
sea of wilderness dotted with islands of development has become a de-
veloped sea supporting a beleaguered archipelagoes of wild lands of
various sizes. The rate of the assault is reflected in the growing lexicon
describing the invasion of development into the remaining wilderness:
"suburbia," "exurbia," "wild land-urban intermix." The popularity of
wilderness protection reflects a growing concern over the loss of the wild
places all around us.
The upshot of this inversion is that the wild end of the continuum is
now increasingly less common in many landscapes and increasingly val-
ued for what it provides. The so-called Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975
was pathbreaking in its explicit recognition that wilderness exists relative
to its surroundings." It identified the most wild federal lands of the highly
developed eastern United States as wilderness. The implications are far
reaching. While the Wilderness Act and its regulations will still guide
what may be designated a wilderness area on large federal land holdings,
the Eastern .Wilderness Act established the philosophical underpinnings
for the recognition of other federal and non-federal wild lands as wilder-
ness. Wilderness no longer needs to be thought of only as vast tracts in a
distant land; it may be found much closer to home in the wildest parts of
any landscape.
The Eastern Wilderness Act also recognized a temporal dimension
to wildness. Many of the lands designated in that law had been highly
modified agricultural landscapes a century earlier. Through their release
from agriculture, they recovered aspects of both naturalness and freedom
from control that led to their recognition as wilderness. Thus, it has been
established that some degree of wildness can be restored, which opens
the philosophical door to the long-term recovery of wilderness ecosys-
tems on degraded lands. The ability to restore wildness has the potential
to inspire a change in wild land conservation from hopeless defense
against development's onslaught to the vigorous assembly of a sustain-
able nationwide network of wild lands.
70. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Recognizing wildness as a two-dimensional continuum also im-
proves understanding of a long-standing controversy in wilderness man-
agement. Some have argued that wilderness management is an oxymo-
ron; that is, land cannot be both managed and free and therefore, cannot
be both managed and wilderness. However, the twin qualities of wilder-
ness, rather than providing conflicting goals, provide twin goals for wil-
derness management that must be approached simultaneously. This will
involve tradeoffs and compromise, but these tradeoffs need not be
viewed as unmanageable conflicts.
Primarily, wilderness management aims to minimize human impacts
by managing people, not the land, to keep the land free and functioning
according to its own rules. This can be done by managing the number
and distribution of people and their behavior in wilderness. Secondarily,
managers may need to intervene to repair damaged ecosystems and re-
store naturalness. Very often, this involves compromising freedom to
restore or maintain naturalness. Decisions to intervene on behalf of natu-
ralness must take into account the relative reversibility of the results of
action and inaction, the sustainability of resulting conditions, and the
long-term impact of intervention on the freedom and naturalness of the
system. Solitude is a lot easier to restore than soil or an extinct species.
Nevertheless, intervention in wilderness must always be approached with
humility and, as Wilderness Watch President Bill Worf cautions, inter-
vention should be "limited to those minimum actions that will establish
conditions that will allow natural processes to hold sway once again."7'
Without wilderness management, overuse, extrinsic influences, and ex-
otic species will cause the land-and the experience of the land-to de-
grade to the point that it can no longer be considered natural or free.
One current example of how the two-dimensional continuum may
help provide a framework for policy making is the issue of fixed anchors
in wilderness. The U.S. Forest Service has proposed prohibiting the per-
manent installation in wilderness of equipment, such as bolts and pitons,
that aids in rockclimbing and mountaineering.' The Forest Service has
argued that these installations result in a modification of the environment
that is not allowed under the Wilderness Act. Rockclimbers have re-
sponded angrily that these modifications are substantially unnoticeable,
especially relative to signs, bridges, and trails that are common features
of wilderness settings. Consideration of both freedom and naturalness
may offer a new perspective on this debate. Instead of considering
whether bolts are more or less natural than bridges, managers may ask:
71. Bill Worf, Response to "Ecological Manipulation in Wilderness" by Dr. David Cole,
INT'L J. WILDERNESS, June 1997, at 30, 31.
72. See Use of Fixed Anchors for Rock Climbing in Wilderness, 61 Fed. Reg. 22,784, 22,786-
87 (1996) (proposed May 13, 1996). Implementation of the regulations was to begin on June 1,
1998. However, the Forest Service delayed implementation of the regulations until the "public has
the opportunity to be involved in the decision making process." USDA News and Information (vis-
ited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.usda.gov/newslreleasesl1998/08/0337>.
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"What is the effect of fixed anchors on the freedom of the land?" "What
will the effect be on the rock if we disallow fixed anchors?" "What will
the effect be on the vegetation if we do?" Ideally, the decision will en-
hance both the freedom and naturalness of the wilderness, but it may
ultimately result in compromise.
In his consideration of the dilemma of wilderness management,
David Cole suggests that it may not be possible to achieve the goals of
freedom and naturalness on the same piece of ground.73 Achieving one
goal makes impossible the achievement of the other. He suggests that the
time may have come to consider a new land system in which some wil-
derness is managed for freedom, and we accept things like weed inva-
sions and unnatural fire, and other wilderness is actively managed to
maintain natural composition and structure. ' Considering what we now
know about the impacts of recreational use on both freedom and natural-
ness, perhaps it is time to consider a third type of wilderness, wilderness
managed strictly for recreation. This would certainly resolve difficult
issues like the fixed anchor debate. Such a system, however, would be a
major departure from traditional conceptions of wilderness. The wildness
of wilderness depends on both freedom and naturalness. It cannot be
broken into constituent parts and remain wild. Similarly, the wilderness
recreation experience can only be sensed in wilderness, not in a recrea-
tional "sacrifice zone." If we are to retain the wildness of wilderness, we
must find ways to simultaneously protect both the naturalness of the land
and its freedom from human control.
CONCLUSION
The recent critique of the wilderness idea leveled by Callicott,5
Cronon,76 and others can be traced ultimately to the tension in traditional
definitions of wilderness created by the opposition of people and nature.
Wilderness is criticized for separating people from nature, for ignoring
aboriginal people, and for holding nature static, even as it is revered as a
place. The representation of wilderness described here as the end of a
two-dimensional continuum of wildness defined by naturalness and free-
dom from human control offers a way out of this dilemma. By describing
wildness as a continuum, we acknowledge the wildness that is all around
us even as we celebrate the places at the end of the continuum. By de-
fining "natural" as presettlement or historical conditions, we have ac-
counted for aboriginal influence in creating natural systems; but by ac-
knowledging that intensive aboriginal influence can diminish the land's
73. See Cole, supra note 44, at 17.
74. See id.
75. See Callicott, supra note 40 (arguing for the integration of economic development with
biological conservation).
76. See Cronon, supra note 7 (arguing that wilderness is a human creation and a cultural
invention).
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freedom from human control, we have placed aboriginal and post-
settlement humans on the same level. Finally, by defining a natural set-
ting as the bounded conditions of ecosystems over a history of relatively
constant environmental factors (including anthropogenic disturbance),
we have allowed for dynamism in ecosystems while acknowledging that
some conditions are more natural than others. Perhaps this conception
will help us understand better both the meaning of wilderness and its
place in our culture.
In closing, we may conclude that the Wilderness Act captured the
essential qualities of wildness. Its recognition of "primeval character and
influence" maps well onto the qualities of naturalness and freedom from
human control, as described here. To be sure, there are gray areas around
the central concept, just as there are around any concept, but it is clear
that the idea of wilderness works. For thirty-five years, the definition
provided by the Wilderness Act has allowed us to agree on what wilder-
ness is-to the tune of over 104 million acres. It is also clear that wild-
ness is a quality inherent in other places that do not meet the Wilderness
Act's definition. Other wild lands reach beyond congressionally desig-
nated wilderness across semi-natural landscapes into the parks and un-
developed lands that permeate rural and urban environments. As we
enter the next century, let us now turn our attention not away from wil-
derness, but toward its protection wherever it occurs, and dedicate our-
selves to expanding our current system into a sustainable national net-
work of wild lands.
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Success in building the National Wilderness Preservation System to
more than 100 million acres over the past thirty-five years has masked
rising challenges to the idea of wilderness itself. These come not from
those who regularly oppose additions to the system but from members of
the environmental community, academia, and those who are charged
with administering the areas.
The Wilderness Act of 1964' was established "in order to assure that
an increasing population... does not occupy and modify all areas within
the United States."' The Act's definition of wilderness begins with a
declaration that "[a] wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man
and his works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area
where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man."3
Thus, these were to be areas where natural processes would be unhin-
dered. They would be areas which would not be dominated by human
intervention. They would be administered under a "hands off' approach.
Such an approach would be necessary if wilderness areas were to
serve as benchmarks, or control areas, that would allow scientists to
compare natural areas with disturbed places.! This was one of the ends
that Congress sought to serve when it set up the wilderness program!
But now more and more are questioning the "hands off' approach.'
They are also questioning whether these are undisturbed areas, and they
are suggesting other ends that might better be served.
* Chairman, Sierra Club. J.D., University of Oregon.
1. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-557, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994)).
2. Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
3. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
4. See Aldo Leopold, Wilderness As a Land Laboratory, 6 LIvING WILDERNESS 3, 3 (1941)
(wilderness provides a "base datum of normality"); see also WILLIAM S. ALVERSON Er AL., WILD
FORESTS: CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 190 (1994).
5. For a discussion of the intended scientific purposes of the Wilderness Act, see Michael
McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 OR. L. REv. 288, 293
(1966).
6. For example, Stephen Budiansky asserts that "[s]trict preservation through a hands off or
'natural' management policy has destroyed many of the very things that nature lovers claim to value
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Some are even denouncing the idea. In a recent book two environ-
mental philosophers have concluded that "wilderness preservation, as
envisioned by Muir and his successors, is [as flawed as Gifford Pinchot's
ideas of utilitarian resource management]." They believe the "wilderness
idea is... ethnocentric, androcentric, phallocentric, unscientific, unphi-
losophic, impolitic, outmoded, even genocidal."'
The constituency for wilderness needs to understand these criticisms
and changes in perspective. The points at issue should be debated openly.
I. BROAD CHALLENGES
Stephen Budiansky argues that "[t]he great American wilderness
was ... a product of human will."9 He points to evidence that native
populations regularly burned large portions of the American landscape to
shape its flora and fauna. 0 He contends, thus, that there was no pristine
wilderness here to preserve.
Since the Wilderness Act was passed in 1964, more has become
known too about worldwide stresses on the environment, including wil-
derness. With the thinning of the ozone layer, ultraviolet light intensity
has grown, resulting in more pronounced impacts on high elevation ar-
eas. Carbon dioxide levels have also grown, which may be inducing
changes in climate and shifts in patterns of vegetation. Sulfates and other
pollutants migrate long distances to turn to acid rain and cripple high
elevation forests, as well as lowering visibility. Pesticides that drift long
distances may be destroying frog populations. Long continued suppres-
sion of fire may have significantly changed the succession of forest
vegetation in wilderness." All of these factors reduce the naturalness of
wilderness. Indeed, Ren6 Dubos asserts that "[n]ot even the strictest con-
servation policies would restore the primeval environment."'"
Are our wilderness areas undisturbed anymore, and can they be con-
sidered to be pristine?3 The simple answer is that they are not." But they
the most." STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, NATURE'S KEEPERS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NATURE
MANAGEMENT 8 (1995).
7. J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson, Introduction to THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS
DEBATE 1, 20 (. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson eds., 1998).
8. Id. at 2.
9. BuDiANsKy, supra note 6, at 103.
10. See id. at 103-11; cf William S. Denevan, The Pristine Myth, in THE GREAT NEW
WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 7, at 414, 414-24 (presenting, however, little data on the western
United States). For a rebuttal, see Thomas Vale, The Myth of the Humanized Landscape: An Exam-
ple from Yosemite National Park, 18 NAT. AREAS J. 231,231-36 (1998).
11. See BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 56-60 (1989) (discussing anthropocentric
changes to nature and wildlands).
12. RENA J. DuBos, So HUMAN AN ANIMAL 199 (1968).
13. See McKIBBEN, supra note 11, at 56-60.
14. The eastern wilderness, moreover, was certainly not pristine because it had recovered from
exploitation.
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are still less disturbed than other areas outside the wilderness system.
Clearly, this does reduce their value as benchmarks.
The system was not set up only to provide protection to pristine ar-
eas. The entry criteria are heavily qualified.5 Units have been admitted
which only "generally appear[] to have been affected primarily by the
forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnotice-
able."'6 The areas admitted to the system do not need to be pristine. The
wilderness system is a practical, legal zoning tool to put given areas off
limits to development. It was not designed to shield areas from global
influences, nor to provide a warranty of pristineness.
Is the wilderness system really an anachronism-an historical odd-
ity? William Tucker thinks so. He suggests that "[w]ilderness today
means the land after the Indians have been cleared away but before the
settlers have arrived."1
7
Scant evidence, however, exists for the notion that these generally
inhospitable lands, which are the lands now included in the National
Wilderness Preservation System, ever supported substantial native
populations, or that they were burned regularly. In fact, they rarely in-
clude the lower areas with open pine forests and savannas. Many of them
are in alpine zones where winter snows are simply too heavy. Further-
more, these were the sites that were unlikely for the settlers to ever reach.
They have been saved because they never were reached, with the excep-
tion of areas in the East that recovered.
In an era of ecological consciousness, the wilderness idea is seen by
some as old-fashioned and anthropocentric." They decry elitists for
"wanting to preserve wilderness as 'scenery' and as places to take vaca-
tions. '""' William Cronon asserts that "elite urban tourists and wealthy
sportsmen projected their leisure-time frontier fantasies onto the Ameri-
can landscape and so created wilderness in their own image."' He also
looks askance at a "wilderness ideology that devalues productive labor.""
Some even lump those concerned with aesthetics in with those con-
cerned with profits and maximum yields.' By using wilderness to back-
15. See McCloskey, supra note 5, at 307 (explaining the qualifications presented in the Wil-
derness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994)).
16. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (emphasis added).
17. William Tucker, Is Nature Too Good for Us?, in TAKING SIDES 17, 19 (Theodore D.
Goldfarb ed., 3d ed. 1989).
18. See R. EDWARD GRUMBINE, GHOST BEARS: EXPLORING THE BIODIVERSITY CRISIS 142-
43, 176-77, 184-85 (1992); cf MAX OELSCHLAEGER, THE IDEA OF WILDERNESS: FROM
PREHISTORY TO THE AGE OF ECOLOGY 292-93 (1991) (differentiating anthropocentrism from
ecocentrism and biocentrism).
19. BILL DEVALL & GEORGESESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY 122 (1985).
20. William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE,
supra note 7, at 471,482.
21. Id. at490.
22. GRUMBINE, supra note 18, at 29.
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pack and by their concern for the options of future generations, they are
put in the same category as exploiters-they are said to be anthropocen-
tric "resourcists."
Others denigrate those who would preserve wilderness because of
their supposed narrowness and lack of social sensitivity. Social ecologist
Murray Bookchin laments those who would "mystically confus[e] wil-
derness with the real world." William Cronon also writes in a similar
vein and finds the intellectual influence of the wilderness idea to be "in-
sidious."' He feels that "wilderness offers us the illusion that we can
escape the cares and troubles of the world in which our past has ensnared
us."' He asserts that "[b]y teaching us to fetishize sublime places and
wide open country, these peculiarly American ways of thinking about
wilderness encourage us to adopt too high a standard for what counts as
'natural."' And, radical writers fault preservationists because they do
not seek to alter "the distribution of power and control over
production."'
Of course, in reality, organizations such as the Sierra Club work not
only on preserving wilderness but also on combating pollution, curbing
population growth, and on issues of human rights and environmental
justice. They have not neglected other issues, nor have they behaved as if
protecting wilderness alone would address the full environmental
agenda.
Restoration ecologists William Jordan and Frederick Turner casti-
gate those who take "human beings out of nature altogether and mak[e]
wilderness of it."' Turner asserts that wilderness areas are "the most as-
tonishingly unnatural places on earth."'" The issue of whether it is un-
natural to take humans out of wilderness is part of the never-ending
philosophical conundrum of what it means to suggest that "man is part of
nature." The problem with pressing this argument has been aptly put by
Max Oelschlaeger: "If humankind is part of nature, then human actions
cannot be construed as anything other than natural even if detrimental to
the larger natural community."" The worst crimes against nature can all
be excused on this basis.
23. OELSCHLAEGER, supra note 18, at 307.
24. Cronon, supra note 20, at 475.
25. Id. at 483.
26. Id. at 491-92.
27. ALLAN SCHNAiBERG & KENNETH ALAN GOULD, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY: THE
ENDURING CONFLICT 144 (1994).
28. G. Stanley Kane, Restoration or Preservation?, in BEYOND PRESERVATION: RESTORING
AND INVENTING LA.NDSCAPES 69, 70 (1994) (citing Frederick Turner, Cultivating the American
Garden: Toward A Secular View of Nature, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1985, at 45,45-52).
29. Id. at 70.
30. OELScHLA rER, supra note 18, at 296.
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II. CONSERVATION BIOLOGISTS
Efforts to apply the latest insights of biology to public policy have
prompted the emergence of a group who call themselves "conservation
biologists." They are uncomfortable with the lack of biological ground-
ing in the Wilderness Act.' They are not content with the notion that
"nature knows best."'32
They see units of protected wilderness as building blocks for mega-
reserves that they are promoting. These would be managed for different
purposes, such as maximizing biodiversity. They would "build upon and
revise the earlier Wilderness Area designations established largely for
other purposes."33
They are critical of the existing systems of protected areas, includ-
ing wilderness, because they are seen as too small, or put in the wrong
places, or they are too far apart. In terms of protecting biodiversity, Reed
Noss believes the "National Wilderness Preservation System does a poor
job."' Only 19 of 261 ecosystems in the United States are. represented.
Conservation biologists apparently do not understand that the National
Wilderness Preservation System, in contrast to the National Park System,
was not set up to represent various ecosystems.
Some of these critics regard the more than 104 million acres in this
system as only "token environmental reform."' 5 They fear that tokenism
will engender a feeling of "free license" elsewhere?' They seem to have
little sense of the effort that it took to get Congress to act over one hun-
dred times so far or of the resistance that was faced.
They also scoff at many reserves as either "worthless" or "empty."
Alfred Runte has popularized the notion that, for the most part, lands
devoid of economic value were put into national parks." Reed Noss
makes a similar assertion for national forest wilderness, pointing out that
selections for it have been "'biased toward low-diversity lands such as
alpine zones.'
31. See ALVERSON Er AL., supra note 4, at 296.
32. Id. at 194.
33. Id. at 194; see John Freemuth, Ecosystem Management and Its Place in the National Park
Service, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 697, 715 (1997) (discussing National Park Service officials' concerns
about overzealously applying ecosystem management, thereby altering traditional conceptions of
park management).
34. GRUMBINE, supra note 18, at 92.
35. Id. at 227.
36. Peter Brussard et al., Strategy and Tactics for Conserving Biological Diversity in the
United States, 6 CONSERvATION BIOLOGY 157, 159 (1992).
37. See ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 50-51 (1979); see
also ROBERT GOTILIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 27 (1993) (stating that Yellowstone was set aside as a national park
because Congress considered the land commercially worthless).
38. ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 191 (quoting Reed F. Noss, From Endangered Species
to Biodiversity, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION 227, 227-46 (K.A. Kohn ed., 1991)).
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Others speak of "living dead" species that are doomed in wilderness
because of fragmented habitat and failure to establish ecosystem-based
mega-reserves. It is feared that these species will die out in time." Others
see areas with vacant niches for top carnivores as empty places. '
Calling these areas "worthless" or "empty" has the unfortunate ef-
fect of questioning their continuing value as public reserves. It is also
historically incorrect to assert that only worthless alpine areas were set
aside. Many wilderness reservations were bitterly resisted precisely be-
cause they were not devoid of commercial timber, minerals, or power
sites."
Finally, some of these conservation biologists would relax the re-
strictions on what can be done in wilderness---ostensibly for the purpose
of making it easier to get more land into the wilderness system. They
would allow firewood cutting and snowmobiling. Such concessions,
however, would do little to reduce opposition from major commercial
interests, which have provided the mainstay of opposition historically.
III. AGENCY MANAGERS
Four different federal agencies administer wilderness in the Na-
tional Wilderness Preservation System: the Forest Service, the National
Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Land
Management. These agencies participate in research on wilderness man-
agement through the Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute in
Missoula, Montana. Publications of researchers at the Institute reveal a
desire to move toward active manipulation of the wilderness environ-
ment. They are not content with merely managing the impacts of those
who use these areas recreationally, nor with protecting them from exter-
nal threats. They point out that because "all wildernesses have already
been compromised to some extent," managers must. be helped "to restore
natural conditions and processes.' 3 They assert that this, in many cases,
"will require active manipulation of ecosystems."
39. See BILL DEVALL, SIMPLE IN MEANS, RICH IN ENDS 163 (1988).
40. See, e.g., O.H. FRANKEL & MICHAEL E. SOUL9, CONSERVATION AND EVOLUTION 118
(1981) (concluding that "[slome large... species will not be adequately protected in even the largest
reserves").
41. For instance, great controversies attended the establishment of wilderness in East Meadow
Creek in Colorado, in the Gospel Hump area of Idaho, and in the French Pete Creek area of Oregon.
42. See ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 243.
43. See David N. Cole & Peter B. Landres, Threats to Wilderness Ecosystems: Impacts and
Research Needs, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 168, 179 (1996) (emphasis added); see also David
N. Cole, Ecological Manipulation in Wilderness, INT'L J. WILDERNESS, May 1996, at 15, 15-18
(arguing that "the task of wilderness management is largely to optimize trade-offs between three
goals"); Reed F. Noss, Soul of the Wilderness, INT'L J. WILDERNESS, Aug. 1996, at 5, 5 (stressing
"the need for active management, at least of a restorative nature, for wilderness areas too small to
manage themselves"). But see Bill Worf, Response to "Ecological Manipulation in Wilderness" by
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In their classic monograph on wilderness management, Hendee,
Stankey, and Lucas call for agency managers to decide "the degree of
naturalness desired" in protected wilderness.' They "must decide what is
desired in types and distribution of ecosystems." They may choose to
"return to presettlement condition," or to perpetuate "a particular species,
ecosystem, or community mosaic," or to maintain "the status quo."7
Others see choices in terms of the attributes of "composition, structure,
and function" which they believe are the "three primary ecological at-
tributes of wilderness character."''
These actions are built on the legal premise that "[t]he mandate of
the Wilderness Act is to protect and preserve natural conditions." The
phrase "natural conditions" does appear in section 2(c) of the Act, which
defines "wilderness."'0 In that extended definition, it is stated that federal
wilderness will be "protected and managed so as to preserve its natural
conditions."" However, there are other sections of the Act that more spe-
cifically address the question of how these areas are to be managed, and
there is also much more to the definition of it.
The language in the definition that specifies at the outset that a wil-
derness is "hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its commu-
nity of life are untrammeled by man"', would suggest that man's inter-
vention in controlling that life should be minimized. The dictionary de-
fines "untrammeled" as unhindered. Thus, the key idea of what wilder-
ness is all about is to make sure that humans do not hinder the develop-
ment of that "community of life,"-the flora and fauna that grow there.
Both the policy section contained in section 2(a) of the Act and the
management section contained in section 4(b) of the Act specify that the
aim of administration is to preserve "the wilderness character" of the
areas. What that character was intended to be can only be determined by
looking to the definition of wilderness. And in the definition, the section
referring to "natural conditions" follows the key initial point about it
being untrammeled, while further embellishing it in a second sentence.
Any meaning given to the phrase "natural conditions" should be consis-
David N. Cole, INT'L J. WILDERNESS, June 1997, at 30, 30 (disagreeing with David Cole's argument
"that the Wilderness Act gives managers three conflicting goals").
44. See Cole & Landres, supra note 43, at 179.
45. JOHN C. HENDEE ET AL, WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT 252 (2d ed. 1990).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Peter Landres et al., A Monitoring Strategy for the National Wilderness Preservation
System, in INTERNATIONAL WILDERNESS ALLOCATION, MANAGEMENT, AND RESEARCH 194, 194
(John C. Hendee & Vance G. Martin eds., 1994).
49. Peter B. Landres, The Role of Ecological Monitoring in Managing Wilderness, 32
TRENDS/WILDERNESS RESEARCH 10, 13 (1995).
50. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2513 (1993).
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tent with the key idea of not "trammeling" these areas. This interpreta-
tion is favored both because this language comes first and, in accordance
with rules of statutory construction, it avoids any unnecessary implica-
tion of conflict between provisions, suggesting that the first sentence is
being modified. Trammeling also means not catching anything in a net or
web which subdues it. Thus, the community of life in wilderness should
not be subdued, or put under the domination of man (a point made in the
first clause of the definition).
It is interesting to note that some of those who advocate manipulat-
ing ecosystems for purposes of restoration do acknowledge some down-
sides to such action. Because wilderness areas are supposed to serve as
reference benchmarks, they admit that "[t]his value is compromised
when these ecosystems are intentionally modified."' Moreover, other
biodiversity goals may be affected. "Attempts to restore fire may in-
crease vulnerability to invasions by alien plants.""' And, elimination of
exotic vegetation may eliminate habitat for newly dependent, rare spe-
cies.' These considerations add to the confusion over what baseline con-
ditions can be considered to be "natural."
IV. MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
But, if manipulation were to be pursued, what would it entail? Some
see "fire" as the key tool. Historian Stephen Pyne calls upon managers
"to determine, site by site, what [constitutes] an appropriate fire
regime. ' Looking at uncut parts of the national forests, including those
in wilderness, he sees "[t]oo many forests [that] were overgrown, dis-
eased, insect-infested, unattractive, prone to species losses, and vulner-
able to catastrophic fire."'5
National Park Service ecologist David Parsons wants to restore "fire
to something approaching its natural role in park ecosystems," including
wilderness." To achieve that end, "prescribed fires must burn under natu-
ral conditions and with minimum constraints." Despite imperfect
knowledge, he calls for a watershed scale program and willingness to
experiment and "to take risks."6' Agency managers are already moving in
this direction. In the Lee Metcalf Wilderness in Idaho, the Bureau of
Land Management has embraced prescribed fire in the Bear Trap Canyon
54. Cole & Landres, supra note 43, at 180.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. STEPHEN J, PYNE, AMERICA'S FIRES: MANAGEMENT ON WILDLANDs AND FORESTS 41
(1997).
58. Id.
59. David J. Parsons & Stephen J. Botti, Restoration of Fire in National Parks, in THE USE OF
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Unit "to reestablish and/or maintain the mosaic of ecological and succes-
sional vegetative types in the area."
This management prescription embraces both the idea of using fire
to restore an original condition, as well as using it on an ongoing basis to
freeze the vegetation at a given stage of succession-for instance to pro-
vide habitat for deer. Sometimes the restoration goal implies resetting the
biological clock to where it would have been had fires not been artifi-
cially suppressed. This would imply a measure of restraint. However,
increasingly that restraint is not evident, as in the case just cited.
Indeed, at conferences of wilderness managers, frequent calls are
heard for more leeway in manipulating vegetation. At the Sixth National
Wilderness Conference in Santa Fe, managers often spoke of problems
of too much brush coming in or of forests becoming more closed. They
also called for more use of prescribed fire and planned ignitions.'
In manipulating the environment in wilderness, conservation biolo-
gists would try to "sustain disturbance regimes typical of the region
without losing species." This would entail efforts "to maintain patterns
of disturbance and habitat patches similar to those that have occurred
historically."' In addition to using fire, some argue for access roads and
would consider using herbicides and machinery-as to remove brush
from rangeland.' Where fire would not work, they would fell trees to
simulate treefalls for the purpose of creating enough gaps to provide
early successional habitats. 7
Active management would also be aimed at eliminating non-native
species, or exotics.' The National Park Service has long grappled with
how to remove feral pigs, goats, burros, and non-native mountain goats
from its various units, including in wilderness.' Various techniques are
used including culling, artificial transfers, sterilization, and fencing. This
has rarely been easy with animals, and it is even more difficult with ex-
otic plants.
62. HENDEE ET AL., supra note 45, at 206.
63. See Jerry Asher, Crushing the Wilderness Spirit, in SIXTH NATIONAL WILDERNESS
CONFERENCE HANDBOOK: THE SPIRIT LIVES 39, 39-43 (1994) [hereinafter THE SPIRIT LIVES];
Edward R. Grumbine, Future Trends, in THE SPIRIT LIVES, supra, at 30, 30-31; Francis Mohr, Fire
Suppression Commensurate with Wilderness Stewardship, in THE SPIRIT LIVES, supra, at 149, 149-
50; see also Christopher V. Barns, Wilderness Strategic Planning, INT'L J. WILDERNESS, Mar. 1997,
at 8, 8-10 (summarizing survey results from this conference).
64. ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 44.
65. Id.
66. See REED F. NOSS & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY 243-45
(1994); see also Donald M. Waller, Getting Back to the Right Nature, in THE GREAT NEW
WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 7, at 558.
67. See NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 66, at 207.
68. See Michael Soul6, What Is Conservation Biology?, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
BIODIVERSrrY 35, 38 (R. Edward Grunbine ed., 1994).
69. See RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 258-61
(1997).
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Broadscale eradication programs could well do more damage than
good. Using poisons such as herbicides or pesticides would be particu-
larly questionable." Efforts in past decades to eradicate the host (ribes)
for the white pine blister rust in western national forests proved to be
unworkable. Little was accomplished after tremendous effort, which in-
volved grubbing the host plant out with hand tools. Efforts to eradicate
exotic plants in wilderness may enjoy little more success.
Wilderness managers are also concerned with the "permeability" of
the boundaries of wilderness areas.7 Permeability refers to the flow of
plants, animals, disease and other disturbing agents in and out of wilder-
ness areas from surrounding lands. These flows may be seen as either
harmful or beneficial. These flows not only involve migrations by ani-
mals such as elk and bison but also pathogens and pests as well. Sources
for recolonization may also be at stake.
An implication of these concerns is how to manage them. In addi-
tion to choosing the best boundaries and establishing buffer areas and
corridors, other steps might be taken too.' These could involve resorting
to fencing and barriers, salt blocks, and other devices to coax animals in
desired directions.
These problems, however, might be better addressed through trying
to coordinate management for desired ends on an ecosystem basis (i.e.,
"ecosystem management").73 Efforts would be made to protect wilderness
from incompatible activities on surrounding lands in the context of a
larger ecosystem. Unfortunately, that approach has yet to find a way to
get agencies with different missions, biases and plans to coordinate ef-
fectively. A 1995 Memorandum of Understanding among federal agen-
cies mainly contemplates regular communication exchanges. '
Mindful of the fact that specific steps need to be taken on a local
basis to safeguard each wilderness, some have questioned the idea of
standardized protection under the Wilderness Act. They seem to want to
vest managers with the discretion to decide what they think is best for
each protected area. Edward Grumbine believes that "[c]hoices about
how humans live with ecosystems can only be .. .specific to local
places, conditions and practices. What works for.., the [grizzly] bear in
70. Section 4(d) of the Wilderness Act does include language that empowers the Secretary of
Agriculture to take measures to control "fire, insects, and diseases" in national forest wildernesses,
but these must meet a necessity test. Wilderness Act § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (1994). Many
exotic plants and animals, however, might not fall into the framework of this dispensation since they
would be neither insects nor disease agents.
71. See Cole & Landres, supra note 43, at 177-78.
72. Id.
73. See Freemuth, supra note 33, at 697 (examining the "effort to bring ecosystem manage-
ment to a unit of the national park system").
74. See Memorandum of Understanding to Foster the Ecosystem Approach Between Fourteen
Federal Agencies, at v, c (Dec. 15, 1995) (on file with author).
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the Greater North Cascades will be different from what works in
Greater Yellowstone.""
In vesting managers with this discretion, presumably, they would be
hoping to apply a variation of the concept of "adaptive management."76
Each manager would experimentally apply the latest and best science to
manage the area under his or her care. These hopes, however, would
have to confront the reality of local pressures from vested interests. Man-
agers have rarely been able to stand up to such pressures in the past.
Casting wilderness areas loose in this way would also undermine the idea
that these areas constitute a national patrimony by securing "for the
American people ... an enduring resource of wilderness.""
V. CAUTIONS
Some are unrestrained in their enthusiasm for managing nature.
Daniel Botkin asserts that "we can engineer nature at nature's rate."
78
Others urge caution. Ecologist William Baker believes "it is premature to
undertake extensive manipulative restoration action using either pre-
scribed disturbances or mechanical means, as these may only produce
undesirable alteration.'9
In her analysis of Aldo Leopold's work, Susan Flader concludes that
"his experiences with deer convinced him that the land organism was too
complex and dynamic ever to be fully comprehended or controlled and
that management ... was itself subject to the same hazardous conse-
quences as the short-sighted actions it was intended to correct." Leopold
came to the conclusion that "[t]he only reality is an intelligent respect
for, and adjustment to, the inherent tendency of land to produce life."8
Moreover, how much confidence can we have anymore in the sup-
position that a given association of plants and animals is "natural?" The
long-held notion that habitats progress through successional stages to
reach an equilibrium stage seems to be collapsing. Equilibrium theories
have been largely replaced by dynamic paradigms.' Nature is seen as
75. See GRUMBINE, supra note 18, at 216.
76. See Waller, supra note 66, at 563.
77. Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
78. DANIEL BLOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES 190 (1990); see R. Edward Grumbine, An
Ecological Denouement, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BIODIVERSITY, supra note 68, at 387,
387 (quoting Blotkin).
79. See William L. Baker, The Landscape Ecology of Large Disturbances in the Design and
Management of Nature Reserves, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BIODIVERSrrY, supra note 68, at
75,92.
80. SusAN L. FLADER, THINKING LIKE A MOUNTAIN 270 (1974).
81. Id.
82. See Callicott & Nelson, supra note 7, at 6. See generally Donald Worster, The Ecology of
Order and Chaos, ENvTL. HIST. REV., Spring/Summer 1990, at I (surveying recent thinking re-
garding the science of ecology).
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"full of uncertainty and episodic at different spatiotemporal scales."83
"[N]ature is a shifting mosaic or in essentially continuous flux .... "84
"[S]pecies composition of vegetation varies continuously in time
and space ... ."" "Because chance (disturbance) factors and small cli-
matic variation can apparently cause very substantial changes in vegeta-
tion, the biota and associated ecosystem processes for a given landscape
will vary substantially over any significant time period-and no one
variant is any more 'natural' than the others."'
If this is true, then there can be no preordained "natural" association
of flora and fauna that must be restored. The Wilderness Act cannot
mean that a given set of "natural conditions" must be restored and main-
tained. Rather, the wilderness character of which the Act speaks must
refer to maintaining natural processes-where nature finds its own way
unaided.
Moreover, it may be futile in any event to try to hold onto all spe-
cies in given nature reserves, including wilderness areas. Frankel and
Soul6 assert that "even the largest nature reserves, if left alone, will
probably suffer major die-offs of species, accounting for a majority of
birds and large mammals in a few hundred or a few thousand years."'"
This will occur because of the disappearance of the main body of their
traditional habitat. In other words, manipulation simply may not work.
Furthermore, changes in climate may rapidly alter habitat conditions.
Climatologists forecast a migration of habitats northward in the northern
hemisphere and to higher elevations in mountainous regions. Some habi-
tats may simply disappear." No manipulative efforts can save them.
CONCLUSION
Wilderness areas were designed to be areas removed from human
dominion. They are areas where nature can work its will and surprise us.
Ponds may become meadows, and meadows may become forests, and
forests may bum and become meadows, and brush may invade. One kind
of forest may replace another. What lives there can and will change. We
should not try to stop the clock and guide nature one way or another.
And, in any event, such efforts simply may not work. They also may not
83. Callicott & Nelson, supra note 7, at 6.
84. Noss & COOPERRIDER, supra note 66, at 166.
85. Id. at 247.
86. GRUMBINE, supra note 18, at 59.
87. FRANKEL & SouLt, supra note 40, at 131.
88. See OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ExEcUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE OF KNOWLEDOE 15 (1997) ("Over the next 100 years, the ideal range for
some North American forest species will shift by as much as 300 miles to the north, far faster than
the forests can migrate naturally.... Such changes could have profound effects on the U.S. system
of national parks and refuges....").
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be lawful. It is doubtful that the "natural conditions" language of the Act
can support all of the management activity that is being suggested.
The emergence, though, of so much thinking at variance with the
original idea behind the Act suggests that the wilderness debate is about
to take a new turn.' The issues could be debated more clearly if distinc-
tions would be drawn between the wilderness idea, such as it was origi-
nally contemplated in 1964, and all of the variations and extensions of the
idea that are current today. The validity of the wilderness idea should not
be judged solely by reference to the most extreme versions of it.
It is particularly important to distinguish between the variations of
the idea and its practical application in today's National Wilderness
Preservation System. What wilderness really looks like is often a far cry
from what it seems in the debates.
Moreover, it would help if the real grist for the system could be
examined in less than absolute terms. An area need not be subjected to
the test of being entirely pristine or be found wanting. Nor to have value
does wilderness have to be the only place where certain values are
found-if more of them are found there.
The ambitions of conservation biologists would be more under-
standable if they focused less attention on protected wilderness, which
they find so lacking in biodiversity, and more on the so-called "middle
lands" (between wildlands and cities) where most of it is found. They
cannot justify these misplaced preoccupations solely on the basis of re-
storing grizzly bear populations. Thousands of needy species await their
attention elsewhere.
Wilderness managers must be mindful of their legal trust. Building
up a case for what they are legally forbidden to do will only jeopardize
any basis for trust with the public they serve. Nothing will build the case
faster for a separate Wilderness Service than persisting in this folly.
89. See Craig W. Allin, Wilderness Policy, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLmCs 172, 186 (Charles Davis ed., 1997) (predicting that "[wihen the allocation battles are over,
sometime in the next century, wilderness policy will be management policy, and the inevitable








Wilderness is both a geophysical reality and a legally defined land
category. As a matter of geography, wilderness is any place that has so
far escaped human development.' Legally, wilderness consists of those
places designated by Congress for preservation from such development,
areas that we call "official wilderness areas." Other writers in this sym-
posium discuss many aspects of wilderness designation and manage-
ment. Our aims in this article are to cover some of this same territory by
placing official wilderness in several contexts-historical, legal, and
managerial. By doing so, we intend to demonstrate that a wider range of
geographic wilderness is compatible with official wilderness and that the
implementation of other federal land management statutes may provide a
basis for resolving several key outstanding wilderness management
questions.
In retrospect, the creation of official wilderness was nearly inevita-
ble. Wilderness designation was the logical culmination of several his-
torical, social, and legal trends. Although Congress began setting aside
federal public lands as national parks for both recreational and preserva-
tion purposes in 1872 with the establishment of Yellowstone National
Park,' by 1964 most citizens agreed that an even more protective cate-
gory was necessary for some federal lands. It is surprising that the Wil-
derness Act of 1964' was enacted so early in the new age of preservation
consciousness and that the process for designating new wilderness areas
has gone as far as it has in such a relatively short time. We assert that the
Wilderness Act was also the beginning of a new era in federal land and
natural resource policy that is not yet near its culmination. Perhaps be-
cause of the relatively recent vintage of official wilderness, the extent to
which wilderness classification actually precludes development is not yet
entirely clear.
* Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
** Tyler Professor of Law, University of Kansas. The authors thank Jenna Wischmeyer for
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1. These places are becoming fewer and farther between. See, e.g., John Markoff, The Lost
Art of Getting Lost, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1994, § 4, at I (stating that due to cellular phones and
other modem communications devices, "the very idea of wilderness, once one of the themes said to
define the American spirit, is vanishing").
2. See Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24,17 Stat. 32 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 21(1994)).
3. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
1131-1136 (1994)).
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I. WILDERNESS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Background of the Wilderness Act
The passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964 was a true break-
through-an apparently radical idea whose embodiment took the form of
federal legislation. But, official wilderness did not become a reality
overnight. The United States still owned an enormous quantity of land in
the 1960s. Manifest Destiny had given us a nation spanning the conti-
nent plus Alaska. By cession of foreign sovereigns and by treaties with
Native American sovereigns, the federal government at one time or an-
other was the fee owner of over two billion acres.'
During the nineteenth century, the dominant federal policy was dis-
position; Congress provided free or cheap lands to veterans, homestead-
ers, ranchers, miners, states, and railroads so that economic development
of the country could proceed apace But, geographical reality helped
bring federal land disposition to a halt in the 1930s. Much of the land
owned by the federal government was unsuitable for economic develop-
ment and therefore not attractive to prospective private owners. For ex-
ample, beyond the 100th meridian, to the west slope of the Sierras, rain-
fall declines drastically, and conventional agriculture becomes difficult if
not impossible.7 Consequently, huge areas of the West and Alaska re-
mained unclaimed and unwanted well into the twentieth century. Federal
holdings were also growing in the East and Midwest as the government
bought out the failed hardscrabble farmers and created new national for-
ests and national grasslands!
Another factor that contributed to a reversal of the federal land dis-
position policy was the progressive era impulse to reserve lands for con-
servation and preservation purposes.9 Writers had extolled the virtues of
raw, undeveloped territory since the middle of the nineteenth century. 0
Beginning in 1872, Congress and the Executive acted on similar im-
4. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
1964, at 29 [hereinafter BLM 1964 STATISTICS] (determining that, as of June 30, 1963, the federal
government owned approximately 770 million acres of land).
5. See PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAW REv. COMM'N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 86 (1968).
6. See 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 2.02 (1990); GATES, supra note 5, at 285, 357,415.
7. See GATES, supra note 5, at 495.
8. The Weeks Act, ch. 186, 36 Stat. 961 (1911), authorized the federal government to pur-
chase forest lands in the watershed of navigable streams. The Act resulted in "an extension of the
national forests to the eastern United States." James L. Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the
United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239, 271 (1977). During the New Deal, the Roosevelt Administration
implemented a program of land acquisition to provide relief for the unemployed. See id. at 272.
9. See I COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 2.03[l].
10. See generally RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND chs. 5, 8 (3d ed.
1982) (discussing the opinions and writings of Thoreau and Muir),
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pulses by creating parks, monuments, and wildlife refuges for primarily
preservation purposes." Pioneering forest rangers succeeded in estab-
lishing de facto administrative wilderness areas as early as the 1920s.'2
Commentators, such as Bernard DeVoto in the 1940s, bemoaned the
over-development and lack of upkeep in the national parks and sought
higher, more protective management standards.'3 Conservationists in the
1950s, led by Howard Zahniser and The Wilderness Society, broke down
political barriers, gaining acceptance for this new concept." In short, an
undifferentiated combination of philosophy, aesthetics, moral beliefs,
spirituality, and even animism coalesced in the concept of wilderness.
Many people found virtue in "savage" nature and wanted to ensure that
America would always have lands in that pre-Columbian state.
By 1964, things stood this way: the federal government was the
owner in trust of hundreds of millions of acres," many if not most of
which were remote from civilization and relatively barren. The National
Park and Wildlife Refuge Systems together comprised less than fifty
million acres, and the National Forest System encompassed less than 200
million acres.'6 About 500 million acres of land remained unreserved,
unclaimed and under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM).'7
The original Wilderness Act designated only 9.1 million acres' out
of 800 million onshore acres of federal land as wilderness (and out of
total United States territory of 2.3 billion acres)."' Thus, the radical notion
of "nonuse" initially was applied to only a tiny fraction of federally owned
lands, a fact which no doubt eased the fears of wilderness opponents.
But why did Congress place any part of the federal domain essen-
tially off limits to all development? And why in 1964? Why did the fac-
tors discussed above coalesce in that year in the form of the Wilderness
Act? In a sense, the answer is that it was both the worst of times and the
best of times. This circumstance incited both sympathetic and far-sighted
legislators such as Hubert Humphrey and Henry Jackson to shepherd this
seminal legislation through Congress.
11. See I COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 2.03[2].
12. Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management in the Twenty-First Century: From Wise Use
to Wise Stewardship, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 360 (1994).
13. See BERNARD DEVOTO, ACROSS THE WIDE MISSOURI at xii (1947); BERNARD DEVOTO,
THE EASY CHAIR 255, 338, 345 (1955).
14. See Michael McCloskey, What the Wilderness Act Accomplished in Protection of Roadless
Areas Within the National Park System, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 455,461 (1995).
15. See BLM 1964 STATISTICS; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
16. Cf id at 18-19; PUB. LAND LAW COMM'N, ONETHIRD oFTHE NATON'S LAND 22 (1970).
17. See id.
18. See Kenneth D. Hubbard et al., The Wilderness Act's Impact on Mining Activities: Policy
Versus Practice, 76 DENY. U. L. REv. 591, 591 (1999).
19. See PUB. LAND LAW REV. COMM'N, supra note 16, at 22. This figure includes 53 million
acres owned by the United States in trust for Indian tribes.
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It was the worst of times because of the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy in November 1963. His successor, President Lyndon
Johnson, enjoyed an almost unprecedented honeymoon on domestic policy
issues after taking office." In an era of burgeoning progressivism, and with
Democrats controlling both Houses of Congress, President Johnson was
able to push through an agenda of reform legislation ranging from civil
rights to Medicare to pollution control to land policy.' Dissenting legis-
lators raised their voices, but they were either drowned out or bought off.
The opposition of Representative Aspinall, for example, to wilderness and
preservation generally, was deflected by including his pet project, a Public
Land Law Review Commission, in the legislative package.'
It was the best of times because the nation was prosperous. The
economy boomed, leaving Americans with the means and the inclination
to enjoy themselves: the music was good, the cars were big, gas was
plentiful, leisure time expanded as did the mobility to use it, and the
great outdoors beckoned. Recreational use of federal lands was expand-
ing almost exponentially. Solitude, and even danger, became virtues in
the public mind. At the same time, the threats posed by resource develop-
ment to public health and welfare were becoming more evident in the
smoggy skies and oily rivers. Rachel Carson published Silent Spring' in
1962. The federal government's unsuccessful 1963 proposal to dam the
Colorado River and flood portions of the Grand Canyon provoked out-
rage among conservationists such as David Brower?' What came to be
known as the environmental movement was in its infancy, but even then
its ideas held great popular appeal. The people wanted wilderness, and
their elected representatives acceded to their desires.
20. See Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradi-
tion: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 227, 269-70 (1996).
21. See id.
22. See Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The Legal
Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 251 n.14 (1988).
23. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). Professor Grad described the book's im-
pact this way:
The book energized conservationists and environmentalists. Its full contribution to the
environmental movement is difficult to measure. In dramatically reporting on the wide-
spread destruction of living things caused by DDT and other pesticides, Carson called
attention to the price we pay for the use of substances heretofore considered benign and
useful in the growing and protection of crops. The impact on plants and birds, and on
animal life, became even more frightening when it became clear that man, too, could be
hurt by pesticides, and that man was endangered because, standing at the very end of the
food chain, man's intake was likely to be greater as a result of bioconcentration.
FRANK P. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1-2 (3d ed. 1985); see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the
Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 981, 981 n.1 (1994) ("Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was arguably the most
important single trigger of the environmental great awakening, the scientific treatise that brought
ecological consciousness into the American mainstream.").
24. See Phillip M. Bender, Restoring the Elwha, White Salmon, and Rogue Rivers: A Com-




B. The Age of Preservation
The Wilderness Act marked the true onset of what has been called
the Age of Preservation in America. ' For the first time, Congress acted
to preserve lands in a pristine state for their own sake, not as "pleasuring
grounds" or bird breeding areas. The congressional choice was almost
independent of human economic demands, much like the rationale for
the Endangered Species Act' would be a decade later. The Wilderness
Act of 1964 opened the floodgates to an unprecedented spate of envi-
ronmental and preservationist legislation and cognate developments.
Although the Act contained several compromises that allowed continuing
resource exploitation," it became, as implemented, the most far-reaching
land preservation statute ever enacted.
In the ensuing years, Congress responded to the emerging public
preservationist sentiment by legislating for stringent pollution control,
more balanced energy development, wildlife protection, and stricter pub-
lic land management standards. President Johnson presided over enact-
ment of the first major federal pollution laws;" their primitiveness and
unenforceability" led to the far more stringent amendments in the 1970s.
Congress also responded to presidential requests in the public land law
arena by enacting legislation for national rivers,3' the wild and scenic
river system,32 national trails,33 and the land and water conservation
fund. '
The biggest explosion of federal environmental legislation the
country has experienced, before or since, occurred during the Nixon
Administration. Addressing pollution, Congress passed the Clean Air
25. See I COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 2.04[1].
26. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
27. See John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1259-60 (1998).
28. See 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.04[1].
29. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (codi-
fied at 33 U.S.C. § 466, transferred to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1160, and omitted by Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)); Clean Air Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat.
485 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
30. See, e.g., Frank J. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 1103, 1117-18(1970).
31. Ozark National Scenic Riverways, Mo., Establishment, Pub. L. No. 88-492, 78 StaL 608
(1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460m to 460m-7 (1994)).
32. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
1271-1287 (1968) (1994)).
33. National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1241-1251 (1994)).
34. Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to -11 (1994 & Supp. 111996)).
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Amendments of 1970," the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972,' the Noise Control Act of 1972,"7 and the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,' among others." In
1970, President Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency.'
Addressing wildlife preservation, Congress enacted the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971,' the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 1972,2 the Endangered Species Act of 1973,.' and the Sykes
Act Extension of 1974.' Federal land use planning was initiated by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969" and the Forest and Range-
land Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974.'
The Ford and Carter years saw Congress solidify and expand this
base of conservation/preservation legislation with amendments to the
pollution and wildlife laws. The former category included the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 7 and the Superfund statute, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980.48 The latter included the National Forest Management Act of
1976, ' the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, the Fed-
eral Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975,"' the Fisheries Conservation
and Management Act of 1976,2 the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
35. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
36. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.,
15 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C.).
37. Pub. L No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1994
& Supp. 1 1996)).
38. Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.,
33 U.S.C.).
39. "Environmental" legislation was not limited to the outdoor environment. See, e.g., The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C.).
40. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970,35 Fed. Reg. 15,623.
41. Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 649 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994 & Supp. H1
1996)).
42. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
43. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 16
U.S.C.).
44. Pub. L. No. 93-452, 88 Stat. 452 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a-670f (1994)).
45. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
46. Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994
& Supp. UI 1996)).
47. Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Star. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
48. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Star. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.,
33 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C.).
49. Pub. L. No. 94-588,90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
50. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.,
16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 40 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.).
51. Pub. L. No. 94-377,90 Stat. 1083 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
52. Pub. L. No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
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mation Act of 1977,'3 the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978,s'
and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980.5
Since the advent of the Reagan Administration in 1981, little reform
legislation has made it through Congress, either to extend or undo the
framework erected in the 1970s. Congress amended several laws, but its
main original contributions in the past two decades were only the Federal
Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987,' the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990,"' and the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement
Act of 1997.'
The act of conferring official status on geophysical wilderness in
1964 was radical; it isn't any longer. The Wilderness Act of 1964 was
the first and perhaps most significant development in the triumph of the
preservation ethic in the United States. The historical significance of
American wilderness creation extends beyond the nation's physical bor-
ders." National park creation, often called the best idea America ever
had,' has been emulated in nearly every country in the world, and wil-
derness preservation is now following the same track.
II. WILDERNESS IN LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Definition of Official Wilderness
Land in the United States can be, and has been, classified in a great
many ways. The two and a third billion acres that comprise the terrestrial
United States, plus territories and offshore areas under American juris-
diction, are owned by millions of entities, subject to hundreds of sover-
eigns, and put to innumerable uses. The federal government--due more
to historical accident than any conscious design-still owns in fee about
twenty-nine percent of onshore America.6' From those 660 million acres
in federal ownership (not counting severed estates or offshore lands),
Congress by 1998 had designated roughly 100 million acres as official
53. Pub. L. No. 95-87,91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
54. Pub. L. No. 95-514,92 Stat. 1803 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.).
55. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.,
43 U.S.C., 48 U.S.C.).
56. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30
U.S.C.).
57. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994)).
58, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252.
59. See George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Concessions Law and Policy in the
National Park System, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 729, 730-31 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park Estab-
lishment Legislation and Its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 779, 779
(1997) (quoting Wallace Stegner).
61. See Edward J. Heisel, Comment, Biodiversity and Federal Land Ownership: Mapping a
Strategy for the Future, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 229, 236 (1998).
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wilderness.' More than half of that is in Alaska.63 States, which also own
large quantities of land, have not established their own wilderness desig-
nation and management programs.'
Official wilderness occupies a unique niche among the many cate-
gories of federally owned lands. The Wilderness Act defines official
wilderness as follows:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where
the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where
man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness
is further defined to mean in this chapter an area of undeveloped Fed-
eral land retaining its primeval character and influence, without per-
manent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) gener-
ally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature,
with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has
outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined
type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of
sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an
unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geologi-
cal, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical
value.65
The definition obviously includes both objective components (to be
entitled to the protections afforded official wilderness, a tract must be
roadless and at least five thousand acres (two thousand hectares) in size),
and subjective components (it must have "outstanding opportunities for
solitude" or "primitive" recreation). ' David Brower has offered a simpler
definition: wilderness is an area "where the hand of man has not set
foot."'
Congress designated certain specific areas as wilderness in the 1964
Act itself." It also established processes, both in the 1964 Acte and sub-
sequently,"0 by which additional, suitable areas would be identified for
62. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND REsouRcEs LAW
141 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND].
63. See id.
64. A notable exception is New York, whose constitution mandates that the Adirondack forest
preserves shall remain forever wild. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
65. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
66. For further description of the objective and subjective components, see 2 CoGGINS &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.02[l][a][i]-[ii].
67. David Brower, Foreword to VoICEs FOR THE WILDERNEss at vii, xi (William Schwartz
ed., 1969). See generally Gregory H. Aplet, On the Nature of Wildness: Exploring What Wilderness
Really Protects, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 347 (1999) (contemplating other approaches to the definition
of wilderness).
68. See 2 CoGGiNs & GLicKsMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.02[1].
69. See Wilderness Act § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1132.
70. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1994).
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ultimate congressional designation. These mechanisms have 'resulted in
the addition of millions more acres to the wilderness preservation sys-
tem, despite the obvious reluctance on the part of some federal land
management agencies to implement the study processes fully.7 In large
part, this broadening of the category of official wilderness is attributable
to expansive judicial interpretation of the obligations imposed on the
agencies by key provisions of the designation process.
The 1964 Wilderness Act commanded a very limited study process
by which the land management agencies (especially the Forest Service)
would report to the President, who in turn would recommend inclusion or
exclusion to Congress.' The Act commanded that the Secretary of the
Interior review all roadless areas of five thousand contiguous acres or
more in the national parks and monuments and all roadless areas within
the national wildlife refuges and report on their suitability for preserva-
tion as wilderness." According to the statute, the Forest Service was to
review only areas classified by it as "primitive" in 1964.' In 1971, the
Tenth Circuit in Parker v. United Statesi expanded that study mandate to
contiguous areas and decreed that the agency could not allow wilderness-
destroying activities until the President and Congress had an opportunity
to exercise their discretion. ' Other courts concurred in the context of
NEPA evaluation.'
The Forest Service responded to the judicial desire to safeguard
wilderness possibilities by embarking on two successive system-wide
wilderness suitability studies called RARE I and RARE U." In 1982, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction against the "release" of wilderness-
eligible tracts back into multiple use, sustained yield management.'9 The
consequent freeze on road building and logging in thirty-six million acres
71. See Hardt, supra note 12, at 380-81.
72. See Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c); see also Marla E. Mansfield, A Primer of
Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801, 848-49 (1993) (discussing the process by which federal
lands become wilderness areas).
73. See Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
74. See Wilderness Act § 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b).
75. 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971).
76. Parker, 448 F.2d at 796-97.
77. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. United States Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial review of Forest Service compliance
with NEPA); Smith v. United States Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring the Forest
Service to consider environmental impact on an area of proposed timber sale even though the area
included inventoried land); Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir.
1973) (ruling that a Forest Service determination that environmental impact statement procedures
did not apply must be evaluated under a reasonableness standard in light of the requirements and
high standards in NEPA); Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. 20071 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (enjoining
any action that would change the wilderness character of any roadless or undeveloped area listed in
Forest Service inventories until the filing of a NEPA environmental impact statement).
78. See generally Michael McCloskey & Jeffrey Desautels, A Primer on Wilderness Law and
Policy, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10278 (1983) (discussing development of the wilderness system and the
National Forest System's roadless area reviews and evaluations).
79. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 769 (9th Cir. 1982).
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of national forests prompted Congress to enact a series of statewide wil-
derness bills in the early 1980s.' The equivalent process for BLM public
lands has lagged far behind," despite judicial reversals of agency efforts
to delete all split-estate lands from its inventory of tracts with wilderness
characteristics."'
B. Modernizing Official Wilderness Designation
At present, one hundred million or so acres of land comprise the
National Wilderness Preservation System." That is about twice the size
of Kansas, or more than one quarter the size of Alaska. ' Is it too much?
Wilderness opponents typically argue that wilderness designation should
be minimized because it "locks up" valuable resources, the development
of which will assist in our material prosperity." From this perspective, far
too much land in total has been put off limits to resource exploitation and
reserved for unproductive "nonuse." Wilderness proponents typically
chafe at both the nonuse and unproductivity characterizations, claiming
that natural resources in wilderness areas are being preserved for future
generations.' In any event, they claim, wilderness preservation is afford-
able in this affluent society and should be expanded for noneconomic
reas~nsY There is obviously no single correct legal "answer" to the
question of how much is enough (or too much) land to protect. To this
question, there are only political answers. The most critical political fact
is this: in three and one half decades since the initial adoption of the Wil-
derness Act, legislation has added lands to the system on a more-or-less
annual basis, but not one tract has ever been "de-designated," i.e., re-
moved from wilderness status.88
Our response to the question takes a more process-oriented tack.
Despite the addition of millions of acres to the wilderness preservation
system as a result of the study and designation procedures mandated by
Congress, the process as originally conceived and subsequently imple-
mented has not been sufficiently systematic to promote fully the statutory
goal of "secur[ing] for the American people of present and future gen-
erations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness." 9 We con-
80. See, e.g., Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-328, 98 Stat. 272 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); see also FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND, supra note 62, at 1053.
81. See 2 C6GGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.02[4].
82. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 335-38 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
83. See FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND, supra note 62, at 141.
84. See THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1566, 1605 (Barry Turner ed., 1998).
85. Rohlf & Honnold, supra note 22, at 257-58.
86. See id. at 273, 279.
87. See id.
88. Cf. FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND, supra note 62, at 1031-32.
89. Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
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tend that the administration of the process by which lands are considered
for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System should be
consolidated so that opportunities for present and future generations to
benefit from wilderness amenities are not inadvertently lost.
The current wilderness system is a product of planning-sort of.
Each of the four major federal land management agencies conducted
surveys to determine which tracts of land qualified for designation ac-
cording to the semi-objective criteria for wilderness.' Those surveys and
recommendations were then forwarded to the President and the Congress
for definitive action.91 But, so far as we can tell, little thought has been
devoted to the National Wilderness Preservation System as a system, in
the same way, for example, as the National Park System is designed to
function as an integrated whole. Certainly, the management of official
wilderness areas by four separate agencies-each with its own traditions,
missions, and governing standards-has no pretense of uniformity or
even of coordination.
While the management priorities of the Wilderness Act are fairly
clear, 2 the agencies just as clearly differ in their receptivity to wilderness
designation and management. Both the Forest Service and the BLM, for
example, have at times evinced hostility toward wilderness designation?
As a result, no one can be sure that Congress has had the opportunity to
consider all lands meeting the minimum statutory criteria, judicial review
of the designation process notwithstanding. Further, the final decision on
each tract-often made on a state-by-state basis-is necessarily a prod-
uct of political considerations with a local or statewide rather than a na-
tional focus. In a striking sense, wilderness is what is left over. Not only
did no one choose to homestead or mine the tract that may now be ripe
for wilderness designation when it was available for exploitation, no
decision makers thought it was worthy of multiple use resource devel-
opment of any intensity after it was withdrawn from homesteading.
To remedy the scattershot nature of the designation process, we
suggest consideration of a general overhaul of the jurisdictional bounda-
ries of federal lands." The existence of four separate major (and several
lesser) agencies to manage these lands is neither constitutionally required
nor historically foreordained. Modern,justification for retaining four
separate land management agencies to govern a multiplicity of federal
lands categories is difficult to discern; the rationale for dividing up the
90. See CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE POLMCS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION 148 (1982),
91. See id.
92. Cf infra Part L1.A.
93. See Hardt, supra note 12, at 378-80.
94. The reorganization we propose here has implications that extend well beyond improve-
ments in the wilderness designation and management processes. This article is not the place to
explore those extrawilderness implications, although we are confident that the proposed reorganiza-
tion would benefit other aspects of federal land management as well.
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task of managing official wilderness among these same four entities is
entirely lacking. We recommend, therefore, that serious thought be de-
voted to consolidation and simplification.
At the risk of oversimplification, one can view federal lands as the
source of two kinds of "goods"--commodities and personal pleasure.
One obvious course of reform, then, is to condense the four existing
agencies into two: the National Park and Wildlife Service (NPWS),
which would take charge of the lands devoted primarily to noncommod-
ity uses, and the National Forest and Range Service (NFRS), which
would control the lands set aside principally for resource extraction. The
new NPWS would assume jurisdiction over all current units of the na-
tional park and national wildlife refuge systems plus all adjacent or
(more-or-less) freestanding wilderness areas. In the process, Congress
should consolidate the new federal land management systems by adding
to the NPWS any NFRS lands necessary for contiguity and buffer zones,
preservation of wildlife corridors, and ecosystem management. The new
NFRS would then be responsible for the remaining lands, which would
remain open to extractive activities under the multiple use, sustained
yield laws.95
This streamlining concept is relatively simple and aligns well with a
wide variety of proposals for wider and broader management priorities.
The process of redrawing the boundaries would be far from simple, how-
ever, and undoubtedly would be highly acrimonious. The division be-
tween lands suitable for resource extraction and those amenable to rec-
reational use, for example, is anything but a clean one. On the one hand,
even on national forest and BLM lands, where commodity production
(minerals, timber, red meat, etc.) has long been the dominant goal, re-
source exploitation is giving way to recreational and preservation use.'
On the other hand, the growth of commercial outfits that provide recrea-
tional outings to the federal lands for ever-increasing numbers of tourists
has tended to blur the distinction between commodity and personal
pleasure use.' But the end is worth the fight. Present land categories and
land management agencies are not etched in stone: as Congress did, so
can it undo. Consolidation, as here advocated, would produce a more
efficient administration of federal land policy and far better protection
for American wilderness. The new NPWS would still have to reconcile
potential conflicts between recreational and preservation use of the lands
95. Multiple use, sustained yield management in practice is a fundamentally bad idea, but that
story is for another time and place. Cf. 3 COGGINS & GLuCKSMAN, supra note 6, ch. 16.
96. See Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of Environmental
Quality in Western Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 369, 390-91 (1994).
97. See generally Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 59 (discussing current law governing
National Park Service concessions as well as proposals for reform).
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placed in its stewardship." With the exception of wilderness lands sub-
ject to preexisting developmental uses, the agency would not have to
resolve conflicts between preservation and development on lands poten-
tially suitable for wilderness designation or lands within its jurisdiction
adjacent to official wilderness.
C. The Scattershot Nature of Official Wilderness Designations
The current legal definition of official wilderness" is not the only
possible definition. In fact, Congress on more than one occasion jetti-
soned "purity" notions when it wanted to include areas with marginal
qualifications under the Wilderness Act's definition. An example is the
Endangered American Wilderness Act of 197 8 ."00 Congress in that Act
designated as wilderness a number of areas that arguably did not qualify
as such according to the technical legal definition."l ' We contend that the
evolution of preservation law in the United States, since the adoption of
the Wilderness Act in 1964, makes it appropriate, if not imperative, to
consider expansion of the legal definition of wilderness. In particular,
official wilderness should be expanded to include natural landforms and
ecosystems not currently represented in the wilderness system, recreated
wilderness areas, lands not currently in federal ownership, and offshore
lands.
Several post-1964 large-scale federal lands developments," and the
even larger proposals for change now pending,'" provide a template for
sweeping ecosystems not now included within the confines of official
wilderness. The National Park System now resembles a true national
system because the NPS is committed to having all representative biomes
of the country included in its holdings." New federal, state, and private
arrangements for more integrated and preservation land management
98. Conflicts between recreational and preservational use of the federal lands, including lands
designated as official wilderness, have joined conflicts between recreational use and commodity
development as frequent subjects of litigation in recent years. See 3 COGGINS & GtLCKSMAN, supra
note 6, §§ 17.01, 17.03(1].
99. See Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
100. Pub. L. No. 95-237,92 Stat. 40 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
101. See FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND, supra note 62, at 1039. But see Endangered American Wil-
derness Act of 1978 § l(a)(2) ("[C]ertain of these undeveloped national forest lands meet all statu-
tory criteria for suitability as wilderness as established by subsection 2(c) of the Wilderness Act.").
102. See Heisel, supra note 61, at 265.
103. See id. at 277.
104. Professor Fischman maintains that "[a]s the biological diversity of the United States con-
tinues to erode ... the national park system becomes ever more valuable to maintain the biological
integrity of representative ecosystems throughout the country." Fisehman, supra note 60, at 782.
Park System lands do not currently reflect that diversity. See Heisel, supra note 61, at 232 n.10; cf
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 48-49 (1997) ("Although
they fall short of fully representing all of the nation's ecosystem types, the lands the federal govern-
ment currently holds present enormous conservation opportunities and are the logical starting point
for a national biodiversity conservation strategy.").
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have been created for areas such as the New Jersey Pine Barrens,"° the
Lake Tahoe Basin,"'6 the Columbia Gorge,"D and the California Desert
Conservation Area,"' among others. Habitat conservation plans under the
ESA are expanding rapidly in size and scope." Planning for entire water-
sheds is in vogue."' Protection and allocation of salmon runs involves
multiple jurisdictions, dozens of entities, and thousands of people."'
Many pending land use and classification proposals necessarily im-
plicate wilderness considerations. The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem
concept posits the notion that an area much larger than the Park itself
should be brought under coordinated management to minimize conflicts
and degradation. " ' Even more ambitious is the proposal for a Northern
Rockies Supercorridor for wildlife habitat and movement stretching from
Yellowstone hundreds of miles north to Lake Louise in Canada."' The
Poppers' vision of a Buffalo Commons on the Northern Great Plains,"'
although seldom taken seriously, has considerable intrinsic merit.
105. SeeJOHNA. MCPHEE, THE PINEBARRENs 15 (1968).
106. See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1969).
107. See Bowen Blair, Jr., The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area: The Act, Its Gene-
sis and Legislative History, 17 ENVTL. L. 863, 866-68 (1987).
108. California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat 4471 (codified at
16 U.S.C. § 410aaa note (1994)).
109. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the
U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 351-58 (1993); Lindell L.
Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New Paradigm for Conserving
Biological Diversity, 8 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 97, 98-99 (1994).
110. Cf Constance E. Hunt, Wetland Planning Processes in a Watershed Context, SA83 ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY 207, 209 (1996).
111. See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution of Ecosystem
Management in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653 (1997) (discussing water man-
agement plans aimed at saving salmon); Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the
Parity Promise: Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL.
L. 657, 659-62 (1991) (discussing the failure of the Northwest Power Act).
112. See Robert B. Keiter, An Introduction to the Ecosystem Management Debate, in THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE EcosysTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 3, 4-6
(Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991); John.Mumma & Paul Grigsby, A Vision for Yellow-
stone's Forests, 15 PuB. LAND L. REV. 11, 49-52 (1994); see also T.W. Clark & D. Zaunbrecher,
The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: The Ecosystem Concept in Natural Resource Policy and Man-
agement, 5 RENEWABLE RESOURCES J., Summer 1987, at 8 (discussing the evolution of the greater
Yellowstone ecosystem and policy considerations).
113. See Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act of 1992, H.R. 5944, 102d Cong. § 4;
Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U.
COLO. L. REv. 293, 327 (1994); see also Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act of 1993, H.R.
2638, 103d Cong. (proposing designation of wildlife areas in Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington,
and Wyoming ).
114. See Frank J. Popper & Deborah Epstein Popper, The Great Plains: From Dust to Dust,
PLANNING, Dec. 1987, at 12, 17-18; see also ANNE MATTHEWS, WHERE THE BUFFALO ROAM 13-
14 (1992) (discussing the Poppers' vision of a buffalo common); Winona LaDuke, Traditional Eco-
logical Knowledge and Environmental Futures, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 127, 144-45
(1994) (discussing Ward Churchill's expansion of the Poppers' idea of a buffalo common).
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As the idea of broader inclusion seems not so far-fetched, so too the
idea of wilderness creation or re-creation should not be dismissed out of
hand. While no human agency can reclaim an area as well as Mother
Nature, still, humans can undo much of what humans have done-and in
fact are doing so on several fronts. '
Consider wildlife species reintroduction. The recent reintroduction
of wolves into Yellowstone, Montana, and Idaho wilderness areas gener-
ated a great deal of controversy."' In reality, however, a number of other
reintroduction programs have been quite successful and relatively un-
controversial."" Wild turkeys and otters in Missouri, pronghorn antelope
in Kansas, condors in the Southwest, and elk in Wisconsin are just a few
of the instances in which humans are recreating aspects of nature that
humans had earlier eradicated." s
Or consider dams and roads. Whether the United States has built too
many is of course a political judgment, but the deleterious effects of both
on the natural world are incontestable. Neither dams nor roads are neces-
sarily permanent, however. Roads can be torn up and reclaimed. Dams
can be blown up so that rivers can reacquire their natural free-flowing
characteristics. The notion of reclaiming nature or recreating wilderness
is not a pipe dream. If development turns out to be mistaken, corrective
measures sometimes can and should be taken. The Forest Service-with
the longest road system in the world" 9 -will see many of its roaded areas
revert to roadlessness because it simply does not have the resources to
keep the forces of deterioration at bay.' And, dams are no longer sacro-
sanct. Since the Supreme Court ruled in the Snail Darter case"' that the
welfare of an obscure little fish took legal precedence over completion of
115. Cf. Dave Foreman, The Wildlands Project and the Rewilding of North America, 76 DENV.
U. L. REV. 535 (1999) (describing the concept of rewilding).
116. See United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 1998); Wyoming Farm
Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349, 1355-56 (D. Wyo. 1997); see also Inga Haagenson
Causey, Comment, The Reintroduction of the Wolf in Yellowstone: Has the Program Fatally
Wounded the Very Species it Sought to Protect?, 11 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 468-73 (1998) (discuss-
ing reintroduction of the gray wolf and the litigation surrounding it).
117. See generally Holly Doremus, Private Property Interests, Wildlife Restoration, and Com-
peting Visions of a Western Eden, 18 J. LAND REsOuRcES & ENVrL. L. 41, 41-43 (1998) (discuss-
ing the reintroduction of nearly extinct species).
118. See id at 41; see also Christine Bertelson, Hi Hi Birdie Turkeys Make Comeback to Wild,
Not to Tables, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 1991, at Al; Jerry Davis, Add Elk to View List;
Director of Elk Reintroduction Study Says Clam Lake Is Waking Up to Tourist Opportunities, Wis.
STATE J., Oct. 11, 1998, at 13D; Andrew Melnykovych, Indiana Is Hoping New Otters Will Thrive
at Patoka Restoration-An Example of National Effort, COURIER J., Jan. 29, 1997, at IA; Missouri
Conservation Dep't, Despite Second Trapping Season, River Otters Are Thriving, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 1998, at 6.
119. See Nick Jans, Alaska Boondoggle Costs Taxpayers $102 Million, USA TODAY, Nov. 6,
1997, at 19A.
120. See Susan Drumheller, Road Closures Loom for CDA Forests; Forest Service Taking
Extensive Look at Heavily Roaded District, THE SPOKESMAN REV., Nov. 8, 1997, at Al.
121. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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a large, unnecessary dam," public opinion in general has swung away
from dam-building (now virtually a dead letter, like nuclear plants)"
toward protection of fish habitat and free (or freer) flowing rivers. An
Interior Secretary suggested studying whether to tear down Hetch-
Hetchy dam in Yosemite National Park.'" The Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission recently ordered the decommissioning of a dam in
Maine because the damage it caused to fish runs could not be eliminated
at a cost that would be justified by the revenues to be generated by con-
tinued operation of the dam." Even more radical is the idea, now being
actively pursued, of blowing up four dams on the Snake River system to
facilitate anadromous fish passage.'" The impetus, ironically enough, is
economic: it costs more to transport the fish around the dams than the
dams are worth.27
To date, all official wilderness areas have been carved out of lands
already owned by the federal government. That need not always be the
case. Many national recreational tracts have been created out of both
public and private lands, using purchase, condemnation, exchange, zon-
ing, and cooperative agreements as the means of acquisition and en-
forcement.'" Politics and money, not geography or law, are the only bar-
riers to doing the same thing for wilderness re-creation. One obvious
candidate is the high plains region of the Midwest. Vast regions of west-
ern Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and the Dakotas, along with eastern
Colorado and Wyoming, are becoming depopulated.'" The remaining
122. The fate of the dam was subsequently reversed by Congress. See George Cameron Cog-
gins & Robert L. Glicksman, Power, Procedure, and Policy in Public Lands and Resources Law, 10
NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Summer 1995, at 3, 81-82.
123. See Maryanne Lawrence Grodin & Alexandra B. Keith, Nuclear Whistleblowers: An
Environment of Change, 41 FED. BAR NEws & J. 98, 100 (1994). But cf Margaret Kriz, A Come-
back for Nukes?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24, 1998, at 2492 (describing the "comeback" being staged by
nuclear power).
124. See Hetch Hetchy Plan "Dead," L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1988, at 2. For discussion of the
unsuccessful battle by John Muir and others to prevent construction of the dam, see Peter Manus,
One Hundred Years of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three Twentieth Century Nature Philoso-
phers, 59 U. PrT. L. REV. 557, 611-16 (1998); Elmo R. Richardson, The Struggle for the Valley:
California's Hetch Hetchy Controversy, 1905-1913, 38 CAL. HIST. Soc'Y Q. 248, 250 (1959);
William Andrew Shutkin, Note, The National Park Service Act Revisited, 10 VA. ENVTE.. LJ. 345,
357-60 (1991).
125. See Edwards Mfg. Co., 81 F.E.R.C. 1 61,255, at 62,209-11 (1997); Carey Goldberg, Fish
Are Victorious Over Dam As U.S. Agency Orders Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1997, at A6.
126. See New Plan for Rescuing the Salmon Breaching of Dams Would Let Endangered Fish
Swim to Sea, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1997, at B5. See generally Bender, supra note 24 (discussing the
proposed removal of several dams).
127. See Edwards Mfg. Co., 81 F.E.R.C. at 62,210.
128. See, e.g., 2 COoGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 15.04[l] (discussing use of condem-
nation and purchase to establish wild and scenic river corridors); I COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 6, § 10B (discussing sources and scope of federal condemnation power).
129. See Jon Margolis, The Reopening of the Frontier, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 15, 1995, § 6, at 51.
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people survive by mining groundwater, which in time will be depleted.'"
The United States several times before has bailed out bankrupt, hard-
scrabble farmers by purchasing their marginal farms. Doing the same for
the establishment of a plains wilderness, thus, has precedent. Conversion
from farms to roadlessness would of course be expensive and difficult,
but certainly not impossible.
Similarly, the Mississippi River delta in Louisiana would be an ex-
cellent candidate for recreated wilderness. According to many accounts,
human activity has trashed it unmercifully with pollution, water diver-
sions, and related activities."' Coastal river deltas are among the most
prolific producers of life on the planet,' 2 and protecting that productive
capacity should be among our highest priorities. Nothing protects land
like designation as official wilderness.
Further, the concept of official wilderness to date has been limited
to onshore lands within the boundaries of this country.'33 It need not be so
circumscribed. For example, cross-boundary national park creation with
Canada has proven successful.'" In the same vein, the Canada/Alaska
border has many areas that could qualify for wilderness designation.'
Creating a wilderness complex stretching from Yellowstone to Lake
Louise and beyond is well within the realm of possibility."n Offshore
wilderness may be even more important to develop. All of the Florida
Keys are now within a national marine sanctuary. "7 To create a wilder-
ness from the north end of the Everglades National Park down to and
past the Keys would serve many worthwhile purposes, not the least being
protection of a prolific life producing region. A case can also be made for
declaring the entire Bering Sea an international wilderness.
Attempts to implement each of these ideas would create contro-
versy, provoke bitter resistance, and threaten disruption of the status quo
130. See Kurt Stephenson, Groundwater Management in Nebraska: Governing the Commons
Through Local Resource Districts, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 521 (1996).
131. See generally Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences,
and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1983) (discussing the negative effects of canals, pipelines, and
pollution on the Mississippi River).
132. See id. at 84.
133. Cf. Wilderness Act § 2(a), (c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a), (c) (1994).
134. The international parks that have been established include Waterton-Glacier and Quetico-
Superior. See Dino Ross, International Management of the Flathead River Basin, 1 COLO. J. INT'L.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 223, 223-24 (1990).
135. See Miistakis Institute for the Rockies, The Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative:
To Restore and Protect the Wild Heart of North America (last modified Aug. 9, 1998)
<http://www.rockies.ca/y2y/>.
136. See id.
137. See Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-605, 104
Stat. 3089 (1990) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-587, §§ 2206, 2209, 106 Stat. 5039, 5053, 5054
(1992)).
138. St. Matthew Island within the Bering Sea was designated as an official wilderness area in
1970. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825, 828 (D. Ala. 1984) (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1431(a) (1982)).
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in a variety of ways. Resistance, however, is not a good reason for dis-
carding such possibilities out of hand; every change that we now recog-
nize as social progress also was the subject of bitter resistance at the time
of proposal.9 Some wilderness protection efforts may turn out to be in-
feasible or simply not worth the economic and social disruption they
would cause. Yet, others might prove to be beneficial from a variety of
perspectives.
Congress in 1964 apparently thought of wilderness as mountainous,
wooded, remote areas, owned by the government, in which few had ever
expressed an economic interest. That view was highly valuable at the
time, but many factors contribute to an argument for a more expansive
definition today-a definition to which there is no legal barrier. As the
richest nation ever on earth, the United States can afford to do the right
thing. Whether the designation of any particular area as official wilder-
ness is the right thing cannot, of course, be decided in the abstract. The
potential benefits of a broadened definition of official wilderness, how-
ever, can be appreciated in general terms." Wilderness ensures the avail-
ability of experiences with nature and the continuation of productive
capacity of the land for future generations of Americans.' An increase in
official wilderness will probably be an economic plus, given the enor-
mous rise in tourism and recreation. This factor, however, should not be
dispositive, because wilderness is not, at bottom, about money.
Im. WILDERNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF FEDERAL LAND USE
MANAGEMENT
Designation of a parcel as part of the National Wilderness Preserva-
tion System does not change its geophysical character. Indeed, designa-
tion is intended in large part to prevent changes in the physical character
of the land and the resources it contains. 2 Designation does, however,
drastically change a parcel's legal status in terms of its availability for
human use. Official wilderness is open to fewer uses than any other fed-
eral lands category."'3 The apparent simplicity of the management stan-
dard governing official wilderness, however, is misleading. Among the
issues likely to recur in future controversies involving wilderness man-
agement are those relating to the protection of existing private rights, the
scope of agency duties to provide affirmative protection to wilderness
139. Cf. Hubbard et al., supra note 18, at 592-97 (describing the strong opposition of mining
interests to the adoption of the Wilderness Act).
140. See, e.g., Pete Morton, The Economic Benefits of Wilderness: Theory and Practice, 76
DENV. U. L. REv. 465,475-91 (1999) (describing categories of the benefits of wilderness).
141. See Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994) (declaring a policy of securing for
present and future generations "the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness").
142. See id (Wilderness areas shall be administered "in such manner as will leave them unim-
paired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness.").




characteristics, and the authority of agencies with jurisdiction over wil-
derness to protect it against external threats.
A. The Impact of Grandfathering Existing Private Rights and Related
Uses
Primitive recreation is the only allowable human use of official wil-
derness, barring special statutory exception or preexisting vested use
rights. As a general rule, no commercial enterprises or permanent roads
are allowed in official wilderness.'" Except to the extent necessary to
administer wilderness areas, temporary roads, motor vehicle use, and the
establishment of structures or installations are also barred. " Commercial
services may be performed only to the extent necessary to realize the
recreational or other wilderness purposes of designated areas."
The range of permissible uses is considerably broader than those
authorized by the general rule, however. The general prohibition on
commercial uses and permanent roads is "subject to existing private
rights."' 7 The scope of that exception is far from clear, as the Sixth Cir-
cuit's recent nondefinitive decision concerning the propriety of Forest
Service restrictions on preexisting littoral rights illustrates." The 1964
Act also creates a series of more specific exceptions. Aircraft and motor-
boat uses already established at the time of designation may continue,
subject to reasonable agency regulation.' 9 Activities, such as prospecting
for the purpose of gathering information about mineral resources, are
permitted in national forest wilderness areas, provided they are con-
ducted in a manner compatible with wilderness preservation.' ° New min-
eral location and leasing in wilderness areas has been prohibited since
January 1, 1984," but pre-1984 claims and leases may continue to be
exploited, subject to "reasonable stipulations" adopted by the Secretary
of Agriculture to protect wilderness character."' Similarly, livestock
grazing within national forest wilderness areas that predated designation
may continue, subject to "reasonable regulations.""
144. See Wilderness Act § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
145. See id.
146. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5). This authorization does not encom-
pass commercial fishing in wilderness areas of the national parks. See Alaska Wildlife Alliance v.
Jensen, 108 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1997).
147. WildernessAct§4(c), 16U.S.C. § 1133(c).
148. Cf Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'g on rehearing en
banc by an equally divided court 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 764
(1997). For further discussion of Stupak-Thrall see infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
149. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 133(d)(1).
150. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2).
151. See 2 CoGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.04[6].
152. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3).
153. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4).
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The statutory exceptions for "existing private rights" may be neces-
sary to avoid raising takings questions under the Fifth Amendment,"
although private property rights in public lands are often limited.' The
fuzziness of the concept, together with the inherent ambiguity of the
scope of "reasonable" regulation to which grandfathered uses are subject,
leaves open the possibility that activities which create substantial risks to
wilderness character may proceed. Courts tend to defer to the exercise of
agency expertise in many federal lands contexts." A little extra judicial
vigilance might be appropriate in circumstances in which excepted uses
appear to threaten wilderness values."7
An even greater threat to these values may lie in the exceptions to the
restricted uses of official wilderness that appear in individual wilderness
designation legislation. In a rider to the Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century,"" adopted in 1998, Congress authorized motorized portages
in portions of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness.'9 The ex-
ample is noteworthy not necessarily because of its likely impact but be-
cause of its manner of adoption. In the 1990s Congress has increasingly
resorted to appropriations riders in lieu of substantive authorizing legis-
lation to effectuate national environmental (or antienvironmental) pol-
icy.'" If Congress continues to do so, it will create a significant risk that
activities with the potential to damage wilderness character permanently
may be authorized by stealth rather than through the crucible of informed
public debate. This threat is not an idle one. For example, during the
105th Congress efforts were made to attach to appropriations legislation
a rider that would authorize, for the first time, the construction of a new
road in an official wilderness area.' In the long run, such piecemeal ex-
ceptions may not only transform the geophysical character of the affected
wilderness areas, they also may wind up seriously diluting the legal con-
cept of official wilderness itself.
154. U.S. CONST. amend V ("[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."); cf. Store Safe Redlands Assoc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726 (1996); Hage v.
United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996).
155. See, e.g., Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
156. Cf., e.g., 3 CoGoiNS & GLICSMAN, supra note 6, § 16.01[3] (addressing the implementa-
tion of multiple use management statutes).
157. Cf. Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Robertson, 978 F.2d 1484 (8th Cir.
1992) (determining that the law needs to be strictly construed to fulfill the intent of the Wilderness
Act).
158. Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C.A. § 101
(1998)).
159. See Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century § 1212(v), 23 U.S.C.A. § 101.
160. See Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the
Contract with America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental Protection?,
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9,21-22 (1996).
161. See Margaret Kriz, Rough Riders, NAT'L J., Sept. 5, 1998, at 2022, 2024-25 (describing




B. The Affirmative Preservation Duty
An important management question which has received relatively
little attention to date is the extent to which land management agencies
with jurisdiction over official wilderness have an affirmative duty to
protect the values reflected in that designation. The Wilderness Act de-
crees in section 4(b) that each agency with jurisdiction over official wil-
derness area "be responsible for preserving the wilderness character of
the area and shall so administer such area for such other purposes for
which it may have been established as also to preserve its wilderness
character."' 2
The question of whether and to what extent the managing agency is
under an affirmative preservation duty was raised in 1987 litigation over
beetle infestations, 3 but the judicial answer was not entirely clear. The
Forest Service embarked on an "extensive tree-cutting and chemical-
spraying campaign" to control pine beetle infestations in southern Na-
tional Forest wilderness areas.'" Plaintiffs claimed that the beetle pro-
gram violated the Wilderness Act as well as several other statutes.'" The
Act authorizes the Secretary to take "such measures ... in the control
of... insects.., subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems desir-
able."" Plaintiffs argued that the control program was not necessary be-
cause it would be demonstrably ineffective.'
The district court distinguished between measures meant to protect
wilderness resources and measures taken within wilderness areas to pro-
tect economic interests and resources on adjacent private lands." As to
the former, the agency enjoys great latitude; courts should upset such de-
cisions only upon "the most explicit showing of arbitrary irresponsibil-
ity."' But a program involving harm to wilderness resources for the
benefit of private landowners, said the court, is altogether another story."'
[T]his case does not involve the management of Wilderness Areas as
such. Rather, it presents a different question, one that is not fully ad-
dressed by the Act itself. That question is whether the Secretary has
been given the same .. .broad management discretion previously
noted when he takes actions within the Wilderness Areas for the
benefit of outside commercial and other private interests. This ques-
tion must be answered in the negative because in a situation like this
the Secretary is not managing the wilderness but acting contrary to
wilderness policy for the benefit of outsiders.
162. Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1994).
163. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40,41-42 (DD.C. 1987).
164. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. at 41.
165. See id.
166. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(l), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1).
167. See Lyng, 662 F. Supp. at 41.
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A fair reading of the Wilderness Act places a burden on the Sec-
retary affirmatively to justify his actions under these circumstances.
Where such actions are shown to contravene wilderness values guar-
anteed by the Wilderness Act, as they do here, then the Secretary
must, when challenged, justify them by demonstrating they are neces-
sary to effectively control the threatened outside harm that prompts
the action being taken. Here the Secretary has not addressed this af-
firmative burden.''
The court then condemned the beetle program as antithetical to wilder-
ness purposes and policies: "Only a clear necessity for upsetting the
equilibrium of the ecology could justify this highly injurious, semiex-
perimental venture of limited effectiveness."'"2 The court remanded for
the Forest Service to complete an environmental impact statement and
rethink the notion.'
The Forest Service did so, and came up with a much more limited
beetle control plan.' It narrowed the program's purposes, limited timber
cutting, made control the exception, and required adjacent private owners
to take their own reasonable steps.'" This time the court determined that
the Secretary met his burden "affirmatively to justify control actions
taken for the benefit of adjacent landowners" on the ground that wilder-
ness value would not be "unnecessarily sacrificed to promote the inter-
ests of adjacent landowners."' 6
The need for interpreting the scope of the affirmative duty was pre-
sented clearly in Sierra Club v. Yeutter.'" In that case, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the government breached the affirmative statutory duty, as
well as its obligations emanating from the public trust doctrine, by failing
to assert federal reserved water rights for national forests in Colorado in
pending state water rights adjudications." The Tenth Circuit avoided
addressing the merits by holding that the case was not ripe for adjudica-
tion.'7 In doing so, it remarked that the Wilderness Act "imposes an af-
firmative duty" to preserve wilderness character,"8 albeit a "limited"
171. Id. at42-43.
172. Id. at 43.
173. See id.
174. Cf Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F. Supp. 556, 557 (D.D.C. 1987) (discussing the plan adopted
by the Forest Service).
175. Sierra Club, 663 F. Supp. at 558.
176. Id. at 560.
177. 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990).
178. See Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1408.
179. See id. at 1421.
180. Id. at 1413; see also Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir.
1998) ("The Wilderness Act of 1964 makes agencies that administer wilderness areas responsible for
preserving their wilderness character."); California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 475 n. 12 (E.D.
Cal. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Areas




one."' It added that, even if the Wilderness Act creates federal reserved
water rights, "the Forest Service is not obligated to assert those rights in
the absence of a threat to the wilderness characteristics" of the affected
areas82 and that "only agency conduct that is irreconcilable with the
statutory mandate to preserve the wilderness characteristics of the Colo-
rado wilderness areas will invoke judicial review."'' In Vigil v.
Rhoades,' the court subsequently commented that it had held in Yeutter
that the statutory mandate at issue did not provide a "manageable standard
of review."'" The issue has arisen rarely enough that Yeutter's inconclu-
sive pronouncements concerning the content of the duty and the posture a
court will take in reviewing allegations of breach are about as expansive as
anything the courts have produced in interpreting section 4(b).
The issue of the extent of the land management agencies' duties to
take affirmative steps to protect resources committed to their stewardship
has arisen in other contexts." These analogous situations, however, point
in different directions. A California district court in the 1970s recognized
an affirmative duty in the nature of a trust obligation on the part of the
National Park Service to control logging practices on private land adja-
cent to Redwood National Park.'8 ' The duty arose from both the specific
legislation establishing the Park, which authorized the Interior Secretary
to take a variety of actions "to afford as full protection as is reasonably
possible" to park resources," and the National Park System Act, the
stated purpose of which is "to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wildlife therein."'' But the same court later dis-
missed the litigation, finding that the agency had done all that it reasona-
bly could have done.'"' No other courts have endorsed the public trust
181. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1413. The district court, in a previous phase of the case, had recog-
nized the administering agencies' duty under section 4(b) "to protect and preserve all wilderness
resources, including water," and "a general duty under the Wilderness Act to protect and preserve
wilderness water resources," but concluded that "[t]here is ... no specific statutory duty to claim
reserved water rights in the wilderness areas even though Congress impliedly reserved such rights in
order to effectuate the purposes of the Act." Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 864 (D. Colo.
1985) (emphasis added). For further discussion of the Sierra Club litigation, see Karin P. Sheldon,
Waterfor Wilderness, 76 DENY. U. L. REV. 555, 568-74 (1999).
182. Yeutter, 911 F.2dat 1418.
183. ld. at 1419.
184. 953 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
185. Vigil, 953 F.2d at 1231 n.7; see also Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1414 (holding that the Wilder-
ness Act does not provide courts with meaningful or substantive standards to review agency land
management practices unless the practices are irreconcilable with the statutory mandate imposed by
the Wilderness Act).
186. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior (Sierra Club I1), 424 F. Supp. 172,
172-73 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior (Sierra Club II), 398 F. Supp.
284, 285 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior (Sierra Club I), 376 F. Supp.
90, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see also cases cited in 1 CoGGiNs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 8.07 n.18.
187. Sierra Club , 376 F. Supp. at 95-96.
188. Id. at 94 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 79c(e)).
189. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see Sierra Club II, 398 F. Supp. at 287.
190. See Sierra Club 111, 424 F. Supp. at 175-76.
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rationale of the Sierra Club cases, and other courts have rejected the no-
tion of extrastatutory trust responsibilities for the Park Service.'9' The
Park Service's compliance with any affirmative duties it has to protect
park resources appears to be at best, therefore, reviewable in only the
most deferential and perfunctory fashion."
The other obvious point of comparison comes from section 7(a)(1)
of the Endangered Species Act, which states that all federal agencies
"shall ... utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the
statute] by carrying out programs for the conservation" of listed endan-
gered and threatened species." In cases in which the issue has arisen, the
courts have acknowledged the existence of an affirmative conservation
duty.' That ESA duty extends beyond the obligation created by section
7(a)(2) to refrain from taking actions likely to jeopardize listed species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of their critical habitat.'"
The affirmative conservation duty of section 7(a)(1) has provided courts
with grounds for invalidating bird hunting regulations issued by the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS),' banning the use of lead shot in portions of
the national wildlife refuges to protect bald eagles," upholding a FWS
decision to close a wildlife refuge to human use to protect breeding
habitat for threatened birds,'" and enunciating an obligation on the part of
the Interior Secretary to deny water use permits that would impair suit-
able habitat for endangered fish.'" In one case, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the absolute terms in which the affirmative conservation duty
is phrased precludes the agency (in that case, the U.S. Navy) from re-
fusing to abide by it on the ground that doing so would be inconsistent
with its primary mission.' The duty overrides an agency's primary mis-
sion, although the agency retains discretion in choosing the means of
compliance."' The ESA's affirmative duty to conserve listed species is
191. See cases cited in 1 CoGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 8.07 n.18.
192. Id.
193. Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994).
194. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410,1416-17
(9th Cir. 1990); Carson-Truckee Water Conservation Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257,259 (9th Cir. 1984).
195. See Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see also House v. United
States Forest Serv., 974 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (enjoining timber sale for noncompli-
ance with affirmative duty to place listed species "at the top of [the agency's] priority list").
196. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977).
197. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 15 Envt'l L. Rep. 20891, 20893 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
198. See New England Naturist Ass'n v. Larsen, 692 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D.R.I. 1988).
199. See Carson-Truckee Water Conservation Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 1984).
200. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F. 2d 1410, 1417
(9th Cir. 1990).
201. See id. at 1418-19; see also Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 688 F. Supp. 1334, 1352 (D.
Minn. 1988), aff'd in relevant part, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989) (deferring to agency judgment "as
to the proper level of activism"). Litigants have failed to demonstrate a violation of the duty in some
instances. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1511-12 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that section 7
does not apply to agreements formed prior to passage of the ESA); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Na-
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more stringent and therefore more judicially enforceable than the Park
Service's affirmative conservation obligations.
Which of the two models provides the more appropriate comparison
for interpretation of the affirmative duty of agencies with jurisdiction
over wilderness areas to preserve their wilderness character? We suggest
that the ESA's conservation duty is more analogous to the duty stem-
ming from section 4(b) of the Wilderness Act for at least two reasons.
First, the statutory language of section 4(b) is closer to that of section
7(a)(1) of the ESA than it is to the relevant Park Service Organic Act
provision.' The Organic Act requires that the Park Service "promote and
regulate the use" of the national parks and monuments "by such means
and measures as conform to the fundamental purposes" of those areas,
including conservation of scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild-
life. ' Although the word "promote" arguably signifies an obligation that
extends beyond merely stopping conduct that threatens park resources,
the Organic Act language is perhaps not as clear in its action-forcing
mandate as ESA section 7(a)(1)'s absolutely stated ' decree that agencies
"carry[] out programs for the conservation of endangered species and
threatened species."' The Wilderness Act's mandate-that agencies
administer wilderness areas to preserve such areas' character-implies a
stronger responsibility to initiate action with preservation aims than does
the Organic Act's delegation of authority to "regulate the use" of park
and monument resources.'
Second, putting aside such technical distinctions in statutory termi-
nology, courts interpreting the scope of section 4(b) need not be con-
cerned, as some courts which have refused to recognize a public trust
obligation for the Park Service appear to have been, with the separation
of powers issues attendant upon the creation of extrastatutory duties.'
Congress, by enacting section 4(b) of the Wilderness Act, created the
affirmative preservation duty and it is the responsibility of the courts to
see to its enforcement, provided that in the course of doing so they do not
usurp the discretion vested in the agencies by Congress.'
C. Protection Against External Threats
Even if the agencies with jurisdiction over official wilderness areas
have an affirmative obligation to take action to preserve wilderness char-
tional Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 392 (D. Wyo. 1987) (upholding NPS's refusal to close a camp-
ground to protect grizzly bears).
202. Compare Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1994), and Endangered Species Act
§ 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994), with 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
203. 16 U.S.C. § 1.
204. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, 898 F.2d at 1417.
205. See Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
206. 16 U.S.C. § 1.
207. Cf cases cited in I COGGJNS & GLUCKSMAN, supra note 6, § 8.07 n. 18.
208. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1419 (10th Cir. 1990).
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acter, their authority does not necessarily extend to activities on adjacent
private lands with the potential to impair that character. The litigated
instances in which agencies invoked that authority to protect wilderness
areas from external threats are again few in number, perhaps because of
the federal government's reluctance to assume jurisdiction.' In this
context, the text of the Wilderness Act is relatively unilluminating. The
provision establishing a National Wilderness Preservation System com-
posed of wilderness areas to be administered in a manner that leaves
them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness speaks only
to the administration of official wilderness areas themselves.' Section
4(b)'s mandate to "preserve" wilderness character arguably sweeps more
broadly, encompassing the authority to address threats to that character,
regardless of their location. "'
Particular wilderness areas are governed, of course, not only by the
1964 Act but also by the specific statutes adding those areas to the realm
of official wilderness. Some of these specific acts address the external
threats issue more directly. The Arkansas Wilderness Act of 1984,"2 for
example, disclaims any intention to create buffer zones around desig-
nated wilderness areas."3 In Newton County Wildlife Association v.
Rogers,"' the Eighth Circuit relied on this language to refuse to enjoin
timber sales outside wilderness areas based on resulting degradation of
downstream water quality of waters flowing through such areas."' The
Michigan Wilderness Ace'6 has a similar provision, which adds that
"[t]he fact that nonwilderness activities or uses can be seen or heard from
areas within the wilderness shall not, of itself, preclude such activities or
uses up to the boundary of the wilderness." '7
Courts have been unable to reach agreement on the scope of agency
authority to regulate activities outside wilderness areas that predated
designation. A recent set of disputes concerning the Forest Service's
efforts to restrict the use of sailboats and motorboats in a lake partially
located within a wilderness area is illustrative. In its decision in Stupak-
209. Cf. 2 COrGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03 (addressing external threats to the
national parks).
210. Cf Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
211. Cf Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b).
212. Pub. L. No. 98-508, 98 Stat. 2349 (codified as amended, in pertinent part, at 16 U.S.C. §
1132 note (1994)).
213. See id. § 7, 98 Stat. at 2352 ("Congress does not intend that designation of wilderness
areas in the State of Arkansas lead to the creation of protective perimeters or buffer zones around
each wilderness area.").
214. 141 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 1998).
215. See Newton County Wildlife, 141 F.3d at 810.
216. Michigan Wilderness Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-184, 101 Stat. 1274 (codified as
amended, in pertinent part, at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note (1994)).
217. Id. § 7, 101 Stat. at 1277.
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Thrall v. United States,"' the Sixth Circuit upheld the Forest Service's
authority to restrict certain uses of the lake, including sailboating, by
littoral owners because littoral rights were subject to reasonable regula-
tion under the police power, and the Property Clause"9 vested analogous
authority in federal agencies.' The same littoral owners, however, sub-
sequently convinced a district court that they were exempt from another
Forest Service regulation prohibiting motorboats in the lake because the
regulation failed to protect "valid existing rights" recognized by the
Michigan Wilderness Act."'
The external threats issue, like the affirmative preservation duty
issue, has provoked federal lands controversies outside the wilderness
context. The resulting decisions leave little doubt as to the federal gov-
ernment's constitutional authority under the Property Clause to regulate
conduct on private land that threatens to impair the purposes for which
federal lands have been withdrawn.' The more difficult question is
whether the concerned agencies have the appropriate statutory authority
to abate such threats. Courts have upheld the government's attempts to
prevent the spraying of pesticides within the boundaries of a national
river on both private and federal landse' and endorsed a plan to control
sources of air pollution adversely affecting visibility miles away in the
Grand Canyon. ' The Sierra Club also succeeded, as indicated above, in
convincing a federal district court, at least temporarily, that the Park
Service had not only the power but the duty to prevent logging adjacent
to Redwoods National Park.' Other attempts to abate external threats
have been less successful.'
218. Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'g on rehearing en banc
by an equally divided court 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 764
(1997).
219. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States .... ).
220. See Stupak-Thrall, 843 F. Supp. at 330-32, aff'd, 89 F.3d at 1269. The Sixth Circuit itself
evidences the lack of agreement concerning the regulation of activity outside wilderness areas. In
Stupak-Thrall, fourteen judges sitting en banc were unable to reach a consensus, splitting seven to
seven, over the scope of the Wilderness Act's phrase, "subject to existing private rights." See Stu-
pak-Thrall, 89 F.3d at 1269 (construing Wilderness Act § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. 1133(c) (1994) and Michi-
gan Wilderness Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-184, § 5, 101 Stat. 12774, 1275 ("subject to existing
rights")); id. at 1269-72 (Moore, J., concurring); id. at 1272-1306 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
221. Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
222. See 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03 (discussing the powers of the Na-
tional Park Service).
223. See United States v. Moore, 640 F. Supp. 164, 166-68 (S.D. W.Va. 1986).
224. See Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1533 (9th Cir. 1993).
225. See Sierra Club I1, 424 F. Supp. 172, 172-73 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club 1, 398 F.
Supp. 284, 285 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club 1, 376 F. Supp. 90,92 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see also supra
notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973) (refusing to
compel action by the Bureau of Reclamation to prevent water impounded in Lake Powell from
spreading into a national monument); United States v. Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va.
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Congress could clear up the judicial confusion by enunciating that
agencies with jurisdiction over official wilderness are authorized to
regulate activity on adjacent state or private land whose development or
use may threaten wilderness character. The trend in recent individual
wilderness designation legislation has been to the contrary, probably in
part due to fears that such regulation may trigger an obligation to com-
pensate and in part due to a desire to avoid the anticipated political fire-
storm likely to result from authorization to address external threats. But
the politically expedient path often diverges from the one most likely to
protect the long-term public good. The Wilderness Act, after all, was
adopted largely to protect the interests of future generations, so the long
view is a particularly appropriate consideration here.
Moreover, the rationale, both politically and legally, for regulation
of external threats to wilderness areas is not difficult to discern. The
splintered court in Stupak-Thrall affirmed a district court's opinion up-
holding Forest Service regulation of boating by littoral owners on the
theory that those owners were already subject to the reasonable exercise
of state police power-the federal government's Property Clause powers
applied by analogy.' 7 Likewise, the state police power encompasses
regulation of nuisance-like uses of property' and activities on private
lands that threaten the character of official wilderness are not unfairly
described as nuisances.9
CONCLUSION
Neither law nor history' is static. American citizens who recognize
the benefits of untrammeled lands owe a great debt of gratitude to those
who in 1964 made official wilderness a reality. Without their efforts,
qualifying lands would have almost certainly diminished greatly over the
succeeding decades, depriving future generations of the opportunities for
wilderness experiences.
But, from the preservationist perspective, what has been achieved is
not (and probably never will be) enough. The 1964 Act provides a foun-
dation for wilderness preservation efforts. The potential to build upon
1979) (refusing to prevent the construction of office buildings which would potentially diminish
views from national monuments in Washington, D.C.).
227. See Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1269 (6th Cir. 1996), affg on rehearing
en banc by an equally divided court 843 F. Supp. 327, 330-32 (W.D. Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 764 (1997).
228. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926).
229. Cf. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) (erecting fence entirely on private
land, and thereby disrupting use of public land, is a nuisance).
230. History involves the interpretation of events that occurred in the past. Because such inter-
pretation is inevitably filtered through the lens of the present, past "events" are often transformed
over time. Cf. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IowA L. REv. 277, 307 ("[AIIl history
involves a fusion of horizons in which historical materials are interrogated to ask contemporary
questions about contemporary life.").
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that foundation inheres in the addition of nonrepresented ecosystems,
recreated wilderness areas, private lands, and offshore lands to the realm
of official wilderness. The foundation itself may be somewhat insecure,
however. Absent resolution of a series of wilderness management issues
in a manner that insures protection of areas already designated as official
wilderness, that foundation may be chipped away by incremental incur-
sions by human development into areas previously "untrammeled" by
humans."'
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INTRODUCTION
Since Congress adopted the Wilderness Act of 1964,' the National
Wilderness Preservation System has grown dramatically. As of 1998,
Congress had designated more than 103 million acres of federal public
land as wilderness.' Numerous bills are pending in Congress that would
create millions of acres of new wilderness areas within the national for-
ests, national parks, national wildlife refuges, and lands administered by
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).3 Since 1994, however, there
has been very little new wilderness established, largely due to opposition
by key congressional leaders.
In the absence of congressional action to designate additional wil-
derness, there has been mounting concern about the loss of roadless ar-
eas-or "undesignated" wilderness areas--due to logging road construc-
tion, mineral development, and other management activities. The Forest
Service's road-building program in particular has become the focus of
much criticism and political debate. The Chief of the Forest Service ad-
dressed the controversy in February 1999 by imposing an eighteen-
month moratorium on new road construction in most roadless areas
within the national forests.
This article examines the legal framework for future wilderness
designations and for administrative study and protection of roadless ar-
eas. It begins with a brief summary of lands that are currently in the wil-
derness system and that could be added to the system. Second, it reviews
the processes established by the Wilderness Act and other statutes for
designation, administrative review, and management of potential wilder-
ness areas. Third, it discusses legal authorities and requirements for fed-
eral agencies to protect roadless areas pending congressional action, us-
ing the Forest Service's roadless area moratorium as a case study. Fi-
nally, it analyzes legal options for expanding the wilderness system and
maintaining options for future designations. The article focuses on the
1. Pub. L. No, 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136
(1994)).
2. See THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, THE WILDERNESS ACT HANDBOOK 3 (Jay Watson ed., 3d
ed. 1998) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
3. Cf., e.g., Red Rock Wilderness Act of 1997, H.R. 1500 & S. 773, 105th Cong. (designat-
ing 5.7 million acres of BLM lands in Utah); Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act of 1997,
H.R. 1425, 105th Cong. (designating more than 13.5 million acres of wilderness in Idaho, Montana,
Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming); Morris K. Udall Wilderness Act of 1997, H.R. 900 & S. 531,
105th Cong. (designating as wilderness 1.56 million acres of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in
Alaska); Rocky Mountain National Park Wilderness Act of 1997, H.R. 302, 105th Cong. (designat-
ing certain lands in Rocky Mountain National Park as components of the National Wilderness Pres-
ervation System).
4. See infra Part III.B. The moratorium is intended to "retain resource management options in
those unroaded areas subject to suspension from the potentially adverse effects associated with road




Forest Service and BLM, as national forest and BLM lands are more
controversial and contain most of the nation's potential wilderness out-
side of Alaska!
Thirty-five years after passage of the Wilderness Act, there remains
tremendous potential, as well as strong public support, for additional
wilderness designations. At the same time, there is much concern for
preserving the natural character and values of undesignated wilderness
areas. Ideally, Congress should establish comprehensive procedures and
standards for periodic, on-going review and recommendations of poten-
tial wilderness, coupled with interim protection. Absent such congres-
sional action, however, existing laws still obligate the land management
agencies, at a minimum, to consider potential wilderness additions as
part of their regular planning processes and to use the utmost care to
avoid degradation of roadless areas. Further, we recommend adoption of
a protective, status quo management policy for all roadless areas on fed-
eral land in order to maintain their wilderness character and important
environmental values.
I. CURRENT AND FUTURE WILDERNESS SYSTEM
A. The Current System
The Wilderness Act of 1964 initially designated as wilderness 9.1
million acres of national forest land that the Forest Service had adminis-
tratively classified as wilderness, wild, or canoe areas.' Since then, the
wilderness system has expanded eleven-fold to 103.6 million acres,
which represents 4.5 percent of all land in the United States.!
The wilderness system has been built through enactment of dozens
of wilderness bills, typically establishing wilderness areas in a particular
state. The largest single increment occurred in 1980 with passage of the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), which
designated more than 56 million acres as wilderness." More recently, the
California Desert Protection Act of 1994 '0 designated 7.5 million acres as
wilderness, including 3.5 million acres of BLM land."
5. For information about wilderness classification in national parks and wildlife refuges, see
J. HENDEE ET AL., WLDERNESs MANAGEMENT 142-47 (2d ed. 1990). For a narrative account of the
history and protection of the National Park System under the Wilderness Act, see Michael
McCloskey, What the Wilderness Act Accomplished in Protection of Roadless Areas Within the
National Park System, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LMr. 455 (1995).
6. See Wilderness Act § 3(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
7. See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 3.
8. Pub. L. No. 96-487,94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233
(1994)).
9. Cf ANILCA §§ 701-704,16 U.S.C. § 1132 note.
10. Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note).
11. ANILCA § 102, 16U.S.C. § 1132 note.
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While the vast majority of the wilderness system is located in the
western states, many wilderness areas have been established in the East.
The Eastern Wilderness Act of 19752 established the precedent of ex-
tending wilderness status to areas that were smaller and less pristine than
the western wilderness areas. 3
Management responsibility for wilderness areas is spread among the
four federal public land agencies. The National Park Service administers
43 million acres of national park wilderness; the Forest Service manages
34.6 million wilderness acres in the national forests; the Fish and Wild-
life Service controls 20.7 million acres in national wildlife refuges; and
the BLM is responsible for another 5.2 million acres of wilderness."
About 16 percent of all federal public lands is designated Wilderness.-
B. The Future System
Remarkably, there is no reliable government estimate of how much
undesignated wilderness remains on federal lands. However, the poten-
tial amount of additional wilderness likely far exceeds the size of the
current wilderness system.
The Wilderness Act defines a wilderness area as a tract of undevel-
oped federal land that (1) is substantially natural in appearance; (2) pro-
•vides outstanding opportunities for solitude or primitive recreation; (3) is
generally at least five thousand acres in size or large enough to be man-
ageable as wilderness; and (4) may have ecological, geological, scien-
tific, educational, scenic, or historical value.'6 Past government invento-
ries of potential wilderness have usually begun by identifying roadless
areas of five thousand acres or more.
Using five thousand acre roadless areas on federal land as a defini-
tion, The Wilderness Society estimates there are about 220 million acres
of undesignated wilderness in the United States.'8 Table 1 displays esti-
12. Pub. L. No. 93-622,88 Stat. 2096 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note).
13. Less than five percent of the total wilderness acres lies east of the 100th Meridian, and
almost half of that is in just two areas: Everglades National Park in Florida and the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area in Minnesota. See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 3.
14. See id.
15. The proportion of land within each of the four public land systems which is designated
wilderness is as follows: National Parks (48.3%), National Forests (18.0%), National Wildlife Ref-
uges (22.6%), BLM lands (2.2%). Cf. id.; DYAN ZASLOWSKY & TOM H. WATKINS, THESE
AMERICAN LANDS 11, 58, 105, 151 (1994).
16. See Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
17. The Wilderness Act directed the Secretary of Interior to review the wilderness suitability
of "every madless area of -five thousand contiguous acres or more" within the national parks and
wildlife refuges. Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c). The Forest Service and BLM have also
used the five thousand acre size criterion in their wilderness inventories. See infra notes 33, 88 and
accompanying text.
18. See Memorandum from Bill Meadows, President, The Wilderness Society, to Executive
Committee (June 25, 1998) (on file with author). Acreage estimates were developed by Wilderness
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mated acreages of potential wilderness under the jurisdiction of each land
management agency. More than half the potential wilderness is in
Alaska.
Relatively little of the undesignated wilderness has been formally
recommended by the land management agencies for addition to the wil-
derness system. A total of about 26 million acres of wilderness recom-
mendations are currently pending before Congress, including 7.4 million
acres of BLM land, 7.1 million acres of national parks, 6.1 million acres
of national forests, and 5.4 million acres of national wildlife refuges.'9
Thus, only about 12 percent of the unprotected wilderness on federal
lands has been recommended for designation.
TABLE 1: ESTIMATED ACREAGE OF UNPROTECTED WILDERNESS ON
FEDERAL LANDS IN THE UNITED STATES2
(millions of acres)
National BLM National National Total
Forests Parks Wildlife
Refuges
Lower 48 45 37 5 10 97
Alaska 15 35 20 55 125
Total 60 72 25 65 222
Combining protected and unprotected wilderness, we estimate that
the wilderness resource on federal lands totals approximately 325 million
acres. This represents about 14 percent of all land in the United States
and half of all federal public land.2'
II. EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND REQUIREMENTS
This Part analyzes the current legal framework for the designation,
administrative review, and management of potential wilderness areas.
While the Wilderness Act established the original framework, several
subsequent laws-principally the national forest "RARE II" bills enacted
in the early 1980s, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), and ANILCA-have added important elements.
Society staff based on a variety of sources, including acreage figures supplied by the Forest Service,
Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service. See id.
19. See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 41, 43; see also infra notes 59, 98-99 and accompanying
text.
20. See supra note 18 (describing the derivation of the acreage estimates).
21. See Memorandum from Bill Meadows, supra note 18 (providing an estimate for unpro-
tected wilderness).
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A. The Wilderness Act
Under the Wilderness Act, areas can only be added to the National
Wilderness Preservation System through congressional designation.'
Congress thereby elected not to authorize executive designation of wil-
derness areas, as originally advocated by conservationists.' Instead, the
Act set up a process by which the land management agencies would re-
view potential wilderness areas and the President would present recom-
mendations to Congress for additions to the system. '
Regarding the national forests, the Wilderness Act directed the For-
est Service to complete, within ten years, a wilderness suitability review
of 5.5 million acres that the agency had previously classified as "primi-
tive areas."' The Forest Service completed the primitive area reviews on
schedule and, in most cases, without major controversy.' A notable ex-
ception involved the East Meadow Creek roadless area, which was adja-
cent to the Gore Range-Eagles Nest Primitive Area in Colorado. ' In up-
holding a district court decision enjoining a timber sale in the roadless
area, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals established a precedent of re-
quiring land management agencies to "proceed slowly" before foreclos-
ing wilderness designation options.'
The Wilderness Act established a similar ten-year suitability review
process for national parks and national wildlife refuges. The major dif-
ference was that, instead of limiting the review to previously classified
lands like the national forest primitive areas, Congress directed the Sec-
retary of Interior to examine "every roadless area of five thousand con-
tiguous acres or more" in the parks and refuges.' The Department of
22. The Act states that "no Federal lands shall be designated as 'wilderness areas' except as
provided for in this chapter or by a subsequent Act." Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C § 1131(a).
Similarly, "[elach recommendation of the President for designation as 'wilderness' shall become
effective only if so provided by an Act of Congress." Wilderness Act § 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b).
23. See ZASLOWSKY & WATKINS, supra note 15, at 208,211.
24. See Wilderness Act § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1132.
25. Wilderness Act § 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b).
26. See D.M. ROTH, FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE WILDERNESS MOVEMENT
AND THE NATIONAL FORESTS: 1964-1980, at 11 (Forest Service History Series 1984).
27. See id. at 19-22.
28. Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793,795 (10th Cir. 1971). The court stated:
We have no difficulty in recognizing the general purpose of the Wilderness
Act. It is simply a congressional acknowledgment of the necessity of preserv-
ing one factor of our natural environment from the progressive, destructive
and hasty inroads of man, usually commercial in nature, and the enactment of
a "proceed slowly" order until it can be determined wherein the balance be-
tween proper multiple uses of the wilderness lies and the most desirable and
highest use established for the present and future.
Id.
29. Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c). For national wildlife refuges, the Act required
the Secretary to review "every roadless island" in addition to roadless areas. Id.
AMERICA'S UNPROTECTED WILDERNESS
Interior completed the required reviews and submitted wilderness rec-
ommendations to Congress."
The Act's wilderness review process provided for extensive public
involvement. Before submitting recommendations to the President, the
agencies were required to publish notice of each proposal in the Federal
Register and local newspapers, hold a hearing in the local area, and no-
tify and invite comment from state and local officials and other con-
cerned federal agencies.'
While the Wilderness Act set the stage for securing "an enduring re-
source of wilderness,"3 it did not specify a long-term role for the land
management agencies in constructing the wilderness system. In particu-
lar, the Act did not mandate or specify a process for ongoing administra-
tive or public review of potential wilderness, beyond the ten-year studies
of national forest primitive areas and of national park and wildlife refuge
roadless areas. The Act, however, provided the purposes, definitions, and
a basic public involvement model for future legislation and administra-
tive reviews.
The Act entirely omitted two major types of potential wilderness
from the review process: (1) national forest roadless areas that were not
classified as primitive areas and (2) all roadless areas administered by the
BLM. In addition, Congress understandably did not foresee the events
that led in 1980 to creation of vast new parks and wildlife refuges in
Alaska. However, as discussed below, subsequent legislative, adminis-
trative, and judicial actions have partially filled in those gaps.
B. National Forest RARE 11 Legislation
1. Background
In 1967, the Forest Service went beyond the requirements of the
Wilderness Act and initiated a nationwide study of the wilderness poten-
tial of all previously unclassified national forest roadless areas larger
than five thousand acres." The Roadless Area Review and Evaluation
(RARE) was criticized for omitting many suitable areas from the inven-
tory. Conservationists successfully argued in court that the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) ' required the Forest Service to
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) before authorizing tim-
ber sales in roadless areas.3 Affirming a decision to enjoin logging in a
30. See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 41, 43.
31. See Wilderness Act § 3(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(d).
32. Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
33. See Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the
National Forests, 64 OR. L. REv. 1, 345 (1985).
34. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4370d (1994
& Supp. H 1996)).
35. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 33, at 347.
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roadless area, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1973 found that
"there is an overriding public interest in preservation of the undeveloped
character of the area."' The Forest Service responded by deferring de-
velopment activities in roadless areas pending compliance with NEPA.
In the 1970s, Congress became increasingly willing to go beyond
the designation of primitive areas in national forests. Rejecting Forest
Service arguments that national forests in the East contained few areas
suitable for wilderness, Congress designated thirty-two wilderness and
wilderness study areas in the Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975." The Na-
tional Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA)"' directed the Forest
Service to consider wilderness in developing land management plans."
In 1977, the Forest Service began a new nationwide roadless area
study called "RARE II." The RARE II inventory identified 2919 roadless
areas encompassing 62 million acres. ' The roadless areas were allocated
to three categories-recommended wilderness, further planning, and
nonwilderness. In an effort to comply with NEPA, the agency prepared
an EIS with alternatives that allocated different amounts of roadless areas
to the three categories. The preferred alternative allocated 15 million
acres to wilderness, 10.8 million acres to further planning, and 36.2 mil-
lion acres to nonwilderness." However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in 1982 ruled that the EIS was inadequate, '2 again halting manage-
ment activities in roadless areas.
In 1984, the roadless area controversy culminated in the passage of
nineteen separate wilderness bills that added 8.6 million acres to the wil-
derness system.4' The wilderness bills accepted many of the RARE II allo-
cations, but sometimes designated substantially more wilderness than rec-
ommended in RARE II."
36. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 1973).
37. Pub. L. No. 93-622, §§ 3-4, 88 Stat. 2096, 2097-2100 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1132 note).
38. Pub. L. No. 94-588,90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994)).
39. See NFMA § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1), (g)(3)(A); 36 C.F.R. § 219.17(a) (1997); see also
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1992); California v. Ber-
glund, 483 F. Supp. 465,478 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
40. See FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ROADLESS AREA REVIEw AND EVALUATION,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr STATEMENT at iii (1979) [hereinafter RARE II). The first RARE
inventory identified 56 million acres in 1449 roadless areas. See id. at 6.
41. See id. at iv.
42. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 765-69 (9th Cir. 1982). The Forest Service subse-
quently amended its forest planning regulations to require wilderness review of all roadless areas,
including those evaluated in RARE H, unless directed otherwise by Congress. See 36 C.F.R.
219.17(a) (1997); 48 Fed. Reg. 40,383 (1983).
43. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 1053
(3d ed. 1993).
44. In Oregon, for example, RARE II recommended 370,000 acres for wilderness, but the




A key issue in the RARE II bills concerned the statutory direction
for management of roadless areas that were not designated as wilderness
in the legislation.' The Forest Service and timber industry wanted lan-
guage that would permanently insulate development activities in roadless
areas from further legal challenges and eliminate any obligation to con-
duct additional wilderness reviews. Environmentalists, on the other hand,
wanted to maintain legal options to protect roadless areas for future
designation.
Congress eventually agreed upon standard "soft release" language
and included virtually identical language in all the RARE H bills. First,
each act declared that, with regard to the RARE II inventoried roadless
areas in that state, the RARE II EIS was legally sufficient and not subject
to judicial review.' Second, each act excused the Forest Service from
reviewing roadless areas in the state during the first round of planning
required by the NFMA. However, the acts required the Forest Service to
"review the wilderness option when the plans are revised," roughly every
ten to fifteen years.'7 Third, prior to or during revision of the NFMA
plans, all RARE II areas that were not designated as wilderness or for
special management in the legislation were to be managed in accordance
with the plans and not necessarily to protect their wilderness suitability."
In a series of decisions involving management of national forest
roadless areas, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals narrowly interpreted
the soft release language in RARE II legislation. The decisions have
made clear that the release language in RARE II bills did not exempt all
subsequent Forest Service roadless area development decisions from
judicial review. First, in City of Tenakee Springs v. Blocke9 the court held
that RARE II release language in ANILCA did not immunize from judi-
cial review the roadless area allocations in the Tongass National Forest
management plan. Second, in National Audubon Society v. United
States Forest Service," the court concluded that "the prohibition on ju-
dicial review found in [the Oregon Wilderness Act] applies not to
45. See id. at 2-7.
46. See e.g., Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No, 98-339, § 5(b)(l), 98 Stat.
299, 303.
47. E.g., id § 5(b)(2), 98 Stat. at 303.
48. See id. § 5(b)(3), 98 Stat. at 303. Furthermore, the undesignated roadless areas "need not
be managed for the purpose of protecting their suitability for wilderness designation prior to or
during revision of the initial land management plans." Id.
49. 778 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1985).
50. See Tenakee Springs, 778 F.2d at 1405. The court stated that the sufficiency language
"immunizes from judicial review only the wilderness/nonwilderness allocations made by RARE I
and not the detailed Tongass Plan allocations of nonwilderness areas as suitable for primitive, envi-
ronmentally compatible, or intensive development." Id.
51. 4 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1993).
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roadless or roaded determinations, but to the Act's wilderness or non-
wilderness designations." 2
Most recently, in Smith v. Forest Service" the Ninth Circuit blocked
a timber sale located within a RARE II area in Washington State because
the agency had not adequately disclosed the sale's impact on the area's
roadless values.' Regarding the RARE I legislation, the court stated:
Judicial review of the wilderness option is not foreclosed forever by
the [Washington State Wilderness Act]. Under that Act, the wilder-
ness option for inventoried lands may be revisited in second-
generation Forest Plans. Accordingly, when the agency is considering
the development of a 5,000 acre roadless area, selection of a no-
action alternative, which the agency is required to consider,. . . would
preserve the possibility that the area might some day be designated as
wilderness .... [Tihe possibility of future wilderness classification
triggers, at the very least, an obligation on the part of the agency to
disclose the fact that development will affect a 5,000 acre roadless
area.
55
3. Wilderness Review and Forest Planning
The RARE II Acts and the NFMA require the Forest Service to re-
view all roadless areas for wilderness suitability during the revision of
NFMA land and resource management plans.' During the first round of
NFMA planning, the Forest Service developed 123 separate plans. Some
of the first-generation plans-for national forests in Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, and other states for which Congress did not enact RARE II wil-
derness bills-included wilderness reviews and made wilderness rec-
ommendations. The plans typically recommended wilderness for only a
small fraction of the inventoried roadless areas. 7 For national forests
covered by RARE II legislation, the forest plans did not make wilderness
recommendations; however, some plans did include roadless area re-
views in response to strong public interest and concern about roadless
areas that were legislatively "released" to the forest planning process.""
52. National Audubon Soc'y, 4 F.3d at 837 (emphasis added). The court explained, "The
desire of Congress to preclude further review of wilderness designations made by the [Oregon Wil-
derness Act] and RARE I does not persuade us that Congress also intended to preclude judicial
review of Forest Service compliance with NEPA in these four contested timber sales." Id.
53. 33 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1994).
54. See Smith, 33 F.3d at 1073.
55. Id. at 1078 (citations omitted).
56. See supra notes 39, 47 and accompanying text.
57. For example, the Idaho Panhandle National Forest plan recommended only 4 of the 47
inventoried roadless areas, amounting to 18 percent of total roadless acreage. See Idaho Conserva-
tion League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1512 (9th Cir. 1992).
58. All national forest plans in the Pacific Northwest Region (Oregon and Washington), for
example, included detailed roadless area reviews. The forest plan EISs in that region included a
separate appendix describing each roadless area, the area's management allocation under each alter-
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Of the 60 million acres of inventoried roadless areas, the Forest
Service has recommended wilderness for 6.1 million acres." The re-
maining 53.9 million acres have been allocated to various nonwilderness
management classifications in local forest plans. Only 9 million acres of
inventoried roadless land are considered to be suitable for timber pro-
duction;' however, many other roadless areas are vulnerable to develop-
ment activities such as salvage logging, oil and gas drilling, and associ-
ated road construction. The Forest Service estimates that, under current
forest plans, new roads could be built into 33 million acres of inventoried
roadless areas. Before the Forest Service can authorize activities that
substantially alter the undeveloped character of a roadless area, it must
evaluate the impacts in an EIS.'
Current NFMA regulations specify the types of areas subject to wil-
derness review and issues to consider in the review, such as the area's
wilderness values and feasibility of management as wilderness Pro-
posed Forest Service amendments to the NFMA regulations would still
require plan revisions to review roadless areas for wilderness designa-
tion.' A few national forests have already completed plan revisions, and
several others-mostly in the Southeast and Rocky Mountains-are in
the midst of revising their plans.
During the 1990s, the Forest Service has increasingly focused on
"ecoregional" plans and assessments to cure inadequacies of the NFMA
plans and lay the scientific groundwork for plan revisions. While the
ecoregional plans have not included wilderness reviews or recommenda-
tions, they have generated new information about the ecological and
economic importance of roadless areas. For example, the Interior Co-
lumbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project (ICBEMP) is a mammoth
interagency effort to devise an ecosystem-based management strategy for
all 75 million acres of national forests and BLM lands in the Columbia
native, and the environmental consequences of those allocations. See, e.g., FOREST SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, LAND AND RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT PLAN WILLAMETTE NATIONAL FOREST app. at C-I (1990).
59. See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., WILDERNESS AND ROADLESS AREA DATA
(attachment to Letter from Gerald T. Coghlan, Acting Director of Engineering, Forest Service, to
author (June 29, 1998)) (on file with author).
60. See id.
61. See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FACTS ABOUT THE NATIONAL FOREST ROAD
SYSTEM (attachment to Letter from Chief Michael Dombeck, Forest Service, to Colleagues (Jan. 22,
1998)) (on file with author).
62. See National Environmental Policy Act; Revised Policy and Procedures, 57 Fed. Reg.
43180, 43,200 (1992). But cf Smith v. United States Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir.
1994) (stating that site-specific EIS for roadless area timber sale "may not be per se required"); Na-
tional Audubon Soc'y v. Forest Serv., 4 F.3d 832, 838 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding decision to
enjoin madless area timber sale with instructions to review under arbitrary and capricious standard).
63. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.17 (1997).
64. See 60 Fed. Reg. 18886, 18931 (1995).
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River Basin.' Notably, the economic assessment for the ICBEMP found
that the existence value of roadless areas in the Columbia Basin far ex-
ceeds the value of timber and livestock forage on federal lands.' The
ICBEMP's ecological assessment also highlighted the importance of
roadless areas as habitat strongholds for endangered salmon and trout
species in the Basin. 7
Despite growing scientific support for roadless area protection,
NFMA plan revisions to date have recommended remarkably little addi-
tional wilderness. In the Rocky Mountain Region, where the plan revi-
sion process is farther along than the rest of the country, the four plan
revisions completed to date recommend wilderness designation for less
than one percent of the inventoried roadless areas."
On the other hand, Forest Service Chief Mike Dombeck has urged
greater protection of wilderness and roadless areas." As discussed later in
this article, Dombeck in February 1999 instituted a controversial interim
suspension of new road construction in most national forest roadless
areas. 
0
65. See generally FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, EASTSIDE DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1997).
66. See THOMAS M. QUIGLEY & SYLVIA ARBELBIDE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AN
ASSESSMENT OF ECOSYSTEM COMPONENTS IN THE INTERIOR COLUMBIA BASIN 1824 (1997) ("[IThe
existence of unroaded areas is by far the most valuable output from FS- and BLM-administered
lands in the Basin today, and will continue to be so in the year 2045.").
67. See id. at 1348 ("Unroaded areas have the potential to maintain natural processes unaltered
by land management activities and may be important refugia for strongholds of salmonid.... Desig-
nated wilderness and areas predicted to be unroaded are important anchors for strongholds through-
out the Basin.").
68. See Letter from The Wilderness Society et al. to Lyle Laverty, Regional Forester, Rocky
Mountain Region (July 7, 1998) (on file with author). The letter states:
Region 2's record on recommending additional wilderness during the forest
planning process is abysmal. The Forest Service identified as roadless a total of
1,387,835 acres on the Black Hills, Rio Grande, Arapaho-Roosevelt, and Routt
National Forests. Of this, conservationists recommended 806,430 acres for
wilderness, and the agency itself found hundreds of thousands of acresl [sic] to be
"eligible" for wilderness. Yet, the Forest Service recommended only a paltry 8,551
acres for wilderness designation.
Id. (citation omitted).
69. See Letter from Chief Mike Dombeck, Forest Service, to all Forest Service Employees
(July 1, 1998) (concerning conservation leadership) (on file with author). Chief Dombeck stated:
Values such as wilderness and roadless areas, clean water, protection of rare spe-
cies, old growth forests, naturalness-these are the reasons most Americans cher-
ish their public land.... [Twenty percent of the National Forest System is wil-
derness, and in the [minds] of many, more should be. Our wilderness portfolio
must embody a broader array of lands-from prairie to old growth. As world lead-
ers in wilderness management, we should be looking to the future to better manage
existing, and identify potential new, wilderness and other wild lands.
Id
70. See discussion infra Part HJ.B.
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C. Federal Land Policy and Management Act
1. Background
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has exclusive jurisdiction
over about 48 percent, or 264 million acres, of federally owned lands,
most of which are located in eleven western states and Alaska." During
the first thirty years of its existence, the BLM operated under various
mining, homestead, and other land laws inherited from its predecessors,
the General Land Office and the U.S. Grazing Service?2 When these two
agencies merged to create the BLM in 1946,"3 Congress did not establish
a comprehensive statutory framework for management of BLM lands, as
it had for the national park, forest, and wildlife refuge systems. From
the beginning, BLM lands were regarded primarily as a source of live-
stock forage, timber, and mineral resources. Policy makers generally
viewed the BLM as an agency with two main functions: transferring
lands from federal to state or private ownership, and managing grazing
and mining on the public lands.
The Wilderness Act did not direct the BLM to consider wilderness
values when administering its lands, in part because of the traditional
view mentioned above, but also because the question of whether BLM
lands were to remain in public ownership had not been settled." It was
not until twelve years later, with the passage of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA),"6 that Congress fundamentally
modified the BLM's mission and provided a comprehensive system of
management for public lands under its jurisdiction.'
71. See Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Public Land Statistics: 1997
(last modified Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.blm.gov/natacq/pls97/partl.html> [hereinafter 1997 BLM
Statistics]. Throughout this section "public lands" refers to those lands under the BLM's jurisdiction.
BLM lands are also referred to as "National Resource Lands." See ZASLOWSKY & WATKINS, supra
note 15, at 131. Alaska contains over one-third of all BLM lands. See 1997 BLM Statistics, supra.
For a discussion of ANILCA and its impact on wilderness review in Alaska, see infra Part II.D.
72. See ZASLOWSKY & WATKINS, supra note 15, at 105-48 (detailing the extensive history of
the BLM and natural resource lands, including the enactment of FLPMA).
73. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, 60 Stat. 1097, 1100.
74. See John D. Leshy, Wilderness and Its Discontents: Wilderness Review Comes to the
Public Lands, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 361, 363 (1981).
75. See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 37; Leshy, supra note 74, at 362-64 (1981). Frequently,
BLM lands have been "dismissed as the 'leftover lands,"' or "the land that no one wanted."
ZASLOWSKY & WATKINS, supra note 15, at 105, 135. William P. Clarke, who served as Secretary of
Interior under Reagan, thought of BLM lands in this way and professed to be surprised to find even
24 million acres containing wilderness characteristics. See id. at 135.
76. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (1994
& Supp. 1II 1997)).
77. Many have referred to FLPMA as the BLM's "organic" act, and with respect to outlining
land management guidelines, it is more precise than most other organic acts for public land agencies.
See HENDEE ET AL., supra note 5, at 148. As a historical note, immediately after passage of the
Wilderness Act, Congress established the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) to review
and recommend revisions of the public land laws, "most of which were administered by the Bureau
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As for establishing a legal framework for future wilderness desig-
nations, FLPMA may be no more effective than the Wilderness Act. It
does, however, go one step further by requiring protection of lands as
they await final congressional action.78 FLPMA reflects Congress's con-
cern with "defining the concept of wilderness and prescribing how
statutorily designated wilderness areas were to be managed, [rather than]
directing how new areas were to be included in the [National Wilderness
Preservation System]."'
Regardless, FLPMA did change the direction of public land man-
agement in two significant ways. First, it established the policy that pub-
lic lands should be retained in federal ownership and managed for the
national interest." Second, it recognized wilderness as fully consistent
with the multiple-use mandate for BLM lands and as deserving of the
same consideration as other possible uses of the land.8'
2. BLM Wilderness Review
Under the general land use planning provisions of FLPMA, the
BLM must maintain an ongoing inventory of "all public lands and their
resource and other values."' Section 603 further required the Secretary
of Interior to review all "roadless areas" identified during this inventory
for their suitability as wilderness, and to make recommendations to the
President within fifteen years. 3 For speed and convenience, the Secretary
of Interior decided to conduct a one-time, nationwide wilderness review
for BLM lands and divided the process into three stages: inventory,
study, and reporting.' State directors were given the responsibility for
making inventory decisions and recommendations consistent with the
guidelines issued in the BLM's Wilderness Inventory Handbook (WIH)."
of Land Management." Leshy, supra note 74, at 368; see also Public Land Law Review Commis-
sion, Pub. L. No. 88-606, §§ 1-3, 78 Stat. 982, 982 (1964) (originally codified at 43 U.S.C. §§
1391-1393 (1964) and subsequently omitted with the termination of the Commission, 43 U.S.C. §
1391 note (Codification) (1994)) [hereinafter PLLRC]. In many respects, the work of the commis-
sion was Congress's first step towards FLPMA's enactment. Cf PLLRC, supra, §§ 1-3; see also
Leshy, supra note 74, at 368-71.
78. See FLPMA § 603(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).
79. Leshy, supra note 74, at 365--66.
80. See FLPMA § 102(a)(l), 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1).
81. See Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Land Under Wilderness Review, 44
Fed. Reg. 72,014, 72,015 (1979) [hereinafter IMP]. The BLM recognized that "[u]nder FLPMA,
wilderness preservation is part of BLM's multiple-use mandate, and wilderness values are recog-
nized as part of the spectrum of resource values and uses to be considered in the inventory and in the
land-use planning process." Id. Section 603 of FLPMA "directs the BLM, for the first time, to carry
out a wilderness review of the public lands." Id.; see also FLPMA § 603(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
82. FLPMA § 201(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a).
83. FLPMA § 603(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
84. See HENDEE ET AL., supra note 5, at 148.
85. See generally BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK (1978) [hereinafter WILDERNESS INVENTORY]. The inventory
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The WIH guidelines divided the inventory into two phases.' State
directors first identified "roadless areas" of at least five thousand acres
which may have contained wilderness characteristics." The initial in-
ventory reduced the lands under consideration to about 50 million acres."
A more intensive inventory of these "wilderness inventory units" fol-
lowed, and roadless areas that met the definition of wilderness as pro-
vided in the Wilderness Act were designated "Wilderness Study Areas"
(WSAs)."
In 1980, the BLM announced that it had identified 24 million acres
as having wilderness characteristics warranting further wilderness
study--only 13 percent of its lands in the lower forty-eight states (in
contrast, the Forest Service had found 32 percent of its lands in those
same states to be "roadless").' Perhaps the most heated and nationally
recognized controversy erupted in Utah, where the BLM eliminated more
than 2 million acres from further review because of their potential for
mining, grazing, or industrial development."'
During the wilderness study, or "suitability" review, the BLM must
weigh the benefits of preserving a WSA's wilderness values against the
benefits of managing the area for other purposes, such as mineral leasing
or grazing. In balancing these values, the BLM must consider factors
such as the area's ecological, educational and historical value, the extent
to which designation would diversify the wilderness system, and whether
the area can be "effectively managed to preserve its wilderness charac-
ter."
93
Before recommendations as to the suitability of an area are submit-
ted to the Secretary, they are subject to extensive public participation, as
required by the Wilderness Act for parks and refuges.' The Secretary
reports his decision to the President, who then submits the final recom-
began in September 1978 and covered 174 million acres in the lower 48 states. See HENDEE ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 147. Because of the uncertainty concerning the future of Alaska's public lands,
BLM land in Alaska was not reviewed. See WILDERNESS INVENTORY, supra, at 4.
86. See HENDEE ET AL., supra note 5, at 148.
87. See Wilderness Inventory Results for Public Lands Under Administration of the Bureau of
Land Management in the Contiguous Western States, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,574, 75,574 (1980).
88. See HENDEE ET AL., supra note 5, at 148.
89. 45 Fed. Reg. at 75,576.
90. See id. at 75,574-75; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
91. See Utah; Final Wilderness nventory Decision, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,602, 75,604 (1980).
92. See Wilderness Study Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 5098, 5103 (1982); HENDEE ET AL., supra note
5, at 151.
93. Wilderness Study Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 5098, 5103 (1982). The BLM does not provide any
guidance as to how "manageability" is to be determined. Cf id. The decision is essentially based on
whether it would be practical to manage a particular area as wilderness-a highly subjective deter-
mination-given such factors as the degree to which private or state inholdings would disrupt federal
management. See HENDEE ET AL., supra note 5, at 151.
94. See FLPMA § 603(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1994 & Supp. II (1996)). Section 603 of
FLPMA extends the public participation requirements of section 3(d) of the Wilderness Act to the
BLM wilderness review. See id; see also Wilderness Act § 3(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(d) (1994).
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mendations to Congress."5 Even WSAs that are deemed "unsuitable"
must be reported.' As with the Wilderness Act, Congress reserved the
final authority to make wilderness designations for itself."
As of September 30, 1997, the BLM made recommendations on 561
WSAs throughout the nation, covering over 16 million acres." It recom-
mended 7.4 million acres as suitable for wilderness, and 8.9 million as
nonsuitable."
The controversy surrounding the wilderness review in Utah gave
rise to direct legislative involvement that had not occurred in other states.
Throughout Utah, the BLM conducted its wilderness inventory in great
haste. It allocated only two years to evaluate 22 million acres of land
even though FLPMA had allowed fifteen years for completion of the
review." A lack of adequate staff conducting the review compounded
the problem. The Utah BLM determined that 14.5 million acres "clearly
and obviously" did not contain wilderness characteristics." ' Only 2.5
million acres were actually designated WSAs. Conservationists, and
even BLM employees who had participated in the inventory, accused the
BLM of violating its own wilderness inventory policy in several ways
and excluding lands that should have been designated WSAs.
In 1988, Representative Wayne Owens introduced a bill to protect
5.7 million acres, as advocated by conservationists."' Secretary.of Inte-
95. See FLPMA § 603(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
96. HENDEE Er AL., supra note 5, at 152.
97. See Leshy, supra note 74, at 374. Although the House version of FLPMA would have
made the President's wilderness recommendations automatically effective if Congress failed to take
action within 120 days, the Conference Committee jealously guarded Congress's right to have the
final say and dropped the provision. See id.
98. See 1997 BLM Statistics, supra note 71.
99. See id.
100. See FLPMA § 603(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a); Utah; Final Wilderness Inventory Decision, 45
Fed. Reg. 75,602, 75,605 (1980).
101. Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1998) (summarizing the history of Utah's
wilderness debate).
102. See id. Another 0.7 million acres were subsequently added as a result of administrative
appeals, bringing the total amount of WSAs to 3.2 million acres. See Telephone Interview with Ken
Rait, Issues Director, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (Sept. 2, 1998).
103. See Ray Wheeler, The BLM Wilderness Review (visited Oct. 27, 1998)
<http://www.suwa.org/WATE/review.html>. In 1983, House Public Lands Subcommittee Chairman
John Seiberling went to Utah to investigate charges of mismanagement in the Utah BLM wilderness
inventory. Seiberling returned to Washington convinced that the BLM had indeed mismanaged the
inventory, and told reporters: "'They've left out areas that obviously qualify for wilderness-and I've
seen a lot of them." Id.
104. See Daniel Glick, A Wilderness Shell Game, WiLDERNESs, Winter 1995, at 14, 16-17.
When Rep. Owens left Congress in 1993, Rep. Hinchey reintroduced H.R. 1500, with 5.7 million
acres of proposed wilderness. In response, Utah Representative James Hansen offered H.R. 1745 in
1995-a bill that would designate only 1.2 million acres and which would have allowed unprece-
dented development of dams, roads, pipelines, and other facilities even within designated wilderness.
Id. at 16. A companion bill to H.R. 1500 has been introduced in the Senate. See S. 773, 105th Cong.
§ 2(b)(1) (1997).
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rior Bruce Babbitt ordered the BLM to re-inventory the lands included in
H.R. 1500-a move challenged by wilderness opponents in Utah v. Bab-
bitt.w The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs' request
for a preliminary injunction against the reinventory on the basis of
standing and, therefore, never reached the question of whether FLPMA
actually authorized such an undertaking.'"
Utah's wilderness designations are still locked in a stalemate. Cur-
rently, Utah contains ninety-five WSAs, which cover 3.2 million acres,
and only 2 million of those were recommended as suitable for wilder-
ness."° In response to the creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante Na-
tional Monument in 1996, several Utah counties began to blade roads in
the monument and in other potential wilderness areas, asserting that they
held valid R.S. 2477 rights-of-way.' R.S. 2477 claims have become an
important tool for wilderness opponents and have sparked many of the
cases involving interim protection of potential wilderness areas."
3. Interim Protection of WSAs
Unlike previous wilderness legislation, FLPMA requires the BLM
to protect the wilderness values of both areas under inventory and
WSAs." All activities, except for those specifically exempted by
FLPMA, must be regulated so as to prevent impairment of wilderness
105. Babbitt, 137 F.3dat 1199-1200.
106. See id. at 1216. The court did note that section 603 "envisions a much more comprehen-
sive process... than that implemented by the [reinventory]," which did not address the suitability of
the lands for management as wilderness. See id. at 1206 n.17. Therefore, authority for the Secre-
tary's decision flowed from FLPMA's general land use planning provisions. See id; see also
FLPMA §§ 201, 202, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711, 1712 (1994). For the most part, the BLM has justified
wilderness inventory work after 1991 (the deadline imposed by section 603) on the basis of these
provisions. See Babbitt, 137 F.3d at 1206 n.17.
107. See 1997 BL.M Statistics, supra note 71.
108. See Alexander H. Southwell, Comment, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federal-
ism Implications of a 1990s States' Rights Battle, 32 GONz. L. REv. 417, 435 (1996-97). Although
R.S. 2477 was repealed, FLPMA expressly grandfathered rights-of-way established before 1976. See
FLPMA §§ 701(a), (h), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1994).
109. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1077-79 (10th Cir. 1988).
110. Section 603(c) provides that during the inventory and study phase of the review, the Sec-
retary:
shall continue to manage such lands according to his authority under this Act and other
applicable law in a manner so as not to impair the suitability Of such areas for preserva-
tion as wilderness, subject, however, to the continuation of existing mining and grazing
uses and mineral leasing in the manner and degree in which the same was being con-
ducted on October 21, 1976; Provided, That, in managing the public lands the Secretary
shall by regulation or otherwise take any action required to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation of the lands and their resources or to afford environmental protection.
FLPMA § 603(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (emphasis added). The BLM has promulgated guidelines for
management of land under wilderness review. See IMP, supra note 81, at 72,014. The Reagan ad-
ministration limited the extent to which the BLM may restrict "valid existing rights" by amending
the IMP in 1983. See Interim Management Policy and Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,854, 31,854
(1983) [hereinafter Revised IMP].
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suitability."' Management under the "nonimpairment" mandate essen-
tially protects Congress's "right to make the designation decision by pre-
venting actions that would pre-empt that decision'"-a concept which
mirrors the Parker "proceed slowly" rationale."'
Implementing interim protections has proven to be a contentious is-
sue, because FLPMA requires both interim protection and recognition of
valid existing uses."" The BLM has recognized two standards for interim
management in order to accommodate valid existing uses."" For lands
that are not subject to existing uses, the "nonimpairment" standard ap-
plies and the agency must manage those lands so as to prevent impair-
ment of their wilderness characteristics."" If a valid existing right exists,
and if it can only be exercised through activities that will diminish an
area's wilderness suitability, that use will be permitted to continue under
the less stringent "nondegradation" standard."'
The BLM's Interim Management Policy was first upheld in Utah v.
Andrus.' The court reiterated the principle established in Parker, noting
that Congress did not want "future uses to be foreclosed by the impact of
present activity.""' 9 It further acknowledged that for activities in potential
wilderness areas, which are not subject to existing uses, the more strin-
gent nonimpairment standard applies.' Although the opinion was not
appealed, the Tenth Circuit adopted the district court's view of section
603 in Sierra Club v. Hodel.
Section 603 does provide the BLM with a tool that could be used to
protect potential wilderness, but the agency rarely applies the nonim-
pairment standard so as to prevent damaging activities. Neither court
mentioned above attempted to clearly distinguish between the two stan-
dards; in fact, in Utah v. Andrus, the court weakened the nonimpairment
standard by limiting the BLM's duty to preventing permanent impair-
ment of wilderness suitability." If the BLM determines that reclamation
111. FLPMA § 603(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).
112. IMP, supra note 81, at 72,016.
113. Parker v. United States, 498 F.2d 793,795 (10th Cir. 1971).
114. Section 603 recognizes grandfathered uses such as mining, grazing, and mineral leasing.
See FLPMA § 603(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). Section 701(h) protects "valid existing rights." FLPMA
§ 701(h), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 note.
115. See Revised IMP, supra note 110, at 31,854-55.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. 486 F. Supp. 995, 1007 (D. Utah 1979); see also Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Bureau of
Land Management, 932 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (D. Colo. 1996) (noting that existing mineral leases are
exempt from the nonimpairment standard).
119. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 1007.
120. See id. at 1004.
121. 848 F.2d 1068, 1085-87 (10th Cir. 1988) (characterizing the tension between interim
protection and recognition of valid existing rights as a "latent ambiguity," the court deferred to the
BLM's interpretation of section 603).
122. See Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 1007-08.
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or time will restore an area's suitability before recommendations are
made-a factual matter left to the agency's expertise-it may permit
temporary impacts."' Essentially, interim management has been left al-
most entirely to the discretion of the agency."
D. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
1. Background
While public lands were being reviewed for wilderness throughout
the United States, Congress had just begun to decide the future of
Alaska's public lands. After Alaska became a state in 1959, Congress
was primarily concerned with settling the distribution of land among the
state, Native Alaskans, and the federal government." Because of the
uncertainty of future ownership, the reviews mandated by the Wilderness
Act and FLPMA were not conducted in Alaska. Congress took a major
step towards establishing additional conservation lands in Alaska with
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA),'" which
directed the Secretary of Interior to set aside up to 80 million acres for
consideration as national parks, wildlife refuges, forests, and other con-
servation areas." In 1977, only one year after FLPMA was enacted, the
first legislation creating wilderness in Alaska was proposed.
In 1980, Congress passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act (ANILCA),"2 which placed more than 104 million acres of
Alaska's federal lands into new or expanded national parks, refuges, for-
ests, and other conservation areas." Of these, 56.4 million acres were
added to the National Wilderness Preservation System. Before ANILCA
was enacted, only 116,320 acres of public lands in Alaska were desig-
123. See id at 1008-09.
124. See FLPMA § 603(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1994). FLPMA requires the BLM to manage
all public lands, even those not under wilderness review, so as to "prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation." Id. Given the BLM's application of section 603, and its treatment in the courts, man-
agement standards for WSAs do not differ much in effect from any other public lands under its
jurisdiction.
125. See Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (1958) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 21 note
(Alaska Statehood) (1994)). Before Alaska became a state, all of its lands were federally owned. The
Alaska Enabling Act granted Alaska the right to select for state ownership 104 million acres of
land-approximately one-third of the state. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 43, at 143; HENDEE ET
AL., supra note 5, at 148.
126. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Star. 688 (1971) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.); see also ANCSA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-204, 89 Stat. 1149 (1976) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.). 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2) (1994)).
127. See 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2) (codifying ANCSA § 17(a)(7), 85 Stat. at 707, as amended by
ANCSA Amendments § 7, 89 Stat. at 1149); see also Leshy, supra note 74, at 377.
128. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.).
129. See ANILCA §§ 701-704, 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note (1994). ANILCA is also commonly
referred to as the "Alaska Lands Act."
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nated wilderness.' ° Signing the Act on December 2, 1980, President
Carter remarked: "Never before have we seized the opportunity to pre-
serve so much of America's natural and cultural heritage on so grand a
scale.' ' 1
2. Wilderness Review
Although wilderness opponents have argued that Congress did not
intend to allow wilderness designations beyond those specifically pro-
vided by ANILCA, several sections of the Act clearly anticipate, in fact
require, additional wilderness review of parks, refuges, and forests. For
parks and refuges not designated as wilderness by ANILCA, the Act
directed the Secretary of Interior to review all lands within those areas in
accordance with the park and refuge provisions of the Wilderness Act.'32
It required the Secretary to submit his findings and recommendations to
the President within five years, and directed the President to submit the
final recommendation to Congress within the following two years. 3 The
Act further required the Secretary of Agriculture to review forest lands
within "wilderness study" boundaries, as established by ANILCA, and to
report his recommendations to the President and Congress within three
years.' The same procedures outlined for parks and refuges by the Wil-
derness Act applied.'"
As of December 1990, the Department of Interior had reviewed 77
million acres of park and refuge lands in Alaska, finding that 67.8 mil-
lion acres would be suitable for wilderness designation.'" Although the
Secretary had planned to recommend 8.1 million acres---only 11.9 per-
cent of suitable lands-the recommendation process has been stalled.'37
To date, no recommendations have been made for Alaska's national
parks and refuges.
BLM lands are in an even worse state of affairs. Except for BLM
lands on Alaska's North Slope, ANILCA did not require the BLM to
conduct a wilderness review for lands under its jurisdiction-it left that
130. See ZASLOWSKY & WATKINS, supra note 15, at 345-46. The only pre-ANILCA wilder-
ness areas in Alaska were managed as part of the National Wildlife Refuge System. See id.
131. THE WILDERNESS SoC'Y, THE ALASKA LANDS AcT: A BROKEN PROMISE 1 (1990) [here-
inafter A BROKEN PROMISE].
132. See ANILCA § 1317(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3205(a).
133. See ANILCA § 1317(a), (b), 16 U.S.C. § 3205(a), (b).
134. See ANILCA § 704, 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note. ANILCA only created one such area---the
Nellie Juan-College Fjord Study Area in the Chugach National Forest. See id. All of Alaska's na-
tional forest roadless areas were included in the Forest Service's nationwide RARE II study. Out of
about 16 million roadless acres reviewed in Alaska, the Forest Service recommended wilderness for
5.6 million acres. See RARE II, supra note 40, at A-I.
135. See ANILCA § 704, 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note.




decision entirely up to the discretion of the Secretary of Interior."' In
1981, Secretary James Watt, a long-time wilderness opponent, issued a
memorandum prohibiting any wilderness review of BLM lands in
Alaska, and his decision has not been revoked by subsequent
Secretaries.39
For the North Slope BLM lands, the Secretary of Interior was re-
quired to conduct a wilderness review along with an assessment of the
area's potential for oil and gas development." Unlike the other provi-
sions discussed above, section 1004 of ANILCA established an interim
management mandate similar to that imposed by FLPMA.'" It required
the Secretary to administer the BLM lands "so as to maintain presently
existing wilderness character and potential for inclusion in the National
Wilderness Preservation System," subject to valid existing rights, "until
Congress determines otherwise.""2 As with FLPMA, "established uses
may be permitted to continue, subject to such restrictions as the Secretary
deems desirable, in the manner and degree in which the same were being
conducted on [the date of ANILCA's enactment].' ' 3
ANILCA addressed management of the controversial Arctic Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge coastal plain somewhat differently. While
authorizing limited oil exploration in the coastal plain, ANILCA prohib-
ited leasing or production activities unless directed otherwise by a subse-
quent act of Congress.'" The Interior Department in 1987 recommended
leasing the entire coastal plain for full-scale oil development, but Con-
gress has not agreed to authorize production activities.'
5
III. NATIONAL FOREST ROADLESS AREA PROTECTION-A CASE STUDY
This Part discusses the background and legal context of the Forest
Service's roadless area moratorium. National forest roadless areas have
long been at the center of debate over wilderness and public land man-
agement. Likewise, the Forest Service has pioneered ways to protect
wilderness, utilizing its broad statutory grant of administrative authority.
Chief Dombeck's moratorium on road construction in roadless areas
could mark a historic turning point in federal land conservation policy.
However, some have questioned whether the Chief's moratorium is on
solid legal ground.
138. See ANILCA § 1320,43 U.S.C. § 1784.
139. See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 37.
140. See ANILCA § 1004, 16 U.S.C. § 3144.
141. See ANILCA § 1004(c), 16 U.S.C. § 3144(c). For a detailed discussion of FLPMA's
interim management provisions, see supra Part I.C.3.
142. ANILCA § 1004(c), 16 U.S.C. § 3144(c).
143. id.
144. See ANILCA § 1003, 16 U.S.C. § 3143. ANILCA also withdrew the coastal plain from all
mineral entry. See ANILCA § 1002(i), 16 U.S.C. § 3142(i).
145. See ZASLOWSKY & WATKINS, supra note 15, at 309-12.
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A. Background
The Forest Service administers the 192 million-acre National Forest
System pursuant to a broad multiple-use legal mandate.'" The agency has
often been criticized for giving undue preference to timber production at
the expense of recreation, wildlife, water quality, and other non-
commodity uses and values of the forest. Yet, the Forest Service also has
a long tradition of conservation advocacy, including development of wil-
derness designation and management policies that became the starting
point of the current wilderness preservation system.
Inspired by the advocacy of conservationists Aldo Leopold and Ar-
thur Carhart, the Forest Service broke new ground in the 1920s by desig-
nating the first of many wilderness preserves, including the Gila Primi-
tive Area in New Mexico and the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilder-
ness in Minnesota. 7 In 1929, Forest Service Chief William Greeley is-
sued Regulation L-20, "providing formal guidelines for establishing and
managing 'primitive' areas."" In 1939, at the urging of Director of Rec-
reation Robert Marshall, the agency promulgated the "U Regulations,"
which provided for reclassification of primitive areas and gave more
specific management direction." A quarter century later, the Forest
Service's system of wilderness/primitive areas and management guide-
lines were essentially written into law in the Wilderness Act.'"
In the 1960s and 1970s, as discussed above, the Forest Service initi-
ated the RARE process to inventory and recommend roadless areas for
potential wilderness designation.'"' The political process of determining
which areas would be designated as wilderness greatly increased public
awareness and concern about roadless areas and their future. The height-
ened public interest in roadless areas coincided with an effort by the For-
est Service during the 1980s to expand its system of logging roads into
roadless areas that had been legislatively "released" from the RARE II
court injunctions. Meanwhile, Congress continued to appropriate mil-
lions of dollars annually to fund logging road construction.
During the 1990s, conservationists succeeded in reducing substan-
tially the amount of logging and road construction in the national
forests.' Congress became increasingly skeptical of funding additional
forest roads, particularly in roadless areas. In 1997, proposals to slash
146. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 43, at 622-23.
147. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 33, at 336-37.
148. See id. at 337-39 (citing McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283, 284 n.3 (9th Cir. 1965)).
149. See id. at 339-40.
150. See id. at 340-41.
151. See discussion supra Part ILB.1.
152. Between 1987 and 1995, for example the total timber sale volume declined from 11.3
billion board feet to 2.9 billion board feet, while total road construction fell from 2,593 miles to 468
miles. Compare 1987 REPORT OF THE FOREST SERVICE 18, 37 (1987), with 1995 REPORT OF THE
FOREST SERVICE 17, 30 (1995).
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appropriations for new road construction barely lost in both the Senate
and House. Several senators from the Southeast urged the Clinton Ad-
ministration to defer new roads and timber sales in roadless areas pend-
ing revision of forest plans in that region.' In signing the 1998 Interior
appropriations bill, President Clinton signaled the Administration's in-
tention to "develop[] a scientifically based policy for managing roadless
areas in our national forests."'" The President declared, "These last re-
maining wild areas are precious to millions of Americans and key to
protecting clean water and abundant wildlife ....""
B. U.S. Forest Service Road Policy & Roadless Area Moratorium
In February 1999, Forest Service Chief Mike Dombeck adopted an
interim regulation of potentially great significance for roadless area pro-
tection.'" The rule temporarily suspended road construction activities,
including construction of temporary roads, in most national forest
roadless areas.'57 The policy generally applies to roadless areas invento-
ried in RARE II or in subsequent forest plans. The road-building morato-
rium will last until the Forest Service adopts a revised road management
policy, or no longer than eighteen months."
The interim rule contained several exceptions. First, it did not apply
to any national forest with a revised forest plan, including four Rocky
Mountain forests and Alaska's Tongass National Forest, which contains
more than 9 million acres of roadless land. Second, it exempted the
nineteen Pacific Northwest national forests covered by the 1994 North-
west Forest Plan. The combined effect was to exclude about 15 million
acres of roadless land from the policy.
Second, the interim policy left out a large amount of "uninvento-
nied" roadless areas. However, it did cover about 250 thousand acres of
roadless land in the Southern Appalachians that were missed by RARE II
but identified by a federal interagency study.'" The moratorium also ap-
plied to unroaded tracts greater than one thousand acres that are adjacent
to inventoried roadless areas."W
153. See, e.g., Letter from Max Cleland et al., U.S. Senators, to Dan Glickman, Secretary of
Agriculture (Nov. 14, 1997) (on file with author).
154. President's Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998,33 WKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1809, 1810 (Nov. 14, 1997).
155. Id.
156. See Temporary Suspension of Road Construction in Unroaded Areas, 64 Fed. Reg. 7289,
7290 (1999) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 212).
157. See id. at 7290.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 7298. See generally SoutHERN APPALACHIAN FoREsT COALITION & THE
WILDERNESS SOC'Y, THE SOUTHERN APPALACHIAN ASSESSMENT: HIGHLIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVES
22 (1997) [hereinafter SAA HIGHLIGHTS].
160. 64 Fed. Reg. at 7298. In the Northwest, conservationists have contested timber sales in
several areas that they contend qualify as roadless. See, e.g., Smith v. Forest Service, 33 F.3d 1072,
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In addition, the policy did not prohibit helicopter logging, oil and
gas leasing, or trail construction for off-road vehicles (ORVs) within the
inventoried roadless areas. ORV use has become an increasingly serious
environmental problem in roadless areas and other public lands. 6'
Once the Forest Service adopts a revised road management policy,
the interim rule will expire."3 The long-term opportunity to extend and
broaden the roadless area moratorium.
C. Legal Issues
Opponents of the roadless area protection may challenge the interim
rule or the revised road management policy in court, arguing that the
decision was not adopted in accordance with procedures required by
various laws. 3 Following is a brief analysis of two legal issues that may
arise in such litigation.
1. Authority to Protect Roadless Areas
One potential legal argument is that the Forest Service lacks statu-
tory authority to prohibit road construction.'"M However, Congress has
delegated exceptionally broad regulatory power to the Forest Service to
protect national forest resources. The Organic Act of 1897 authorizes the
agency to "make such rules and regulations and establish such service as
will insure the objects of [the national forests], namely, to regulate their
occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from
1079 (9th Cir. 1994) (enjoining timber sale affecting an uninventoried roadless area adjacent to an
inventoried area).
161. See generally FRIENDs OF THE EARTH & WILDLANDS CENTER FOR PREVENTING ROADS,
TRAILS OF DEsTRUCrioN (1998).
162. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 7290. The revision of the Forest Service's overall road management
policy began with an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued in conjunction with the pro-
posed interim rule to suspend road construction in roadless areas. See 63 Fed. Reg. 4349 (1998). The
notice acknowledged the need to reexamine the condition and function of the 373 thousand mile
forest road system and take steps to remove unneeded roads, reduce environmental impacts, and use
available funds more wisely. See id. at 4350-51.
163. A lawsuit challenging the interim policy was filed pro se shortly after release of the draft
rule. See Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, Martin v. Glickman,
(W.D. Va. 1998) (No. 98-M-05-R). The government argued that the case was premature since the
draft rule was not final agency action. See id. The suit, which sought to enjoin the policy pending
local public involvement and preparation of an EIS, was dismissed for failure to respond to a show
cause order. See Telephone Interview with Vincent DeWitt, U.S. Dep't Agric., Office of General
Counsel (Sept. 16, 1998).
164. Cf. Memorandum from Karen Budd-Falen & Gus Redmond Michaels, III to Tom McDon-
nell, Am. Sheep Indus. Ass'n (Mar. 26, 1998) (arguing that the NFMA and FLPMA do not grant
"discretion to enact moratoriums or... manage roadless areas administratively" and that instead the
laws "evidence Congressional intent to build roads for adequate transportation within the National
Forests in order to honor access rights to existing multiple use interests located in roadless areas")
(on file with author).
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destruction"''" The courts have consistently upheld Forest Service regu-
lations and conservation actions taken under the authority of the Organic
Act.'"
The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA)" 7 con-
firmed the Forest Service's expansive management authority. The
MUSYA broadened the purposes of the national forests and clarified that
"[t]he establishment and maintenance of areas of wilderness are consis-
tent with the purposes and provisions of [this Act]."' In McMichael v.
United States,'" the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Or-
ganic Act and MUSYA authorized the Forest Service to prohibit use of
motorized vehicles in a designated primitive area.' Similarly, the Forest
Service has ample authority to adopt regulations that prohibit road con-
struction and logging in roadless areas in order to protect the watershed,
wildlife, recreational, and wilderness values of the national forests. Of
course, the Forest Service's management discretion under the Organic
Act and MUSYA has been curbed by various laws. The Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA),'7' for example, prohibits federal agencies
from authorizing management activities that destroy critical habitat for
endangered species." However, there is scant statutory limitation on
Forest Service decision-making authority to protect the environment and
maintain management options.
2. Compliance with Planning Requirements
A second potential legal objection to the moratorium is that it vio-
lates the procedural requirements of the NFMA and NEPA. The NFMA
requires the Forest Service to give public notice whenever it amends a
forest plan and to undertake extensive analysis and public involvement if
the amendment "would result in a significant change" in the plan. 3 Op-
ponents of the roadless area moratorium argue that the Chief's interim
policy violates the NFMA by changing existing forest plans without ob-
serving the Act's plan amendment process."
165. Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 35 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 551
(1994)).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 509-14, 521, 523 (1911) (upholding
grazing regulations); see also Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 33, at 55-59.
167. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994)).
168. See MUSYA § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 529.
169. 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965).
170. See McMichael, 355 F.2d at 285-86.
171. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
172. See ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
173. NFMA§6, 16U.S.C§ 1604(f)(4) (1994).
174. See Letter from Frank Murkowski et al., U.S. Senators & Representatives, to Dan Glick-
man, Secretary of Agriculture (Nov. 13, 1997) ("Mhe NFMA does not allow instantaneous changes
to the plans based on new policy direction .... Congress expects the Secretary of Agriculture to
amend or revise the plans with the same degree of analysis it took to prepare the plans in the first
instance.") (on file with author).
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The Forest Service adopted the roadless area moratorium through
informal rulemaking procedures similar to those required by the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act (APA).'7' Potentially, the agency could have
chosen, in addition to or instead of the rulemaking, to amend the NFMA
plans for all the national forests affected by the moratorium." However,
amending most of the 123 forest plans would have been cumbersome and
inefficient, especially since many of the plans are already in the process
of being revised. Further, the APA procedures provide the public with
notice and opportunity to comment on the proposed moratorium, thereby
substantially fulfilling the NFMA's basic notice requirement for plan
amendments." In addition, the Forest Service held twenty-five public
meetings on the draft policy in affected regions of the country.
During the rocky course of plan implementation, the Forest Service
has prevailed twice and lost once in lawsuits that have raised NFMA plan
amendment issues. In Southern Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock,"
the timber industry argued that a regional policy providing greater habitat
protection for the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker could not be
implemented without a significant plan amendment." The court rejected
the industry's claim, finding:
[Tihe policy is a temporary attempt to preserve the status quo in cer-
tain discrete locations while a later policy can be weighed, which se-
riously limits the policy's significance to the [forest plan]. Moreover,
the... policy merely calls a time-out during which the current [plan]
strategy for protecting the red cockaded woodpecker. .. can be re-
evaluated.' 80
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgement of the district
court with respect to the NFMA claim, finding that the industry plaintiffs
lacked standing to pursue the claim.8
The timber industry unsuccessfully raised the same argument in
Prairie Wood Products v. Glickman." In that case, the Forest Service
adopted two sets of regional interim policies designed to protect old-
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). The APA specifically exempts decisions concerning federal
lands from rulemaking procedures. See id. § 553(a)(2); see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759, 776 n.1 (1969) (noting that the public property exemption applies to BLM lands). Land
management agencies, however, commonly do not take advantage of the exemption.
176. See NFMA § 6, 16 U.S.C. 1604(0(4).
177. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b).
178. 779 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ga. 1991), vacated sub nom., Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber
Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 811 (1 lth Cir. 1993) (vacating for jurisdictional rea-
sons).
179. See Southern Timber, 779 F. Supp. at 1360-61 (concluding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction because the timber company and the Council lacked standing to bring claims under the
Forest Management Act).
180. Id. at 1361.
181. See Forest Service Timber, 993 F.2d at 807-10.
182. 971 F. Supp. 457,462,472-74 (D. Or. 1997).
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growth forests and salmon stream habitat in the Pacific Northwest.' The
Forest Service implemented both policies through non-significant plan
amendments for the nine affected national forests.'' The court deferred to
the Forest Service's determination of non-significance, ruling that "Con-
gress has allowed the Forest Service substantial leeway in determining
the significance of proposed forest plan amendments."'" The court was
not persuaded by evidence that the policies would reduce timber outputs
by 58 million board feet, since "the Forest Service was obligated to con-
sider its duty to meet other goals and objectives," such as wildlife and
fish viability.'8
The court in Prairie Wood Products also rejected the industry's
claim that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS
on the regional interim policies. The court ruled that "[pireparation of an
EIS is... unnecessary when the agency's action merely prevents human
interference with the physical environment rather than irretrievably
committing resources.""' Thus, no EIS was required for the interim poli-
cies, since they "are designed to arrest environmental degradation in or-
der to preserve the environmental status quo."'
Both of the above cases involve the issue of whether a plan amend-
ment is significant or non-significant, not whether a plan amendment is
required in the first place. The only reported case addressing the latter
issue is House v. United States Forest Service,' where a federal district
court in Kentucky enjoined a Forest Service timber sale in potential
habitat for the endangered Indiana bat, partly on the grounds that the
agency had implemented bat habitat policies without adopting them as
plan amendments.'" In that case, however, the Forest Service provided
no opportunity for public comment on the policies.'9 ' Thus, the decision
provides little support for opponents of the moratorium, as the Forest
Service provided extensive public involvement opportunities through the
rulemaking process.
183. See Prarie Wood Prods., 971 F. Supp. at 460-61. Both policies were instituted pending
completion of a longer-term regional strategy being developed through two EISs covering Forest
Service and BLM lands in different parts of the Columbia River Basin. See id. at 461. One policy,
called the "Eastside Screens," prohibited most logging in old-growth forests and near streams in
eastern Oregon and Washington. See id. The second policy, called "PACFISH," expanded the ripar-
ian protection policy to anadromous fish habitats in Idaho and California. See id.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 465; accord Sierra Club v. Cargill, 11 F.3d 1545, 1548 (10th Cir. 1993) (The NFMA
"expressly commends the significance of an amendment to the Forest Supervisor's judgment.").
186. Prarie Wood Prods., 971 F. Supp. at 464,465.
187. Id. at 467; accord Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995) ("NEPA
procedures do not apply to federal actions that do nothing to alter the natural physical environment.").
188. Prarie Wood Prods., 971 F. Supp. at 467.
189. 974 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ky. 1997).
190. See House, 974 F. Supp. at 1024 n.l, 1028, 1034.
191. See id. at 1034.
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IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: OPTIONS FOR WILDERNESS AND
ROADLESS AREA PROTECTION
This Part examines opportunities to utilize existing legal authorities
to expand the wilderness system and maintain options for future desig-
nations. It discusses models for future wilderness designation and review
and proposes a new policy for managing the undesignated wilderness
areas.
A. Wilderness Designation
The ultimate goal for wilderness protection is to enact legislation
that designates land as part of the National Wilderness Preservation Sys-
tem established by the Wilderness Act. Sooner or later, barring an un-
foreseen loss of public support for wilderness protection, Congress is
likely to resume enacting legislation that adds new areas to the wilder-
ness system. Legislation may "package" the wilderness additions in sev-
eral different ways. None of these models will fit all situations.
Traditionally, most wilderness bills have designated several areas
managed by a single federal agency in a single state. Examples include
the numerous RARE II wilderness bills (national forests), the Arizona
Desert Wilderness Act of 199Y' (BLM), the Washington Park Wilder-
ness Act of 1988' (national parks), and the pending America's Red
Rock Wilderness Act'" (Utah BLM). This model has the potential ad-
vantages of engaging a state's political representatives in the review and
local debate over wilderness designation and of adding substantial
amounts of wilderness in a single bill. However, it has the disadvantage
of excluding political representation of interested citizens who do not
reside in that state. Thus, some of the nation's finest wilderness remains
undesignated and under serious threat in.Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and
Utah due to strong opposition by the states' congressional delegations.
A second commonly used approach is to designate single areas,
such as in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978' '
and the Alpine Lakes Area Management Act of 1976.'" This model is
especially appropriate where unique or complex management issues are
involved that need to be specifically addressed in the legislation. It may
also be easier to obtain political consensus on individual areas. The ma-
192. Pub. L. No. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4469 (codified as amended, in pertinent part, at 16 U.S.C. §
1132 note (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). The legislation also designated several national wildlife refuge
wilderness areas.
193. Pub. L. No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961, 3961-63 (codified as amended, in pertinent part, at
16 U.S.C. § 1132 note).
194. H.R. 1500, 105th Cong. (1997).
195. Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (codified as amended, in pertinent part, at 16 U.S.C. §
1132 note).




jor disadvantage is that it can be a time-consuming and inefficient use of
the legislative process, especially where there are numerous, relatively
small areas involved.
A third potential model is to take an "ecosystem" approach to wil-
derness designation. The outstanding example is ANILCA, in which
Congress protected many wilderness areas managed by different agen-
cies across a large landscape. Similarly, the pending Northern Rockies
Ecosystem Protection Act covers a multi-state region and includes desig-
nation of biological corridors and recovery areas as well as wilderness
areas." This type of legislation has the potential advantage of providing
greater benefits to fish and wildlife resources and attracting more scien-
tific support. On the other hand, it can be very complex legislation in
terms of drawing boundaries, defining management prescriptions, and
explaining its objectives to the public.
Taking a step back from designation, Congress can require the fed-
eral agencies to study certain areas for potential addition to the wilder-
ness system. Wilderness study was a prominent feature of the Wilderness
Act, the Eastern Wilderness Act,'98 and other wilderness legislation. It
can be an effective tool for providing interim protection, working out
difficult boundary or management issues, or paving the way for eventual
designation. However, wilderness study also can be a legislative cop-
out-a means of trying to avoid or defer hard but necessary decisions.
B. Wilderness Inventory and Review
Often a key step on the road to legislative designation is an admin-
istrative wilderness recommendation or at least verification that an area
has wilderness qualities. About 26 million acres of undesignated wilder-
ness areas have already been recommended for designation to
Congress.'" Yet, the currently recommended areas represent just 12 per-
cent of the potential wilderness.
Ideally, Congress should establish a unified, inter-agency wilderness
review process that would periodically update roadless area inventories
and wilderness recommendations on all federal lands.' However, the
agencies' general planning laws, like the NFMA, FLPMA, and NEPA,
197. H.R. 1425, 105th Cong. (1997).
198. H.R. 1567 § 4(a), 105th Cong. (1997).
199. See supra text accompanying note 19.
200. The Eastern Wilderness Act, a bill now pending, would require the federal land manage-
ment agencies to inventory and review potential wilderness areas located east of the 100th Meridian.
See H.R. 1567, 105th Cong. §§ 2(c)(3), 2(d), 3, 4(a). The proposed bill would also require the fed-
eral agencies to study the wilderness potential of state and private lands in the East. See id. § 3. The
agencies would have to complete'the reviews within 15 years. See id. § 4.
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provide adequate legal authority and direction for on-going review of the
undesignated wilderness."'
Both federal land managers and interested citizens can play impor-
tant roles in gathering information and advising Congress on potential
wilderness. Agencies have considerable discretion to design processes
for conducting wilderness inventories and reviews, particularly since
many of the procedures required by the Wilderness Act and FLPMA no
longer apply. Several models are emerging in different parts of the coun-
try that engage citizens and agencies to varying extents.
In the Southeast, the Forest Service has re-inventoried its roadless
areas as part of the Southern Appalachian Assessment-a wide-ranging,
interagency study of the region's forests and surrounding environment.'
The assessment also identified which roadless areas contain threatened
and endangered species and possible old-growth forests.'n In addition,
the agencies conducted a public opinion survey which found, among
other things, that 69 percent of Southern Appalachian residents thought
there should be more designation of wilderness. ' The new inventory
included many areas that had been missed in RARE II; however, conser-
vationists have criticized the agency for disqualifying areas on the basis
of inadequate opportunities for solitude and backcountry recreation.'
The Wilderness Society and other conservationists have prepared de-
tailed maps of unprotected roadless areas in the region's six national
forests.' The Forest Service intends to use the results of the assessment
in the upcoming revision of forest plans, which will review the wilder-
ness suitability of all national forest roadless areas in the region.'
201. See NFMA § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e) (1994); FLPMA § 201(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a)
(1994); NEPA §§ 101-207, 42 U.S.C. 88 4331-4370d (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). The National Park
Service and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service also have a policy of conducting wilderness reviews as
part of their normal management planning. See The Eastern Wilderness Act: Hearings on H.R. 1567
Before the Subconmm. on National Parks and Public Lands of the House Comm on Resources, 105th
Cong. 39-41 (1997) (statement of Destry T. Jarvis, National Park Service).
202. See 4 SOUmERN APPALACHIAN MAN AND BIOSPHERE, THE SOUrHERN APPALACHIAN
ASSESSMENT (1996). For a useful summary of the assessment, see SAA HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 159.
203. See SAA HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 159, at 51.
204. See id. at 29.
205. See id. at 22.
206. See, e.g., THE WILDERNESS SOC'Y, TENNESSEE'S MOUNTAIN TREASURES (1996); The
Wilderness Society, Conservation Coast to Coast: Center for Landscape Analysis: Mapping the
Wild (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.wildemess.org/ccc/cla/index.htm> (describing The Wilder-
ness Society's mapping of the Sierra Nevada region, the Columbia River Basin, and the Southern
Appalachians).
207. See Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Southern Appalachian Assessment Hits the
Streets! (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http'J/www.fs.fed.us/news/080796.htn?southern+appalachian>
(reporting on the release of the Southern Appalachian Assessment and stating "the USDA Forest
Service plans to use the information in the assessment in the upcoming revision of several long term
management plans for the National Forests in the Southern Appalachians").
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California citizens and conservation organizations have taken the
initiative to inventory all roadless areas in the state's national forests and
BLM lands. Coordinated by the California Wilderness Coalition, the
mostly volunteer effort is proceeding independently of the Forest Service
and BLM.' The principal objective of the citizens' project is to develop
legislative proposals for wilderness designation, rather than to change
agency management plans or wilderness recommendations.
In Utah, the BLM and citizen wilderness advocates are conducting
simultaneous but separate wilderness inventories. Founded in 1985, the
Utah Wilderness Coalition has been the main force behind the legislative
initiative to establish additional wilderness areas in Utah.' At the direc-
tion of Secretary of Interior Babbitt, the BLM is evaluating areas that are
included in pending legislation but were omitted from the agency's ear-
lier WSA inventory." ' Meanwhile, citizens working with the Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance have completed their own inventory, identify-
ing a total of 8.5 million acres of potential wilderness.2"'
Colorado citizen conservationists and BLM personnel are taking a
more coordinated approach to address roadless areas."' The Colorado
Environmental Coalition initially took the lead in re-inventorying BLM
roadless areas, but the BLM made the next step by reviewing the Coali-
tion's proposals and issuing its own recommended roadless area maps for
public review and comment. Depending on public input, the BLM may
adopt the updated roadless area inventory by amending its resource man-
agement plans.
These examples illustrate a trend toward greater participation by
citizen groups in inventorying and mapping of unprotected wilderness
areas. If land managers choose not to deal seriously with roadless area
issues, citizens will likely bypass such agencies and go directly to mem-
bers of Congress with new wilderness legislation and to the courts for
interim protection of roadless areas. On the other hand, agency officials
can take the initiative and seek out opportunities to collaborate with in-
terested citizens-as well as other agencies and universities-to accom-
208. Cf California Wilderness Coalition, California Wilderness Coalition (last modified Janu-
ary 25, 1998) <http://www.calwild.orgf-mail.htm> (presenting information about the California
Wilderness Coalition including its membership, mission, and projects).
209. Cf Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, The BLM Wilderness Review (visited Nov. 6,
1998) <http://www.suwa.orgtWATIreview.html> (outlining the inventory of Utah's public lands
for designation as wilderness by the Utah Wilderness Coalition, a private group of conservationists
dedicated to maintaining the wilderness); supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
210. See Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1207-08 (l0th Cir. 1998).
211. Cf Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, New Utah Wilderness Inventory: Fruition of the
New Citizen's Inventory of Utah Wilderness (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.suwa.org/
newinventory> (reporting on the Utah Wilderness Coalition's inventory of public lands in Utah).
212. See Memorandum from State Director, Colorado BLM Office, to District Managers, Area
Managers, and Deputy State Director, Resource Services (May 19, 1997) (on file with authors)
(setting forth policy for the management of lands described in the Colorado Environmental Coali-
tion's wilderness proposal for BLM lands) [hereinafter Colorado BLM Directive].
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plish wilderness reviews. Collaborative inventorying and mapping of
roadless areas could save substantial amounts of agency time and re-
sources.
C. Management of Unprotected Wilderness
Roadless area management has been a long-standing battleground
for conservationists, commodity development interests, and federal land
managers. The debate traditionally has focused on whether roadless areas
should be designated as wilderness or managed for commodity produc-
tion." ' For a variety of reasons, however, the terms of the debate have
changed in recent years. Scientific documentation of widespread declines
in fish and wildlife, water quality, and overall ecological integrity due to
road construction, intensive logging, motorized recreation, and other
human disturbances have underscored the increasingly important role of
roadless areas in maintaining environmental quality."' Consequently, it
has become more difficult for federal land managers to reconcile roadless
area degradation with legal obligations imposed by NEPA, NFMA, the
Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, and other environmental
laws. In general, federal land management priorities have shifted from
producing commodity resources to protecting biological diversity and
amenity values. Further, public opinion polls indicate widespread support
for roadless area protection."'
Thus, a strong case can now be made for retaining the natural values
and benefits of essentially all remaining roadless areas on federal land.
Protecting roadless areas helps to maintain environmental quality and
ensure compliance with existing environmental laws. A policy of main-
taining the wild, undeveloped character of roadless areas would defuse
much of the controversy and polarization that has beset federal land man-
agement, such as the annual debate over congressional appropriations for
Forest Service road construction. It also would save millions of taxpayer
dollars that are being spent on new logging roads, timber sales, and the
213. See, e.g., Forest Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Words to Action: Conservation Leadership
for the 21st Century, Remarks of Mike Dombeck National Leadership Conference, October 27, 1998
(visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.fs.fedtus/intro/speech/19981027.html>.
214. See, e.g., supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (arguing that roadless areas should
remain undeveloped based on studies of the potential effects on wildlife, water quality, and natural
conditions if development were to take place in the roadless areas of the Columbia Basin); see also
P.R. Ehrlich & E.O. Wilson, Biodiversity Studies: Science and Policy, 253 SCIENCE 758 (1991)
(arguing that human action, specifically land development, is causing the extinction of wild species
and ecosystems); Reed F. Noss, Sustainability and Wilderness, 5 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 120,
120-21 (1991) (arguing for the necessity of roadless areas to provide habits for various species such
as wolves, grizzly and black bears, and mountain lions).
215. See Ken A. Rait, Forest Service Should Keep President Clinton's Promise, OREGONIAN,
Sept. 4, 1998, at 24, 26 (reporting on the nationwide opinion survey commissioned by The Wilder-
ness Society finding that 65 percent of voters support a proposal to "stop all timber cutting in
roadless wild forest areas").
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preparation of site-specific EISs.16 Moreover, it would preserve options
for future generations by halting the irreversible loss of wild areas.
We recommend that the federal government adopt a legally-binding,
long-term roadless area protection policy. Ideally, the policy should be
enacted by Congress, as it did when it assumed responsibility for creating
the Wilderness System. However, such a wildland policy could also be
adopted administratively by the President through executive order or by
the agencies through rulemaking, such as the Forest Service's morato-
rium on road construction in roadless areas."' Our recommended policy
would include the following elements.
1. The policy should begin with a clear statement of intent to establish
a national policy to protect in their natural condition the remaining
wild, undeveloped public lands. In 1976, Congress settled a compa-
rable, long-standing dispute over whether to dispose of BLM public
lands or retain them in federal ownership by enacting FLPMA. Sec-
tion 102 of FLPMA declared a national policy that "the public lands
be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a result of the land use
planning procedure provided for in this Act, it is determined that




2. Consistent with scientific recommendations, the policy should de-
fine wildlands to include all roadless areas greater than one thou-
sand acres in federal ownership and smaller tracts with significant
wildland characteristics, such as old-growth forests."9 The definition
could also encompass additional, lightly-roaded public lands that are
essentially in their natural state, as is current Forest Service practice
for eastern national forests.'
3. The policy should at a minimum permanently protect federal wild-
lands from new road construction, logging, mineral development,
and motorized vehicle use. Exceptions could be made on a case-by-
case basis, either through land management planning (as FLPMA
provides for disposal of public lands) or, perhaps in the case of large
216. See, e.g., 95 GEN. Accr. OFF. REP. 237FS, at 2 (1995) (reporting that expenditures for timber
sales exceeded receipts returned to the Treasury by a total of $995.4 million in three-year period); THE
WILDERNESS SOc'y, DOUBLE TROUBLE: THE LOSS OF TREES AND MONEY IN OUR NATIONAL FORESTS
1 (1998) (stating that the commercial timber sale program lost $204 million in 1996).
217. See supra Part II.C.
218. FLPMA § 102(a)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1994).
219. See Letter from Dominick Dellasala et al., Scientists, to President Clinton (Dec. 10, 1997)
("In our view, a scientifically-based policy for roadless areas on public lands should, at a minimum,
protect from development all roadless areas larger than 1,000 acres and those smaller areas that have
special ecological significance because of their contributions to regional landscapes.") (on file with
author); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-814 (1998) (proposing the Eastern Wilderness Act of 1997
which would provide interim protection for all roadless areas 500 acres or larger on federal lands
east of the 100th Meridian).
220. See FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE LAND AND RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT PLANNING HANDBOOK § 1909.12, § 7.1 lb (1992) (defining inventory criteria allow-
ing for up to a half mile of improved road for each 1,000 acres).
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areas, through an act of Congress (as ANILCA provides for drilling
in the Arctic Coastal Plain). FLPMA's management direction for
BLM Wilderness Study Areas, which preserves valid existing
rights, is a potential model."' The overall management objective
should be to maintain the status quo in order to preserve future op-
tions and the non-commodity values and uses of the areas. How-
ever, existing activities such as excessive grazing and fire suppres-
sion should be carefully scrutinized and curtailed where necessary
to protect wildland values.
4. The policy should direct the federal land management agencies to
inventory their wild lands on a regular basis. The inventory effort
should focus on identifying uninventoried roadless areas larger than
one thousand acres, as well as areas larger than five thousand acres
that were missed by previous inventories. The agencies should col-
laborate with citizen groups like the California and Utah wilderness
coalitions to conduct the inventories. National, regional, and local
scientific panels should develop criteria and protocols and oversee the
inventory process. All inventoried wildlands would be protected from
development. While inventories are being completed, the NEPA pro-
cess for any road-building, logging, and mining project would have
to assess the affected area's wildland characteristics and make a de-
termination that the project would not affect a de-facto wildland.m
CONCLUSION
On the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Wilderness Act, a national
consensus is emerging that our remaining wild public lands are valuable
resources that should remain unspoiled. Yet, millions of acres of national
forest and BLM roadless areas are subject to logging, mining, oil and gas
drilling, and associated road construction, threatening irreversible losses
of the nation's wilderness resource. In Idaho's national forests alone, one
million acres of roadless land were lost to logging and road building
during the past decade.m
221. See supra Part 1I.C.3; see also H.R. REP. No. 105-814 (1998) (proposing the Eastern
Wilderness Act of 1997 which would apply FLPMA's interim protection requirement to potential
wilderness areas on federal land east of the 100th Meridian); H.R. 1376, 105th Cong. (1997) (pro-
hibiting road building and logging in public land roadless areas larger than five thousand acres in the
West and 1500 acres in the East).
222. In Colorado, where the BLM is reviewing the wilderness characteristics of previously
uninventoried areas, the agency has adopted a policy to "[ilnitiate an evaluation of an area or areas
whenever discretionary actions that might have irreversible or irretrievable impacts are proposed in
the areas recommended for wilderness by the [Colorado Environmental Council]" and "to hold
discretionary actions that might have irreversible or irretrievable impacts temporarily in abeyance"
pending resolution of wilderness issues through the BLM planning process. Colorado BLM Direc-
tive, supra note 212.
223. See THE WILDERNESS Soc'y, IDAHO'S VANISHING WILDERNESS: A STATUS REPORT ON
ROADLESS AREAS IN IDAHO'S NATIONAL FORESTS 1 (1997).
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Due to public support for wilderness preservation, the success of the
Wilderness Act has far exceeded the expectations of its original propo-
nents. The land management agencies need to work collaboratively with
citizens to review potential wilderness as part of normal planning proc-
esses. Congress, in turn, should resume the role it assigned to itself of
evaluating agency and citizen-sponsored wilderness recommendations
and making appropriate additions to the wilderness system.
In the meantime, though, the undesignated wilderness areas need
greater protection to ensure that future generations have the option to
preserve and enjoy ample wilderness resources. If we were to adopt a
policy of protecting the remaining roadless areas, approximately 50 per-
cent of America's federal lands would remain in a wild, natural condi-
tion. ' This seems to be a reasonable balance between competing de-
mands for federal lands. We owe it to ourselves and to future generations
to let nature reign free over at least half of our public lands.
224. See supra Part I.B.
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In 1964, the United States Congress passed the Wilderness Act "to
secure for the American people of present and future generations the
benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness."' The Act established 9.1
million acres of instant wilderness areas.2 Today, the National Wilder-
ness Preservation System (NWPS) has grown to include 104 million
acres, 3 a land mass slightly larger than the state of California. Four dif-
ferent federal agencies and two cabinet-level departments administer
these lands.' Though the size of the wilderness system has already ex-
ceeded the dreams of its founders, some now talk of a future wilderness
system of 300 million acres
Designating wilderness is only the first, albeit essential, step toward
its enduring preservation. George Marshall, former president of the Si-
erra Club and brother of wilderness advocate Robert Marshall, noted
shortly after passage of the Wilderness Act: "At the same time that wil-
derness boundaries are being established and protected by Acts of Con-
gress, attention must be given to the quality of wilderness within these
boundaries, or we may be preserving empty shells." Of more recent
vintage, and expressing more pressing alarm, are statements made by the
two Cabinet-level officials most responsible for the enactment of the
1964 Wilderness Act. Stewart Udall, Secretary of Interior under Presi-
dents Kennedy and Johnson, recently wrote:
* Executive Director, Wilderness Watch.
1. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 2(a), 78 Stat. 890, 890 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994)).
2. See PETER LANDRES & SHANNON MEYER, U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
NATIONAL WILDERNESS PRESERVATION SYSTEM DATABASE: KEY ATTRIBUTES AND TRENDS, 1964
THROUGH 1998, at 1 (1998) (Rocky Mountain Research Station Document No. RMRS-GTR-18).
3. See id.
4. The four agencies and two departments include the United States Forest Service in the
Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, and the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of Interior. See DAVID N. COLE,
INTERMOUNTAIN RESEARCH STATION, WILDERNESS RECREATION USE TRENDS, 1965 THROUGH
1994, at 2 (1996).
5. See The Wilderness Society, The Future of Wilderness (visited Oct. 20, 1998)
<http://www.wildemess.org/standbylands/wildemess/future.htm>.
6. J. HENDEE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT 1 (1990) (citing
WILDERNESS AND QUALITY OF LIFE 13-15 (Maxine E. McCloskey et al. eds., (1969)).
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[Thirty] years ago many of us involved in the Act expected to retire
with the ability to look across the country at the legacy we labored to
leave for our grandchildren, and to find it secure and intact. Instead, I
find myself now 75 years old and unable to relax as I see that in-
tended inheritance seriously threatened.
Orville Freeman, who served alongside Udall as Secretary of Agricul-
ture, has expressed similar concerns."
Threats to wilderness are many and varied. Undoubtedly our "in-
creasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing
mechanization"'' is making the job of those who are responsible for ad-
ministering and protecting our wilderness heritage more difficult, but
certainly not impossible. The list of issues discussed in this article is not
exhaustive, nor does it include world-wide environmental problems such
as acid rain, global warming, human population growth and large-scale
wildlife habitat destruction that affect the health of our wilderness lands.
Instead, this article will focus on those issues over which wilderness
managers and local citizens have some control and/or for which man-
agement actions can be taken-for example, wilderness managers have
little control over population growth, but can effect how increased user
demand impacts the wilderness. Of course, any such list must be pre-
sented with a caveat: just as many of the technological and environ-
mental challenges facing wilderness today could not be foreseen just
three decades ago, the next thirty years will undoubtedly include many
new threats.
I. ADMINISTRATiVE CHALLENGES
One has to wonder, as the list of challenges grows and the resolve of
the managing agencies to confront those problems weakens, whether our
current institutional structure is adequate to protect wilderness in the long
run. It seems somewhat incongruous that both the citizen and congres-
sional supporters of the 1956-1964 wilderness bills believed that the
administration of wilderness areas should remain with the agencies that
oversaw these areas prior to designation.'" After all, it was a fear that the
Forest Service and National Park Service were not committed to the
long-term protection of wild areas that led to the push for a legislative
solution." Still, there was virtually no consideration given during the
eight years of debate leading up to the passage of the law to create a new
agency or strip the existing agencies of their control over these lands, a
7. From Stewart Udall ..., WILDERNESS WATCHER (Wilderness Watch, Missoula, Mont.),
Winter 1995, at 3, 7.
8. See Introducing Mr. Orvill Freeman, WILDERNESS WATCHER (Wilderness Watch,
Missoula Mont.), Summer 1995, at 4, 11.
9. Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL FROME, BATTLE FOR THE WILDERNESS 138 (1997).
11. See id. at 136-38.
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principle that has basically gone unchallenged to this day." To be sure,
there has been substantial congressional concern over degradation of
lands within the NWPS, and at least one serious effort to overhaul the
wilderness programs of the four agencies charged with their administra-
tion.'3 The idea, however, that the system should be placed in the care of
another entity has not gained much favor.
A. Recreation Use
Wilderness visitation has grown steadily since 1964." While part of
the growth is due to the increase in wilderness areas and acres, at least
one-half of all areas saw their highest use levels during the 1990s."
Along with an increase in use comes an increase in impacts.'6 Managers
have implemented limited entry permit systems in some areas, but in
most areas there is little direct control. This is in spite of a recent survey
of managers finding recreation overuse to be the most commonly stated
problem.'7
Users often resist any effort to limit use or impacts, and in many
cases are resorting to legislative attempts to thwart managers' actions.
For instance, hiking groups in the Pacific Northwest argue that limiting
access to wilderness will interfere with "green bonding," in turn reducing
the constituency for more wilderness designations." When the Forest
Service attempted to remove material caches from commercial outfitter
camps in the Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness, the outfitters
12. The one notable challenge comes from Frome, who calls for the formation of a National
Wilderness Service. See id. at 199-202.
13. In the 102d Congress, Rep. Bruce Vento introduced H.R. 4325, H.R. 4326, and H.R. 4327
"to strengthen the [wilderness] management programs of the Forest Service, the Park Service and the
Bureau of Land Management, as well as the Fish and Wildlife Service." Wilderness Management:
Hearing on H.R. 4325, 4326, 4327 Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks and Pub. Lands of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong. 2 (1992) (statement of Bruce Vento,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks and Pub. Lands). Vento stated:
The proposed Wilderness Management Acts I have introduced substantially deal
with how our land management agencies are managed and how they take care of the ex-
isting wilderness areas today and tomorrow. They will not designate a single new acre of
wilderness, but instead will create strong, new management program initiatives to protect
the wilderness that we already have designated. Such legislation is urgently needed.
Id.
14. See COLE, supra note 4, at 3. These recent research findings differ from reports in the late
1980s, which indicated that wilderness use was declining, leading many managers to believe that
recreation impacts would heal themselves. Cf Joseph W. Roggenbuck, Wilderness Use and User
Characteristics: Ending Some Misconceptions, 14 W. WILDLANDS 1, 8 (1988).
15. See COLE, supra note 4, at 9.
16. See David N. Cole, Wilderness Recreation Management. We Need More Than Bandages
and Toothpaste, 91 J. FORESTRY 22, 22 (1993); see also DAVID N. COLE, INTERMOUNTAIN
RESEARcH STATION, CAMPSITES IN THREE WESTERN WILDERNESSES: PROLIFERATION AND
CHANGES IN CONDITION OVER 12 TO 16 YEARS 1 (1993) (documenting visitor impact on campsites).
17. See Summary, WILDERNESS EDUC. & TRAINING NEEDS ASSESSMENT SURVEY (Arthur
Carhart Nat'l Wilderness Training Ctr., Hudson, Mont.), 1997, at 1, 1.
18. Cf Comments on Wilderness Solitude: A Special Report of Guest Editorials, in SIGNPOST
FOR NORTHWEST TRAILS 12 (1997).
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sued the agency resulting in an out-of-court settlement that was later
overturned by a federal judge who ruled that the caches and other perma-
nent improvements at the camps violated the Wilderness Act.9 The out-
fitters now have turned to legislation to regain their permanent camps.'
Most recently, Forest Service Chief Michael Dombeck ruled that the
installation of permanent ("fixed") anchors by climbers violated the
law.2' Climbing groups exclaimed that the permanent anchor ban would
effectively eliminate most wilderness climbing and, along with their in-
dustry counterparts, convinced a U.S. senator to add a provision to the
agency's funding bill that prevents the Forest Service from implementing
the ban.'
Even when legislation is not invoked, administrative challenges are
virtually guaranteed any time an agency attempts to limit visitor use.
Group size limits, restrictions on pack stock use, or campfire closures
draw immediate objections.
Wilderness advocates are accustomed to responding to charges from
off-road vehicle users, mountain bike riders, ranchers, loggers, and oth-
ers who complain that wilderness designation restricts their ability to use
public lands. Now, the shoe is on the other foot. Many of the groups op-
posing restrictions on wilderness use are the ones who supported wilder-
ness designation, but are now having difficulty accepting limitations on
their own use.
B. Access to Private Inholdings
The Wilderness Act provides that owners of private land within
wilderness shall be given "adequate access" or such lands shall be ex-
changed for lands of equal value.' Thus, the Act preserved the agencies'
ability to protect the wilderness from projects requiring access that would
compromise wilderness character. A 1980 Opinion from the United
States Attorney General affirmed that if a private landowner refused an
exchange, the government could deny access that was incompatible with
preserving wilderness character.' If, for example, an inholder proposed
to build a road to his/her property, the agency could offer to exchange the
inholding for lands outside the wilderness. If the offer to exchange was
19. See Wilderness Watch v. Robertson, No. 92-0740 (April 16, 1993, D.D.C.).
20. See Outfitter Policy Act of 1997, S. 1489, 105th Cong. § 3.
21. See Letter from Darrel L. Kenops, Reviewing Officer for the Chief, U.S. Forest Service, to
George Nickas, Executive Director, Wilderness Watch (May 27, 1998) (Discretionary Review of
April 13, 1998, Appeal Decision on Sawtooth Wilderness Management Direction) (on file with
author). This constitutes the final administrative determination of the Department of Agriculture on
36 C.F.R. 217.17(f) (1998)).
22. See S. 2237, 105th Cong. § 331 (1998); see also 144 CONG. REC. S9965 (daily ed. Sept. 8,
1998) (presentation of Amendment No. 3548 by Sen. Slade Gorton, Wash.).
23. Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
24. See 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 243, 269 (1980).
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rejected, the agency would not be obligated to approve the inholder's
requested access. Indeed, the agency would be obligated to deny access
if it would impair wilderness character.'
A different interpretation of access rights based on a provision in the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) is now
espoused by managing agencies. This new view subscribes to the notion
that section 1323 of ANILCA effectively amended the Wilderness Act.'
As a result, federal agencies behave as if they no longer have the option
to offer access or exchange. Instead, they must guarantee reasonable
access even if the access results in harm to the wilderness resource.' This
resulted in recent approvals for vehicle access to a proposed strip mine in
the Mt. Nebo Wilderness (Utah), a proposed lodge in the Kalmiopsis
Wilderness (Oregon), and to a planned recreation cabin in the South Si-
erra Wilderness (California). These decisions, while troubling, are just
the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The amount of nonfederal land within
units of the wilderness system is staggering. There are literally hundreds
of inholdings totaling nearly one-half million acres scattered throughout
national forest wilderness, while some BLM administered wilderness has
nearly as much nonfederal land as public land within their borders. The
threat posed by increasing requests for vehicle access is enormous.
C. Manipulating Ecosystems in Wilderness
The Wilderness Act defines wilderness "as an area where the earth
and its community of life are untrammeled by man ... retaining its pri-
meval character and influence.., which is protected and managed so as
25. See id. at 265-74.
26. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended, in pertinent part, at 16
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1994)).
27. Section 1323 reads:
(a) Reasonable use and enjoyment of land within boundaries of National Forest System
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to such terms and conditions
as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe, the Secretary shall provide such access to
nonfederally owned land within the boundaries of the National Forest System as the Sec-
retary deems adequate to secure to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof:
Provided, That such owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to ingress and
egress to or from the National Forest System.
(b) Reasonable use and enjoyment of land surrounded by public lands managed by the
Secretary
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to such terms and conditions
as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe, the Secretary shall provide such access to
nonfederally owned land surrounded by public lands managed by the Secretary under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1701-82) as the Secretary
deems adequate to secure to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof: Pro-
vided, That such owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to access across
public lands.
ANILCA § 1323(a)-(b), 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a)--(b).
28. See David A. Price, Wilderness Values and Access Rights: Troubling Statutory Construc-
tion Brings the Alaska Lands Act into Play, 54 U. COLO. L. REv. 593, 602-04 (1983) (discussing
ANILCA's section 1323 impacts on wilderness areas).
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to preserve its natural conditions."'" Indeed, on the continuum of land
protection systems, wilderness has the greatest statutory protection from
human influence of all public lands.
One of the public purposes of wilderness areas is their benefit for
scientific study, an opportunity to learn how unmodified environments
respond to natural conditions. Wilderness represents the "control" in our
great experiment called land management. The law's intent, however,
that natural processes should operate freely and management should be
directed toward controlling human impacts rather than natural processes,
continues to be a very elusive goal in wilderness ecosystems. In part, this
is because virtually no wilderness is immune to outside influences. Even
the largest wilderness cannot escape the consequences of disrupted wild-
life migration routes, fire suppression, acid rain, or human-caused global
climate change.
Thus, the case is often made that some intentional ecological ma-
nipulation within wilderness is necessary to offset the unintended conse-
quences of actions outside the area. This point of view suggests that
managers are forced to choose either to attempt to create "pristine" con-
ditions (i.e., what these areas would be if there were no internal or exter-
nal human influence), or to maintain "unmanipulated" conditions (i.e., let
natural processes respond to any and all factors which will result in
something different than "pristine"), or both?
A different view suggests that Congress did not set up any such di-
chotomy. The Act does not mandate a "pristine" condition, rather there is
a mandate to allow natural processes to operate freely." Fire behavior,
for example, might be different had fire suppression never been practiced
in a particular wilderness or in the surrounding terrain, but by designat-
ing an area as wilderness we have decided that from that point forward
the natural processes will determine the conditions within that area. Even
the effects of outside influences do not alter the basic charge of wilder-
ness managers-that inside the line, natural processes must be allowed to
operate without management interference. This recognizes that some
unnatural changes will occur. Wilderness, however, must be allowed to
respond to the cards it is dealt.
As the debate over the. proper role of "management" within wilder-
ness is engaged, there are a number of controversial practices that must
be addressed. These ongoing practices all challenge the ideal that wilder-
ness will be "untrammeled by man."'32
29. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
30. See David N. Cole, Ecological Manipulation in Wilderness-An Emerging Management
Dilemma, 2 INT'L J. WILDERNESS 15, 16-18 (1996).
31. See Bill Worf, Response to "Ecological Manipulation in Wilderness" by Dr. David N.
Cole, 3 INT'L J. WILDERNESS 30, 31 (1997).
32. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
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1. Introducing Exotic Fish and Wildlife Species
Introducing exotic fish and wildlife species is not a new phenomena.
The practice of stocking naturally fishless lakes, for example, dates back
over one hundred years in many western high mountain wilderness areas.
Indeed, fishing in wilderness remains a popular pursuit and many wil-
derness visitors first entered the backcountry with a fishing rod in hand.
Fishing's popularity does not change the fact that fish stocking has
substantially altered aquatic ecosystems, even in the most remote areas
of the forty-eight contiguous states. It is estimated that ninety-five per-
cent of the 16,000 lakes in high mountain regions of the eleven western
states were naturally fishless, but ninety-five percent of the lakes deeper
than ten feet now contain trout.33 Recent studies show that fish stocking
in the High Sierras contributes to widespread decline in native fish spe-
cies, dramatic changes in zooplankton and invertebrate species composi-
tion, and to the endangerment of the mountain yellow-legged frog.'
Introducing exotic species is not limited to fish. The Utah Division
of Wildlife Resources has long been engaged in introducing Rocky
Mountain goats into federal wilderness where no evidence exists that
goats historically occurred.
The dubious ecological rationality of these exotic species introduc-
tions is generally subordinated to the debate over "states' rights." The
Wilderness Act did not alter the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the
states or the federal government with respect to fish and wildlife man-
agement. Therefore, federal policies managing wilderness so that "the
forces of natural selection and survival rather than human actions deter-
mine which and what numbers of wildlife species will exist"' are pitted
against state wildlife policies emphasizing recreational fishing and hunt-
ing opportunities. To date, there is scant evidence that either the Forest
Service or the BLM will protect wilderness from the exploitative tenden-
cies of state wildlife departments, or that state agencies intend to modify
their management objectives.
2. Exotic Plant Invasions
"Weed" is a term generally used to describe a plant growing in an
area where it did not naturally occur. While the introduction of alien
33. See P. Bahls, The Status of Fish Populations and Management of High Mountain Lakes in
the Western United States, 66 Nw. SCIENCE 12, 12 (1992).
34. See Roland A. Knapp, Non-Native Trout in Natural Lakes of the Sierra Nevada: An Analy-
sis of Their Distribution and Impacts on Native Aquatic Biota, in SIERRA NEVADA ECOSYSTEM
PROjECT: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 363, 372-378 (1996); see also Connie Gill & Kathleen
Matthews, Frogs or Fish???, FORESTRY RESEARCH W., Aug. 1998, at 1, 1-4.
35. See Dick Carter, Maintaining Wildlife Naturalness in Wilderness, 3 INT'L J. WILDERNESS
17,19 (1997).
36. U.S. FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRiC., U.S. FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2323.31(1)
(1990) [hereinafter FSM].
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
wildlife is often viewed with indifference or sometimes even support by
wilderness managers, the spread of weeds is considered a major threat to
wilderness ecosystems. Most wilderness administrators and users can
agree that the presence of alien plants has and will continue to lead to
undesirable affects, but growing conflict over the appropriate response to
this threat remains.
Two of the most popular treatments are, on their face, contradictory
to the principles of wilderness. They involve the use of herbicides and,
increasingly, the use of biological controls (i.e:, insects that are them-
selves alien, but that also inhibit the spread of alien plants). Are the use
of poisons and the introduction of alien biological controls appropriate in
wilderness? Can the spread of weeds even be controlled? Should natural
processes be the force of choice for "managing" alien plants in wilder-
ness? These are important questions that receive only cursory considera-
tion in most weed management programs. In addition to philosophical
and legal questions surrounding their use, herbicides are controversial
because they impact nontarget species (native plants and animals) and,
potentially, human visitors. Biological controls, while sometimes effec-
tive, pose serious concerns over whether the alien insects might change
host species, thus eliminating native plants as well. When it comes to
weeds, whether the cure is worse than the disease will be intensely de-
bated in coming years.
3. Fire Management
Fire has been a major influence for shaping the structure, composi-
tion, and function of many wilderness ecosystems, yet it may also be the
natural force most manipulated by land managers. 7 Fire suppression, the
dominant management response for the past century, led to a host of un-
desirable effects. Fortunately this policy is evolving, albeit slowly, as our
view of fire changes from one of a destructive force to one of an essential
natural process.
As more is learned about the natural role of fire in maintaining these
ecosystems, the tendency for managers to want to manipulate fire to
achieve management objectives also grows. This view is strengthened by
the recently approved national fire policy, stressing that all natural fires
should be controlled unless there is a specific fire management plan in
place for the wilderness area and, even then, that natural ignitions will be
allowed to burn only under narrowly defined prescriptions. 8 While the
policy requires a comprehensive plan before natural fires will be allowed
to burn, there is no such plan required before administrators engage in a
37. See FROME, supra note 10, at xlv-xlvi.
38. See generally NAT'L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY,
ImPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE REFERENCE GUIDE (1998).
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program of prescribed bums. Fire is destined to become a means to an
end, a manipulative tool rather than a natural process in wilderness.
Adding to the difficulty of managing fire within wilderness is that an
escaped fire can affect public and private resources outside the wilder-
ness. An important question managers must wrestle with is determining
to what degree fire within wilderness will be manipulated in order to
protect or serve "outside" interests. Is it appropriate to attempt to sup-
press a fire that might burn for weeks in a twenty thousand acre wilder-
ness drainage in order to protect a private cabin on a twenty acre inhold-
ing? Is it okay to control a fire in wilderness to reduce the likelihood it
will burn up an adjacent timber stand, and should it make a difference if
the timber stand is on private or public land? What responsibilities, both
legal and ethical, do land managers have to protect private interests from
natural events? How do those responsibilities stack up against the man-
date to administer wilderness as an area untrammeled by humans? The
Wilderness Act, broadly defined, grants managers a good deal of discre-
tion in responding to fire.39 An approach favoring outside interests will
surely result in wilderness ecosystems that are more culturally con-
structed than natural systems. At the same time, a management approach
that favors untrammeled conditions will test the will of managers and the
public to live in a wilder environment.
D. Water Impoundments
It might seem odd to discuss dams in an article dedicated to desig-
nated wilderness. After all, the purpose for building a dam is to bring
under human control a wild and uncontrolled natural system. "Yet, be-
cause there are some 200 dams found in wildernesses across the nation,
all built before designation, their management can have profound im-
pacts on the wilderness system and thus requires the closest scrutiny of
managers and wilderness advocates alile."' Most of the dams were built
at existing lakes to enhance water storage capacity and control the timing
of downstream flows.
Creating a reservoir completely alters the existing ecosystem. Up-
stream migration of fish and other aquatic organisms is blocked. Unnatu-
ral water releases impair riparian vegetation and damage stream mor-
phology. Riverine environments are replaced by lacustrine (lake) sys-
tems. In short, dams directly contradict the basic ideal of wilderness as
places "where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by
man,'01 even though they are legally permitted as existing private rights.
39. The Wilderness Act states that "such measures may be taken as may be necessary in the
control of fire, insects, and diseases, subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems desirable."
Wilderness Act § 2(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1) (1994).
40. Tin Cup Dam Disaster, WILDERNESS WATCHER (Wilderness Watch, Missoula, Mont.),
Fall 1997, at 1, 1.
41. WildernessAct§2(c), 16U.S.C. § 1131(c).
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Protecting wilderness values is complicated by a host of other con-
cerns that result from the presence of dams. Approval to use motorized
equipment for routine maintenance is becoming commonplace. The Tin
Cup Dam in the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, for example, was main-
tained with motorized equipment at least six times in the past decade and
heavy construction equipment was airlifted to the site twice in the past
two years. In 1996, a ten-foot wide, 60,000 pound tracked excavator was
driven up a pack trail leading to the Bass Lake Dam in the same wilder-
ness.'2 Requests for heavy equipment access spread to dams in the High
Uintas Wilderness in Utah. In addition to requests for motorized vehicle
access and motorized equipment use, many of the water companies also
claim private property rights based on a number of antiquated easements
and rights-of-way statutes. 3 If water interests succeed in their quest to
obtain easements and rights-of-way it could seriously erode the ability of
managers and the public to safeguard wilderness values.
E. Grazing by Domestic Livestock
Many people are surprised to learn that commercial livestock grazing
is allowed in wilderness where it was established prior to wilderness
designation." The impacts from grazing on vegetation and soils is well
documented, as are the impacts of competition and disease transmission
on wildlife. Grazing has been identified as one of the top two manage-
ment issues by BLM managers.3
While allowing for grazing, the Wilderness Act also charges manag-
ers with preserving wilderness character. In response to livestock indus-
try concerns that the Forest Service was attempting to phase out livestock
grazing in wilderness, Congress, in 1980, drafted new guidelines for
grazing management." These "congressional grazing guidelines" allow
livestock operators to construct and maintain facilities (i.e., corrals and
fences) not otherwise allowed in wilderness. The guidelines also allow
ranchers to use motor vehicles in some situations. In writing the guide-
lines, however, Congress also made it clear that it was not amending the
Wilderness Act. The Act and the clarifying guidelines present a real
42. See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRiC., RECORD OF DECISION 1 (1995) (discussing the
need to drive heavy equipment up Bass Creek Trail #4 for Bass Lake Dam reconstruction).
43. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, "Ditch Bill" provision, Pub.
L. No. 94-579, § 501, 90 Stat. 2743, 2776 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1761(c) (1994)); General Right of
Way Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1101 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1986)) (repealed in
part by Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2793 (1976)); General Mining Act of 1866, ch. 166, § 5, 14 Stat.
86 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1994)) (amended by General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, § 1, 17
Stat. 91 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1994))).
44. "[The grazing of livestock, where established prior to September 3, 1964, shall be per-
mitted to continue subject to such reasonable regulations as are deemed necessary by the Secretary
of Agriculture." Wilderness Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4)(2).
45. See Summary, supra note 17, at 1.
46. See FSM, supra note 36, § 2323.22.
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challenge for managers given that domestic livestock have such an obvi-
ous impact on ecological conditions and visitor perceptions. Managers
must strive to control grazing impacts so natural vegetative succession is
unobstructed, wildlife species composition and populations are deter-
mined by natural conditions, and visitors can experience wilderness free
of the intrusive evidence of humankind.
F. Aircraft Use
The Wilderness Act gives land managers the discretion to allow air-
craft use to continue in those areas where its use was established at the
time of wilderness designation. In the forty-eight contiguous states, the
use of aircraft is restricted to three wilderness areas.' Where it is allowed,
aircraft use has grown to the point that it poses serious impacts to wilder-
ness quality. According to a study on reconstructing a popular flood dam-
aged airstrip in the Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness, the
number of airplane landings has increased significantly in recent years. A
full one-third of all landings there are for pilot training, "touch and goes,"
or "bagging an airstrip." This begs the questions whether these are wil-
derness dependent activities and whether their continuance runs counter to
the agency's charge to protect wilderness character.
Because federal land managers do not control the airspace over wil-
derness, flightseeing and other aircraft overflights present a particularly
perplexing issue. Many of our nation's premier wildernesses and national
parks are experiencing an increase in overflights and flightseeing. Ironi-
cally, when federal officials restricted overflights of the Grand Canyon,
many of the planes were rerouted over the nearby Saddle Mountain Wil-
derness on the Kaibab National Forest. Restrictions proposed for Rocky
Mountain National Park caused Forest Service officials to petition the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to restrict overflights of the ad-
jacent Indian Peaks Wilderness. Flightseeing over Glacier National Park
has expanded to include the Bob Marshall, Scapegoat, and Great Bear
Wilderness. Controlling the impacts of aircraft use on wilderness will
require a coordinated and cooperative approach between wilderness
managers and the FAA.
Special provisions in ANILCA allow for a great deal of aircraft use in
Alaska wilderness. Even there, the aircraft industry is not satisfied with its
special privilege; efforts are underway to expand the types of aircraft use
allowed. In the spring of 1996, the Forest Service released a proposal to
47. The three wilderness areas allowing aircraft use are the Great Bear Wilderness, Selway-
Bitterroot Wilderness, and Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness. See Shannon S. Meyer,
Wilderness Airstrips: A Case Study for Using Legislative History to Inform Wilderness Manage-
ment 50 (1998) (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Montana (Missoula)) (on file with
author).
48. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ENviRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 30 (1997) (Repair
of Cabin Creek Airstrip, Payette National Forest, McCall, Idaho).
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establish 129 helicopter landing zones in twelve wilderness areas in the
Tongass National Forest. '9 The proposal met a storm of public opposition,
eventually causing the Regional Forester for Alaska to rule against the
helicopter plan. Not to be dissuaded, the helicopter tourism industry suc-
ceeded in getting two U.S. senators to introduce legislation that would
authorize helicopter use throughout all wilderness in that state."
II. WILDERNESS LEGISLATION: LOSING GROuND
From 1964 until 1994, wilderness legislation was of a singular
bent-adding areas and acreage to the wilderness system. It was wildly
successful as evidenced by the eleven-fold increase in wilderness acres
over thirty years.' Equally important, the Wilderness Act itself remained
virtually inviolate as the system grew.
The elections in the fall of 1994 caused a sea-change in wilderness
politics. No longer were wilderness champions in Congress controlling
the legislative debate. Instead, the new leaders controlling key natural
resource committees were folks whose conservation voting records, on a
scale of one hundred, generally register in the single digits. Bipartisan-
ship, a hallmark of early wilderness legislation, seemed dead. This was
an interesting turn for wilderness politics given that it was a Republican,
Representative John Saylor, who sponsored the original wilderness bill
and was its champion in the House of Representatives, and a Democrat,
Senator Hubert Humphrey, who introduced the first Senate bill. 2 In fact,
the 1964 Wilderness Act enjoyed nearly unanimous bipartisan support,
passing the House with only one negative vote. 3
Antiwilderness legislation in both the 104th and 105th Congresses
has attempted to either weaken protection for individual wilderness areas
or reduce wilderness protection as a whole. To be sure, no one has yet
tried to "undesignate" a wilderness, nor has anyone explicitly stated their
intention to amend the Wilderness Act. In the words of a top Department
of Agriculture official, however, the cumulative effect of various bills
now debated in Congress "represent[s] an assault on the Wilderness Act
[and] on long-standing wilderness management policy."'
49. See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., DRAFr ENVRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
21 (1996) (Helicopter Landings in Wilderness, Alaska Region, Tongass National Forest).
50. See S. 967, 105th Cong. § 13(5) (1997) (introduced by Sens. Frank H. Murkowski and Ted
Stevens, Alaska). This amendment would add the following provision to section 1315 of ANILCA:
"Within National Forest Wilderness Areas.. : as designated in this and subsequent Acts, the Secre-
tary of Agriculture may permit or otherwise regulate helicopter use and landings, except that he shall
allow for helicopter use and landings in emergency situations where human life or health are in
danger." Id.
51. Cf LANDRES & MEYER, supra note 2, at 1.
52. See id. at 139.
53. See 20 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 485,491 (1964).
54. Memorandum from James R. Lyons, Under Secretary, Natural Resources and Environ-
ment, to Mike Dombeck, Forest Service Chief (Aug. 14, 1998) (on file with author).
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The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness is the first casualty of
this new brand of legislation. For nearly four years, bills were debated
and beaten back that would have allowed trucks to haul boats across
three wilderness portage trails and would have repealed the phase-out of
motorboats on wilderness lakes. Eventually, a scaled-back version of the
portage bill was attached as a "rider" to a conference report on a federal
transportation bill, and the proponents of greater motorized access to
wilderness areas counted their first legislative coup."
The next blow is likely to fall on the Emigrant Wilderness, located
on the northern boundary of Yosemite National Park. Legislation passed
the House allowing the reconstruction and maintenance of eighteen rock
and mortar dams constructed between 1920 and 1951.' The bill's spon-
sor claims it was the intent of Congress for the dams to be maintained for
their fishery and cultural values." Senator Alan Cranston, who sponsored
legislation to designate the Emigrant Wilderness, refuted these claims.
Despite Cranston's and environmentalists' protests, the Emigrant bill
stands on the verge of passing.
Other bills could dramatically alter the balance between the use of
wilderness and the protection of wilderness character. The Outfitter Pol-
icy Act of 1997" seeks to overturn court rulings and long established
agency policies that found that permanent structures used by commercial
outfitters violate the Wilderness Act. The bill would grant commercial
outfitters the right to construct private camps with permanent structures
(lodging, water systems, livestock-handling, etc.) and would also allow
for traditional modes of transport, which in many areas could include
aircraft and motorboats.
Numerous provisions were also attached to Interior and Transporta-
tion appropriations bills in the 105th Congress. These so called "riders"
include a provision that would overturn a recent Forest Service decision
banning the installation of permanent anchors for climbing,' because the
anchors violate the Act's prohibition on installations.6' Another special
provision would authorize helicopter landings for tourism in wilderness
throughout Alaska. 2 A third rider would authorize constructing a seven-
55. For an extensive discussion of the caselaw and legislative activity surrounding the Bound-
ary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, see Richard A. Duncan & Kevin Proescholdt, Protecting the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness: Litigation and Legislation, 76 DENy. U. L. REv. 621
(1999).
56. See H.R. 1663, 105th Cong. (1997).
57. See Letter from Rep. John T. Doolittle, to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (Feb. 23, 1998) (on file
with author).
58. See Letter from Sen. Alan Cranston, to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (Nov. 3, 1997) (on file with
author).
59. S. 1489, 105th Cong. (1997).
60. See S. 2237, 105th Cong. § 331 (1998); see also 144 CoNG. REc. S9965 (daily ed. Sept. 8,
1998) (presentation of Amendment No. 3548 by Sen. Slade Gorton, Wash.).
61. See Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1994).
62. See S. 967, 105th Cong. § 13(5) (1997); see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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mile road through the Izembek National Wildlife Refuge Wilderness, a
300,000 acre area near the tip of the Aleutian Chain. 3 And yet another
special provision added to the Interior Appropriations bill expresses con-
gressional dismay that the Forest Service considers providing "opportu-
nities for solitude"" to be an important component of wilderness plan-
ning and administration. The congressional committee's direction at-
tempts to overturn three decades of wilderness regulations recognizing
solitude as a critical element for realizing the benefits of wilderness.
While most of the public lands environmental community focuses its
efforts on protecting roadless wildlands and pushing legislation to enlarge
the NWPS, Congress has turned its attention toward undoing the gains of
the past. The Boundary Waters bill represented the first time that protec-
tion afforded a designated wilderness area was relaxed; the Emigrant
dams bill may be the second. Whereas for the first thirty years, conserva-
tionists focused almost singularly on building a larger wilderness system,
the new reality is that we are at risk of losing what we have created.
CONCLUSION
In 1964, the American people embarked on a mission to protect for
all time what remained of the vanishing North American wilderness. The
starting point for that mission was the Wilderness Act, and over the next
three decades the journey gained tremendous momentum, reaching goals
beyond its originators' wildest dreams. Designating wilderness, however,
is only the first step toward its long-term protection. The demands on our
wilderness system are growing and so, too, are the threats.
More people are seeking a wilderness experience each year. Com-
mercial interests demand exceptions for livestock grazing, water devel-
opments, recreation structures, and aircraft use. Wilderness administra-
tors search for opportunities to manipulate wilderness ecosystems, con-
vinced they know how wild nature should behave. Private landowners
demand motor vehicle access across wilderness to reach their lands. Add
them all up and wilderness might not look much like wilderness anymore.
In his preface to the 1997 reissuance of Battle for the Wilderness,
Michael Frome quotes Max Peterson, former Chief of the Forest Service,
who sums up the challenge this way:
We have to ask very hard questions... and be quite conservative in
allowing entries into wilderness which, one at a time, don't seem to
bring much impact; but when I add those up over my short career of
35 years, I wonder where the wilderness will be 35 years from now if
the door is opened to making those exceptions.6
63. SeeS. 2237, 105th Cong. § 126.
64. See FSM, supra note 36, § 2320.1(1).
65. FROME, supra note 10, at xxxviii.
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Amidst this landscape of challenges, is there reason for hope? I be-
lieve there is. Public support for wilderness protection is as strong as
ever and a recent survey indicates wilderness visitors support stronger
safeguards than in the past. Two recent appeal decisions by the Chief of
the Forest Service--one banning permanent climbing anchors and the
other keeping helicopters out of wilderness in Alaska-makes me think
that the Forest Service may be ready to reassert leadership in managing
wilderness use. In the end, however, just as it took citizen activism to
build the wilderness system, it will take even greater citizen support to
ensure that wilderness endures. The next thirty-five years will determine
if we are up to the task.

THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WILDERNESS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE
PETE MORTON*
In wildness is the preservation of the world.'
I am afraid that I don't see much hope for a civilization so stupid that
it demands a quantitative estimate of the value of its own umbilical
cord.2
INTRODUCTION
How can we put a dollar value on the wild experience of being high
atop a mountain peak, alone with nature, miles from the sounds and
stresses of modem civilization? Why is it necessary to quantify the bene-
fits from the exhilarating auditory experience of bugling elk on a cool
autumn eve? And, why is it necessary to estimate the economic value of
the ecological processes necessary to sustain earth's life support system?
Aren't some of life's necessities, pleasures and experiences invalu-
able-beyond quantification by "dismal scientists?" While many folks
may find it unethical to place a dollar value on wilderness and wildness,
it is important to at least recognize qualitatively the economic value of
the ecological, personal and societal benefits of wilderness. The main
justification for discussing and perhaps quantifying wildland economic
benefits is to level the playing field with the more easily quantifiable
benefits associated with marketable commodities (e.g., timber). While
steadfastly acknowledging that the economic benefits of wilderness will
never be fully quantified, without at least qualitatively describing and
understanding these benefits, politicians and public land managers will
continue to make policy decisions that shortchange wilderness in public
land management decisions.
The Wilderness Act of 1964' recognizes the multiple benefits of
wilderness areas: "[W]ildemess areas shall be devoted to the public pur-
* Resource Economist, The Wilderness Society, Denver, Colorado. Thanks are due to John
Loomis, George Peterson, Greg Aplet, and Tom Bancroft for providing insightful comments and
suggestions on an early version of this article.
1. HENRY DAVtD THOREAU, Walking, in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 592, 609 (Carl Bode ed.,
1947).
2. T. H. Watkins, The Worth of the Earth, AUDUBON, Sept. 19, 1997, at 128, 128 (quoting
Conservation Biologist David Ehrenfeld).
3. Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136
(1994)).
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poses of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and
historical uses." While the Act provides a basic framework of wilderness
uses, it does not begin to enumerate all of the uses and benefits of wil-
derness areas.' In the thirty-five years since the passage of the Wilderness
Act, economists have refined their methods for estimating the economic
benefits of wildland conservation. Whereas much of the original focus
was on the benefits generated through recreation use in wilderness areas,
the array of benefits is now expanded to include conservation of biologi-
cal diversity, ecological services, and passive-use benefits such as exis-
tence value. Although economic advancements have been made in quan-
tifying the full array of wilderness benefits, in practice, policy decisions
by public land management agencies have at best undervalued and at
worst excluded wilderness benefits when developing land and resource
management plans.
The objective of this article is to illustrate the apparent disconnec-
tion between the theory behind the economic benefits of wilderness and
how those benefits have been used in practice on the public estate. The
article begins with a brief introduction and review of some basic wilder-
ness economic concepts to facilitate a better understanding of the discus-
sion that follows. Next is a discussion of seven theoretical categories of
wilderness benefits followed by a cursory review of how wilderness
benefits have been applied in practice by public land management agen-
cies, focussing specifically on the national forests.6 The article ends with
a brief discussion of the role of public lands in sustaining our wildland
resources and the potential of applying safe minimum standards in na-
tional forest planning in an effort to internalize wilderness benefits into
public land management.
4. WildernessAct§4(b), 16U.S.C. § 1133(b).
5. See B.L. Driver et al., Wilderness Benefits: A State-of-Knowledge Review, in FOREST
SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., PROCEEDINGS--NATIONAL WILDERNESS RESEARCH CONFERENCE:
IsSUES, STATE-OF-KNoWLEDGE, FUTURE DIRECTIONS 294, 296 (Robert C. Lucas ed., 1987). See
generally HOLMES ROLSTON, In, PHiLosoPHY GONE WILD: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHics 73-142
(1989) (discussing the various values of nature); P. Reed, Perspectives on Beginning Research in
Nonrecreational Values of National Forest Wilderness (1989) (paper presented at Society of Ameri-
can Foresters Annual Convention, Spokane, Wash.).
6. The Wilderness Act. did not direct the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to consider
wilderness benefits in the administration of its land. See H. Michael Anderson & Aliki Moncrief,
America's Unprotected Wilderness, 76 DENY. U. L. REv. 413, 425 (1999). In general, the BLM has
been slow to internalize wilderness benefits into land and resource management decisions.
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I. WILDERNESS ECONOMICS: BASIC CONCEPTS
The purpose of studying economics is not to learn a set of ready made
conclusions about how to manage the world but instead to avoid be-
ing deceived by economists.7
A. Wilderness, Natural Capital, and Market Failure
Wildland ecosystems represent natural capital capable of producing a
wide range of goods and services for society." Some of these outputs,
such as timber, are freely exchanged in formal markets.9 Value is deter-
mined in these markets through exchange and quantified in terms of
price. However, many other outputs, watershed protection, carbon stor-
age, scenic beauty, trophy caliber wildlife, and native fish for example,
contribute to our quality of life, but are without formal markets and
therefore without prices. Although highly valued by society, the benefits
of nonmarket goods and services are typically underestimated in produc-
tion and consumption decisions--i.e., underproduced by private
markets.'" The underproduction of nonmarket resources is an example of
a market failure" and provides economic justification for public owner-
ship of a wildland network.
Resource economists recognize that some public goods and services
produced by wildlands have characteristics that make them unprofitable
7. JOAN ROBINSON, Marx Marshall and Keynes, in 2 COLLECTED ECONOMIC PAPERS 1, 17
(1960).
8. Capital is typically defined in business terms as accumulated goods devoted to the pro-
duction of other goods. The concept of capital can also be applied to wildland ecosystems, where
natural capital produces ecological goods and services essential to human survival. The natural
capital in wildland ecosystems includes the soil organic matter and nutrient cycles, climate, topogra-
phy, and the plant and animal species that together form the productive basis of wild ecosystems.
9. A market may be defined as the place, time, persons, and circumstances involved in the
exchange of a good or a service for a price. See WILLIAM A. DUERR, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORESTRY
ECONOMICS 279 (1960).
10. Cf JOHN LOOMIS, INTEGRATED PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT 70 (1993); RICHARD A.
MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5474 (3d ed.
1980); John C. Bergstrom, An Introduction to Nonmarket Valuation As a Tool for Assessing Public
Policy, in THE GEORGIA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, SPECIAL
PUBLICATION 59, 1-3 (1989); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, in 36
THE REviEw OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 387, 388-89 (1954).
11. A market failure occurs when market forces do not maximize net social benefits by
equating marginal social benefits with marginal social costs. See JAMES R. KAHN, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES 14 (1995). For wilderness, market
failure exists because markets fail to provide the socially optimal level of wildland resources.
12. The core landscape in a network of wildlands includes designated wilderness, semi-
primitive, nonmotorized areas, and roadless areas on public land managed by the Forest Service and
the BLM, as well as the national parks and national monuments. Supplementing federally managed
lands are the thousands of acres of forests, parks, and open space under state, county, or community
jurisdiction. In addition, private lands-including land designated as a nature reserve, managed by a
land trust, subject to a conservation easement, or simply undeveloped-play a critical role in a
nationwide network of wildlands.
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to private enterprises. 3 The aesthetic value of a wilderness viewshed, for
example, would be difficult to divide up and sell to individual consum-
ers. It would also be difficult to exclude "free riders"--people who con-
sume the scenic beauty but are unwilling to pay for it."' As such, private
firms have little incentive to produce wildland viewsheds and market
forces cannot be relied upon to produce an adequate supply of wilder-
ness, even though additional wilderness may be economically rational
and socially desirable. Without adequate production of public goods and
services, society as a whole is less wealthy, and many of us as individu-
als are worse off.5
B. Financial Versus Economic Analysis
The underproduction of nonmarket goods and services is partially
due to private industry conducting a financial or cash flow analysis rather
than an economic analysis. A financial analysis only examines costs and
benefits as measured by market price, and is more concerned with nar-
rowly defined profits or losses. A more appropriate framework for evalu-
ating public land management is an economic analysis conducted from the
point of view of society as a whole.' An economic analysis considers not
only the cash flow, but the nonmarket costs and benefits generated by a
wildland network. A thorough economic analysis from the viewpoint of
society must account for non-priced benefits and costs as well as those
that are more readily observed and measured in market prices.'7
C. Market Information, Consumer and Producer Surplus
The exchange of goods in the competitive marketplace generates in-
formation on the relative value of goods and services--expressed in terms
of market prices---and on the amount of goods and services to be produced
and consumed. Competitive markets establish a market or equilibrium
price where the supply and demand curves intersect. Figure 1 shows a
13. Public goods are distinguished from private goods because they are nontival and nonex-
cludable in consumption. Public goods are nonrival because one person's consumption does not
diminish the amount of the good available for others to consume. Nonexcludability means that while
one person consumes the good, others cannot be excluded from also consuming the good. The most
common example of a public good is national defense. The passive use values of wilderness are
examples of pure public goods. Everyone can consume the existence of the Bob Marshall Wilder-
ness Area, for example, without generating congestion. See John Loomis & Richard Walsh, Future
Economic Values of Wilderness, in FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., PROCEEDINGS: THE
ECONOMIC VALUE OF WILDERNESS 82 (C. Payne et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter FOREST SERV., THE
ECONOMIC VALUE OF WILDERNESS].
14. See PETER H. PEARSE, INTRODUCTION TO FORESTRY ECONOMICS 66 (1990).
15. See G.L. Peterson, Ethical Dilemmas in Economics, in FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.,
1990 SOUTHEASTERN RECREATION RESEARCH CONFERENCE 84 (Daniel Hope ed., 1991).
16. See Loomis & Walsh, supra note 13, at 81.
17. See PEARSE, supra note 14, at 66. Without public interest intervention (e.g., government
regulation) private industry has no incentive to consider the broader perspective provided by an
economic analysis.
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supply and demand curve intersecting at the equilibrium price (P*)., The
supply curve represents the minimum price a producer would be willing to
accept for a good or service. The minimum acceptable price typically cov-
ers the fixed and variable costs of production including a profit margin. 9
The demand curve represents the willingness to pay on the part of con-
sumers. Moving from left to right on the horizontal axis indicates increas-
ing quantities of goods. As more goods are consumed (quantity increases)
the benefits received by consumers from each additional good are less than
the previous good (i.e., diminishing marginal returns). As the benefits de-
crease, the willingness to pay also decreases which results in a downward
sloping demand curve. Conversely, when goods are scarce (quantity de-
creases), consumers receive the highest benefits and their willingness to







The lower section of the supply curve (below P*) indicates that some
firms can produce goods at a cost that is less than the market price. The
difference between the market price received by the purchaser and the
minimum price they are willing to accept (their marginal supply cost) is
called producer surplus. Graphically, producer surplus (PS) is the area
below the equilibrium market price and above the supply (marginal cost)
18. At this price the area under the demand curve and above the supply curve (i.e., social
welfare) is maximized. Theoretically, if all economic assumptions are met (e.g., the markets are
perfectly competitive, perfect information is available to all parties, and spillover costs and benefits
(externalities) are internalized), the resulting allocation of resources will be socially optimal. The
"social" referred to here concerns only economic efficiency and assumes that the existing distribu-
tion of wealth is fair and equitable. See E-mail from George Peterson, Project Leader for the Identi-
fication and Valuation of Wildland Benefits Research Unit, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Forest Serv. Rocky
Mountain Research Station, Fort Collins, Colo. to Pete Morton, The Wilderness Society (1998) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Peterson Communication]. The quantitative measure used by econo-
mists to estimate the social well-being is termed social economic welfare. Social economic welfare
measures the net economic benefits received by both producers and consumers as a result of ex-
changing goods and services in a competitive market structure. Quantitatively, social economic
welfare equals the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
19. The supply curve is also referred to as the marginal cost curve.
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curve." The upper section of the demand curve indicates that some con-
sumers are willing to pay more for the good than the market price. The
difference between the market price a consumer paid for a good and the
maximum price a consumer would be willing to pay is called consumer
surplus (CS). Consumer surplus is the area above the equilibrium market
price and below the demand curve." Consumer surplus is widely accepted
by economists as the appropriate measure relevant to social decisions.' For
economic analysis of public policies, consumer surplus is the proper
measure of the economic value of nonmarket goods and services.'
D. Nonmarket Resources and Consumer Surplus
When goods and services are not exchanged in the market place, in-
formation on their relative value or price is not specified by market
prices. The lack of a market price, however, does not necessarily indicate
that the goods or services have no economic value. Figure 2 illustrates a
good which is provided free (i.e., market price = 0). In this case the entire
value of the good is represented by the consumer surplus underneath the
demand curve. In other words, all the economic value of nonmarket
goods is in the form of consumer surplus. Although the price paid is





20. Producer surplus can be viewed as the economic benefit earned by producers in excess of
a "normal" profit margin.
21. To help understand these concepts consider the following example. A wilderness outfitter
estimates the minimum price she would be willing to accept for a wilderness hunting trip is
$50-which covers the costs of a permit, labor, overhead, plus a profit margin. However, because it
is prime hunting season, she asks and receives $80 for the trip-earning $30 in producer benefit
(surplus). The wilderness hunter paid the $80 fee but was actually willing to pay $100. As such, he
enjoys an untaxed consumer benefit (surplus) of $20 for which he did not have to pay. Although this
was for a single transaction, the theoretical concept holds for market-wide transactions.
22. Cf RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 69-83
(1982); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 449-62 (9th ed. 1973).
23. See John R. Stoll et al., A Framework for Identifying Economic Benefits and Beneficiaries
of Outdoor Recreation, 7 POL'Y STUD. REv. 445,445-48 (1987).
24. See PEARSE, supra note 14, at 67.
25. The consumer surplus referred to here is the "net value to the consumer." This should not
be confused with "net value to society." In order to derive the net economic value to society, net
supply costs must be accounted for. While price paid by the consumer is zero, the supply cost to
society may not be zero. See Peterson Communication, supra note 18.
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The fact that wilderness benefits are not priced does not mean they
have no value, only that market indicators of the value do not exist. It is
therefore important to estimate the demand curve and consumer surplus
for the nonmarket goods and services generated by public wildlands.
Economists use indirect methods to estimate wilderness benefits when
consumers are unable to express their preferences and willingness to pay
via the marketplace. The two methods most commonly used are the sur-
vey-based contingent valuation method and the expenditure-based travel
cost model.' Economists have used these methods to estimate willing-
ness to pay (demand) curves and calculate the consumer surplus below
those curves for a variety of nonmarket goods and services including rec-
reation, wilderness, air and water quality, wildlife and the scenic beauty.
The use of indirect methods provides information on the relative values
of wildland goods and services. This information is needed by forest
planners in order to estimate the optimal production of jointly produced
goods and services.
E. Modeling the Joint Production of Wildland Benefits with FORPLAN
The ability of wildlands to simultaneously produce more than one
good or service--e.g., habitat for endangered species, scenic beauty, and
watershed protection--s termed joint production." Although the ability
of wildlands to jointly produce goods and services is advantageous, it can
be problematic because of competing uses; the production of one output
may affect the ability of wildlands to produce another output.' For ex-
ample, forest land used for timber production cannot be used for wilder-
ness. So, in addition to poor information on relative values, the decision
of which forest outputs to jointly produce complicates public land and
resource allocation decisions.
During the first round of forest planning, the Forest Service used
management science to model the joint production of forest resources.
Specifically FORPLAN, a linear programming model, was used to allo-
cate resources and develop forest management plans.2 A linear program
is a constrained optimization model where an objective function is opti-
mized subject to a set of linear constraints. The workings of FORPLAN
can be explained graphically using a simple joint production example."
26. See John B. Loomis, Shifting and Broadening the Economic Paradigm Toward Natural
Resources, in A NEW CENTURY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 221, 225 (Richard L. Knight
& Sarah F. Bates eds., 1995).
27. The annual joint production of goods and services can be thought of as the interest earned
through maintenance and investment in the natural capital. The rate of harvest should be one that
does not lower the productive capability of the remaining natural capital (i.e., harvest interest, not
capital).
28. See PEARSE, supra note 14, at 93-96.
29. The new version of FORPLAN, called SPECTRUM, provides a graphical user interface
that makes it easier for inexperienced planners to run the model.
30. Cf. J. EDWARD DE STEIGUER eT AL., FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T AGRiC., SOUTHERN
APPALACHIAN TIMBER STUDY 1-2 (1989); PEARSE, supra note 14, at 217.
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The area under the production possibility curve (PP) represents all possible
combinations of timber and wilderness that can be produced on a national
forest given natural resources and the planned budget. The economic ob-
jective is to determine how resources should be allocated in order to
maximize net public .benefits. Net public benefits are estimated using tim-
ber prices derived from market information and nonmarket estimates. of
consumers' willingness to pay for wilderness. The relative values of timber
and wilderness determine the slope of the exchange or total benefits line
(BB). The optimal allocation'occurs at point E, where the total benefits
line (B) is tangent to the production possibility curve (PP)---since no
other possible combination will yield higher total benefits. At this tan-
gency point the slopes are just equal: the marginal rate of transforming one
acre of timber to one acre of wilderness (slope of PP) is just equal to the
ratio of their relative values (slope of BB). This results in the economically










ACRES ALLOCATED TO TIMBER
FIGuRE 3
Planners used the FORPLAN model to estimate net public benefits
based on the potential outputs and responses possible if a forest was op-
timally managed under a given set of goals and objectives. In order for
the model to maximize net public benefits, economists must estimate the
relative values of the goods and services jointly produced by the wilder-
ness landscape.
31. While the FORPLAN models run by national forest planners are much more complex than
illustrated here, the basic concept is the same.
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II. WILDERNESS BENEFITS IN THEORY
The value of wilderness has evolved over time in response to
changing societal preferences. Early Americans saw wilderness as an
economic bad-the "hideous and desolate wilderness" as described by
one Pilgrim. Although some individuals and lobbyists for the resource
extractive industries may still view wilderness as bad, the majority of
Americans now view wilderness as an economic good.33 This majority
view is held even though wilderness provides a primitive experience with
attributes typically valued as economic bads. ' Puzzling over the recrea-
tion value of wilderness, Raymond B. Cowles suggested that "the intense
pleasure of the wilderness experience seems to be commensurate with
the amount of effort and even discomfort involved."3 Pain and effort,
typically viewed as costs, are benefits when it comes to valuing wildland
recreation. Correctly estimating and internalizing dis-amenities as bene-
fits is just one of the many challenges the wilderness resource presents to
resource economists.
The need for a network of wildlands is partially based on the reali-
zation that wild natural capital and managed natural capital are not per-
fect substitutes.' For example, certain functions or services produced by
wild, natural forest capital are not produced by managed forest capital.
Monocultures created with market-driven forestry are less biologically
and ecologically diverse, 7 but may be more efficient at producing quan-
tities of wood fiber (at least in the short term) than natural forests. In
contrast, natural forests are more efficient at producing many of the
nonmarket goods and services valued by society. Wild landscapes pro-
duce many goods and services that historically have been grossly under-
valued by economists and public land management agencies. It may
therefore be necessary to single out natural forest capital for protection in
a network of wildlands. 38
To facilitate informed investment decisions about publicly owned
wildlands, economic analysis must take into consideration both market
32. RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 23-24 (3d ed. 1982).
33. Poll after poll show strong public support for wilderness on public land managed by the
Forest Service and the BLM. See Gregory H. Aplet, On the Nature of Wildness: Exploring What
Wilderness Really Protects, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 347, 348 & n.6 (1999).
34. See Garrett Hardin, Wilderness, A Probe into "Cultural Carrying Capacity," 10
POPULATION & ENV'T 5-13 (1987).
35. See generally RAYMOND B. COwLE, DESERT JOURNAL: A NATURALIST REFLECTS ON
ARID CALIFORNIA (1977).
36. See Peter A. Morton & Jeffrey T. Olson, Forging the Link Between Natural Forest Systems,
Environmental Quality and Community Development, in THE GEORGE WRIGHT SOCIETY, 7TH
CoN ERECE ON RESEARCH & RESOURCE MANAGE EmNT iNPARKS AND ON PUBUC LANDS 245,245-46
(1992).
37. Cf AJ. Hansen et al., Conserving Biodiversity in Managed Forests: Lessons from Natural
Forests, 41 BIOSCIENCE 382, 386 (1991).
38. See Michael A. Toman & P. Mark S. Ashton, Sustainable Forest Ecosystems and Manage-
ment: A Review Article, 42 FOREST So. 366, 375-76 (1996).
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and nonmarket goods and services. For this article, the total economic
benefits generated by a network of wildlands will be discussed based on
seven categories, aggregated based mostly on the thoughts, observations,
and research of other folks.39 The categories of wildland benefits are di-
rect use, community, scientific, off-site, biodiversity conservation, eco-
logical services, and passive use benefits. To account for the full array of
market and nonmarket wildland benefits, economists have derived the
total economic valuation framework.' TEV is the appropriate measure to
use when comparing wilderness benefits to its opportunity costs."' The
seven categories of wildland benefits are conceptually summarized in
Figure 4, using a TEV framework."2
39. See generally ROLSTON, supra note 5 (considering the philosophy of nature); John V.
Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777-86 (1967) (suggesting a basis
for decision making in the conservation context); Michael McClosky, Evolving Perspectives on
Wilderness Values: Putting Wilderness Values in Order, in FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.,
PREPARING TO MANAGE WILDERNESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE
13 (P.C. Reed comp., 1990) (proposing a taxonomy of wilderness values); Richard G. Walsh & John
B. Loomis, The Non-Traditional Public Valuation (Option, Bequest Existence) of Wilderness, in
FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., GTR SE-5 1, WILDERNESS BENCHMARK 1988: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS COLLOQUIUM 181 (Helen R. Freilich ed., 1989) (discussing the hy-
pothesis that society is willing to pay for the preservation of unique environments).
40. Cf. Loomis & Walsh, supra note 13, at 81. See generally Alan Randall, The Total Value
Dilemma, in FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., TOWARD THE MEASUREMENT OF TOTAL ECONOMIC
VALUE 2, 3-6 (1987) (discussing the CVM as they relate to the concept of total value); Alan Randall
& John R. Stoll, Existence Value in a Total Valuation Framework, in MANAGING AIR QUALrrY AND
SCENIC RESOURCES AT NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDERNESS AREAS 265, 265-273 (Robert D. Rowe
& Lauraine G. Chestnut eds., 1983) (discussing the components of total value).
41. See Loomis & Walsh, supra note 13, at 81-82.,
42. While the focus of this article is on the demand side benefits of wildlands, the supply side
costs of wildlands should not be forgotten. The demand for wildlands involves long- and short-run
supply costs. In the long-run, the decision to set aside wildlands may involve opportunity costs to
society by foregoing alternative development and production of man-made capital. In the short-run,
there may be management costs and/or depreciation of natural capital due to human disturbance by
on-site recreation.
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TOTAL ECONOMIC VALUE OF A WILDLAND NETWORK
DIRECT USE COMMUNITY SCIENTIFC OFF-SITE BIODIVERSrrY ECOLOGICAL PASSIVE USE
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Decreasing "tangibility" of value to individuals
FIGURE 4
A. Direct Use Benefits
1. On-Site Recreation
While expenditures by recreationists measure the economic contri-
bution from recreation to the regional economy, they do not fully repre-
sent the total economic benefits to society from public recreation. This
distinction is often not recognized in policy discussions. As Power notes,
there is little connection between the "job and income" definition of eco-
nomic value used by local residents and many decision makers, and the
"willingness to pay" measure typically used by professional economists.'
The willingness to pay estimate of recreation benefits includes market as
well as nonmarket benefits that may not directly generate jobs and income.
43. Thomas Michael Power, The Economics of Wildland Preservation: The View from the
Local Economy, in FOREST SERV., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WILDERNESS, supra note 13, at 175,
175.
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Recreation is an experience that provides the user with satisfaction
or economic utility." Wildland recreation results in a variety of individ-
ual and social benefits.' which include personal development (spiritual
growth, improved physical fitness, self-esteem, self-confidence, and
leadership abilities), social bonding (greater family cohesiveness and
higher quality of family life), therapeutic and healing benefits (stress
reduction helping to increase worker productivity and reduce illness and
absenteeism at work), and other social benefits (decreased social devi-
ance, increased national pride).' These are the perceived benefits of us-
ers, but rejecting them because they cannot be assigned a monetary value
would be counterintuitive. Given the considerable amount of time, effort,
and other personal resources people commit to outdoor recreation, they
"either gain sizeable benefits or are quite foolish."
Research indicates that people participate in outdoor recreation to
satisfy certain motives" identified and ranked by the Recreation Experi-
ence Preference scales. 9 Table 1 displays motives for recreation, ranked
in order of importance, from studies conducted in three wilderness areas
in North Carolina.
Sorg and Loomis conducted a meta-analysis of the research literature
and determined wilderness recreation benefits ranged from $13 to $74 per
activity day (1982 dollars)54 Walsh et al. updated that meta-analysis and
44. See John R. Stoll, Methods for Measuring the Net Contribution of Recreation to National
Economic Development, in A LITERATURE REVIEW: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AMERICAN
OUTDOORS at Values-19, 19 (1986).
45. See generally George L. Peterson & Thomas C. Brown, The Economic Benefits of Outdoor
Recreation, in A LITERATURE REVIEW: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AMERICAN OUTDOORS,
supra note 44, at Values-11, 11-15 (describing how economics offers a framework for measuring
benefits derived from outdoor recreation).
46. See Beverly L Driver, Quantification of Outdoor Recreationalists' Preferences, in
RESEARCH, CAMPING AND ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 165, 165-82 (Betty van der Smissen ed.,
1976); Beverly L. Driver & Perry J. Brown, Probable Personal Benefits of Outdoor Recreation, in A
LITERATURE REvIEW: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AMERICAN OUTDOORS, supra note 44, at
Values-63, 64--66; Patrick C. West, Social Benefits of Outdoor Recreation: Sociological Perspec-
tives and Implications for Planning and Policy, in A LITERATURE REVIEW: THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON AMERICAN OUTDOORS, supra note 44, at Values-93, 93-95; see also G.E. Haas et
al., Measuring Wilderness Recreation Experiences, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WILDERNESS
PSYCHOLOGY GROUP ANNUAL CONFERENCE 20, 20-37 (L.K. Cannon ed., 1980) (discussing other
social benefits resulting from a variety of wildland recreation activities).
47. Driver & Brown, supra note 46, at 65.
48. See Robert E. Manning, Social Research in Wilderness: Man in Nature, in WILDERNESS
BENCHMARK 1988: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS COLLOQUIUM, supra note 39, at
120, 121.
49. Driver, supra note 46, at 165; Driver & Brown, supra note 46, at 65; Haas et al., supra
note 46, at 30.
50. See CINDY F. SORG & JOHN B. LooMIs, FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRiC., GTR RM-
107, EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF AMENITY FOREST VALUES: A COMPARATVE REVIEW 19-20 (1984).
[Vol. 76:2
1999] ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WILDERNESS
determined the net economic value of wilderness recreation ranged from
$11 to $106 per day (1987 dollars), with an average value of $25."
RECREATION EXPERIENCE PREFERENCE DOMAINS-RANKED BY USER IN THE LINVILLE
GORGE, SHINING ROCK AND JOYCE KILMER WILDERNESS AREAS IN NORTH CAROLINA' 2
1. ENJOY NATURE
A. Scenery
B. General nature experience




B. Slow down mentally
C. Escape role overloads
D. Escape daily routine









C. Learn geography of the area
D. Learn about nature
6. SHARE SIMILAR VALUES
A. Be with friends







C. Being in control
9. ACHIEVEMENT/STIMULATION




E. Seeking excitement or stimulation
F. Self-reliance








A. Meet new people







Wilderness is a place to restore mental and physical health, stimu-
late creativity, achieve self-realization, and improve group leadership
skills. Wilderness is a place for spiritual experiences and has inspired the
creation of art, photography, literature, poetry, and music." Individuals
with psychological, social, and physiological disorders derive therapeutic
benefits from participating in wilderness camping programs.' Wildlands
have an important role in human development as they represent a rich
and potent source of personal, national, cultural, and biological identity
51. See Richard G. Walsh et al., Review of Outdoor Recreation Economic Demand Studies
with Nonmarket Benefit Estimates, 1968-1988, in COLORADO WATER REsouRcES RES. INST.,
TECH. REPT. 54 at 23, 23 (1988).
52. The preference domains (numbered) are the masons for recreating. Associated scales (lettered)
are also in order of value. The information contained within this table is adapted from Driver & Brown,
supra note 46, at 64-66.
53. Cf. McCloskey, supra note 39, at 13, 15, 18.
54. See Lynn Levitt, Therapeutic Value of Wilderness, in WILDERNESS BENCHMARK 1988:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS COLLOQUIUM, supra note 39, at 156, 158.
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information. Wildlands play a significant and valuable role in self-
definition on all three levels of human functioning." Many of these bene-
fits are expressed in Driver's Recreation Experience Preference scales.'
3. Cultural Heritage
Wildlands will also continue to have cultural value as "commu-
nit[ies] of life . . .untrammeled by man."'7 The wilderness experience
makes a unique contribution to our cultural and national heritage; one
that should not be trivialized. Wilderness is a reminder of America's
frontier heritage, a chance for society to glimpse back in time and get a
sense of an untamed continent much as our ancestors saw and experi-
enced it." As Nash observed, "Our national ego is fed by both preserving
and conquering wilderness." A network of wildlands will provide cur-
rent and future generations of Americans with a frontier-like environ-
ment to reclaim their cultural identity and feed their soul.
4. Commercial
Wildlands can also provide commercial benefits for private indus-
try. For example, while most salmon harvesting occurs outside wilder-
ness, salmon require the fresh water located in upper pristine reaches of
wild river systems for spawning and rearing habitat.' Hunting and fish-
ing outfitters gain commercial benefits from wildlands by providing a
primitive environment for their clients to experience. Wildlands are also a
source of genetic material for propagators collecting seeds and tissue."'
Harvesting nontimber forest products from public wildlands has become a
big business on national forests. Nationwide, nontimber forest products
support a $130 million industry that employs over 10,000 people.' Un-
fortunately, one of the drawbacks is in controlling the harvest of wild
55. See Daniel R. Williams et al., The Role of Wilderness in Human Development, in
WILDERNESS BENCHMARK 1988: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS COLLOQUIUM,
supra note 39, at 169, 169.
56. See Beverly L. Driver, Item Pool for Scales Designed to Quantify the Psychological Out-
comes Desired and Expected from Recreation Participation, in FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN FOREST AND RANGE ExPERIMENT STATION 38 (1977).
57. NASH, supra note 32, at 5 (quoting the Wilderness Act of 1964 § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c)
(1994)).
58. Cf Michael McCloskey, Understanding the Demand for More Wilderness, in
WILDERNESS BENCHMARK 1988: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS COLLOQUIUM,
supra note 39, at 38, 39-41 (discussing the reasons behind the demand for wilderness protection).
59. Roderck Nash, The Cultural Signicance of the American Wilderness, in WILDERNESS
AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 66, 72 (Maxine E. McCloskey & James P. Gilligan eds., 1969).
60. Cf Ronald J. Glass & Robert M. Muth, Commodity Benefits from Wilderness: Salmon in
Southeast Alaska, in FOREST SERV., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WILDERNESS, supra note 13, at 141,
141.
61. See McCloskey, supra note 39, at 18.
62. Cf. James H. Johnson, The Secret Harvest, AM. FORESTS, Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 28, 28-29.
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species to a sustainable rate, especially since many wild species do not
propagate easily. '
B. Community Benefits
At one end of the community economic development spectrum are
communities where subsistence harvest of wildland products is an im-
portant component. Sustaining wildlands may be especially important for
sustaining these communities. In Alaska, subsistence use of wild re-
sources for food, clothing, and shelter is a customary and traditional use
of the wildland resource." Kruse and Muth estimated that thirty percent
of the villagers in southeast Alaska get at least fifty percent of their meat
and fish from subsistence harvesting. ' In addition to basic resources,
subsistence use provides Southeast Alaskan residents with a number of
psychological, social, and cultural benefits." Subsistence use is inter-
twined with cultural and spiritual beliefs, and the sharing of resources
enforces the social fabric of the village. Unfortunately, subsistence use is
not reflected in government economic data, and history suggests that
native villagers have been marginalized in economic analysis.
At the other end of the community economic development spec-
trum, wildland recreation directly generates thousands of jobs in local
communities. Although many retail and service jobs associated with
wildland recreation are low-paying and seasonal, they do provide local
residents with employment opportunities in less skilled jobs for supple-
menting household income, helping to alleviate rural poverty. Retail and
service businesses also generate important employment opportunities for
women. In contrast, the timber industry provides women with very few
employment opportunities. Wildland recreation generates convenient em-
ployment opportunities for high school students and those home from col-
lege during the summer. And sometimes, these jobs simply allow folks to
live in a place they love. Recreation jobs also support additional jobs, as
the economic impact from visitor spending "multiplies" through a com-
munity. ' A perhaps more important role is the indirect role wildlands
play in diversifying the economies of rural communities.
63. Pricing methods for nontimber resources harvested on the national forests also need to be
evaluated and formalized. In the southern Appalachians, the Forest Service has sold Pink Lady's
slippers, a wild orchid that is difficult to propagate, for $.25 per plant, a price that is well below
replacement costs. See Peter A. Morton, Charting a New Course: National Forests in the Southern
Appalachians, THE WILDERNESS Soc'y 65, 65 (1994) [hereinafter Morton, Charting a New Course].
64. In recognition of this, section 802 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
of 1980 (ANILCA), Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 802, 94 Stat. 2371, 2422 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 3112 (1994)), allows subsistence uses to continue, even in designated wilderness.
65. See JOHN A. KRUSE & ROBERT M. MUTH, SUBSISTENCE USE OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES
BY RURAL SOUTHEAST ALASKA RESIDENTS 18 (1990).
66. See generally ROBERT M. MUTi & RONALD J. GLASS, WILDERNESS AND SUBSISTENCE-
USE OPPORTUNITIES: BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS (1989).
67. Employment and income multipliers measure the total indirect and induced effects of
export employment and income on a regional economy. For each dollar injected into the local econ-
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There is a growing body of literature suggesting that future diversi-
fication of rural economies is dependent on the ecological and amenity
services provided by public wildlands. According to Whitelaw and
Niemi, "the economic-development process is increasingly characterized,
not by jobs-first-then-migration, but by the reverse."' In other words, a
rural development strategy can capitalize on the qualitative features of
the wild landscape to attract a high quality work force and new busi-
nesses to an area." The extraction of publicly owned market resources
should not degrade the long-term production of nonmarket goods and
ecological services by wildlands on the public estate. It is the wildland-
generated goods and services such as scenic landscapes and wildlife habi-
tat that improve quality of life for local residents and drive the amenity
based development currently occurring throughout the nation.7'
The environmental, recreational, and scenic amenity resources gen-
erated on public wildlands improve quality of life for local residents and
indirectly benefit rural communities by attracting and retaining busi-
nesses. Advances in telecommunications have allowed light manufacturers
and "knowledge-based" business firms (e.g., computer programmers, en-
gineers, and stockbrokers) to locate in relatively remote locations with
desirable lifestyles. For many of these "footloose" businesses, information
is the commodity exported (as opposed to a region's natural resources) and
proximity to markets is a less important factor than in the past. Results
from surveys on business location criteria indicate that scenic amenities,
quality of life, and access to recreation are some of the most important
reasons, relative to other more traditional economic criteria, for businesses
to locate and stay in a rural region.' Amenity factors have been deemed
omy, three or four dollars may be earned by local residents as the export dollars are cycled through
local businesses. See THOMAS MICHAEL POWER, LOST LANDSCAPES AND FAILED ECONOMIES: THE
SEARCH FOR A VALUE OF PLACE 7 (1996). The more self-sufficient a community is, the larger the
multiplier because export dollars stay in town longer by circulating through a diversity of local
businesses. Although job and income multipliers for recreation jobs may be lower than timber multi-
pliers, the large number of direct recreation jobs compensate for the lower multipliers.
68. Cf. id. at 159-62 (discussing the multiple economic benefits of natural forests); Morton,
supra note 63, at 65. See generally Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role
of Environmental Quality in Western Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 369 (1994) (exploring
different options for looking at the role of public lands).
69. E. Whitelaw & E.G. Niemi, Migration, Economic Growth, and the Quality of Life, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGIONAL ECONOMIC
CONFERENCE 35, 36 (1989).
70. See Ray Rasker, Dynamic Economy Versus Static Policy in the Greater Yellowstone Eco-
system, in FOREST SERV., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WILDERNESS, supra note 13, at 201,205.
71. The 227 counties containing wilderness have experienced more rapid growth than other
counties, and the presence of wilderness was an important reason why 60% of migrants moved to the
wilderness county, and why 45% of the long-term residents stay. See Gundars Rudzitis & Harley E.
Johansen, How Important Is Wilderness? Results from a United States Survey, 15 ENVTL. MGMT.
227,231 (1991).
72. See Jerry D. Johnson & Raymond Rasker, The Role of Economic and Quality of Life
Values in Rural Business Location, II J. RURAL STUD. 405, 406, 412-14 (1995); Susan Kask &
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particularly important in the location decisions of four types of companies:
corporate headquarters, high-technology, research and development, and
services.'
Regional economic development is fostered by the migration and
retention of local businesses, and the attraction and retention of a high-
quality workforce. States, counties, and communities pursuing economic
development are increasingly competing to attract human and financial
capital. Whereas many rural communities have to make capital invest-
ments in their "amenity infrastructure," public wildlands provide rural
communities with a rich endowment of amenity resources. These amenity
resources are owned by the American public and managed by public land
management agencies at very little cost to local communities. A majority
of the financing needed to manage public lands is provided by taxpayers
outside the local area. The wildland resources on public land, if properly
conserved, can provide rural and urban communities with a comparative
advantage over other areas for diversifying their economy. ' The implica-
tions for managers of public land is that they should no longer feel com-
pelled to focus on extracting a steady flow of resources as the only
method of generating employment in rural communities. Rather they
should recognize the economic importance to rural communities of con-
serving wildland resources on public lands.
The allure of the amenity and recreation resources available on public
wildlands is illustrated by rural migration patterns. During the 1970s and
1980s, rural areas experiencing rapid population growth were highly con-
centrated in areas adjacent to large tracts of public lands that offered rec-
reational and scenic amenities.' Many of the migrants are amenity seeking
retirees who may have first visited public lands as recreationists or tourists.
In general, retirement communities evolve from areas with recreation and
tourism.' The typical amenity-seeking retiree is married, well educated,
Peter A. Morton, Quality of Life and Natural Resource Amenities in Business Location and Reten-
tion Decisions 11, 13 (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
73. See Jill M. Decker & John L. Crompton, Business Location Decisions: The Relative Im-
portance of Quality of Life and Recreation, Park, and Cultural Opportunities, 8 J. PARK &
RECREATION ADMIN. 26, 27, 37-38 (1990).
74. According to Birch, "[tihe successful, innovation-based company will, in general, settle in
an environment that bright, creative people find attractive." DAVID L. BIRCH, JOB CREATION IN
AMERICA: HOW OUR SMALLEST COMPANIES PUT THE MOST PEOPLE TO WORK 9 (1987). And, in
order to retain a quality workforce, firms must provide a setting with a high "quality of life." I&2 A
network of wildlands can help firms with that goal by sustaining a high quality of life in adjacent
communities. See generally Rasker, supra note 68 (discussing the evolving role of public lands in
the economy of the western United States); Raymond Rasker, A New Home on the Range: Economic
Realities in the Columbia River Basin 15, 22-23 (1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
75. See Timothy P. Duane, Exodus to Exurbia: The Threat of Population Growth in Rural
"Buffer Zone" Regions to the Conservation of Biological Diversity 11-12 (paper presented to the
Soc'y of Conservation Biology, June 12, 1993).
76. See CHARLES F. LONGINO, RETIREMENT MIGRATION IN AMERICA 13 (R. Alan Fox ed.,
1995).
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newly retired, in good health, has ample financial resources, and more
frequently lives in counties with public land. The economic contribution of
migrating retirees to rural economies is significant.' Retirees moving to
rural communities buy or build houses, require medical assistance, and
may need local banking services (e.g., mortgages) and investment advice.
These needs translate into employment opportunities in construction,
services (especially health services), retail, finance, insurance, and real
estate. In addition, amenity-seeking retirees tend to increase county reve-
nues while keeping costs low. For example, retirees increase the tax base
for public schools and police services but they do not attend or send chil-
dren to school, and they generally do not commit crimes.' Retirement in-
come is also less sensitive to the business cycle, which can stabilize the
economic base and improve a community's ability to adjust to changing
economic conditions.'
In general, a public network of wildlands can attract new residents,
stimulate economic development, provide local residents with a wider
choice of jobs, and diversify the local economy. These factors provide a
stabilizing influence for communities associated with extractive industries,
such as timber and mining, which are prone to boom and bust cycles.
C. Scientific Benefits
Scientific benefits are often cited as one justification for a network
of wildlands. As Stankey stated: "[T]here remains the persuasive argu-
ment that science and scientific inquiry offer an important way of.justi-
fying the significant investment that society has made in the wilderness
system."'" For this article, scientific benefits will be discussed in three
categories: research, education, and management.
1. Research
There is a growing recognition of the value of large natural areas for
scientific study of how natural systems function. Although studies in
laboratories and degraded ecosystems have merit, ecological studies that
collect baseline data on, and improve knowledge of how natural ecosys-
tems function is essential to appraising and mitigating adverse effects on
77. See P.B. Siegel & F.O. Leuthold, Economic & Fiscal Impacts of a Retirement/Recreation
Community: A Study of Tellico Village, Tennessee, 25 J. OF AGRIc. & APPLIED ECON. 134, 134-47
(1993).
78. See LONGiNo, supra note 76, at 83-84.
79. See id.
80. See Robert D. Plotnick, Small Community Economic Development: Can Income Transfers
Help?, in A NORTHWEST READER: OPTIONS FOR RuRAL COMMuNITIES 55, 57-58 (1989).
81. George H. Stankey, Scientific Issues in the Definition of Wilderness, in
PROCEEDINGS-NATIONAL WILDERNESS RESEARCH CONFERENCE: ISSUES, STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE,
FUTURE DIRECTIONS, supra note 5, at 47, 51.
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the environment.' Although the Forest Service maintains research for-
ests, many of them are too small to fully observe natural processes. His-
torically, agency research has focused on improving forest production or
minimizing the impacts of production, and not necessarily on examining
ecological processes. Large natural areas provide an opportunity to study
intact ecosystems and gather the information necessary to manage forest
ecosystems responsibly. As Nash states: "[W]ildemess holds answers to
questions man has not yet learned to ask."
2. Education
Wilderness provides educational opportunities to study plant and
animal species, ecological and evolutionary processes, and a place to
develop wilderness skills, such as orienteering." Wilderness provides an
opportunity for liberation from the predominantly left brain analytical
orientation of modem society. The education benefits of wilderness ex-
perience include clearing the mind for the creative, visualizing, and in-
tuitive functions of the right brain.'
3. Management
In order to successfully implement ecosystem management or resto-
ration forestry, more information on how natural forest ecosystems func-
tion is essential (i.e., What is it that we are trying to mimic or restore?).
Wildlands represent a continuous source of information on the structure and
function of natural communities, information that is prerequisite for suc-
cessfully implementing ecosystem management. Estimating the historic
range of variability depends on our ability to derive presettlement dynamics
from the natural landscape. The composition and structure of existing
vegetation in wildlands is rich in information about the historical patterns
and processes necessary for sustaining biodiversity outside the wildland
network.
Taking an adaptive, experimental approach to management requires
reference areas or "controls" against which to compare the success of
82. See Sarah E. Greene & Jerry F. Franklin, The State of Ecological Research in Forest
Service Wilderness, in WILDERNESS BENCHMARK 1988: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
WILDERNESS COLLOQUIUM 113, supra note 39, at 113, 113.
83. NASH, supra note 32, at 23.
84. See McCloskey, supra note 39, at 17.
85. Cf John C. Hendee & M.H. Brown, How Wilderness Experience Programs Work for
Personal Growth, Therapy and Education: An Explanatory Model, in THE HIGHEST USE OF
WILDERNESS: PROCEEDINGS OF A SPECIAL PLENARY SESSION AT THE 4TH WORLD WILDERNESS
CONGRESS 5 (John C. Hendee ed., 1987); Edwin E. Krumpe, Managing Wilderness for Education
and Human Development: A Bane or a Blessing?, in PREPARING TO MANAGE WILDERNESS IN THE
21 ST CENTURY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE, supra note 39, at 83, 85. Improving right brain
functions can stimulate flexibility in the human thought process. Flexibility is considered an impor-
tant trait for workers to succeed in the labor marketplace.
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management experiments outside the wildland network. ' Controls are
essential to evaluate the effects of innovative approaches to terrestrial
and aquatic ecosystem management. Wilderness provides the base datum
of normality from which to demonstrate how normal, healthy land sus-
tains its capacity for self-renewal."' Finally, the lessons of history con-
stantly remind us that we do not and we will not know all we need to
know about the natural world. The current paradigm shift in land man-
agement is in direct response to greater understanding of the complexity
of ecosystems and the negative impacts of past management practices.
Ecosystem managers will require wilderness reserves for the long-term
storage of ecosystem information and a needed reminder of our perpetual
knowledge gap."
D. Off-Site Benefits
Wilderness economic research has focused on recreation benefits of
wilderness, specifically on recreation that occurs on-site. However, wil-
derness benefits both recreationists and non-recreationists who are off-
site, outside wilderness areas. For example, wilderness provides habitat
for trophy elk that may be consumed either through hunting or viewing
(i.e., watchable wildlife) outside wilderness areas. Wilderness areas serve
as valuable scenic backdrops for resorts and residences on adjacent lands,
thus enhancing property values and tax revenues." In the southern Appala-
chians, wilderness areas provide many of the spectacular viewsheds for
drivers on the Blue Ridge Parkway. In both time and space, wilderness
benefits are not limited to visitors actually setting foot in wilderness.'
E. Biodiversity Conservation Benefits
Biological diversity, or biodiversity, includes the full array of spe-
cies, the genetic information they contain, the communities they form,
and the landscapes they inhabit. Although biodiversity conservation ob-
viously provides society with significant economic benefits, it is difficult
to assign measurable values when evaluating wilderness proposals. For
this article, the economic benefits from conserving biological resources
can be arbitrarily divided into three categories: direct use benefits, ge-
netic, and intrinsic conservation benefits.
86. See MERRILL R. KAUFMANN ET AL., FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., GTR RM-246,
AN ECOLOGICAL BASIS FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 7 (1994).
87. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM
ROUND RIVER 258,274 (1966).
88. See Gregory H. Aplet, Ecosystem Management White Paper, THE WILDERNESS SOC'Y
(1996).
89. See McCloskey, supra note 39, at 16.
90. See Patrick Reed et al., Management Principles for a 1990's Wilderness Revolution, in
MANAGING AMERICA'S ENDURING WILDERNESS RESOURCE: PROCEEDING OF A CONFERENCE 250,
253 (David W. Lime ed., 1989).
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1. Direct Use
Direct uses of biodiversity, both consumptive and non-consumptive,
include bird watching, viewing wildflowers or scenic vistas, fishing,
hunting, and other pursuits. Harvesting nontimber forest products from
public land, including flowers, mosses, ferns, mushrooms, ginseng and
other herbs, pine cones and rocks, has become a big business on national
forests in the Pacific Northwest, for example.
2. Genetic
One of the most promising areas of science and technology lies in
our increasing understanding of genetics, the raw data of life itself. Ge-
netic diversity can increase the productivity and disease resistance of
crops, and generate new medicinal products." Approximately twenty-five
percent of prescription drugs sold in the United States contain at least
one component derived directly or through chemical modeling, from
flowering plants.'
The conservation of species for their genetic benefits should extend
to multiple populations in order to sustain the full breadth of diversity."
Different populations provide different economic benefits (e.g., medici-
nal compounds) as a result of genetic variability between populations."
For example, research indicates substantial variation in taxol content
between populations of Pacific yew.5 This suggests the need for, and the
potential economic benefits from conserving wildland habitat for geneti-
cally distinct populations of a species. As our knowledge increases and
more information becomes available, species (or populations of a spe-
cies) previously believed to be undesirable may in fact be viewed as
beneficial. Once discovered as useful, a species generates a positive
stream of benefits for future generations. Elimination of species inflicts a
cost in the form of lost benefits on every subsequent human generation.9
91. Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen conducted a detailed analysis of the contribution wild
species of plants and animals made to the American economy and concluded that 4.5% of the gross
domestic product was attributable to wild species. See CHRISTINE PRESCOTT-ALLEN & ROBERT
PRESCOTr-ALLEN, THE FIRST RESOURCE: WILD SPECIES IN THE NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMY 408
(1986).
92. See id. at 100-48 (discussing the types and amounts of natural ingredients in medicine).
93. See Peter A. Morton et al., Sustaining Biological Resources on the Southern Appalachian
National Forests, in PROCEEDINGS: 1994 SoutHERN FOREST ECONOMICS WORKSHOP, D.B. WARNELL
SCHOOL OF FOREST RESOURCES, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 344, 345-46 (1994).
94. See generally MARGERY L. OLDFIELD, THE VALUE OF CONSERVING GENETIC RESOURCES
(1984) (discussing the advantage of genetic diversity in several areas of resource development, including
food production, tree resources, and natural sources for industrial oils and waxes).
95. Pacific yew is a tree species with low value for wood products that was traditionally
burned in slash piles. Taxol, a natural substance extracted from the bark, is an effective drug for
treating ovarian cancer. This illustrates the need to manage forest ecosystems for all species, not just
the species currently valuable as commercial wood products.
96. See Alan Randall, An Economic Perspective of the Value of Biological Diversity, in
CONTRACT PAPERS, PART E: VALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSrTY 5, 14-15 (1986).
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As Shaffer notes: "To assume another species has no value is to assume
that what we know today is all we will ever know."
3. Intrinsic
Protecting biodiversity provides a number of intrinsic or passive-use
benefits such as existence, bequest, option and quasi-option values. Ex-
istence value is that part of total value that derives from the psychic or
spiritual importance a person attaches to knowing that a species exists,
regardless of whether that person will ever consume the species. People
may value the existence of wood thrushes, hellbender salamanders, or
gray wolves even though they may never see them. Existence value is
related to the altruistic motivations of humans to protect their planet and
its inhabitants, combined with the knowledge gained from direct use of
the species."'
People may also be willing to pay to insure that a species will exist
for future generations to enjoy. Such bequest values have been found to
be higher for older persons who, motivated by benevolence, receive util-
ity from the transfer of resources to future generations." Preserving
biodiversity also maintains the option to utilize a resource in the future.
Because it is irreversible, extinction necessarily results in the loss of op-
tion value. The option value of protecting a resource is lower if substi-
tutes exist,' ® but since no species or population of a species is a perfect
substitute for another, all species and populations of species have some
positive option value.
Quasi-option value is the benefit received from future information
that is conditional on protecting wildland resources from irreversible
damage today. Quasi-option value is clearly relevant to wildland man-
agement given the wealth of biological resources on public land. Pre-
serving biological resources maintains the possibility that new uses may
be discovered later, increasing the value of those resources.' ' Developing
a wildland network conserves biodiversity, helps maintain society's op-
tions for the future, and may be an economically rational use of publicly
owned resources.
F. Ecological Services
Wildlands play an essential role in sustaining natural capital and
ecological services that comprise our global life support system."° The
97. Mark Leslie Shaffer, Beyond the Endangered Species Act: Conservation in the 21st Cen-
tury, in THE WILDERNESS Soc'Y 6 (1992).
98. See Walsh & Loomis, supra note 39, at 185.
'99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Cf. Randall, supra note 96, at 31.
102., See generally EUGENE P. ODUM, ECOLOGY AND OUR ENDANGERED LIFE-SuPPORT
SYSTEMS (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the principles of modern ecology).
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functioning of the earth's biosphere and hence the maintenance and en-
hancement of human life depend on a complex series of ecological proc-
esses or services. These ecological services can be global cycles (e.g.,
water, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen), as well as more localized processes
such as soil formation, pollination of crops, watershed protection, storage
and cycling of nutrients, absorption and breakdown of pollutants, and
maintenance of stream flows. 3 Ecological services consist of flows of
materials, energy, and information from natural capital stocks that com-
bine with manufactured and human capital services to generate human
welfare.' The many nonmarket benefits provided by ecological services
are not priced, are only partially understood, and their value is just starting
to be recognized. The economic benefits to human welfare of sustaining
natural capital and ecological services in the aggregate are significant."0'
1. Watershed Protection
An example of an ecological service with some historical precedent
is watershed protection. The Organic Administration Act of 1897'06 stated
that one of the purposes of national reserves was "for the purpose of se-
curing favorable conditions of water flows"'' (i.e., watershed protection).
Watershed protection provides several economic benefits including (1)
topsoil and nutrients remain on the site, helping to maintain ecosystem
productivity; (2) decreased sedimentation maintains the water quality
required by many native fish; (3) clean water lowers water treatment and
reservoir maintenance costs for downstream communities; (4) clean wa-
ter can be bottled and sold; and (5) watershed protection protects prop-
erty values by controlling flood damage on private property. Watershed
protection is an important service because public wildlands contain the
headwaters of many of America's rivers. Watershed protection is an im-
portant role for public lands because controlling development, road con-
struction, forest management practices, and hence erosion on private
lands is more difficult due to concerns over private property rights.
2. Natural Pest Control
For years, foresters have relied on the natural regeneration service
provided by "seed trees" left in the forest. Recognizing ecological serv-
ices simply requires foresters and resource managers to extend the con-
103. See JEFFREY A. McNEELY ET AL., CONSERVING THE WoRLD's BIoLWGIcAL DiVERSrrY 17-
22(1990).
104. Cf Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 NATuRE 253, 253 (1997) (discussing data gathered to estimate the value of many
ecosystem services).
105. Costanza estimated the economic benefits of the world's ecosystem services and natural
capital average $33 trillion per year. In contrast, global gross national product totals equal $18 tril-
lion per year. See id. at 253.
106. Organic Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 34 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
473-482,551 (1994)).
107. 16 U.S.C. § 475.
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cept to other species and processes that provide significant yet unheralded,
nonmarket benefits. Birds and ants, for example, provide important bio-
logical pest control services to managed forests outside the wildland
network. One of the costs of managing for high crop (timber) yields is
the increasing cost and environmental disruption when chemical pest
controls replace natural controls that no longer work.'0 Natural predation
plays an important role in ending pest epidemics and in lengthening the
periods between pest outbreaks."° A wildland network providing a diver-
sity of habitats for natural predators may be a prudent defense against
future pest epidemics.
The economic benefits of biological pest control can be estimated
based on the pesticide and insecticide costs avoided."' Takekawa and
Garton estimated that the benefit of avian predators in controlling spruce
budworm was similar to using chemical insecticides costing at least
$4,700 per square mile treated."' It has been estimated that biological
pest control services contribute $17 billion per year to the United States
economy."' Sustaining habitat for populations of native keystone preda-
tors may be more efficient at sustaining ecosystem health than continual
applications of greater quantities and concentrations of pesticides. Unlike
pesticides that tend to become less effective with time, birds, insects,
fungi, and microorganisms co-evolve with pests and thus maintain their
effectiveness over time. In economic terms, pesticide use has decreasing
returns to scale, whereas natural predation provides constant returns to
scale. This suggests the potential long-term benefits from natural pest
control may be substantial and that sustaining a wildland network that
contains habitat for natural predators may be economically rational."3
3. Carbon Storage
The scientific and political concerns over increasing levels of atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide make carbon sequestration a highly relevant eco-
logical service of wildlands. The Kyoto Protocol"' specifically recog-
108. Cf ODUM, supra note 102, at31.
109. Cf M. MCMANUS ET AL., FOREST SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., GYPSY MOTH, FOREST
INSECT AND DISEASE LEAFLr 162 (1989), available at <http://willow.ncfes.umn.edu/fidl-
gypsy/gypsy.hun> (visited Dec. 8, 1999); H. Smith, Wildlife and Gypsy Moth, WILDLIFE SOC'Y
BuLL. 13, 166-74 (1985). Although a non-native species, the many predators of gypsy moths that
include wasps, flies, beetles, ants, many species of spider, several birds such as chickadees, blue
jays, nuthatches, and towhees, and fifteen or more species of common woodland mammals such as
white-footed mice, shrews, chipmunks, squirrels and raccoons provide a case in point.
110. See John Y. Takekawa & Edward 0. Garton, How Much Is an Evening Grosbeak Worth?,
82 J. FORESTRY 426,426-27 (1984).
111. See id.
112. See David Pimentel et al., Economic and Environmental Benefits of Biodiversity, 47
BIOSCIENCE 747, 748 (1997).
113. See Morton et al., supra note 93, at 349.
114. The Kyoto Protocol on climate change (signed by 163 countries in December 1997) estab-
lished target reductions for net emissions of greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide and meth-
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nized the role of forests in reducing carbon emissions, partially because
of the potential to increase carbon storage in forests. As a market for
carbon is created in response to the Kyoto Protocol, carbon storage in
wildlands could become an increasingly valuable ecological service."
Carbon storage provides an emerging economic argument for pro-
tecting the slow growing forests in Colorado and the huge carbon stores
in the ancient forest wildlands of the Pacific Northwest."6 Although older
forests have lower growth rates, higher mortality rates favor accumulation
of woody debris and increased carbon storage in the litter layers."7 This
may be significant for Colorado's high-elevation spruce-fir forests, for ex-
ample, where deep litter layers accumulate during the long (five hundred
year) intervals between disturbances."'
While the scientific and political debate has focused on above
ground forest biomass as a carbon store (i.e., bole, branches, and needles
of a tree), the role of forest soils in storing carbon has been mostly over-
looked."9 Soil carbon has been ignored even though forty to seventy-five
percent of global carbon is in the soil,'2" and forest management typically
reduces soil carbon and associated productivity. The economic benefits
of storing carbon in the soils of a wildland network could play a signifi-
cant role in protecting the temperate rain forests of Alaska, for example,
where up to seventy-five percent of forest carbon is stored in the soils.2 '
Protected by the forest canopy, soil carbon can be stored indefinitely
ane. In order to meet emission targets, the federal government may auction emission allowances that
can be traded in the marketplace. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (visited Mar. 8, 1999) <http://www.cnn.conSPECIALS/1997/global.warming/
stories/treaty/>.
115. Norway, for example, recently paid $2 million to Costa Rica as part of a joint implemen-
tation agreement to sequester 200,000 tons of carbon from Costa Rican forests.
116. Timberland in the Rocky Mountains contains 4060 million metric tons of carbon. See R.A.
Birdsey et al., Carbon Changes in U.S. Forests, in FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.,
PRODUCTIVITY OF AMERICA'S FORESTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 56,67 (Linda A. Joyce ed., 1995).
The Interior Columbia Basin Assessment estimated the value of carbon sequestered at $65 per ton.
See Richard W. Haynes & Amy L. Home, Economic Assessment of the Basin, in 4 AN ASSESSMENT
OF ECOSYSTEM COMPONENTS IN THE INTERIOR COLUMBIA BASIN AND PORTIONS OF THE KLAMATH
AND GREAT BASINS 1715 (Thomas M. Quigley & Sylvia J. Arbelbide eds., 1997) [hereinafter
COLUMBIA BASIN ASSESSMENT]. This would suggest that carbon stored in Rocky Mountain timber-
land has substantial economic value.
117. Cf. David P. Turner et al., A Carbon Budget for Forest of the Conterminous United States,
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS, May 1995, at 421,429-33.
118. See generally Gregory H. Aplet et al., Patterns of Community Dynamics in Colorado
Engelmann Spruce-Subalpine Fir Forests, 69 ECOLOGY 312 (1989) (discussing the importance of
the role of disturbance in spruce-fir forest dynamics).
119. See Peter A. Morton et al., Linking Soil Nutrient Recapitalization and Sustainable For-
estry: A Modeling Approach (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
120. See J.N. Walker & J.A. DeShazer, Sequestration and Reduction, AGRiC. ENGINEERING,
Sept. 1992, at 17, 17; cf Paul Schroeder, Can Intensive Management Increase Carbon Storage in
Forests?, 15 ENV'TMGMT. 475,475 (1991).
121. See R.A. Birdsey et al., Carbon Changes in U.S. Forests, in FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T
AGRIC., PRODUCTIVITY OF AMERICA'S FORESTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 56, 61 (Linda A. Joyce ed.,
1995).
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(subject to fluctuations caused by natural disturbances) if these forests
are reserved in a wildland network. If the forests are logged, however,
these soils can quickly decompose and lose their carbon through expo-
sure to increased sunlight, temperature, and wind.
Although some ecosystem services, such as storing carbon, benefit
humankind on a global scale, many ecosystem services are of greatest
benefit to those communities closest to the ecosystem." For example, the
-national forests in Colorado provide more services to the citizens of
Denver in terms of modifying the microclimate, protecting watersheds,
or removing air pollutants, than do the national forests located in the
southern Appalachians. The continual flow of these services from public
wildlands has improved the quality of the environment in local commu-
nities, which in turn has stimulated regional economic development in
Colorado's Front Range as well as the Western Slope.
G. Passive- Use Benefits
Wildland recreation also generates significant passive-use benefits.
Walsh and Loomis attach passive use benefits, such as existence, option,
and bequest values," to an insight first provided by Clawson and
Knetsch, who explained outdoor recreation as a five phase experience.'"'
The five phases are anticipation, travel to the site, on-site recreation ac-
tivity, return travel, and recollection.'" The anticipation phase includes
the option benefits of possible future recreation use." The recollection
phase includes both the existence value of knowing the recreation re-
source is protected and the bequest value of endowing future generations
with the resource.2'
Weisbrod first suggested "option value" as an important benefit of
protecting wildland environments.'" His logic was that people were
willing to pay some premium over and above their expected recreation
benefits to maintain the option, for themselves or for their children, of
visiting a natural area in the future.'' Krutilla and Fisher discussed the
likelihood that people who may never visit or intend to visit a unique
natural area might still gain satisfaction from knowing that a network of
122. See Morton & Olson, supra note 36, at 247.
123. See Walsh & Loomis, supra note 39, at 182.
124. See MARION CLAWSON & JACK L. KNETSCH, ECONOMICS OF OurDooR RECREATION, 33-
36(1966).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 33.
127. See id. at 34-35.
128. Burton A. Weisbrod, Collective-Consumption Services of Individual-Consumption Goods,
78 Q. J. ECON. 471,472 (1964).
129. See id.
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wildlands exists and is protected. '" Existence value is the psychic value a
person enjoys from just knowing that a wildland network ex-
ists--regardless of whether the person will ever visit an area. Krutilla
also suggested that the current generation might be willing to pay some-
thing to bequest wildlands to future generations. '
Natural resource economists currently employ the contingent valua-
tion method (CVM) to estimate total economic benefits, as this is the
only method capable of estimating passive-use benefits. Walsh compared
recreation use values and passive-use values of Colorado households
from increasing wilderness acres in Colorado.'32 The results indicate that
passive-use benefits captured by wilderness increased from about $15.3
million for 1.2 million acres up to $35 million for 10 million acres.'" At
all levels of wilderness expansion, passive-use values were a substantial
part of the total economic value of wilderness."'
A recent study on the value of eastern forests illustrates that passive-
use benefits are not limited to western wildlands.' . Gilbert estimated that
eighty-five percent of the respondents' willingness to pay for wilderness
in the East was attributed to passive-use existence benefits.'" People val-
ued the existence of eastern wilderness more than their expected use of
the wilderness.'" These results are consistent with research by Walsh
indicating that western residents have an average willingness to pay of
$49 to protect unroaded areas.'8 Survey respondents ranked unroaded
areas high in use values (e.g., educational and scientific study, as well as
for the option to use them in the future) and passive-use, existence values
(e.g., protecting species, protecting air and water quality, knowing that
natural areas exist for their own sake, and knowing that future genera-
tions will have natural areas).39
130. See JOHN V. KRUTILLA & ANTHONY C. FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL
ENVIRONMENTS: STUDIES IN THE VALUATION OF COMMODITY AND AMENITY RESOURCES 15
(1985).
131. See Krutilla, supra note 39, at 780-81,785.
132. See Richard G. Walsh et al., Valuing Option, Existence, and Bequest Demands for Wilder-
ness, 60 LAND ECON. 14, 16-28 (1984).
133. See id. at 25.
134. See Walsh & Loomis, supra note 39, at 181, 183.
135. See A. Gilbert et al., Valuation of Eastern Wilderness: Extramarket Measures of Public
Support, in FOREST SERv., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WILDERNESS, supra note 13, at 57, 61-62.
136. See id. at 61.
137. See id. at 57, 61.
138. See Richard G. Walsh et al., Regional Household Preference for Ecosystem Restoration
and Sustained Yield Management of Wilderness and Other Natural Areas, in BENEFITS AND COSTS
TRANSFER IN NATURAL RESOURCE PLANNING 42,42 (J. Bergstrom ed., 1996).
139. See d.
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Ill. WILDERNESS BENEFITS IN PRACTICE
[I1t is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to secure for the
American people of present and future generations the benefits of an
enduring resource of wilderness.""
Forest Service employees were early leaders in recognizing the im-
portance of wilderness as a land use designation. In 1919, Arthur Carhart
(a landscape architect) convinced Forest Service managers not to develop
Colorado's Trappers Lake; in 1924, Aldo Leopold pushed the agency to
classify 574,000 acres of Gila National Forest as wilderness; and in
1939, Bob Marshall issued U Regulations for wilderness management.
These and other accomplishments in wilderness management were made
most likely without formally quantifying the economic benefits of wild-
lands and can be attributed principally to the dedication of wilderness
managers, seasonal rangers, and volunteers "working with minimum
budgets and, for the most part, lacking strong support from the higher
levels of agency hierarchies."''
In 1960, Congress passed the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act
(MUSYA) 2 which defined sustained yield as "the achievement and
maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic out-
put of the various renewable resources of the national forests without
impairment of the productivity of the land."' 3 The passage of MUSYA
formally extended sustained yield to include nonmarket, nontimber re-
sources. MUSYA specifically recognized six multiple uses permitted on
the National Forests: outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wild-
life, and fish." Expanding the definition of sustained yield to include all
resources was a persuasive reason for congressional support for MUSYA.4"
140. Wilderness Act of 1964 § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994). This quotation is an example
of a policy statement (and enactment) of a long-run value at the institutional level, not necessarily
based on a quantified economic efficiency analysis. Economic efficiency analysis strives to maxi-
mize benefits, but says nothing about the fairness or equity of how the benefits are distributed.
Informed public policy decisions often ignore economic efficiency in favor of equity considerations
and due process of law. See Peterson Communication, supra note 18.
141. Stephen F. McCool & Robert C. Lucas, Managing Resources and People in Wilderness:
Accomplishments and Challenges, in MANAGING AMERICA'S ENDURING WILDERNESS RESOURCE:
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE, supra note 90, at 67.
142. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531
(1994)).
143. MUSYA § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 531(b).
144. See MUSYA § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528; CRARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON,
LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 29-30 (1987).
145. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG. OTA-F-505, FOREST SERVICE PLANNING:
ACCOMMODATING USES, PRODUCING OuI'purs, AND SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS 38 (1992) [hereinafter
ACCOMMODATING USES].
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In 1974, the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning
Act (RPA)' 6 established a strategic planning process at the national level
by which the Forest Service would address long range renewable re-
source conditions structured around four documents: the RPA Assess-
ment, the RPA Program, the Presidential Statement of Policy, and the
Annual Report. The RPA Assessment includes willingness to pay esti-
mates for a variety of nonmarket resources produced on the national for-
est and serves as a source book for agency planners developing manage-
ment plans for individual national forests.' 8 The "RPA values" are used
in the forest planning process established under the 1976 National Forest
Management Act (NFMA) 4 9
The NFMA expanded the multiple-use list, legislatively acknowl-
edging wilderness areas as a multiple-use resource, and established a
strategic planning process at the local and national forest level.'" Plan-
ning regulations developed by the agency in response to NFMA included
an explicit management objective for the national forest to maximize net
public benefits.' Net public benefits are defined as "the overall long-
term value to the nation of all outputs and positive effects (benefits) less
all associated inputs and negative effects (costs) whether they can be
quantitatively valued or not."'' 2 Estimating net public benefits requires an
economic analysis that accounts for the consumer surplus generated by
146. Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378,88
Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994)).
147. The RPA Assessment is produced every ten years and examines resource supply and
demand, as well as trends in resource conditions. See RPA § 2(a); 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a). The RPA
Program is published every five years and establishes a direction for Forest Service management
based on trends and opportunities identified in the RPA Assessment. See RPA § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1602.
The Presidential Statement of Policy guides the annual budget requests, and the Annual Report
assesses Forest Service accomplishments and progress in implementing the RPA Program. See RPA
§ 7(a), (c), 16 U.S.C. § 1606(a), (c); see also ACCOMMODATING USES, supra note 145 (providing a
comprehensive discussion and analysis of Forest Service planning).
148. See ACCOMMODATING USES, supra note 145, at 9.
149. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.). The NFMA was an amendment to the RPA and although primarily a procedural law,
NFMA did establish standards and guidelines for planning and resource protection. Cf NFMA § 6,
16 U.S.C. § 1604; see also ACCOMMODATING USES, supra note 145, at 3. The NFMA also directs
the Forest Service to prepare long-term (i.e., 50 years) forest management plans for each national
forest, to be revised at least every 15 years. See NFMA § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1604. The NFMA also
requires the Forest Service to conduct an economic analysis of forest management alternatives. See
NFMA § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1600.
150. See NFMA § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
151. Cf LOOMiS, supra note 10, at 43; CINDY SORG SWANSON & JOHN B. LOOMIS, FOREST
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PNW-GTR 361, ROLE OF NONMARKET ECONOMIC VALUES IN
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC FOREST MANAGEMENT 1 (1996).
152. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 47 Fed. Reg. 43,026-
52 (1982).
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wildland resources. Consumer surplus is a subset of net public benefits,
and in most forests makes up a large part of the total."3
A. FORPLAN Follies
The Forest Service chose the FORPLAN linear programming model
to help allocate timber and nontimber forest resources in a way that
maximized long term net public benefits. FORPLAN functions as a con-
strained optimization model that allocates resources based on the relative
values of various forest resources jointly produced. Whether FORPLAN
actually maximizes net public benefits depends on several factors, in-
cluding: data quality, the variables included in the model, the structure of
the model, and the selected constraint set.
1. Structural Problems
An appropriate method for maximizing net public benefits with
FORPLAN would be to include nonmarket, wildland benefits in the ob-
jective function of the model. This objective function could then be
maximized subject to management and resource constraints. During the
first round of planning, agency officials made a policy decision and
.chose not to include nonmarket benefits in the objective function of the
FORPLAN model. Instead planners typically ran FORPLAN with an
objective function that maximized net present value'' of marketable
commodities (e.g., timber) subject to constraints that attempted to take
nonmarket resources into consideration. Including nonmarket resources
(preserving endangered species, visual quality, etc.) only as constraints
on production implies that sustaining ecosystems is a constraint and not a
goal for managing our national forests.'" Thus, the basic structure of
FORPLAN, as modeled during the first round of forest planning, was a
questionable approach for maximizing net public benefits.
2. Coefficients Difficult to Estimate
The data required to develop a FORPLAN model are also sus-
pect--especially for coefficients estimating the impact of management
actions on nonmarket, wildland goods and services. For example, devel-
oping a FORPLAN model requires information on (1) the response of
aquatic populations to harvesting and sediment loading of streams, (2)
the response of wildlife populations to forest fragmentation, (3) the im-
pact of logging operations on soil nutrient cycling and carbon sequestra-
153. See Loomis, supra note 10, at 128-31. From a taxpayer's perspective, consumer surplus
generated by a network of wildlands can be viewed as "untaxed" benefits provided by government
management of the public estate.
154. Net present value, an economic tool for evaluating forest management alternatives, is
calculated by subtracting the discounted management costs from the discounted management bene-
fits. The practice of discounting (the opposite of compounding) is required to compare costs and
benefits that occur at different points in time over the 50 year planning period.
155. See ACCOMMODATING USES, supra note 145, at 135.
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tion, and (4) the impact of forest management on watershed protection,
.visual quality, scenic amenities and existence value. There is simply in-
sufficient research available on basic ecological, economic and socio-
logical responses to forest management activities to construct an accurate
and representative model for maximizing net public benefits as required
by law. The wildland benefits most easily measured are those associated
with recreation. However, there has been a general reluctance on the part
of the agency to accept these theoretical values in practice.
3. Wildland Recreation Benefits Reduced
Pursuant to the 1974 RPA, the Forest Service estimates average
willingness to pay values for resource outputs for use in developing na-
tional forest plans." For the 1985 RPA Assessment, the Forest Service
contracted with Sorg and Loomis to conduct a meta-analysis of the non-
market literature. 7 A panel of formal reviewers was also commissioned
to assist them in developing their procedures and to review their
results. "8 After publication of the report, Forest Service administrators in
Washington, D.C. decided the recreation values estimated by Sorg and
Loomis were too high and that some adjustment was needed.' When the
final 1985 RPA documents were published, the nonmarket recreation
benefits were forty-five percent lower than the values estimated by Sorg
and Loomis. The adjustment methods used by Forest Service officials
were unorthodox at best. According to John Duffield:
The recreational values selected for the 1985 RPA program
were inconsistent with the literature review undertaken by Loomis
and Sorg in 1982. The latter, while necessitating considerable judge-
ment, was done to high professional standards. The procedures used
by the Forest Service staff to establish the final RPA values included
simple but major mechanical errors as well as ad hoc adjustments.
The adjustments were unsupported and appear to be at odds with ba-
sic economic theory and practice."
Duffield concluded: "The overall picture appears to be one of higher
echelon administrators determined to reduce the values assigned to rec-
reation."'6'
156. The willingness to pay values can be used as coefficients in the FORPLAN model.
157. See generally SORG & Loomis, supra note 50 (detailing the results of their meta-analysis).
158. See John H. Duffield, RPA Values for Recreation: Theory and Practice, 10 PuB. LAND L.
REv. 105, 112 (1989).
159. See idi at 115.
160. Id. at 128.
161. Id. at 120. In defense of the downward adjustment, a Forest Service economist stated that
the principal reason for adjusting the values was the inability to represent a collectable price or user
fee in a competitive market. See id. at 117.
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4. Passive-Use Benefits Lack Credibility
For the 1990 RPA, the Forest Service estimated recreation benefits
based on two accounting stances, market clearing price and market
clearing price plus consumer surplus. In most cases, adding consumer
surplus to the market price substantially increased the recreation benefits
estimated. For example, the hiking category increased from $3.41 to
$22.39 when consumer surplus was included. The 1990 RPA included
the following discussion about adding consumer surplus to market
clearing prices when measuring economic value:
This measure of value, typically referred to as the average "willingness to
pay" in technical literature, has gained strong support from economic theo-
rists as a concept relevant to many social decisions .... Critics of the con-
cept object to it on the basis that is does not represent "real wealth"--that
is, money does not change hands. However, most economists agree that
consumer surplus is relevant to many social decisions.
162
Unfortunately, these arguments were not persuasive to national for-
est planners. For example, on the heavily recreated Nantahala and Pisgah
National Forests, planners following policy directives excluded con-
sumer surplus when estimating recreation benefits in the recent plan
amendment."
The disdain for nonmarket benefit valuations continues today in na-
tional forest management plans"' and in the recently completed Southern
Appalachian Assessment.'6" The Southern Appalachian Assessment esti-
mated recreation benefits using travel costs models. Although travel
costs are a reliable method for estimating recreation use benefits of wil-
derness, they are incapable of capturing passive-use values. The contin-
gent valuation method is the only method available for estimating pas-
sive-use benefits." Travel cost studies must be supplemented with con-
tingent valuation studies on passive-use values to capture the full array of
wildland benefits.
162. SAMUELSON, supra note 22, at 449.
163. See Peter A. Morton, Review of Stumpage Prices and Recreation, in THE DRAPT
SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONmENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE NANTAHALA AND
PISGAH NATIONAL FORESTS 6, 6-7, 18-22 (1992) [hereinafter Morton, Review of Stumpage Prices];
Peter A. Morton, Review of the Final Environmental Impact Statement and Management Plan for the
Nantahala and Pisgah National Forests 18 (1994) (a report prepared for The Wilderness Society et
al.) [hereinafter Morton, Review of the Final Environmental Impact Statement] (on file with author).
164. See Morton, Review of Stumpage Prices, supra note 163, at 18-19; see also Loomis, supra
note 26, at 288-89.
165. Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere, in FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., THE
SOUTHERN APPALACHIAN ASSESSMENT 18 (1996).
166. See generally DANIEL W. MCCOLLuM ET AL., FOREsT SERv., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., THE NET
ECONOMIC VALUE OF RECREATION ON THE NATIONAL FORESTS: TWELVE TYPES OF PRIMARY ACrIvITY
TRIPS ACROSS NINE FOREST SERVICE REGIONS (analyzing use values based on travel cost statistics);
Peter H. Pearse & Thomas P. Holmes, Accounting for Nonmarket Benefits in Southern Forest Manage-
ment, 17 SJ. APPLIED FORESTRY 84 (1993).
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The exclusion of passive-use wildland benefits has the potential to
bias the allocation of resources during the national forest plan-
ning/revision process. This can be illustrated graphically with a produc-
tion possibility curve (Figure 5). Underestimating wilderness recreation
benefits lowers the relative value of wilderness. As a result, the slope of
the total benefits line shifts resulting in a change in the production mix.
The shift in the total benefits line due to the decrease in the value of rec-
reation is illustrated by line segment B'B' and a new point of tangency
E'. Lowering the value of wilderness recreation results in the allocation










ACRES ALLOCATED TO TIMBER
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Forest Service researchers recently acknowledged the significant
passive-use benefits from conserving wildlands in the Pacific Northwest.
A Forest Service report on the regional economy of the Interior Colum-
bia Basin provides evidence of the importance of sustaining wildland
resources for rural economic development. 7 The authors conclude that
"the existence of unroaded areas is by far the most valuable output from
FS and BLM-administrated lands in the basin today, and will continue to
be so in the year 2045.""' The same is likely true for wildlands across the
nation.
5. Modeler Bias Influenced the "Optimal" Solution
In order to maximize net public benefits, FORPLAN models must
have a flexible structure that allows the model to be sensitive to changes
in wilderness benefits or demand. Unfortunately, modeler bias can lead
to FORPLAN models that are insensitive to changes in wilderness bene-
fits or recreation demand. Botkin and Devine analyzed the FORPLAN
167. See Richard W. Haynes & Amy L. Home, Economic Assessment of the Basin, in 4
COLUMBIA BASIN ASSESSMENT, supra note 116, at 1715.
168. Id.
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model used to develop the 1985 Chattahoochee National Forest plan.'"
They were interested in how sensitive the model was to changes in the
demand and values assigned to semi-primitive recreation. Their hypothe-
sis was that the amount of land allocated to semi-primitive recreation
would increase as the demand and value for semi-primitive recreation
increased. To test the hypotheses they doubled demand for semi-
primitive recreation and increased the value of semi-primitive recrea-
tional visitor days (RVD) by a factor of ten. Results of their sensitivity
analysis revealed no significant change in resource allocation. The re-
searchers concluded that "the basic FORPLAN management choices
were determined by one initial decision: whether to harvest timber.'
' 0
The harvest level was in turn determined by the timber target assigned to
the Chattahoochee by the Washington, D.C. office of the Forest
Service."'
. The fact that the timber target drove the solution was a result of both
agency and modeler bias. One reason for the insensitivity was that the
Chattahoochee FORPLAN model lacked a decision variable allowing
semi-primitive nonmotorized acres to increase by closing and obliterat-
ing existing roads in the roaded natural areas." Because semi-primitive
acres could not be increased by closing roads, the model was insensitive
to increase in demand (i.e., did not supply additional semi-primitive
acres necessary to meet demand). Planners restricted the management
options available even though the forest had an excess of roaded natural
lands and a shortage of semi-primitive lands. Botkin and Devine recom-
mend that future planning models include such an option.'"
6. Asymmetrical Budget Shortfalls
The annual funding level appropriated by Congress provides an in-
dication of the ability of the Forest Service to implement a forest plan. In
169. See M.RK Botkin & H.A. Devine, Outdoor Recreation Allocation in a FORPLAN Model, J.
FOREsmy, Oct. 1989,,at 31, 31-37.
170. Id. at 37.
171. The decision to harvest timber is driven by the timber targets (resource goals) selected in
the planning process required by the 1974 RPA and the 1976 NFMA. However, the resource goals
do not always reflect the productive capability of individual national forests. See MICHAEL D.
BowES & JOHN V. KRUILLA, MULTIPLE-USE MANAGEMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC
FORESTLANDS 120 (1989). Timber targets not only force a significant amount of land into timber
production that will require a public subsidy to bring the wood to market. Timber targets also impact
wildland resource allocation by significantly influencing the FORPLAN model. When congression-
ally assigned timber targets drive the allocation of public resources on the national forests, the ability
of the agency to maximize net public benefits is doubtful.
172. When confronted with both the high timber target assigned and the increased value for
semiprimitive recreation, the Chattahoochee FORPLAN model reacted in a strange way. As semi-
primitive recreation values were increased, volume of old growth harvested in semi-primitive areas
increased. In other words, as the benefits of wild recreation increased, the naturalness, the acres of
old-growth, and the degree of solitude in the wild decreased!
173. See Botkin & Devine, supra note 169, at 37.
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general, the funding received by the Forest Service has been less than the
budgets required to fully implement forest plans." The overall budget
shortfall was not passed onto resource programs in a symmetrical man-
ner. For example, the recreation programs on the southern Appalachian
national forests received approximately forty-seven percent of the
planned budget.'75 In contrast, the timber program received ninety-seven
percent of the planned budget."6 The lower-than-planned recreation fund-
ing has led to a tremendous backlog of new trail construction and thou-
sands of miles of trails in need of reconstruction or maintenance.77
Budget shortfalls directly influence the benefits jointly produced by
national forests. This influence was not reflected when net public benefits
were estimated with FORPLAN during the first round of forest planning
because budget constraints were not included in the model. When appro-
priated budgets are less than planned budgets, the production potential of a
national forest as modeled with FORPLAN is reduced and the production
possibility curve shifts in toward the origin (line segment P'P' in Figure
6).'"' As a result of this shift and holding relative benefits constant, less











ACRES ALLOCATED TO TIMBER
FIGURE 6
174. See U.S. GEN. Acer. OFF., GAO/RCED-91-115, FOREST SERVICE: DIFFICULT CHOICES
FACE THE FuIUnRE OF THE RECREATION PROGRAM 3 (1991).
175. See Peter A. Morton, Sustaining Recreation Resources on the Southern Appalachian National
Forests, J. OF PARK & RECREATION ADMIN., Winter 1997, at 61, 62 (1997) [hereinafter Morton, Sus-
taining Recreation].
176. See id The asymmetrical budget shortfalls could be a result of Forest Service managers acting
as budget maximizers and responding to the managerial budget incentives tied to logging and "getting the
cut out." 0' TOOI.E, supra note 196, at 56. The asymmetrical budget shortfalls could also be a result of
the agency inadvertently emphasizing a financial analysis when evaluating management alternatives. Or,
the asymmetrical shortfalls could be a result of conscious policy decisions made by agency officials that
revenue produced by timber was more inmportant to national welfare than benefits produced by recreation.
See Peterson Communication, supra note 18.
177. See THOMAS HARVEY & STEPHEN HENLEY, AMERICAN HuaNG SOC'Y, THE STATUS OF
TRaIs IN NATIONAL FORESTS, NATIONAL PARKS, AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENr AREAS (1989).
178. See Morton, Sustaining Recreation, supra note 175, at 63.
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Without acknowledging budget constraints and the asymmetrical reduction
in programmatic budgets, the net public benefits estimated with
FORPLAN are illusory and will not be attained. The shift in production
brought about by the budget shortfalls created public dissatisfaction when
national forest recreational opportunities and timber supplies were less
than planned. As such, the failure to adequately consider budgets during
the first round of forest planning may have exacerbated the tension be-
tween the agency, timber purchasers, and environmentalists.
B. Technical and Procedural Errors Occurred
Research by Loomis also revealed that past Forest Service analysis
in Regions 1 and 2 were biased against wilderness designation because
planners incorrectly valued wilderness recreation use.' Forest Service
procedures failed to account for the economic benefits from all forms of
recreation taking place in wilderness." Rather than classifying and
valuing wilderness recreation based on activities actually occurring in
wilderness (e.g., hunting, fishing, backcountry camping, etc.), planners
valued all forms of recreation based on the RPA value for the wilderness
recreation category. RPA "willingness-to-pay" estimates for the wilder-
ness recreation category are much less than the RPA estimates for the
hunting and fishing categories. By failing to account for the higher val-
ued recreation activities (e.g., hunting and fishing) jointly produced by
wilderness areas, wilderness benefits were significantly underestimated,
generally resulting in biases against wilderness designation.'
Loomis also reported substantial technical errors in Forest Service
procedures used to conduct economic analysis of wilderness study
areas.'" The technical errors included valuing recreation use based on esti-
mated recreation capacity rather than actual recreation use. Morton re-
ported a similar error when agency procedures required planners to use
projected demand (constrained by carrying capacity), instead of actual
visitation, to estimate the benefits of wilderness recreation. In this case,
wilderness recreation benefits were significantly underestimated because,
at the time, actual wilderness visitation was five times greater than esti-
179. See John B. Loomis, Economic Efficiency Analysis, Bureaucrats, and Budgets: A Test of
Hypotheses, 12 W. J. AGRIC. ECON. 27, 29 (1987) [hereinafter Loomis, Economic Efficiency]; John
B. Loomis, Importance of Joint Benefits of Wilderness in Calculating Wilderness Recreation Bene-
fits, in FOREST SERv., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WILDERNESS, supra note 13, at 17 [hereinafter
Loomis, Joint Benefits].
180. The agency also tends to analyze hunting and fishing independently of recreation when it
comes to estimating recreation carrying capacity. As a result, visitation to wilderness areas (use
density-RVDs/acre/year) is underestimated in forest planning. See Morton, Charting a New
Course, supra note 63, at 65. The impact of hunting season, for example, on wilderness carrying
capacity may be significant but ignored. Hunting and fishing occur in wilderness areas and should be
analyzed with other forms of wildland recreation, since they most certainly impact each other.
181. See Linda L. Langner, Use of Wilderness Values in Forest Service Policy and Planning, in
FOREST SERV., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WILDERNESS, supra note 13, at 239, 341-42.
182. See Loomis, Economic Efficiency, supra note 179, at 29.
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mated carrying capacity.'83 Botkin and Devine also reported asymmetrical
accounting of timber and recreation benefits by planners on the Chatta-
hoochee National Forest.'' Whereas planners accounted for the benefits of
surplus timberproduction in excess of estimated demand, surplus produc-
tion of recreation in excess of estimated demand was assigned a value of
zero dollars.
C. Demand for Wilderness Recreation Underestimated
The 1992 draft revised management plan for the George Washing-
ton National Forest (GWNF) included an analysis of the supply and de-
mand for wilderness.8 Forest Service planners projected the demand for
wilderness over the fifty-year planning period. Morton compared the
Forest Service projections with three alternative indices for estimating
future wilderness demand on the GWNF.'" The three alternative indices
were based on the 1990 RPA wilderness use projections, the 1990 RPA
projections for day hiking (as day hiking was the dominant use in these
wilderness areas) and historic visitation trends for wilderness on the
GWNF. The results of the comparison revealed that in all three cases the
wilderness demand estimated with the alternative indices was greater
than the demand projections of Forest Service planners. These results
strongly suggest that future wilderness demand on this national forest
was underestimated during forest planning.
In the wilderness recreation analysis included in the 1992 Draft
Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Nanta-
hala and Pisgah National Forests,"' planners admitted that the current
demand for wilderness could not be met by existing wilderness areas.
The agency assumed "excess" wilderness demand would be satisfied by
wilderness-like settings in semi-primitive nonmotorized (SPNM) areas."
In order for SPNM areas to meet the excess demand for wilderness rec-
reation, projected visitation must stay within the carrying capacity for
wilderness areas over the fifty-year planning horizon. A review of the
data in the Draft Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact State-
183. The density of wilderness use (visits per acre per year) can be estimated by dividing an-
nual wilderness use by total wilderness acres. In this case, current wilderness density on the Nanta-
hala and Pisgah National Forests was 2.4 RVDs per acre per year, whereas planners on another
southern Appalachian national forest estimated a wilderness carrying capacity of only 0.487 RVDs
per acre per year. See Morton, Review of the Final Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 163.
184. See Botkin & Devine, supra note 169, at 33-34.
185. See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., GEORGE WASHINGTON NATIONAL FOREST:
DRAat REVISED LAND MANAGEMENT PLAN (1992).
186. See Peter A. Morton, Analysis of the Supply and Demandfor Wilderness Recreation, in TlE
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr STATEMENT FOR THE GEORGE WASHINGTON NATIONAL FOREST
(1993) (a report prepared for The Wilderness Society et a.).
187. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., DRAFr SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE NANTAHALA AND PISGAH NATIONAL FORESTS (1992).
188. Semi-primitive nonmotorized areas represent a land classification category of the Recrea-
tion Opportunity Spectrum (ROS). ROS categories range from urban to primitive environments, and
are used by planners to categorize the recreation settings occurring on public land.
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ment revealed that SPNM demand exceeded the carrying capacity during
the second decade of the planning horizon.' In response to these com-
ments, planners updated the recreation analysis for the Final Supplement
to the Final Environmental Impact Statement, 0 but completely dropped
the analysis of wilderness recreation. The policy decision to omit practi-
cally all discussion of wilderness recreation supply, demand, and carry-
ing capacity obviously draws into question the adequacy of the recreation
analysis in the Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact
Statement.
D. Stumpage Price Trends Overestimated9'
In order to evaluate forest plan alternatives and maximize net public
benefits, Forest Service planners must generate fifty-year forecasts of the
economic costs and benefits associated with forest management. For the
timber program, stumpage prices over a fifty-year period must be esti-
mated in order to schedule timber harvest, determine the suitable timber
base, estimate revenue from the timber program, and estimate net public
benefits with the FORPLAN model. Accurately estimating future stump-
age prices is an important wilderness issue because projections of higher
stumpage prices increase the suitable timber base and encourage logging
in roadless areas. Higher stumpage prices provide the agency with finan-
cial justification to incur road costs and log more extensively, including
marginally productive and steeply sloped lands in wild areas.
Accurately estimating future stumpage prices is an important eco-
nomic issue because price trends have a significant effect on the financial
returns estimated for the timber program." If planners overestimate future
stumpage prices, for example, future timber revenues, the allowable sale
quantity, and the suitable base will be overestimated. Planners, under pres-
sure to financially justify elevated allowable timber sale quantities and
meet timber targets, have an incentive to inflate future stumpage prices.
Pressure on planners and economists to generate positive price
trends is evident from the recent forest planning effort on the Nantahala-
Pisgah National Forest in North Carolina. In order to estimate stumpage
price trends for the southern Appalachian national forests, the Forest
Service published the Southern Appalachian Timber Study.'93 The
authors of the report concluded that real stumpage price trends were de-
189. Cf Morton, Review of Stumpage Prices, supra note 163.
190. FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., FINAL SuppuwENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACr STATEMENT FOR THE NANTAHALA AND PISGAH NATIONAL FoREsrs (1994).
191. Stumpage price refers to the value of standing timber in a forest.
192. The land brought into the suitable timber base as a result of overestimating stumpage
prices is typically the marginal land for timber production. Bringing marginal land into timber pro-
duction should be a concern for managers and is a questionable investment of taxpayer money.
193. See generally DE STEIGUER Er AL., supra note 30 (detailing the results of the Southern
Appalachian Tmber Study).
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clining, and that "demand has not kept pace with supply."" Agency offi-
cials made a policy decision to ignore the results, and instead contracted
another study that used a regression'" model to estimate stumpage price
trends on the Nantahala-Pisgah. The regression was calibrated with tim-
ber sale data over a thirteen-year period (1979-1991), a time of largely
declining stumpage prices. The regression was then used to project
stumpage prices for fifty years (1992-2040), assuming that to be a period
of increasing prices.'" The drastic turnaround projected for Nantahala-
Pisgah stumpage prices is illustrated in Figure 7. Close scrutiny of the
regression equations revealed several problems." 7
ACTUAL (1979-199 1) AND PREDICTED (1992-2040) STUMPAGE PRICE FOR LOW VALUED
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FIGURE 7
194. Id. at 41.
195. A regression equation attempts to establish a functional relationship by using independent
variables to predict the value of a dependent variable. In this case, timber sale characteristics such as
volume for each species and contract length (independent variables) were used to estimate future
stumpage prices (the dependent variable).
196. Using data from a generally declining market to forecast prices in an increasing market is
problematic as lumber price elasticities estimated during a declining market probably do not apply in
a rising market. The fact that stumpage prices fell at a faster rate than lumber prices in a declining
market does not guarantee that stumpage prices will increase at a faster rate than lumber prices in a
rising market--especially over a 50 year period.
197. The regression equations included statistically insignificant variables and suffered specifi-
cation problems because relevant independent variables were omitted from the regressions. By
assuming that stumpage prices would increase at a faster rate than lumber prices, planners projected
higher stumpage prices than most purchasers would be willing to pay. For example, after 50 years,
stumpage costs for low-valued species equaled 90% of the lumber price, leaving purchasers only a
10% margin to cover transportation and conversion costs, let alone a decent profit. See Morton,
Review of Stumpage Prices, supra note 162, at 6.
198. Data reflected in Figure 7 is taken from the DRAFT SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE NANTAHALA AND PISGAH NATIONAL FOREsTS,
supra note 187.
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The most significant problem with stumpage price trends in general,
is that estimating long term price trends with short term data is econo-
metrically indefensible.'" On the Nantahala-Pisgah, thirteen years of data
were used to calibrate the stumpage regressions in order to estimate fifty-
year price trends. However, the reliability of a regression based model
decreases as the forecast goes beyond the range of data used in calibrat-
ing the regression equation. If the regressions were reliable, planners
could be fairly confident using the stumpage price trends for an equiva-
lent time period. After thirteen years, however, the opposite is true; the
confidence interval becomes increasingly wide and the reliability of the
regression equation decreases. The stumpage regression equations, as
specified, had relatively low explanatory power to begin with, and it gets
much worse after fifteen years. There is simply too much variation to
accurately forecast fifty-year price trends with thirteen years of data.'
The tendency of the agency to overestimate stumpage price trends is not
an isolated problem and has provided the agency with financial justifica-
tion for building roads and logging semi-primitive non-motorized (i.e.,
roadless) areas on many national forests.
The models used by the Forest Service to project stumpage prices
have a history of overestimating future stumpage prices. Clawson, after
reviewing the approximately decennial Forest Service timber projections
since 1909, found that every one of them projected consumption out-
stripping production."' A comparison of price projections made in the
1980 and 1985 RPA documents reveal that in both, projected prices were
overestimated when compared to actual prices.' The persistent trend
among studies which have forecasted upward price trends is that "each
succeeding report forecasts somewhat lower future prices than its prede-
cessor."
While price trends for stumpage have been exaggerated, price trends
for wildland benefits have been nonexistent. As a result, past public land
management decisions have been biased against nonmarket benefits,
including wilderness and biodiversity conservation. This again draws
into question whether Forest Service management maximizes net public
benefits.
199. Econometrics is the study of the application of statistical methods to the analysis of eco-
nomic data.
200. See Morton, Review of the Final Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 163. The
stumpage price projections used in the FEIS were adjusted downward from the projections included in
the DEIS.
201. See Marion Clawson, Forests in the Long Sweep of American History, 204 ScIENCE 1168,
1172 (1979).
202. See RANiDAL O'TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE 56 (1988).
203. Perry Hagenstein, Forests, in NATURAL REsoURCES FOR THE 21sT Cm Y 78,93 (R. Neil
Sampson & Dwight Hair eds., 1990).
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IV. DiscussioN
The Wilderness Society is, philosophically, a disclaimer of the biotic
arrogance of homo americanus. It is one of the focal points of a new
attitude--an intelligent humility toward man's place in nature.4
Natural resource economists have made theoretical advances in es-
timating the benefits of wilderness, but many of the goods and services
generated by wildlands are currently beyond quantification. While ex-
amples from only a few national forests were presented here, it appears
that wildland benefits had poor credibility and/or were ignored by Forest
Service decision makers.' When nonmarket benefits are excluded, the
economic value of a wildland network is underestimated and the alloca-
tion of forest resources becomes biased towards timber production. As
Duffield notes:
In the past, economic evaluation of natural resource policy or specific
developmental projects has sometimes been more of a justification for
market uses rather than a comprehensive and valid economic com-
parison of alternatives. This has been in part because of the difficulty
of placing a value on the service flows that are not traded in a
market.'06
Forest Service policy decisions continue to exclude passive-use
benefits associated with wildland conservation despite the growing body
of literature suggesting that these benefits are significant. ' In addition, a
blue ribbon panel, including two Nobel Prize-winning economists, con-
cluded that carefully designed and implemented CVM studies produce
204. Aldo Leopold, Why the Wilderness Society?, 1 LIvING WILDERNESS 1,1 (1935).
205. The use of the word "ignore" implies neglect, or a refusal to take notice of wildland bene-
fits on the part of agency decision makers. This may or may not be the case. Failure of policy deci-
sions to be sensitive to consumer surplus may not reflect a deliberate choice by the Forest Service to
ignore consumer surplus-policy decisions often contradict the economic facts. For example, policy
decisions often sacrifice economic efficiency in order to achieve social equity objectives. Did the
Forest Service ignore wildland values because of fallacious logic, ignorance of the fact, or did
agency officials adequately consider the values in question and then consciously decide on other
policy directions that make it appear as if wildland values were ignored? The results presented here
provide some insight to these questions. Duffield's commentary on agency administrators "deter-
mined to reduce the values assigned to recreation" would suggest that fallacious logic was used by
agency officials to adjust RPA values. See Duffield, supra note 158, at 112. Deceptive logic could
also have contributed to the timber bias in the FORPLAN model examined by Botkin and Devine.
See Botkin & Devine, supra note 169, at 33-34. The other problems cited about the FORPLAN
model are more likely a result of policy decisions that considered wildland values but chose to not
allow them to determine choice after having considered them. To more fully investigate answers to
these questions, see generally MICHAEL FROME, THE FOREST SERvICE (1984); PAUL W. HIRT, A
CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM: MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS SINCE WORLD WAR II
(1996); O'TOOLE, supra note 202.
206. John W. Duffield, Total Valuation of Wildlife and Fishery Resources: Applications in the
Northern Rockies, in FOREST SERv., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WILDERNESS supra note 13, at 97.
207. See Loomis & Walsh, supra note 13, at 81.
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
reliable information for judicial and administrative decisions involving
passive-use or existence values.'
As Loomis and Walsh note:
While the theory that wilderness preservation provides more than just
on-site recreation benefits is over 25 years old (starting with Weis-
brod in 1964 and Krutilla in 1967), it bears repeating as the U.S. For-
est Service continues to economically value only the recreation use.
This practice exists despite empirical demonstration that recreation is
less than 50 percent of the total economic value of wilderness nearly
seven years ago.'
By solely relying on recreation use values, the total economic value of
wilderness will be severely underestimated during the national forest
planning process."' In general, the Forest Service's planning process is
biased towards timber, ignores nonmarket values and gives little atten-
tion to sustaining ecosystems."
By excluding consumer surplus, the economic benefits of wildland
recreation, for example, are biased downward. The downward bias in
wildland recreation benefits is reflected in forest plans, annual reports,
and Timber Sale Program Information Reporting System (TSPIRS) re-
ports,"' and results in the recreation and wilderness programs being
shortchanged in the budgeting process. Much of the expanded interest in
nonmarket valuation came as a result of growing pressure from both in-
side and outside government for improving the criteria used to base pub-
lic expenditure decisions."3
Reasons that consumer surplus has poor credibility with public deci-
sion makers include (1) analysts sometimes measure and apply consumer
surplus incorrectly; (2) consumer surplus is money not spent or captured
as revenues and therefore not taxable; and (3) giving credence to con-
sumer surplus tends to justify government expenditures that do not pro-
duce direct revenue."" While consumer surplus is a valid and fundamen-
208. Cf Loomis, supra note 26, at 229.
209. Loomis & Walsh, supra note 13, at 81.
210. See Langner, supra note 181, at 240.
211. See ACCOMMODATING USES, supra note 145, at 38.
212. TSPIRS is the Forest Service's annual effort to provide an accurate accounting of the
benefits and costs of national forest management.
213. See Walsh et al., supra note 51, at 1-5.
214. Cf. Peterson, supra note 15, at 87. At a recent meeting attended by the author, a Forest
Service economist noted that "you can't buy a beer with consumer surplus." That sentiment suc-
cinctly sums up the criticism of nonmarket benefits. Even this criticism is misplaced, however, since
by definition consumer surplus is money you would have paid but did not have to pay. See E-mail
from John Loomis, Professor of Economics, Colo. St. Univ., to Pete Morton, The Wilderness Soci-
ety (Oct. 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Loomis Communication]. As such, consumer
surplus can be viewed as income retained in your wallet and available to buy beer.
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tal concept of the economic profession," ' the fact that Forest Service
policy decisions excluded consumer surplus and nonimarket benefits in
national forest planning is indicative of the historical timber bias in the
agency. The recent acknowledgment of the large magnitude of existence
benefits from roadless areas in the Interior Columbia Basin"'1 is signifi-
cant and encouraging, and will hopefully influence policy decisions in
the upcoming round of forest plan revisions.
Incorporating consumer surplus and wildland benefits into forest
planning may help correct the timber biases present in the FORPLAN
models used during the first round of forest planning. However, the ac-
tual shift in resource allocation will depend on the sensitivity of the
FORPLAN model to an increase in wildland benefits. Past FORPLAN
models have been unresponsive to wildland benefits because (1) wild-
land benefits, if considered at all, were included as constraints in the
model, not in the objective function; (2) inflated stumpage price trends
biased the "optimal" solution toward timber production; and (3) agency
and modeler bias prevented FORPLAN from responding to increasing
wildland benefits as the timber target dominated the allocation of re-
sources.
Perhaps the most significant problem with FORPLAN (not yet dis-
cussed) is the model's lack of spatial resolution. In most cases, it is simply
not possible to implement the FORPLAN-generated management plan out
in the forest. This is a significant shortcoming as the juxtaposition of
wildlife forage, hiding cover, thermal cover, and birthing areas are critical
to the viability and productivity of wildlife populations. Sustaining biodi-
versity, the ecological services, and passive-use benefits of a public wild-
land network requires a spatially explicit model and management plan.
A. Why a Network of Public Wildlands?
1. Biodiversity Conservation
In 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency cited the accelerating
loss of biodiversity through habitat loss and forest fragmentation as one
of the principal threats to human welfare. Biodiversity is our "green in-
frastructure," our living natural capital, necessary to sustain our life-
support systems, but undervalued by private markets. The main reasons
why the value of biological diversity may not be adequately represented
in formal markets are inadequate information and incomplete markets.
217
If markets are incomplete, prices and market demands are misleading or
unrevealing about economic values. Market value (i.e., price) depends on
accurate information and knowledge, which is currently very limited for
215. See generally JUST ET AL., supra note 22, at 68-84; SAMUELSON, supra note 22, at 456-
57.
216. See Haynes & Home, supra note 68.
217. See Randall, supra note 96, at 20-23.
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biological resources. Without adequate information, it is difficult to
quantify the benefits of biodiversity, let alone the long term costs to fu-
ture generations from the irreversible loss of that diversity.
The irreversible impact of species extinction, scientific concern over
the loss of biodiversity, poor biological inventories, and inadequate in-
formation on the economic benefits of conserving wildland resources
form a strong argument for a network of wildlands on the public estate.
An expanded wildland reserve system is necessary if managers are to
conserve biodiversity. Davis found that 157 of the United States' 261
ecosystem types recognized by Bailey were included in the national wil-
derness system.' A wildland network with full representation of ecosys-
tem types will serve as a "coarse filter" for conserving biodiversity, as well
as a continuous source of information on the structure, function, and com-
position of natural communities."'
Wildlands serve a vital short term role in the conservation of imper-
iled elements of biodiversity. The loss of habitat is the primary cause of
species endangerment in the United States (e.g., northern spotted owl and
the red-cockaded woodpecker). The protection of habitat in wildland
reserves is a prudent defense against the further loss of biodiversity.
Wildland reserves are not simply part of a short term strategy, they will
continue to be essential long after a functional landscape has been re-
stored. A wildland network will always be needed for the conservation of
"wilderness species," such as grizzlies, wolves, and caribou, that do not
tolerate contact with humans. Perpetual wildland reserves are also the
most practical means of conserving rare, slow changing elements of the
landscape, such as late successional forests.'
Developing networks of representative habitat has been recom-
mended as an efficient means of conserving biodiversity 2' Focusing
conservation efforts at the community or landscape level is more cost
effective than focusing on individual species. Once a species is endan-
gered, conservation efforts become prohibitively expensive. Establishing
reserves is proactive and provides economies of scale by sustaining
habitat for a suite of species. On-site conservation efforts in wildlands
are also more efficient than seed banks or botanical gardens.m On-site
218. See G.D. Davis, Ecosystem Representation As a Criterion for World Wilderness Designa-
tion, WILD WINGS FOuND. (1987); Robert G. Bailey, Description of the Ecoregions of the United
States, in FoREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRic., Misc. PuB. 1391 (1980).
219. Given the underrepresentation of ecosystem types, expanding the wildland network to
include additional habitats and communities will have high economic value at the margin.
220. See Aplet, supra note 88.
221. See generally Reed F. Noss, Indicators for Monitoring Biodiversity: A Hierarchical Ap-
proach, 4 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 355 (1990),
222. Cf Bruce Alyward, Appropriating the Value of Wildlife and Wildiands, in ECONOMICS FOR
Tm WmDs: Wi.DLwE, DmvERn' AD DEVELOPMENT 34,56-61 (Timothy M. Swanson & Edward B.
Barbier eds., 1992).
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conservation allows evolutionary forces to continue, maintaining the
dynamic nature of an ecosystem's biological resources. Seed banks, al-
though needed and useful, represent only a one time snapshot of biologi-
cal resources. The benefits to society from protecting wildland habitat
include not only savings in storage costs and future benefits from the use
of biodiversity, but also the avoidance of restoration costs. Restoration is
typically more expensive than conservation, and that assumes that resto-
ration is even possible.
The National Forest Management Act of 1976"3 requires the Forest
Service to "provide for a diversity of plant and animal communities."
Federal lands have the potential to conserve biological resources by pro-
viding wildland habitat for species that cannot survive in the market-
driven, fragmented landscape on private lands. Conserving wildland
habitat on public land could also benefit private landowners. If habitat
protection on public wildlands keeps species from becoming threatened
or endangered, pressures on private landowners to provide habitat will
decrease, possibly obviating the need for land use restrictions on private
land. Given increasing concerns over private property rights, this benefit
may be significant. If public lands fail to provide ample habitat for cer-
tain neotropical songbirds or salamanders, for example, private landown-
ers whose land contains critical habitat may face restrictions on future
land use.'
2. Wild Recreation
When Congress passed the Wilderness Act, wilderness visitation
was so low that little attention was given to recreation demands. If, how-
ever, projections for natural resource based outdoor recreation are in-
dicative of the future, national forests must be managed with more em-
phasis on dispersed recreation." Primitive camping and backpacking,
hiking and horseback riding, nature study, and wildlife observation are
all projected to have large shortages. Many of these recreation activities
are jointly produced by wilderness areas. 7
223. Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 477 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
224. NFMA § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
225. See generally Morton et al., supra note 93.
226. See H. Ken Cordell et al., An Analysis of the Outdoor Recreation and Wilderness Situation
in the United States: 1989-2040, in FOREST SERv., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., TECHNICAL DOCUMENT
SUPPORTING THE 1990 RPA ASSESSMENT 99 (1990).
227. Forest Service recreation visitation data have been criticized as being unreliable and lack-
ing the spatial resolution required to monitor and disperse recreation use. See Robert C. Lucas &
Stephen F. McCool, Trends in Wilderness Recreation Use: Causes and Implications, 14 WESTERN
WILDLANDS 15, 15-21 (1988). The Forest Service maintains recreation visitation information in the
Recreation Information Management System (RIM). Morton examined RIM data and found wild
fluctuations in annual visitation reported for several wilderness areas in the southern Appalachian.
See Morton, Review of Stumpage Prices, supra note 163. For example, wilderness use on the Cheoah
Ranger District ranged from 45,000 RVDs in 1987, to zero RVDs in 1988, to 49,000 RVDs in 1989,
and back to zero in 1990 and 1991. The drop in wilderness visitation was a result of poor data col-
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As total recreational use increases, the kind of recreation in demand
is evolving. The unprecedented rise in the demand for adventure based
recreations is an example. The increasing demand for wild recreation is
readily apparent with the increased popularity of rock climbing, rafting,
kayaking, backcountry hiking, skiing, and camping. Wild recreation is a
distinct type of outdoor recreation experience consistent with the theory
of recreation specialization. Recreation specialization is characterized by
the evolution of recreational preferences toward more natural settings
that hold greater challenges for enhanced skills and experience.' Using
fishing as an example, the beginning angler may simply want to catch as
many fish as possible by whatever means necessary; a seasoned veteran
may release all catches, fly fish only, and prefer wild fish to stocked va-
rieties. Each qualifies as an angler, but each seeks a different experience.
The beginner desires quantity while the veteran wants a quality experi-
ence. The general thought is that people begin recreating as generalists
and evolve along the continuum towards a specialist.'
The attraction of wilderness for adventure recreation is based on the
combination of the remoteness of the setting, the demands on one's
abilities to be self-sufficient, and the skills necessary to succeed in the
activity."' The implications for public land managers, regarding the fishing
example, are that developed stream sites and reservoirs stocked with hatch-
ery-raised fish can help meet the demand for a quantity fishing experience,
while wilderness and other undeveloped areas available on public land pro-
vide an opportunity for the specialized anglers, who seek a wild experience,
a chance to fish a wild remote stream in search of native fish. Across the
nation, public wildlands provide the majority of wild fishing opportunities.
Whether anglers, hunters, campers, or hikers demand a more primi-
tive, adventure oriented recreational experience, public wildlands may be
the only place that can fill this niche. The majority of remaining wildland
exists in the public estate, and private wildlands are increasingly re-
stricting access. The potential of private land to supply the full range of
lection not lack of demand. The accuracy of RIM data is very questionable. In order to accurately
value the recreation benefits jointly produced by wilderness better visitation data are needed. See
Loomis, Joint Benefits, supra note 175, at 23. The need for better visitation data also applies to the
BLM. Cf. Loomis Communication, supra note 214. Research increasingly suggests that recreation is
not a benign activity. See WILDLIFE AND RECREATIONISTS: CoXIsTENcE THROUGH MANAGEMENT
AND RE EARCH 340-344 (Richard L. Knight & Kevin J. Gutzwiller eds., 1995). As such, improving
the temporal accuracy and spatial resolution of recreation data collection and monitoring is a prereq-
uisite for adaptively managing a sustainable recreation program. See Morton, Sustaining Recreation,
supra note 176, at 71. Recreation data collection and monitoring programs also create additional
employment opportunities for local residents.
228. See Alan Ewert & Steve Hollenhorst, Testing the Adventure Model: Empirical Support for
a Model of Risk Recreation Participation, 21 1. LEISURE RES. 124, 125 (1989).
229. Cf Manning, supra note 48, at 121.
230. See HOBSON BRYAN, CoNFLIcr IN THE GREAT OUTDOORS: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING
AND MANAGING FOR DIvERsE SPORTSMEN PREFERENcES 59-86 (1979).
231. Alan Ewert, Risk Creation Poses New Management Problems, 8 PARK SCI. 1, 7 (1987).
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recreation opportunities is limited by liability concerns, access, the desire
for privacy, and development. "2 National trends indicate greater restric-
tions on recreation access to private lands; increased restrictions on pri-
vate land translate into greater recreational pressures on public land.
Public lands provide the wildland setting undersupplied by private mar-
kets, but treasured by wild recreationists of all ages.
3. Market Failure
The growing scarcity of wildland resources has increased the pub-
lic's desire to protect what remains, while the relative abundance of
wood products has left the public indifferent to concerns about timber
supply. This indifference is partially a result of an abundant wood supply
and global market influences that have kept the real price of wood low or
decreasing. The abundant supply is a result of investors responding to
timber markets and profit incentives. Substantial financial investments
have been made in the southeast United States, New Zealand, and Brazil,
for example, partially in response to concerns over a "timber famine" and
projected increases in lumber prices.
Market responses to rising prices include (1) investment in timber
management by private landowners--who own sixty-one percent of the
forest land in the United States; (2) the use of substitutes by produc-
ers-e.g., kenaf, hemp, or stuffing pulp fibers with calcium carbonate
which reduces by twenty percent the number of trees required; (3) pref-
erence shifts by consumers toward recycled products; and (4) techno-
logical advances that improve the efficiency of the wood products indus-
try. In the past, price projections have not been realized because the projec-
tions underestimated eventual production."3 Technological investments in
response to price signals stretched the timber supply and moderated price
increases. However, nontimber resources are without the market prices
necessary to reflect increasing scarcity. Without price information to
reflect scarcity, market adjustments similar to those for timber will not
occur for wildland resources. This is an example of what economists call
market failure.'
A market failure occurs when incentives created in the market sys-
tem fail to adequately reflect the present and future economic interests of
consumers or society as a whole.'5 In the presence of a market failure,
price breaks down as an efficient measure of social values, financial
232. See generally B. Wright et al., Industrial and Nonindustrial Resources (1988) (paper
prepared for the Benchmark 1988: A National Outdoor Recreation and Wilderness Forum).
233. See generally William F. Hyde & David H. Newman, Forest Economics and Policy
Analysis: An Overview (1991) (World Bank Discussion Paper) (on file with author).
234. Market failures occur when (1) competition is not perfectly competitive; (2) information is
imperfect; (3) public goods are involved; or (4) when external costs or benefits (unintended conse-
quences) are not considered in market transactions.
235. Cf Alan Randall, The Problem of Market Failure, 23 NAT. RESouRcEs. J. 131, 131-48
(1983).
1999)
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
profits do not reflect net social benefits, and markets do not allocate re-
sources in an economically efficient manner." In forestry, the benefits of
management are perceived to be large while the benefits of protection are
typically underestimated. As a result of the incorrect signals from the
market, an incorrect decision is made, i.e., not to provide adequate pro-
tection of nonmarket forest resources. 7 As Cubbage notes:
When one analyzes markets in forestry, virtually every neoclas-
sical economic assumption that underlies the superiority of a pure
market system is violated to some degree. All the ,identifiable prob-
lems with market distribution of goods and services occur in natural
resources. Wildlife and pollution have common-pool characteristics,
timber markets are dominated by a few buyers, producers lack com-
plete information, and current and future externalities abound. '
"Markets diverge in so many ways from the conditions necessary to
achieve maximum social benefit that we cannot rely solely on markets to
determine the allocation of [forest] resources.'' 9 When a market failure
occurs, some economic correction device is required. One such device is
government intervention--government provision of the goods and serv-
ices underproduced in the market but desired by society. Western indus-
trial nations have turned increasingly to governments to correct or offset
weaknesses in their market economies. '
One of the reasons why market adjustments are less likely to occur
for nontimber forest resources is because technological advances are not
symmetrical: technology is biased toward commodity extraction and
marketable goods and services.24' While technology can be expected to
increase the supply of timber, technology is unlikely to increase the sup-
ply of wilderness. Wildlands are natural environments, gifts of nature,
not producible by man. 2 While restoration activities (if properly funded)
can potentially increase the supply of wildlands, a prudent policy deci-
sion is to view a reduction in wildlands as virtually irreversible.
236. See Daniel W. McCollum et al, A Manager's Guide to the Valuation of NonMarket Re-
sources: What Do You Really Want to Know?, in VALUING WILDLIFE RESOURCES IN ALASKA 25, 27
(George L. Peterson et al. eds., 1992).
237. See JOHN A. DIXON & PAUL B. SHERMAN, ECONOMICS OF PROTECTED AREAS: A NEW
LOOK AT BENEFITS AND COSTS 193-200 (1990).
238. FREDERICK W. CUBBAGE ET AL., FOREST RESOURCE PoLiCY 71 (1993).
239. PEARSE, supra note 14, at 38.
240. Cf. id. Three key factors led society to advocate retention over the public estate: (1) con-
cern of the abuses and fraud associated with land disposal programs (i.e., government failure); (2)
desire to preserve unique scenic and geologic wonders (nonmarket justifications); and (3) perhaps
most importantly, public outrage at the shortsighted destructive influence of human activity on the
land (responding to market forces) and the potential for resource shortages (i.e., timber famine). Cf
LOOMIS, supra note 10, at 24-25.
241. See KRUTILLA & FISHER, supra note 130, at 85-86.
242. See id
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Technological changes in the timber industry have stretched the
supply and kept stumpage prices consistently lower than projected by the
Forest Service. The asymmetric impact of technology is likely to in-
crease wildland benefits relative to commodity values. In fact, many
economists believe that nonmarket forest resources, not timber, will be
the scarce resources of the future. 3 Increasing scarcity of wildland re-
sources should induce an increase in economic value." Although the
Forest Service planners typically do not forecast trends for wildland
benefits, projecting trends may actually be more justified for wilderness
resources than for timber resources.
B. Public Wildland Network As a Safe Minimum Standard
The lack of information on wildland benefits combined with the ap-
parent distrust on the part of Forest Service officials of nonmarket esti-
mates in general and consumer surplus in particular, suggests a need to
explore an alternative approach for evaluating the economics of a net-
work of public wildlands. One alternative suggested in the writings of the
late S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrups' and advocated by a number of scholars' is
the safe minimum standards (SMS) management philosophy. For biodi-
versity conservation, a SMS approach can be defined as preserving a
sufficient area of habitat to ensure the survival of species, subspecies or
ecosystems."
The SMS approach places greater emphasis on potential damage
and risks to wildlands, and avoids some of the pitfalls of formal benefit-
cost analysis including the treatment of gross uncertainty as mere risk,
the false appearance of precision when estimating benefits, and the
problem of discounting. 8 The SMS approach assumes wildlands produce
positive benefits and makes no attempt to quantify them in an economic
analysis. The benefits are discussed qualitatively, but the empirical eco-
nomic question examines the opportunity cost of reserves. The economic
243. Cf., e.g., V. KERRY SMITH, TECHNICAL CHANGE, RELATIVE PRICES, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE EVALUATION (1974); Krutilla, supra note 39, at 777-86.
244. Research by Loomis and Walsh indicates that passive-use benefits will likely increase in
the future. See Loomis & Walsh, supra note 39, at 181. Passive-use forest benefits are positively
related to income, education, and whether the household is retired or not. Socio-economic trends
indicate income, education, and retirees have increased in counties adjacent to public lands and are
expected to continue to increase in the future. See Morton, Charting a New Course, supra note 63, at
65.
245. S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, RESOURCE CONSERVATION: ECONOMICS AND POLICIES 251-67
(1952).
246. Cf., e.g., Richard C. Bishop, Endangered Species and Uncertainty: The Economics of a
Safe Minimum Standard, 60 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 10, 10-18 (1978); Randall, supra note 96, at 30-
33; Michael A. Toman, Defining Economics of Sustainable Forestry: General Concepts, in
DEFINING SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY 261, 274-77 (Gregory H. Aplet et al. eds., 1993); Toman &
Ashton, supra note 38, at 376.
247. See Bishop, supra note 246, at 10-11, 16-18.
248. Alan Randall, Human Preferences, Economics and the Preservation of Species, in THE
PRESERVATION OF SPECIES: THE VALUE OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSrrY 98 (1986).
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rationale is based on the proposition that the costs of maintaining SMS
are small in relation to the possible losses from irreversible declines in
wildland diversity.' Wildland conservation should be afforded unless
the opportunity cost of reserves becomes intolerably high.
In order to conserve ecosystem integrity, SMS constrain where and
how logging takes place.' In essence, SMS shift the burden of proof
from those who believe that a wildland network is needed to those who
believe that conservation efforts are not necessary. SMS shift the debate
from deciding whether or not a wildland network is needed to deciding
how big the network should be." SMS do not diminish the need for eco-
nomic information, they just sets lower limits below which the economic
analysis is suspended. The suspension of economic analysis remains un-
less the opportunity costs are intolerably high. Such a suspension is con-
sistent with the "precautionary principle" advocated by many scientists, 2
and is an appropriate risk averse stance to take until better information on
the ecological and economic benefits of wildland conservation becomes
available.
A SMS approach would certainly be an improvement over the cur-
rent interpretation of the suitability analysis required by NFMA and
completed by planners during the first round of forest planning. The
three-stage screening process adopted by the Forest Service estimates
land suitable for timber production, not land required to ensure the
sustainability of wildland reserves.' Under the current interpretation, the
de facto wildland network is the residual-lands leftover after the suit-
able timber base has been established. The final determination of the
suitable timber base is made in NFMA stage three using the FORPLAN
model for timber harvest scheduling. A reserve system based on residual
lands left after timber suitability is established is an inefficient procedure
for conserving wildland resources on public land. The suitability process
should be reversed; select suitable wildlands first and let timber be the
residual--the land leftover after conserving a network of wildlands.
The lack of spatial resolution and the difficulties encountered when
estimating linear coefficients for non-linear ecological relationships,
when combined with all the other problems previously noted with the
249. See Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note 245, at 262.
250. See Toman & Ashton, supra note 38, at 371.
251. See Morton, Charting a New Course, supra note 63.
252. See, e.g., Norman Myers, Biodiversity and the Precautionary Principle, 22 AMBIO 74, 74
(1993) (noting a "super-premium" on applying the principle).
253. Pursuant to the NFMA, the Forest Service adopted a three-stage screening process to
determine the suitable timber base (land available for logging) on each national forest. The first
screen withdraws land that is physically unsuitable for timber production. The second screen ana-
lyzes the financial returns from timber production but does not withdraw any land. The third screen
uses FORPLAN to identify land needed to accomplish the agency's timber production goals and
other objectives (i.e., the suitable timber base).
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FORPLAN model provide justification for establishing a wildland net-
work before running FORPLAN. This could be accomplished by adding a
wildland suitability screen to the planning process. Rather than modeling
wildland benefits as constraints in FORPLAN, identifying a wildland net-
work and conserving the benefits would become the goal of the suitability
analysis. Incorporating safe minimum standards for wildland conservation
in the FORPLAN model can be illustrated graphically in Figure 8. In this
figure the line segment SS reduces the decision space by setting a mini-
mum number of acres allocated to a wildland network. FORPLAN could
then be used to schedule activities for the land outside the reserves and to
estimate the opportunity costs of alternative wildland reserve designs.
Visually mapping and presenting the opportunity costs of alternative
wildland networks could provide useful information for public meetings.
Safe minimum standards represent an alternative economic analysis of
wildland benefits than traditionally completed--one that will reveal the




ACRES ALLOCATED TO TIMBER
FIGURE 8
Morton et al. examined the opportunity costs of a wildland network
on the southern Appalachian national forests and concluded that the op-
portunity costs would be relatively Small. ' The southern Appalachian
national forests are at a comparative disadvantage in terms of the costs of
getting logs to the market," ' and timber production has a negative finan-
254. See Morton et al., supra note 93, at 352.
255. The southern Appalachian national forests are steeper, less accessible, and have logging
costs that are $150--$200 more per acre than private lands in the region. See Southern Appalachian
Man and the Biosphere, supra note 165. These findings are significant as they reject the argument
put forth by many that Forest Service timber sale administrative and environmental compliance costs
are entirely to blame for the national forest timber sold below costs. Although significant, these
findings are not new. See generally WILLIAM A. DUERR, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF FORESTRY
IN THE APPALACHIAN REGION (1949) (providing a detailed study of the forestry problems of the
Appalachian region).
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cial return on a majority of public land.' Timber harvested from the
southern Appalachian national forests accounts for less than one percent
of the total cut in the five state region. Jobs directly and indirectly attrib-
utable to national forest timber programs represent less than two percent
of timber industry employment and less than one-tenth of one percent of
the total employment in the eighty-eight counties surrounding the south-
ern Appalachian national forests.7 In contrast, the opportunity costs as-
sociated with continued widespread logging on the national forests may
be quite high. As such, maintaining society's options for the future by
establishing a network of wildland reserves may be an economically effi-
cient alternative to the current management policies on these national
forests. The same result may be true for wildland reserves on other na-
tional forests.
CONCLUSION
"Without the services performed by the diverse, intact communities
of plants, animals and microorganisms in [wildlands], we would be
starving, baking, gasping for breath and drowning in our wastes."' So
do we really need economists to tell us how much our wildland life sup-
port system is worth? Is not that value infinitely obvious? In the past,
many public investments were made without completing an economic
analysis. Public assets that we take for granted, wilderness areas, national
parks, wildlife refugees, Central Park, etc., would not be here today if we
relied solely on markets and advice from market economists. Economics
provides necessary information useful for policy discussions, but econom-
ics alone is not sufficient to promulgate policies. Economic efficiency is
only one consideration when allocating multiple public resources; fairness
of the process and equity considerations play more important roles.' This
is consistent with the MUSYA and NFMA definition of multiple-use that
256. The lost timber revenues can be estimated from Forest Service planning documents. On
the 625,000 acre Cherokee National Forest, only 35,553 acres (5.7%) are estimated to generate
positive returns from timber production; of the 1,025,000 acres on the Nantahala and Pisgah Na-
tional Forests, planners estimate that 281,500 acres (27.4%) would produce positive returns from
timber production. See DRAFr SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR THE NANTAHALA AND PISGAH NATIONAL FORESTS, supra note 187. Farther north, planners
estimated that 272,465 acres (26%) of the 1,055,525 acres on the George Washington National
Forest have positive returns from timber production. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.,
INCORPORATION OF NFMA REQUIREMENTS (1993) (process paper for the revision of the George
Washington National Forest). The financial returns from timber production on these national forests
were estimated with the most efficient harvesting methods (typically clearcutting) and without road
building costs. If other harvesting methods were used and/or road costs included, the proportion of
each forest generating a positive financial return from timber production would be even lower.
257. See Morton, Charting a New Course, supra note 63, at 65.
258. ELLIOTT A. NORSE ET AL., THE WILDERNESS SOC'Y, CONSERVING BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSrfY IN OUR NATIONAL FORESTS 9 (1986).
259. See BOwES & KRUTLLA, supra note 171, at 3-5.
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states the optimum policy is "not necessarily the combination of uses that
will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output."26°
Although wildlands are highly valued by society, without formal
markets the benefits of wildland conservation are difficult to quantify in
economic terms. As a result, nonmarket wildland benefits are typically
underestimated in private land management decisions. This is a serious
shortcoming as certain functions of nature, although they have no market
value and their benefits are only partially understood, are necessary to
keep the market economy running. Public lands can help correct these
market failures by sustaining wildlands that cannot survive the market
forces driving private land use decisions.
The Forest Service was once a leader in wildland conservation, but
over the last thirty-five years the policies and procedures adopted by the
agency have failed to adequately internalize wildland benefits into the na-
tional forest planning process. Over the same time period, academic and
agency economists have made great advances in developing methods to
value wildland goods and services. Many heretofore unquantifiable
wildland benefits and costs are now quantifiable and available to agency
officials responsible for developing the procedures and policies for
guiding public land management. The recent acknowledgement by Forest
Service researchers on the economic importance of protecting wildlands in
the Pacific Northwest is encouraging and may be a sign of positive change
on the horizon. As a global leader in natural resource management, the
Forest Service should take a leading research role in valuing wildland
resources and developing a natural resource accounting system that fully
accounts for the nonmarket benefits and costs that accrue to society from
public land management activities. Increasing public investments in
wildland economic research could produce global benefits if the methods
and results become integrated into forest management in other countries.
In the meantime, applying safe minimum standards provide a
complementary approach to current forest planning procedures; an
approach that avoids the difficult task of fully accounting for nonmarket,
wildland benefits." Management planning based on safe minimum
standards is more conservative than current management but a conservative
approach is an appropriate management philosophy for a public trustee and
steward of our nation's natural capital. Some scientists, however, believe
SMS analysis is unlikely to be useful because estimating minimum habitat
260. 16 U.S.C: § 531(a) (1994); see 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e) (1994) (requiring the NFMA's defini-
tion of "multiple use" and "sustained yield" to comply with the MUSYA definitions); cf Paul J.
Culhane & H. Paul Friesema, Land Use Planning for the Public Lands, 19 NAT. RESOURcES J. 43,
43-74(1979).
261. Adopting a SMS approach should not, however, prevent the Forest Service from actively
funding the nonmarket valuation research necessary to fully account for the economic benefits and
costs of national forest management.
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needs of viable populations is an intractable problem. 2 While agreeing
with the skeptics that the problem is large and uncertainty exists, SMS
provide a complimentary approach, that if adopted, could help the agency
improve wildland conservation on the national forests during the upcoming
round of forest plan revisions. Although not perfect and not sufficient,
adopting a SMS approach is a step in the right direction for conserving
wilderness benefits simply by reframing the questions asked and the
analysis completed by public land management agencies.
262. Paul R. Ehrlich & Gretchen C. Daily, Population Extinction and Saving Biodiversity, .22
AMBIO 64, 67 (1993).
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ENVIRONMENTAL ENTREPRENEURS: KEYS TO ACHIEVING
WILDERNESS CONSERVATION GOALS?
JOHN A. BADEN, PH.D.*
PETE GEDDES**
INTRODUCTION
Historically, Americans have relied on the federal government for
wilderness protection; but, the federal government has made promises
too politically expensive to keep. While federal designation may provide
protection from some forms of development (e.g., dams on western riv-
ers), there is no immunity from threats. A 1998 report by The Wilderness
Society listed the nation's fifteen most endangered wilderness areas.' Oil
drilling, motorized vehicles, road building, and military expansion are
increasingly threatening the country's wilderness heritage. In many cases
agencies charged with wilderness stewardship are the worst offenders.2
Under the current system of public ownership and political man-
agement, taxpayers all too often find themselves subsidizing economi-
cally irrational, environmentally destructive activities! The fact that the
federal agencies charged with protecting wilderness resources are actu-
ally the culprits may surprise some people; however, these are the pre-
dictable consequences of bureaucratic management.'
Wilderness lovers are indebted to Arthur Carhart, Aldo Leopold,
and Robert Marshall, founders of the modem American wilderness
movement through their advocacy of wilderness in the 1920s. The 103.6
million acres currently in the National Wilderness Preservation System
(NWPS) is testimony to their visions! The first victories came relatively
easily with administrative designations of wilderness by the U.S. Forest
* Ph.D.; Chairman, Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment and
Gallatin Writers, Inc.
** M.S.; Program Director, Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment and
Gallatin Writers, Inc. Address correspondence to pgeddes@free-eco.org. We thank Yvonne Baskin,
Barb Cestero, and Jim Elias for their constructive criticisms of this manuscript.
1. The Wilderness Society, Report: 15 Most Endangered Wild Lands (visited Oct. 29, 1998)
<http://www.tws.org/standbylands/15most>.
2. For a discussion of pressure facing agency personnel, see TODD WILKINSON, SCIENCE
UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICIANS' WAR ON NATURE AND TRUTH (1998).
3. See RANDAL O'TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE at xii (1988); William F. Hyde,
Compounding Clear-Cuts: The Social Failures of Public Timber Management in the Rockies, in
BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT 186, 199 (John Baden & Richard L. Stroup eds., 1981).
4. For a discussion of the underlying logic, see John Baden & Richard L. Stroup, Introduc-
tion to BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 1, 5.
5. See SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 132-33 (2d ed. 1980).
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Service." These designations were easy because they involved mostly
high elevation "rock and ice" areas. The economic value forgone, what
economists call opportunity costs for withdrawing such ecosystems ap-
proached zero.7 Today, however, it seems unlikely that significant
amounts of our remaining, more ecologically valuable, public land will
be protected by additional federal wilderness designation. How then, can
we realistically achieve conservation goals?
Commodity production long dominated federal land management.
This was often at the expense of ecological integrity, economic effi-
ciency, and social sustainability' This is changing, however. National
forests, parks, and wilderness are increasingly valued for their ecological
and amenity services (e.g., clean water, aesthetics, and wildlife habitat).
The protection of biological diversity (biodiversity) is now a national
priority and a central focus of federal land management."
Ensuring the persistence of species with large home ranges, such as
grizzly bears and wolves, requires protection of much larger areas of
habitat than previously imagined."0 In North America, conservation ef-
forts are now directed at preserving biologically valuable lands outside
our wilderness areas and parks, especially those that provide habitat cor-
ridors between protected areas. For example, the Yellowstone to Yukon
initiative (Y2Y) aims to protect habitat between core reserves (i.e., na-
tional and state parks and wilderness areas) from the Canadian Yukon to
the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem." In the western United States many
of the most ecologically valuable lands are in private ownership. This
creates new challenges for conservationists, who traditionally relied on
the federal government for public land protection.
Environmentalists are finding that conventional approaches to envi-
ronmental protection (e.g., establishing federally designated protected ar-
eas and carefully limiting human use) are not sufficient to accomplish
projects on the scale of Y2Y. These large projects require the cooperation
of private landowners who have made huge emotional and economic in-
vestments in their land. Naturally, they will try to protect these investments.
6. For example, the Forest Service L-Regulations of 1929 established criteria and procedures
for designating primitive areas, many of which later became wilderness areas. These regulations
were later supplanted by the more forceful U-Regulations. See id. at 132-33, 157-58.
7. See DYAN ZASLOWSKY & THE WILDERNESs SOCIETY, THESE AMERICAN LANDS: PARKS,
WILDERNESS, AND THE PUBLIC LANDS 224-25 (1986).
8. See UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE & UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATED SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE
INTERIOR COLUMBIA BASIN AND PORTIONS OF THE KLAMATH AND GREAT BASINS, PNW-GTR-382
(1996).
9. See Robert B. Keiter, Ecosystems and the Law: Toward an Integrated Approach, 8
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 332, 332 (1998).
10. See William D. Newmark, A Land-Bridge Island Perspective on Mammalian Extinctions
in Western North American Parks, 325 NATURE 430,432 (1987).
11. See The Y2Y Mission (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http:l/www.rockies.caly2y/nmission.htm>.
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Including these lands in conservation plans means overcoming the
opportunities lost by precluding development. To reduce these costs and
enlist cooperation, government policies and Non-Governmental Organi-
zations' (NGO) initiatives must be sensitive to the economic concerns
and expectations of affected individuals and communities.
The challenge of enlisting the support of private landowners has
created a niche for a new breed of environmental activists--environ-
mental entrepreneurs. 2 Environmental entrepreneurs specialize in identi-
fying conservation opportunities, mobilizing resources, and building a
constituency for conservation. This role is a vital, but often ignored,
piece of the conservation puzzle. A key to their success is the recognition
that solutions will be more acceptable and successful if locals are both
the beneficiaries of and participants in conservation efforts.
As Alexis de Tocqueville explained early in our history, Americans
excel at building voluntary institutions that foster cooperative pursuit of
shared interests. 3 In the spirit of de Tocqueville, we explore some mod-
est alternatives to achieving conservation goals that do not depend on
federal designation of additional wilderness. We explain how environ-
mental entrepreneurs can help bring ecologically valuable private lands
between wilderness areas and parks into conservation plans and thus,
may provide the best opportunities to protect biodiversity while reducing
conflict over natural resource management.
I. CONSERVATION AFTER A CENTURY OF RESOURCE EXTRACTION
The American West long enjoyed a cultural, economic, and political
coherence. The glue, however, was often the subsidized exploitation of
natural resources. Some of these subsidies were explicit and involved the
transfer of resources (e.g., railroad land grants) while others were im-
plicit, tolerating or ignoring large externalities (e.g., mining and smelter
wastes). A comfortable alliance among state and federal agencies,
elected politicians, and resource users reinforced this tradition. The mu-
tual interests of this alliance have come at the expense of local commu-
nities, national taxpayers, and sustainable ecosystems."
This destructive tradition has its roots in geography as well as his-
tory. West of the 100th meridian, a mix of climate and topography pre-
cluded repetition of the successful homesteading experience in the Mid-
12. The Chronicle of Community tracks many of these innovative conservation efforts. See
Northern Lights Research & Education Institute, Chronicle of Community (visited Oct. 29, 1998)
<http://www.Bateslnfo.comchronicle.htnl>.
13. See ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA 51-52 (George Lawrence trans., J.P.
Mayer ed., 1960) (1835).
14. See John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan, The Federal Treasury As a Common-Pool
Resource: The Predatory Bureaucracy As a Management Tool, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 204,
209 (John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 2d ed. 1998).
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west." The result has been ongoing federal ownership and control of half
the western lands. Thus, the West became the staging ground for experi-
ments in Progressive Era conservation via "scientific management."
Progressive Era reformers created agencies (e.g., the Forest Service)
to curb the waste of natural resources characteristic of nineteenth century
private land development. Political economists have explained why
agencies like the Forest Service go astray."' Over time, these agencies
predictably deviate from their mission. Protecting their budgets and co-
dependent commodity interests becomes the dominant strategy." Rather
than building the West of Thomas Jefferson's vision, these agencies be-
came part of an iron triangle of special interests, bureaucratic entrepre-
neurs, and elected officials. What started out as principled reform gradu-
ally mutated into unabashed dependency. This unfortunate by-product
was anticipated by few but exploited by many."
Commodity development by federal agencies unfolded as Wash-
ington, at the behest of western senators and members of the House, di-
rected a massive engineering assault to subdue the West's waters and
wildlands. The U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation
constructed 340 dams in seventeen states west of the Mississippi River,
most noticeably the huge Hoover, Glen Canyon, and Grand Coulee
Dams. 9 The U.S. Forest Service built a road network that is eight times
the size of the U.S. interstate highway system.'
These monuments to public works were expensive in many curren-
cies: cultural, ecological, and social. The region's population came to
rely upon the federal "landlord" for economic benefits. Most were bene-
fits that the market process would not have delivered, for most were eco-
nomically inefficient. The opportunities forgone exceeded the benefits
generated (e.g., livestock grazing on marginal public lands). Many bene-
fits were political payoffs. If they are weighed against the environmental
costs, as an honest accounting must do, many of the public works were
grossly irresponsible.
Even though policies that subsidize the exploitation of natural re-
sources no longer serve the interests of most westerners, they have de-
fenders. Such defenders constitute what University of Colorado Law
15. See generally JONATHAN RABAN, BAD LAND: AN AMERICAN ROMANcE (1996) (relating a
historically-based fictional account of homesteading in Montana and North Dakota).
16. See Richard Stroup & John A. Baden, Erternality, Property Rights, and the Management
of Our National Forests, 16 J.L. & ECON. 303, 305 (1973) (elucidating the management conflicts
inherent in the Forest Service).
17. See O'TOOLE, supra note 3, at 118-24.
18. See generally BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3 (discussing the unneces-
sarily high cost of bureaucratic management of natural resources).
19. See James V. DeLong, Dam Fools, REAsON, Apr. 1, 1998,40,42.
20. The U.S. Forest Service was in fact the world's largest socialized road building enterprise.
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Professor Charles Wilkinson calls the "Lords of Yesterday"2'-tenacious
political groups and institutions that refuse to die even though demo-
graphic, economic, and technological changes have eroded the original
justifications for their existence. Ironically, the western politicians sup-
porting these programs claimed to be "conservative" in favor of "free-
market capitalism." Nevertheless, they operated government as an engine
of plunder to keep the subsidies flowing.'2
This political tradition continues today with prominent western Re-
publican natural resource policy makers like Don Young of Alaska
(Chairman of the House Resources Committee) and Helen Chenoweth of
Idaho (Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Forests and Forest
Health), who "parade under the banner of free enterprise while demand-
ing subsidies for. . . environmentally harmful resource exploitation on
public lands."' Democrats are also not immune from criticism. They fail
to offer new or constructive alternatives, defaulting to the standard or-
thodoxy of "improved" regulation and better, more integrated agency
oversight.
Rethinking approaches to natural resource management challenges
politicians of all stripes. Creative ideas are too often scarce in the envi-
ronmental policy field, however. The debate degenerates into images of
Jane Fonda chaining herself to a tree or an out-of-work logger enjoying
spotted owl stew. There is an open niche for politicians of either party
who are brave and creative enough to propose reforms that support both
local communities and ecosystems. The current failure of politicians to
engage in constructive environmental policy reform has left this niche
open to environmental entrepreneurs.
II. THE TIDE TURNS: ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND THE RISE OF
BIODIVERSITY
Despite laws designed to assure that a range of values are protected
on federal lands' natural resource managers have traditionally been re-
warded for commodity production (e.g., grass, timber, and water). To-
21. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 19-21 (1992).
22. See generally WILLIAM C. MrrcHELL & RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS:
MARKETS, WEi'ARE, AND THE FAILURE OF BUREAUCRACY (1994) (describing how government
intervention was claimed to improve market imperfections but was actually used to politically con-
trol and influence economic choices).
23. John A. Baden, The GOP Can't See the Forest for the Trees, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY,
Aug. 8, 1997, at A28.
24. See, e.g., Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act § 4(a), Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215, 215
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1994)) (defining multiple use as "making the most
judicious use of the land... to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform
to changing needs and conditions"); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 102(a)(7),
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743, 2744-45 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (1994))
(requiring that public land "management be on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield unless
otherwise specified by law").
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day, there is strong pressure for change. National policy directives now
emphasize an integrated approach to management recognizing a spec-
trum of ecosystem values. Many agree that this has made the preserva-
tion of biodiversity the de facto goal of public land management in the
United States."
Regarding the national forests, environmentalism had its "coming of
age" during the clearcutting controversies of the 1960s. In 1969, Senator
Lee Metcalf of Montana asked Arnold W. Bolie, then Dean of the Uni-
versity of Montana's School of Forestry, to investigate management on
the Bitterroot National Forest in western Montana. A University View of
the Forest Service (The Bofle Report)' was a devastating indictment of
traditional forestry focused on timber production.' The Bolle Report was
in part responsible for prompting legislative and administrative reforms
of Forest Service management.'
Three pieces of legislation have been used as a framework to make
the protection of biodiversity a top priority on federal lands. First, the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) ' requires federal
agencies to consider the consequences of their actions before acting."
Procedural in nature, NEPA prevents "uninformed-rather than un-
wise-agency action."3 Thirty-eight years after its passage, it remains an
important statute. Many legal challenges to management of the national
forests, for example, are based in part on NEPA.
Second, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)' places the
protection of species above other considerations. Sometimes described
25. See Keiter, supra note 9, at 332.
26. S. Doc. No. 91-115 (1970).,
27. The Bolle Report stated:
The problem arises from public dissatisfaction with the Bitterroot National Forest's
overriding concern for sawtimber production. It is compounded by an apparent insensi-
tivity to the related forest uses and to the local public's interest in environmental values.
In a federal agency which measures success primarily by the quantity of timber pro-
duced weekly, monthly and annually, the staff of the Bitterroot National Forest finds it-
self unable to change its course, to give anything but token recognition to related values,
or to involve most of the local public in any way but as antagonists.
... mhe continued emphasis [on timber production] largely ignores the economics of
regeneration; it ignores related forest values; it ignores local social concerns; and it is
simply out of step with changes in our society since the post-war years.
Id. at 14.
28. The Forest Service released an internal report of the "Bitterroot Controversy" shortly after
the Bolle Report. Its conclusions were not dramatically different. See DAvID A. CLARY, TIMBER
AND THE FOREST SERVICE 187-88 (1986).
29. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Star. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.. §§ 4321--4370d (1994
& Supp. 11 1996)).
30. See NEPA § 2,42 U.S.C. § 4332.
31. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,333 (1989).
32. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (1994 &
Supp. II 1996)).
33. See ESA § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1531.
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as the "pit bull" of environmental statues, ' the ESA is one of the nation's
most comprehensive environmental laws. The ESA's requirement for the
designation of critical habitat for each threatened or endangered species
has broad implications for public and private land management (e.g.,
close to ten million acres of land have been suggested as critical habitat
for the grizzly bear). It has moved ecological concerns to the top of
agency agendas.
Third, the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA)3' ele-
vated wildlife and ecological values to a par with timber harvests.' In
principle, the intent of the Act was to stop the Forest Service from turn-
ing the National Forests into tree farms at the expense of other values.
For example, the implementing regulations for the NFMA specifically
require the agency to provide for minimum "viable populations of exist-
ing native and desired non-native vertebrate species."3 Though this sec-
tion has been a useful lever for forcing more ecologically sensitive man-




In the 1980s, debates over the protection strategies for the northern
spotted owl and the dramatic decline of Pacific Northwest salmon
grabbed national headlines. These controversies have become infamous
examples of the divisive potential of federal actions, now referred to as
"environmental train wrecks."'39 A new management paradigm, ecosys-
tem management, has emerged in response to these crises. In large part,
ecosystem management represents a last ditch effort by agencies like the
Forest Service to regain public trust and a sense of mission.'
Whatever the agency's motives, the key goals of an ecosystem ap-
proach must include the maintenance and enhancement of biodiversity.4
34. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 790
(3d ed. 1993).
35. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§, 1600-1614
(1994)).
36. See NFMA § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1600.
37. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1998).
38. See Interview with Charles F. Wilkinson, Professor of Law, University of Colorado,
Boulder, in Gallatin Gateway, Mont. (July 16, 1998).
39. E.g., Howard M. Crystal, The Elimination of the Category 2 Candidate Species List: A
Prescription for Environmental Train Wrecks, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at
7. See generally STEVEN LEWIS YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF THE SPOTTED OWL: POLICY LESSONS FOR
A NEW CENTuRY (1994) (discussing how the spotted owl and other indicator species forced a drastic
change in national resource policy).
40. See generally PAUL W. HIRT, A CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM: MANAGEMENT OF THE
NATIONAL FORESTS SINCE WORLD WAR Two (1994) (describing how the post-war culture of the
Forest Service sowed the seeds for an agency identity crisis that surfaced twenty years later and is
still unresolved).
41. In 1993 the Society of American Foresters defined ecosystem management as an attempt
to "maintain the complex processes, pathways, and interdependencies of forest ecosystems intact,
and functioning well, over long periods of time.... The key elements include: maintenance of
biological diversity and soil fertility; conservation of genetic variation and its dispersal; and through
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The recognition of biodiversity protection, and the importance of main-
taining ecosystem processes and thinking at larger landscape scales rep-
resents a fundamental departure from traditional resource management
paradigms. Emphasis on a sustained yield of commodities will no longer
suffice as a policy defense. '
II. WILDERNESS AND WILDLIFE HABITAT As LUXURY GOODS
The contemporary changes in agency management mandate mirror
changes in society. Americans continue to demand greater environmental
quality and are increasingly reluctant to accept the negative environ-
mental and economic externalities associated with traditional resource
extraction on public lands (e.g., livestock grazing in riparian areas). This
new emphasis is the predictable consequence of increased education and
income. Compared with earlier periods, the majority of people in the
contemporary West are relatively well-educated and wealthy. Well-
educated people not only seek environmental quality for themselves, but
normally consider environmental quality an essential goal for a responsi-
ble culture.'3 Across time and cultures, as people become wealthier, their
preference for biking, boating, camping, fly fishing, and similar pursuits
increases. The quality of these activities varies with the quality of the
natural environment. Clearcut forests, polluted waters, and scarce wild-
life greatly impoverish these experiences.
It is clear that the West's cultural and economic future is inextrica-
bly linked to its environmental quality." High environmental quality at-
tracts visitors, new permanent residents, and new businesses. Increased
appreciation for environmental quality means that resource extraction with
its attendant environmental costs no longer benefits the quality of life for
most of the region's people. Thus, public demand is expected to drive the
evolution, future biological diversity." SocIETY oF AMEIcAN FORESTERS, TASK FORCE REPORT ON
SUSTAINING LONG-TERM FOREST HEALTH AND PRODUCIVITY 13 (1993). In 1996, the Ecological
Society of America suggested, "[elcosystem management is management driven by explicit goals,
executed by policies, protocols, and practices, and made adaptable by monitoring and research based
on our best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes necessary to sustain ecosys-
tem structure and function." Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of
America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 665, 668-669 (1996) (emphasis omitted).
42. See R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management? 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
21,38 (1994).
43. See Don Coursey, The Demand for Environmental Quality (Dec. 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
44. See, e.g., RAY RASKER, A NEW HOME ON THE RANGE: ECONOMIC REALITIES IN THE
COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 31 (1995) (linking "economic well-being to a complex set of factors [re-
lated to demographics], including ... local residents who have successfully adapted to changes in
the global economy").
45. Gundars Rudzitis & Harley E. Johansen, Migration into Western Wilderness Counties:
Causes and Consequences, W. WILDL.ANDS, Spring 1989, at 19, 19.
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region towards more environmentally sensitive politics. So far, however,
traditional major party politics have not reflected this shift in public mood.
Democrats have long been aligned with the environmental move-
ment. However, Democrats in the Rocky Mountain states have been pro-
posed (jokingly) for the Endangered Species List." Newcomers appear to
be adopting (or bringing with them) political values associated with the
Old West.' For example, after President Clinton's 1993 inauguration,
there were fifty-two Democratic and thirty-seven Republican members
from eleven western states in the U.S. House of Representatives. ' By
January of 1997 the political landscape had changed considerably: there
were forty Democratic and forty-nine Republican members of the House
and the number of Republican governors had jumped from four to
seven.'9 What this means for the region's environment is unclear. How-
ever, it illustrates the limitations of relying on the political process to
produce environmental goods.
Economists understand that whatever people claim, environmental
quality is only one of several competing values they seek. They must
trade-off more of some values for less of another. Scarcity-the fact that
virtually no resources are abundant enough to satisfy all human demands
at zero cost---dictates that choices must be made among competing val-
ues or goods. Just as people on fixed budgets must choose between buy-
ing a new television or a new sofa, societies must choose among com-
peting goods (e.g., more health care, safer roads, or more environmental
protection). Open space and wildlife habitat provided by parks, ranches,
and wilderness are among the goods involved in the trade-offs. It is in-
tellectually and ethically impossible to pretend away the necessity of
such choices.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL WILDERNESS DESIGNATION
With the possible exception of the dry, depopulating western
reaches of the Great Plains, the era of designating large expanses of wil-
derness (such as the Bob Marshall-Scapegoat or the Selway Bitterroot) is
past. In the United States, it is highly unlikely that federal lands will be
politically protected on the scale envisioned by Y2Y. The primary reason
is because focused, motivated interest groups bonding together to defend
economic benefits will have significant advantages in political struggles
against more diffuse and disorganized groups united only by a general
46. Interview with Tom France, Senior Attorney, National Wildlife Federation, in Gallatin
Gateway, Mont. (July 15, 1998).
47. Center for the New West, Report Analyzes Unprecedented Republican Party Advances in
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interest in environmental quality.' Moreover, institutional inertia retards
or actually prevents laws, policies, and political institutions from chang-
ing as quickly as society's values.
Thus, protecting habitat at such large scales in the future requires
understanding a new paradigm: economic security and environmental
protection must go together. Only when environmental policies foster
economic security and productivity can we reasonably expect additional
protection. Conversely, when environmental policies thwart material
wants, conservation goals languish.
Public decision makers are seldom in a position to gain personally
from increasing efficiency (e.g., cutting costs and increasing public bene-
fits), nor do they lose from decreasing efficiency. Preserving wilderness
for future generations at the expense of present powerful interests usually
fails in the political calculus. This is especially true if a wilderness area is
home to a particularly valuable resource (e.g., oil in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge). As previously noted, the history of the American West
is closely tied to political support that continues to underwrite the pro-
duction of commodities at the expense of ecological and social values.
Efforts to conserve biodiversity present an opportunity to design in-
stitutional structures that capture the benefits of both private and public
sector organization while avoiding the high costs of public ownership
and political control. Dave Foreman, founder of Earth First!, observes
that "conservationists have relied too much on federal government law
and regulation."5 He reminds us that it "has also been easier to pass fed-
eral laws than to work out good conservation through the free market or
through voluntary agreements.""
Environmentalists may hope that additional wilderness designation
will preserve biodiversity, but such hopes should not be confused with
prudent expectations. While we may be grateful for any additional desig-
nation, given the economic, recreational, and other opportunities forgone
by this classification, it is unlikely that biologically significant areas will
be added in time to protect species at risk. For example, Montana has
been involved in a twenty-year battle over how much remaining public
land to designate as wilderness. There is little realistic hope of resolution.
In Utah, environmentalists are struggling to designate 5.7 million acres
of wilderness." Environmental politics being what they are in Utah
(President Clinton finished third in the 1996 elections), it will be a long
50. See generally MANClIR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLxCrnVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 141-44 (1995) (theorizing that groups made up of rational, self-interested
individuals will not always act to achieve their common interests).
51. Dave Foreman, Am I a Free Market Environmentalist?, 14 PERC REP., Mar. 1996, at 1, 4.
52. Id. at 4.




wait before any significant portion of that acreage is protected by federal
wilderness designation.
Environmentalists can learn lessons from the international conser-
vation arena. In many rural landscapes, such as Africa, protection of
biodiversity and the alleviation of human poverty are. intertwined. ' In
these protected areas, despite elaborate efforts, conventional approaches
to conservation (i.e., establishing protected areas and limiting human
use) are not working. Four problems have been identified, all of which
are relevant to both federal and traditional NGO conservation initiatives
in North America. First, there is the problem inherent to "island ecol-
ogy;" small protected areas lose diversity over time. Second, this pro-
tected area strategy is too costly and scattered to protect biologically rich
landscapes. Third, governments cannot afford to protect borders of re-
serves. Fourth, the protected area approach is the result of top-down
planning. This has often robbed rural communities of their traditional
user-rights over forests, waters, fisheries, and wildlife. Hence, local peo-
ple see conservation efforts as misanthropic and threatening to their eco-
nomic security." Achieving the ambitious conservation goals of Y2Y
will require constructive policies that are sensitive to the concerns and
hopes of communities both small and large.
V. INCLUDING PRIVATE LANDS
Since the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964,' the NWPS has
grown by a factor of eleven from 9.1 million acres to 103.6 acres," but
most of these wilderness areas were chosen for scenic and recreational
attributes. Many are at high elevations and have relatively little ecologi-
cal value. These ecosystems are not sufficient to protect biodiversity.
Even large protected areas such as Yellowstone National Park are too
small and isolated to support viable populations of wide-ranging
species. 8 As David Quammen describes in The Song of the Dodo,9 when
populations of plants and animals are confined to small habitat islands
(often surrounded by intense resource use and development) they meet a
predictable fate--extinction.'
54. See generally NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASED
CONSERVATION (David Western & R. Michael Wright eds., 1994) (giving an overview of commu-
nity-based conservation through case studies).
55. See LIZ CLAIBORNE & ART ORTENBERG FOUND., THE VIEW FROM AIRLIE: COMMUNITY
BASED CONSERVATION IN PERSPECTIVE 4 (1993).
56. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994)).
57. Telephone Interview with H. Michael Anderson, Senior Resource Analyst, The Wilder-
ness Society (Sept. 18, 1998).
58. See Newmark, supra note 10, at 432.
59. DAVID QUAMMEN, THE SONG OF THE DODO: ISLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY IN AN AGE OF
EXTINCTIONS (1996).
60. Id. at 491-92.
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Any strategy to link habitat and protected areas over large landscapes
must consider the importance of private lands. In the arid West, low ele-
vation riparian areas provide critically important habitat, especially in the
winter months. Due to early settlement patterns, most of these lands are
privately held. For example:
" According to a 1990 Bureau of Land Management study,
sixty to eighty percent of native wildlife in the arid West
depend on riparian habitats to survive.
* In Teton County, Wyoming, fifty percent of bald eagle nests
are on private lands, and ninety percent of the mule deer
population that summers in Grand Teton National Park
winters on private lands.
• One quarter of the northern elk herd in Yellowstone Na-
tional Park uses private lands during the winter months.
* "Sixty-two plant and animal species listed by the Nature
Conservancy as 'sensitive species in the Greater Yellow-
stone Ecosystem' are found primarily on private lands."'
Since less than one tenth of endangered species makes their homes
exclusively on public lands, conserving species on private lands is vital
to achieving conservation goals. Michael Bean and David Wilcore of the
Environmental Defense Fund comment:
Without effective strategies for conserving species on private
land, the nation cannot succeed in recovering most of the species that
the Endangered Species Act seeks to conserve. Unfortunately there is
growing evidence that the principal strategies used thus far have not
worked particularly well. According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service's most -recent report to Congress on the status of recovery ef-
forts, fewer than 10% of listed species are judged to be improving;
nearly four times that number are declining.u
Conservation strategies that attempt to establish and protect core reserves
and connecting wildlife corridors must recognize the importance of eco-
nomic security to private landowners. For ranchers and timberland own-
ers, their real property is their store of wealth and may well represent
college tuition or retirement savings. Lured by development pressures
and threatened by perceived restrictions on the use of their property, they
face agonizing choices about their lands, some of which have been held
and nurtured for generations. As industry and environmental groups spar
61. DENNIs GucK ET AL., INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVING OPEN LANDS IN GREATER
YELLOWSTONE 7 (1998).
62. Michael J. Bean & David S. Wilcove, The Private-Land Problem, 11 CONSERVATION
BIoLOGY 1, 1 (1997).
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in protracted and expensive litigation, some owners hurry to reduce their
exposure to political uncertainties by harvesting, draining, or selling
critical habitat.'
The chief lesson from economics is clear: there are no perfect, cost-
free solutions--only trade-offs. Policies that fail to respect property are
strongly resisted, for they alienate people and waste resources. Conser-
vation strategies must capitalize on the desires of environmentally sensi-
tive landowners who are eager to manage their land for environmental
ends but are afraid of political entanglements and potential takings.
VI. WHAT Do WE MEAN BY "ENTREPRENEURS" AND WHY ARE THEY
IMPORTANT?
The resource extraction model described above represents business-
as-usual in the West; however, major forces are at work eroding this
static model. As many have correctly observed, the American West is in
the midst of a fundamental transformation from a natural resource extrac-
tion economy to an economy based on services, amenities, and the crea-
tion and transfer of information.' One possible way to achieve conserva-
tion goals without relying on federal legislation is to harness and nurture
entrepreneurial activity that has successfully helped the environment.
There is wide recognition that entrepreneurial activity is vital to
economic and community development. Successful entrepreneurs iden-
tify, create, and act on profitable opportunities, typically by innovative
arrangements of people, information, and material. In addition, entrepre-
neurs frequently pursue social opportunities as well as economic opportu-
nities. In stark contrast with America, the Soviet Union had no entrepre-
neurs; those with the talents and the tolerance for risk became bureaucratic
criminals. Among the results were some of the world's worst episodes of
pollution and resource waste. In this system there could be no entrepre-
neurs to discover profitable opportunities to address these problems. These
persistent negative outcomes in the U.S.S.R. and throughout the commu-
nist world demonstrate the importance of entrepreneurial actions.
We recognize three kinds of entrepreneurs. First, for profit entrepre-
neurs ranging in size from Federal Express to Predator Friendly, Inc.,
perceive and develop unoccupied market niches and provide services that
meet people's demands. Second, non-profit or NGOs create innovative,
attractive incentives for individuals, landowners, and communities to
practice better conservation. One example is Defenders of Wildlife's
"wolf insurance program," an effort to reduce the resistance to wolf re-
covery by compensating ranchers for wolf predation on livestock. The
63. Michael J. Bean, Environmental Economics and Policy Analysis: A Seminar for Profes-
sors of Environmental Law, Address at the Foundation for Research on Economics and the Envi-
ronment Seminar (July 17, 1998).
64. See Pete Geddes, Economy and Ecology in the Next West, J. FORESTRY, Aug. 1998, at 56,56.
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third kind of entrepreneurs is creative individuals within government
agencies who develop and then execute new programs. One example is a
U.S. Forest Service manager in the Gallatin National Forest, in south-
western Montana, who worked with the Bozeman Lions Club to develop
a handicapped hiking and interpretive trail in the Hyalite drainage.
Only the first economically motivated entrepreneurship has received
wide media attention. However, other newer forms of entrepreneurship
are crucial in a rapidly changing West. NGO entrepreneurs, in particular,
offer some of the best thinking and best practices to a region torn apart
by political polarization, rampant mistrust and enmity between urban and
rural residents, and widespread disgust with agencies of government.
Also, environmental entrepreneurs often bridge the gap between public
and private land protection. For example, since the early 1980s, efforts
have been made to stem the decline of the red-cockaded woodpecker in
the southeastern United States. This non-migratory bird requires mature,
fire-maintained pine forests for foraging and nesting. These are forests
with high economic value. 5 In addition to protecting habitat on the re-
gion's federal lands, successful recovery requires that private timber
lands play an important role in recovery.6'
In 1995, the Environmental Defense Fund, in cooperation with other
organizations, began the "safe harbor" program to protect habitat through
voluntary agreements with area landowners. Under the program, land-
owners agree to enhance woodpecker habitat on their lands, maintaining
the current or baseline populations of birds present at the time of the
agreement. In return, the owners are assured of protection from liability
under the ESA if the population of woodpeckers on the land increases.
A "permit" trading scheme is included in the "safe harbors" pro-
gram. Landowners who increase the population of red-cockaded wood-
peckers on their property can sell safe harbor "rights" to landowners
seeking permission to modify habitat." In the Sandhill region of North
Carolina, these efforts are expected to double the population of wood-
peckers over the next fifteen years."
The "safe harbors" approach is successful because it responds to
landowner concerns. Previously, the arrival of these woodpeckers meant
65. See FOREST SERv. SOUTHERN REGION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRiC., R8-MB 73, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE RED-COCKADED
WOODPECKER AND ITS HABITAT ON NATIONAL FORESTS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION 1, 12, 14
(1995).
66. See M.R. LENNARTZ & V. GARY HENRY, ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY PLAN: RED-
COCKADED WOODPECKER 35-36 (1985).
67. See Robert Bonnie, Safe Harbor for the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker, J. FORESTRY, Apr.
1997, at 17, 20.
68. See Robert Bonnie & Michael Bean, Habitat Trading for Red Cockaded Woodpeckers:
Enhancing Recovery, Reducing Conflicts, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, AprJMay 1996, at 7, 8.
69. See Bonnie, supra note 67, at 20.
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owners could lose control of their property. Now landowners enrolled in
the program have their rights protected. Even if they attract woodpeckers
they may continue active forestry and agriculture. Similar programs can
link large tracts of habitat without removing land from all productive
uses.
Creativity, flexibility, and adaptability are essential in coordinating
habitat protection at the scales needed for the future. However, these
traits are rare in governmental bureaucracies. Environmental entrepre-
neurs specialize in identifying conservation opportunities and building
constituencies for wildlands. For example:
* The Malapais Borderlands Group, which is an alliance of
about fifteen ranchers in Arizona and New Mexico, has
raised and spent almost $1 million to protect the threatened
and endangered species in the region. John Cook of the
Nature Conservancy was quoted, in praise of their efforts:
"Private efforts like these represent the future of conserva-
tion. Government can't do it all."
* The Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation, founded in 1984,
"now has more than 115,000 members who have
helped.., conserve and enhance 2.3 million acres of wild-
life habitat in North America.
71
* Ducks Unlimited's Habitat 2000 campaign has the goals of
conserving nine million acres of wetland and upland habi-
tat; nearly 8.2 million acres have already been conserved.'
[Tihe Audubon Society operates the 26,000-plus acre Rai-
ney Sanctuary Preserve in southern Louisiana. Natural gas
wells have operated within the preserve for more than 25
years without measurable damage to the surrounding eco-
system. The preserve is home to ducks, geese, and a vari-
ety of mammals including mink, otter and deer.
* Audubon uses royalties from oil and gas production "to
purchase additional wildlife habitat while improving the
management and ecological integrity of the Rainey Pre-
serve."
74
It is important to recognize that many of the protected lands de-
scribed above will not fit the traditional definition of wilderness as a
70. Grazing: "New Breed" Ranchers Seek Middle Ground in SW, GREENWIRE (Aug. 5, 1998)
<http://www.cloakroom.com>.
71. Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.rmef.orgindex.htm>.
72. See Ducks Unlimited (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.ducks.org/5x/habitat 2000.htm>.
73. John Baden, Oil and Ecology Do Mix, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1987, § 1, at 32.
74. Id.
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place "untrammeled by man." These are working landscapes. Protection
strategies will resemble "multiple-use modules" (MUM) consisting of
protected cores surrounded by a gradation of buffer zones, with intensity
of human use increasing outward.75
It is quite reasonable to expect that traditional greens will find the
perspective we have offered quite difficult to accept. The early successes
of the environmental movement came through political organizing and
subsequent agency regulation. The value of entrepreneurship was un-
known, discounted, or ignored by mainstream environmentalists. The
term "entrepreneurship," if used at all, was employed with derision, not
respect.
There were times and places when politics and regulations were ap-
propriate means for achieving ecological ends. Establishing the Wilder-
ness Act was surely one, of only as a way to constrain political/industrial
exploiters of the federal lands.
These strategies, however, are doomed to frustration as we move to-
ward efforts to preserve environmental values on the privately owned
lands of the West. The creativity and flexibility required for these varied
lands and circumstances are antithetical to bureaucratic means. Our expe-
rience with the environmental movement suggests that some of today's
environmental leaders fail to recognize these changes. Their organiza-
tions are failing while their boards search for leaders who appreciate the
environmental value of entrepreneurs.
Attempts to save wildlands by dipping deeper into the U.S. Treasury
seem doomed. It is an important federal role to monitor against abuse
and adjudicate conflict. To achieve acceptable results, however, we
should recognize the value of environmental entrepreneurs and create
institutions that foster their good works. The key is to create institutional
arrangements that involve, rather than alienate, local communities. The
locksmith will be the environmental entrepreneurs.
75. See REED F. Noss & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY: PROTECTING
AND RESTORING BIODIVERSITY 146-50 (1994).
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Ecological concerns, including the preservation of habitat for rare
and imperiled species and the protection of representative examples of all
ecosystems, have always been at least minor goals in wilderness area and
national park advocacy in the United States. At the Sierra Club Biennial
Wilderness Conferences from 1949 to 1973, scientists and others pre-
sented ecological arguments for wilderness preservation and discussed
the scientific values of wilderness areas and national parks. In the 1920s
and 1930s, the Ecological Society of America and the American Society
of Mammalogists developed proposals for ecological reserves on the
public lands. The eminent ecologist Victor Shelford was an early propo-
nent of protected wildlands big enough to sustain populations of large
carnivores.
Some of this country's greatest conservationists have been scien-
tists, too. One of the many hats John Muir wore was that of a scientist.
Aldo Leopold was a pioneer in ecology and wildlife management and
argued for wilderness areas as ecological baselines.' Bob Marshall had a
Ph.D. in plant physiology and explored the unmapped Brooks Range in
Alaska not just for adventure, but also to study tree growth in that ex-
treme climate. Olaus Murie, long-time President of The Wilderness So-
ciety, was an early wildlife ecologist and one of the first to defend the
wolf.
Aesthetic, recreational, and utilitarian (e.g., watershed protection)
arguments have traditionally dominated advocacy for national parks and
wilderness areas and these values have had more influence on what areas
were protected than have ecological arguments. In the last decade, how-
ever, ecological arguments have risen to the top of the conservation
* Chairman of the Wildlands Project, publisher of Wild Earth, and a director of the New
Mexico Wilderness Alliance. Portions of this article have appeared in a different form in Wilderness:
From Scenery to Nature, WILD EARTH, Winter 1995-96, at 8; Missing Links, SIERRA, Sept./Oct.
1995, at 52. A different version of this article will appear in The War on Nature, a book in progress
by Dave Foreman. Thanks to Michael Sould and Steve Gatewood for their suggestions.
1. Michael Soulk & Reed Noss, Rewilding and Biodiversity As Complementary Goals for
Continental Conservation, WILD EARTH, Fall 1998, at 19, 20-21.
2. The section entitled "Wilderness" in Leopold's A Sand County Almanac is stunning for the
extent to which it anticipated much of modem conservation biology. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND
CouNTY ALMANAC AND SKETcsEs HERE AND THERE 188-201 (1949).
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movement. Scientists, particularly from the new discipline of conserva-
tion biology, have become more prominent in conservation groups. This
is most true in the Nature Conservancy, Wildlife Conservation Society,
and World Wildlife Fund, but other groups, like the Sierra Club and The
Wilderness Society, in their current campaigns to protect endangered
species, wetlands, and ancient forests, have emphasized ecological val-
ues. Hard-hitting groups like the Biodiversity Legal Protection Fund,
Southwest Center for Biodiversity,. and Forest Guardians have filed sci-
ence- based lawsuits and appeals to protect species and ecosystems alike.
I. THE RISE OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
Since 1991, the Wildlands Project has brought together citizen con-
servationists and conservation biologists to formulate a new idea of con-
servation and to apply science to the design and management of pro-
tected areas. This ecological renaissance in conservation has come about
because of new research and theory in several branches of biology.
Looking back over our shoulders, we see that five interrelated lines of
scientific inquiry have led to the sort of wilderness networks now being
proposed by the Wildlands Project and other conservation groups. These
are extinction dynamics, island biogeography, metapopulation theory,
large carnivore ecology, and natural disturbance ecology.
Ecological values began to come to the fore when we became aware
of the shrill fury of the extinction crisis. The most important-and
gloomy-scientific discovery of the twentieth century was made only
twenty years ago. During the 1960s and 1970s, field biologists had
grown more and more disturbed by population declines in a myriad of
species and by loss of ecosystems of all kinds around the world. Tropical
rainforests were falling to saw and torch. Coral reefs were dying from
God knows what. Ocean fish stocks were crashing. Elephants, rhinos,
gorillas, tigers, and other charismatic megafauna were being slaughtered.
Frogs were vanishing. These staggering losses were in oceans and on the
highest peaks, in deserts and in rivers, and in tropical rainforests and
Arctic tundra alike.
A few scientists, including geneticist Michael Soul6 (later founder
of the Society for Conservation Biology) and Harvard's famed E.O. Wil-
son, put these worrisome anecdotes and bits of data together. They knew,
through paleontological research by others, that in the 570 million years
or so of the evolution of modern animal phyla there had been five great
extinction events-the hard punctuations in the equilibrium Wilson and
company calculated that the current rate of extinction was one thousand
to ten thousand times the background rate of extinction in the fossil rec-




ord.' That discovery hit with all the subtlety of an asteroid striking Earth:
RIGHT NOW, TODAY, LIFE FACES THE SIXTH GREAT
EXTINCTION EVENT IN EARTH HISTORY. The cause is just as un-
settling: eating, manufacturing, traveling, warring, and breeding by six
billion human beings.
The crisis we face is biological meltdown.' Soul6 has said that the
only large mammals that will be left after the turn of the century will be
those we consciously choose to protect.6 He wrote, "The end of specia-
tion for most large animals rivals the extinction crisis in significance for
the future of living nature. As [Bruce Wilcox and I] said in 1980, 'Death
is one thing, an end to birth is something else."' 7
Knowledge that we were living in, and causing, the greatest mass
extinction since the end of the dinosaurs scared the daylights out of both
biologists and conservationists. Biology could no longer be removed
from activism if scientists wished their research subjects to survive. Con-
servation could no longer be about protecting outdoor museums and art
galleries, and setting aside backpacking parks and open-air zoos. Biolo-
gists and conservationists all began to understand that species could not
be brought back from the brink of extinction one by one. Nature reserves
had to protect entire ecosystems to guard the flow and dance of evolution.
A new branch of applied biology was launched. "Conservation biol-
ogy," Soul6 declared in 1985, "differs from most other biological sci-
ences in one important way: it is often a crisis discipline. Its relation to
biology, particularly ecology, is analogous to that of surgery to physiol-
ogy and war to political science.""
Conservation biologists immediately turned their attention to nature
reserves, "the most valuable weapon in our conservation arsenal," ac-
cording to Soul6 and Bruce Wilcox in 1980.' A key question was: Why
had national parks, wilderness areas, and other reserves not prevented the
extinction crisis? And, flowing from that question was the issue of how
4. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 280 (1992).
5. Wilson warns that the number of species driven to extinction "might easily reach 20 per-
cent by 2022 and rise as high as 50 percent or more thereafter." Id. at 278. Some nonscientists,
particularly those who stand to make a buck off of exploitation of the land, and neoclassical resource
economists pooh-pooh this extinction crisis. University of Tennessee ecologist Stuart Pimm has
taken the lead in quantifying the magnitude of the extinction crisis. See Stuart L. Pimm et al., The
Future of Biodiversity, 269 SCIENCE 347, 348-49 (1995).
6. "This century will see the end of significant evolution of large plants and terrestrial verte-
brates in the tropics." Michael E. Soul6, Thresholds for Survival: Criteria for Maintenance of Fit-
ness and Evolutionary Potential, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 151, 168 (Michael E. Soul6 & Bruce A. Wilcox eds., 1980).
7. Michael E. Soul6 & Bruce A. Wilcox, Conservation Biology: Its Scope and Its Challenge,
in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 1, 8.
8. Michael Sould, What Is Conservation Biology? A New Synthetic Discipline Addresses the
Dynamics and Problems of Perturbed Species, Communities, and Ecosystems, 35 BIoSCIENCE 727,
727 (1985).
9. Soul6 & Wilcox, supra note 7, at 4.
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reserves could be better designed and managed in the future to protect
biological diversity.
Conservation biologists first drew on a young, vigorous field of
population biology called island biogeography for insights. In the
1960s, E.O. Wilson and Robert MacArthur studied colonization and
extinction rates in oceanic islands like the Hawaiian chain. They hoped
to devise a mathematical formula for the number of species that an is-
land can hold, based on factors such as the island's size and its distance
from the mainland.'"
Soon after MacArthur and Wilson developed their theory of island
biogeography, Jared Diamond, John Terborgh, and Michael Soul6 ap-
plied island biogeography to land-bridge islands." Oceanic islands are
different from land-bridge islands in that they have never been connected
to the continents. Hawaii, for example, is a group of volcanic peaks ris-
ing from the sea floor to above the waves. Any plants or animals had to
get there from somewhere else-by flying, blowing, or floating across
several thousand miles of open ocean.
But land-bridge (or continental) islands, like Taiwan, Vancouver, or
Ireland, were once parts of nearby continents. When the glaciers melted
18,000 to 10,000 years ago and the sea level rose some four hundred feet,
these high spots were cut off from the rest of the continents and became
islands. Over the years, land-bridge islands invariably lose species of
plants and animals that remain on their parent continents, a process
called relaxation. Island biogeographers developed mathematical for-
mulas for the rate of species loss and for future colonization, and to de-
termine whether equilibrium would someday be reached.
Certain generalities jumped out at the researchers. The first species
to vanish from land-bridge islands were the big guys: tigers, rhinos,
bears, and moose. The larger the island, the slower the rate at which spe-
cies disappear. The farther an island is from the mainland, the more spe-
cies it loses; the closer, the fewer. An isolated island loses more species
than one in an archipelago.
10. See ROBERT MACARTHUR & EDWARD WILSON, THE THEORY OF IsLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY
5-7 (1967). David Quanunen's outstanding book, The Song of the Dodo, looks at island biogeogra-
phy and extinction in exhaustive, but fascinating, detail. See DAVID QUAMMEN, THE SONG OF THE
DODO: ISLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY IN AN AGE OF EXTINCTIONS (1996).
11. See John Terborgh, Preservation of Natural Diversity: The Problem of Extinction Prone
Species, 24 BIOSCiENCE 715, 715 (1974); see also Jared Diamond, The Island Dilemma: Lessons of
Modem Biogeographic Studies for the Design of Natural Reserves, 7 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION
129, 144 (1975). See generally Michael Soul6 & Allan J. Sloan, Biogeography and Distribution of
the Reptiles and Amphibians on Islands in the Gulf of California, Mexico, in TRANSACTIONS OF SAN
DIEGO SOc'Y OF NAT. HIsT. 139, 154 (1966) (discussing and illustrating "the relationship of the




Closely tied to island biogeography is the species-area
relationship.'2 The species-area relationship has been shown with birds,
mammals, reptiles, and other kinds of animals on the Greater Sunda Is-
lands (the Indonesian archipelago), Caribbean islands, and elsewhere. In
1979, Michael Soul6 and his students Bruce Wilcox and Claire Holtby
used the species-area relationship to predict the loss of large mammals in
East African reserves." An ecological rule of thumb is that if the area of a
habitat is reduced by ninety percent, it will lose fifty percent of its
species."'
Usable habitat also can be reduced by fragmentation of forest eco-
systems. Ornithologists have become increasingly alarmed by the role of
forest fragmentation in the decline of songbirds. For years, it has been
known that warblers, flycatchers, vireos, thrushes, and other songbirds
have been declining in the more fragmented parts of the central and east-
ern United States and Canada. These neotropical migrants winter in
Central America and Mexico, but fly north in the spring to take advan-
tage of the long days and abundant insects to breed and raise young (yes,
mosquitoes and no-see-ums are good for something-actually for many
things). The decline of neotropical migrants was first blamed on destruc-
tion of their winter habitat in the tropics. Careful research later showed
that a larger piece of the puzzle was fragmentation of their forest habitat
in North America. Many of the neotropical migrants need interior forests
for habitat. This interior forest is especially important for nesting because
it protects against nest parasitism.
The brown-headed cowbird is one of those animals that is hard to
love. Formerly a denizen of the plains and prairies where it followed herds
of bison and elk to scoop up insects in their wake, it spread east with the
clearing of the Great Eastern Forest and with the growing number of cattle
in settlements. The cowbird is a nest parasite-it lays its eggs in the nests
of other birds and leaves them to be hatched and raised by the unknowing
builders of the nest. Cowbird chicks generally hatch sooner than do war-
blers, vireos, and other songbirds. The young cowbird often pushes the
12. "One of the principles of modem ecology is that the number of species that an area can
support is directly proportional to its size. A corollary is that if area is reduced, the number of spe-
cies shrinks." Michael E. Soul6, An Unflinching Vision: Networks of People Defending Networks of
Land, in NATURE CONSERVATION 4: THE ROLE OF NETwORKs 1, 2 (Denis A. Saunders et al. eds.,
1995).
13. See Michael Soul6 et al., Benign Neglect: A Model of Faunal Collapse in the Game Re-
serves of East Africa, 15 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 259, 261 (1979). The predictions of Sou16,
Wilcox, and Holtby have recently been confirmed by William Newmark. See William Newmark,
Insularization of Tanzanian Parks and the Local Extinction of Large Mammals, 10 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1549, 1552 (1996).
14. A thorough discussion of island biogeography and species-area relationship as it applies to
conservation was done by Bruce Wilcox in 1980. See Bruce A. Wilcox, Insular Ecology and Con-
servation, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note
6, at95, 96-99, 113.
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other eggs out of the nest and the poor little warbler parents work them-
selves to a frazzle feeding the big, ugly, demanding cowbird chick.
Songbirds need interior forest habitat for nesting because brown-
headed cowbirds will usually penetrate only a few hundred yards into a
forest.'" But, when road corridors, power line rights of way, clearcuts,
housing developments, and the like break up a forest, the interior forest
habitat is greatly reduced or disappears, allowing songbirds no refuge
from cowbird brood parasitism.'6
In 1985, as Soul, William Conway, Peter Brussard, Katherine
Ralls, David Ehrenfeld, Jared Diamond, and other top biologists were
forming the Society for Conservation Biology, University of Michigan
ecologist William Newmark looked at a map of the western United
States and realized that our national parks were islands." As the sea of
settlement and logging had swept over North America, national parks
had become islands of ecological integrity surrounded by human-
dominated lands. Newmark set out to answer the question of whether
island biogeography applied to these areas.
Newmark found that the smaller the national park and the more
isolated it was from other wildlands, the more species it had lost. The
first species to go had been the large, wide-ranging critters, such as lynx
and wolverine. Relaxation had occurred, and was still occurring. New-
mark predicted that all national parks would continue to lose species, as
Soul6 had previously predicted for East African reserves.'8 Even Yellow-
stone National Park is not big enough to maintain viable populations of
all the large wide-ranging mammals. Only the total area of the connected
complex of national parks in the Canadian Rockies is substantial enough
to ensure their survival.
While Newmark was applying island biogeography to national
parks, Reed Noss and Larry Harris at the University of Florida were us-
ing the metapopulation9 concept to design reserves for the Florida pan-
15. See David Wilcove et al., Habitat Fragmentation in the Temperate Zone, in
CONSERVATION BIoLoGY: AN EVOLUrIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 237,
249-50.
16. See id.
17. See William D. Newmark, Legal and Biotic Boundaries of Western North American Na-
tional Parks: A Problem of Congruence, 33 BIOLoGICAL CONSERVATION 197 (1985); see also
William Newmark, A Land-Bridge Island Perspective on Mammalian Extinctions in Western North
American Parks, 325 NATuRE 430 (1987) [hereinafter Newmark, A Land Bridge Island Perspective].
18. "Without active intervention by park managers, it is quite likely that a loss of mammalian
species will continue as western North American national parks become increasingly insularized."
Newmark, A Land Bridge Island Perspective, supra note 17, at 432.
19. Metapopulations are analogous to a region of semi-isolated human villages.
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ther, an endangered subspecies, and the Florida black bear, a threatened
subspecies.'
A small isolated population of bears or panthers faces all sorts of
genetic weirdness-inbreeding depression causes a.chronic loss of fit-
ness, genetic drift causes progressive loss of genetic variation, and, as a
result of these two effects, natural selection becomes less effective.2'
Also, a small population is more vulnerable than a large one to local ex-
tinction (winking out in ecological jargon). If the animals are isolated,
their habitat cannot be recolonized by members of the species from an-
other population. But if habitats are connected so that animals can move
between them--even as little as one horny adolescent male every ten
years-then, inbreeding is usually avoided, and a habitat whose popula-
tion winks out can be recolonized by dispersers from a nearby population.
Bruce Wilcox and Dennis Murphy wrote in 1985 that "habitat frag-
mentation is the most serious threat to biological diversity and is the pri-
mary cause of the present extinction crisis."' Noss acted on their warning
by designing a conceptual nature reserve system for Florida consisting of
core reserves surrounded by buffer zones and linked by habitat corridors.
In a paper presented to the 1986 Natural Areas Conference, Noss said,
"The problems of habitat isolation that arise from fragmentation can be
mitigated by connecting natural areas by corridors or zones of suitable
habitat."'23 In other words, the problem of island-like nature reserves can
be mitigated by protecting and restoring connective habitat in a frag-
mented landscape.'
Florida is the fastest growing state in the nation. When the Noss
proposal, calling for sixty percent of Florida to be protected in such a
nature reserve network, was first published in 1985, it was considered,
well, impractical. But, over the last decade this visionary application of
conservation biology has been refined by the State of Florida. Now, state
agencies and the Nature Conservancy are using the refinement to set
priorities for land acquisition and protection of key areas.
In 1994, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission pub-
lished a 239 page document, Closing the Gaps in Florida's Wildlife
Habitat Conservation System.' Using GIS computer mapping technol-
20. See Reed F. Noss, Landscape Considerations in Reintroducing and Maintaining the Flor-
ida Panther Design of Appropriate Preserve Networks (1985) (unpublished report submitted to the
Florida Panther Technical Advisory Council).
21. See Sould, supra note 8, at 727,730.
22. Bruce Wilcox & Dennis Murphy, Conservation Strategy: The Effects of Fragmentation on
Extinction, 125 AMERIcAN NATURALIST 879, 884 (1985).
23. Reed Noss, Protecting Natural Areas in Fragmented Landscapes, 7 NAT. AREAS J. 1, 5
(1987).
24. I give a slide show on island biogeography and reserve design a couple of dozen times a
year. The most common response I get is, "Why did it take so long to figure out something that
obvious?"
25. JAMES Cox ET AL., FLORIDA GAME AND FRESH WATER FISH COMM'N, CLOSING THE
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ogy, Closing the Gaps identified biodiversity hot spots for Florida.6 The
study looked in detail at range occurrences and habitat needs for thirty
sensitive species ranging from the Florida panther to the pine barrens
treefrog, and at twenty-five thousand known locations of rare plants,
animals, and natural communities. ' Existing conservation lands in Flor-
ida cover 6.95 million acres.' The hot spots, called strategic habitat con-
servation areas, encompass another 4.82 million acres. ' Florida is work-
ing with private landowners to protect identified areas and has appropri-
ated $3.2 billion to purchase strategic habitat conservation areas and
other conservation lands by the year 2000. Once a new Ph.D.'s pie in the
sky, a conservation biology-based reserve system is now the master plan
for land protection in Florida."
While metapopulation dynamics and island biogeography theory
were being applied to nature reserve design, biologists were beginning to
recognize the value of large carnivores to their ecosystems. Previously,
scientists tended to see wolves and jaguars as relatively unimportant spe-
cies perched on top of the food chain (though Aldo Leopold, prescient as
ever, recognized their keystone role in the 1940s"). These large carni-
vores really did not have that much influence on the overall functioning
of the natural system, biologists thought. Until the 1930s, in fact, the
National Park Service used guns, traps, and poison to exterminate gray
wolves and mountain lions from Yellowstone and other parks (they suc-
ceeded with the wolf).
Today, biologists know that lions, bears, and wolves are ecologi-
cally essential, in addition to being important for a spicy taste of wild-
ness in the landscape. For example, the eastern United States is overrun
with white-tailed deer. Their predation on trees is preventing forest re-
generation and altering species composition according to University of
Wisconsin botanists Don Waller, Steve Solheim, and William Alverson
If allowed to return, wolves and mountain lions would scatter deer from
their concentrated wintering yards and reduce their numbers, thereby
allowing the forest to return to more natural patterns of succession and
species composition.
GAPS IN FLORIDA'S WILDLIFE HABITAT CONSERVATION SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO MEET
MINIMUM CONSERVATION GOALS FOR DECLINING WILDLIFE SPECIES AND RARE PLANT AND





30. The Nature Conservancy's lead person on this was Steve Gatewood, now the executive
director of the Wildlands Project.
31. See LEOPOLD, supra note 2, at 132.
32. See WILLIAM S. ALVERSON ET AL., WILD FORESTS: CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 30 (1994).
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With the extermination of wolves and the near extermination of
mountain lions sixty years ago in Yellowstone, elk populations in-
creased. Freed of their predators, elk grew lazy and lackadaisical, loafing
in large herds in river meadows. Their behavior had changed so much, it
was hard to call them elk. Not only have they overgrazed the grasslands,
their browsing of willow shoots has hampered beavers from becoming
reestablished in Yellowstone. But, with the recent reintroduction of
wolves to Yellowstone, elk have become elk again. They're awake!
They're moving. They're looking over their shoulders. They aren't loaf-
ing in large groups in open river valleys. Wolves have changed their be-
havior for the better and are bringing integrity back to the ecosystem.
Michael Soul6 and his colleagues have shown that native songbirds
survive in large suburban San Diego canyons where there are coyotes;
they disappear faster when coyotes disappear. Coyotes eat foxes and
prowling house cats. Foxes and cats eat quail, cactus wrens, thrashers,
and their nestlings.3
In the eastern United States, David Wilcove, staff ecologist for the
Environmental Defense Fund, has found that songbirds are victims of the
extirpation of wolves and cougars. As we have seen, the population de-
cline of songbirds as a result of forest fragmentation is well documented,
but Wilcove has shown that songbird declines are partly due to the ab-
sence of large carnivores in the East. Cougars and gray wolves do not eat
warblers or their eggs, but raccoons, foxes, skunks, and possums do, and
the cougars and wolves eat these midsize predators. When the big guys
were hunted out, the populations of the middling guys exploded-with
dire results for the birds. ' Soul6 calls this phenomenon "mesopredator
release.""3
In addition to being critical players in various eat-or-be-eaten
schemes, large carnivores are valuable as umbrella species. Simply put,
if enough habitat is protected to maintain viable populations of top
predators, like wolves or harpy eagles, then most of the other species in
the region will also be protected. Those which are not, such as rare plants
with very restricted habitats, can usually be protected with vest-pocket
preserves of the old Nature Conservancy variety.
A final piece in conservation biology's big-picture puzzle is the
importance of natural disturbances. Caribbean forests are adapted to pe-
riodic hurricanes. Many plant communities in North America evolved
with wildfire. Floods are crucial to new trees sprouting in riparian for-
33. See Michael E. Soul6 et al., Reconstructed Dynamics of Rapid Extinctions of Chaparral-
Requiring Birds in Urban Habitat Islands, 2 CONSERVATION BIoLOGY 75, 75-92 (reporting the
results of a statistical analysis conducted to determine the distribution of native, chaparral-requiring
birds in urban San Diego County and concluding that coyotes control the populations of smaller
predators there).
34. See Wilcove et al., supra note 15, at 237.
35. Soul6 et al., supra note 33, at 83-84.
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ests. Such disturbances help maintain the natural mosaic of landscapes
and natural vegetation types. If a wildland is too small, a disturbance can
effect or perturb all of it, thus eliminating a habitat type for a long time.
To be viable, habitats must be large enough to absorb major natural dis-
turbances (types of stochastic events in ecologist lingo). As early as
1978, ecologists Pickett and Thompson argued that nature reserves
needed to be big enough for natural disturbance regimes. They termed
this a "minimum dynamic area."36 When Yellowstone burned in 1988,
there was a great hue and cry over the imagined destruction, but ecolo-
gists tell us that the fire was natural and beneficial. Because Yellowstone
National Park covers two million acres and is surrounded by several mil-
lion acres more of national forest wilderness areas, the extensive fires
affected only a portion of the total reserve area.
Things did not turn out so well when the Nature Conservancy's
Cathedral Pines Preserve in Connecticut was hammered by tornadoes in
1989. In this tiny patch of remnant old-growth white pine forest (some
trees were 150 feet tall), seventy percent of the trees were knocked flat,
devastating the entire forest patch. Had the tornadoes ripped through an
old-growth forest of hundreds of thousands of acres, they instead would
have played a positive role by opening up small sections to new forest
growth.
What we learn from all this science is: Nature reserves must be big
and connected.
II. THE WILDLANDS PROJECT AND REWILDING
These five areas of recent ecological research--extinction dynam-
ics, island biogeography, metapopulation theory, large carnivore ecol-
ogy, and natural disturbance dynamics-are the foundation for the
Wildlands Project and for all science-based nature reserve design. For a
conservation strategy to succeed, it must have clearly defined goals.
These goals should be scientifically justifiable. Reed Noss suggested four
basic goals for an honest conservation strategy in 1992:
1) Represent, in a system of protected areas, all native ecosystem
types and seral stages across their natural range of variation.
2) Maintain viable populations of all native species in natural pat-
terns of abundance and distribution.
3) Maintain ecological and evolutionary processes, such as distur-
bance regimes, hydrological processes, nutrient cycles, and biotic
interactions, including predation.
36. S.T.A. Pickett & John N. Thompson, Patch Dynamics and the Design of Nature Reserves,
13 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 27, 27 (1978).
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4) Design and manage the system to be responsive to short-term and
long-term environmental change and to maintain the evolutionary
potential of lineages.
From the perspective of these goals, we can look closely at existing wil-
derness areas and national parks and ask, "Why has the world's greatest
nature reserve system failed to prevent biological meltdown in the United
States?"
As we have seen, wilderness areas and national parks are generally
islands of wild habitat in a sea of human-altered landscapes. By frag-
menting wildlife habitat, we imperil species from grizzlies to ovenbirds
who need large, intact ecosystems. Because they have been chosen
largely for their scenic and recreational values, and to minimize resource
conflicts with extractive industries, wilderness areas and national parks
are often "rock and ice"-high elevation, arid, or rough areas which are
beautiful and are popular for backpacking, but which also are relatively
unproductive habitats. For the most part, the richer deep forests, rolling
grasslands, and fertile river valleys on which a disproportionate number
of rare and endangered species depend have passed into private owner-
ship or, if public, have been "released" for development and resource
exploitation. In a detailed review, Reed Noss and colleagues found that,
of the various natural ecosystem types in the United States, fifty-eight
have declined by eighty-five percent or more and thirty-eight by seventy
to eighty-four percent.38 To make matters worse, the elimination of large
carnivores, excessive control of natural fire, and livestock grazing have
degraded even the largest and most remote wilderness areas and national
parks in the lower forty-eight states.
To protect biological diversity, we must build on current national
park, wildlife refuge, and wilderness area systems. The ecological model
for nature reserves of large wilderness cores, buffer zones, and biological
linkages is widely accepted by scientists and is the basis for proposals by
the Wildlands Project. Core wilderness areas would be strictly managed
to protect and, where necessary, to restore native biological diversity and
natural processes. Traditional wilderness recreation is entirely compati-
ble with preservation, so long as ecological considerations come first.39
Biological linkages (corridors) would provide secure routes between core
reserves for the dispersal of wide-ranging species, for genetic exchange
between populations, for the flow of ecological processes, and for mi-
37. Reed F. Noss, The Wildlands Project: Land Conservation Strategy, WILD EARTH, Special
Issue 1992, at 10, 11. As an example of how widely accepted the conservation biology approach has
become, the Department of Defense in 1998 listed Noss's goals as the management direction for
military lands.
38. REED F. Noss ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ENDANGERED ECOSYSTEMS OF THE
UNITED STATES: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF LOSS AND DEGRADATION 1 (1995).
39. For example, cliffs in Arizona's Granite Mountain Wilderness Area are closed to climbing
when peregrine falcons are nesting, and a stretch of Utah's wild San Juan River is closed to camping
when bighorn are lambing.
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gration of plants and animals in response to climate change. Surrounding
the core reserves, stewardship zones (buffers) would allow increasing
levels of compatible human activity away from the cores. Active inter-
vention or protective management, depending on the area, would aid in
the restoration of extirpated species and natural conditions. '
Since the formation of the Wildlands Project in 1991, conservation
biologists and traditional citizen conservationists have worked together
to develop the theory and methodology of how nature reserve networks
should be designed and managed. Considerable new field research has
strengthened our understanding of how ecosystems work and what pro-
vides integrity in ecosystems. The Wildlands Project also recognizes that
traditional conservation values of beauty, inspiration, and recreation are
vital and work together with ecological values for a compelling argument
for nature protection. Together, these approaches help us heal the eco-
logical wounds suffered by North America.
The Wildlands Project calls this "rewilding.'"' The rewilding ap-
proach to science-based reserve design uses planning for carefully se-
lected focal species. Brian Miller, a conservation biologist with the Den-
ver Zoo, has studied black-footed ferrets in Wyoming and jaguars and
mountain lions in Mexico. As chair of the science committee for the
Wildlands Project, he has refined the use of focal species. "Focal species
are organisms used in planning and managing reserves because their re-
quirements for survival represent factors important to maintaining ecol-
ogically healthy conditions."'
Miller and his colleagues have identified several different kinds of
focal species.
1. Keystone species "enrich ecosystem function in a unique
and significant manner through their activities, and the ef-
fect is disproportionate to their numerical abundance."' As
we have seen above, large carnivores are often keystone
species. The beaver, through its modification of the land-
scape, is another keystone species.
2. Umbrella species "generally cover large areas in their daily
or seasonal movements." By protecting enough habitat for
them, habitat for many other species is also protected. Wol-
verines and jaguars are good examples.
40. See Reed Noss, A Recipe for Reserve System Design and Management, WILD EARTH,
Special Issue 1992, at 24, 24-25 (stating that a regional reserve system requires active management
to protect and maintain native environment and native species).
41. Soul6 & Noss, supra note 1, at 19.
42. Brian Miller et al., Using Focal Species in the Design of Reserve Networks, WILD EARTH,





3. Flagship species are charismatic animals, like wolves and
eagles, who build "popular support for the protected area.""'
4. Indicator species "provide an early warning system" be-
cause they "are sensitive to ecological changes." The
northern spotted owl is the best known example here.
By carefully selecting focal species in all these categories, conservation-
ists and scientists can design effective nature reserve networks of cores,
corridors, and buffers.
This rewilding approach is built on recent scholarship showing that
ecosystem integrity is often dependent on the functional presence of
large carnivores. John Terborgh of Duke University (in my mind the
dean of tropical ecology) is currently studying the ecological effects of
eliminating large carnivores from tropical forests. He has determined that
large carnivores are major regulators of prey species numbers-a conclu-
sion which is the opposite of a once-upon-a-time ecological orthodoxy.
He has also found that the removal or population decline of large carni-
vores can alter plant species composition, particularly the balance be-
tween large-seeded and small-seeded plants, due to increased seed and
seedling predation by superabundant herbivores that are normally regu-
lated by large carnivores. This is called "top-down regulation."' There is
compelling evidence for such top-down regulation in forests outside the
tropics as well.
Rewilding is "the scientific argument for restoring big wilderness
based on the regulatory roles of large predators," according to Soul6 and
Noss.' They have explained that:
Three major scientific arguments constitute the rewilding argument
and justify the emphasis on large predators. First, the structure, resil-
ience, and diversity of ecosystems is often maintained by "top-down"
ecological (trophic) interactions that are initiated by top predators
.... Second, wide-ranging predators usually require large cores of
protected landscape for secure foraging, seasonal movement, and
other needs; they justify bigness. Third, connectivity is also required
because core reserves are typically not large enough in most regions;
they must be linked to insure long-term viability of wide-ranging spe-
cies .... In short, the rewilding argument posits that large predators
are often instrumental in maintaining the integrity of ecosystems; in
turn, the large predators require extensive space and connectivity.49
If native large carnivores have been extirpated from a region, their rein-
troduction and recovery is central to a conservation strategy. Wolves,
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. SouI6 & Noss, supra note 1, at 22.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citations omitted).
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grizzlies, cougars, lynx, wolverines, black bears, jaguars, and other top
carnivores need to be restored throughout North America in their natural
ranges.
Sould and Noss recognized "three independent features that charac-
terize contemporary rewilding:
* Large, strictly protected core reserves (the wild)
" Connectivity
" Keystone species""
In shorthand, these are "the three C's: Cores, Corridors, and
Carnivores."'"
Although Soul6 and Noss stated that "[o]ur principal premise is that
rewilding is a critical step in restoring self-regulating land
communities,"52 they also claimed two nonscientific justifications: "the
ethical issue of human responsibility" 3 and "the subjective, emotional
essence of 'the wild' or wilderness."' With respect to the second nonsci-
entific justification, Soul6 and Noss observed that "[w]ilderness is hardly
'wild' where top carnivores, such as cougars, jaguars, wolves, wolver-
ines, grizzlies, or black bears have been extirpated. Without these com-
ponents, nature seems somehow incomplete, truncated, overly tame.
Human opportunities to attain humility are reduced."'5
What Soul6 and Noss have done with the concept of rewilding is of
landmark importance for the wilderness conservation movement as well
as for those primarily concerned with protecting biological diversity.
They have developed the scientific basis for the need for big wilderness
area complexes. Here science buttresses the wants and values of wilder-
ness recreationists. Big wilderness areas are not only necessary for inspi-
ration and a true wilderness experience,' but are absolutely necessary for
the protection and restoration of ecological integrity and native species
diversity.
While conservation has traditionally focused on public lands, we
now realize that private lands must play a major role in nature reserve
networks if connectivity is to be built back into the landscape and if all
ecosystems and biological hot spots are represented. Since the 1950s, the
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 24.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Back in 1964, David Brower wrote that "real wilderness" was "big wilderness--country
big enough to have a beyond to it and an inside." David Brower, Wilderness-Conflict and Con-
science, in VOICES FOR THE WILDERNESS 3, 3 (William Schwarz ed., 1969).
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Nature Conservancy has worked to acquire private lands of high ecologi-
cal value. Now, the Foundation for Deep Ecology (FDE), the Wildlands
Project, and other groups are encouraging wildlands philanthropy-the
acquisition of large areas by conservation-minded people who will man-
age such lands for their ecological value 7 Doug Tompkins, president of
FDE, has used his private wealth to acquire eight hundred thousand acres
of old-growth temperate rainforest in Chile." He is developing trails,
campgrounds, and other facilities so that the people of Chile can use the
area, but his main purpose is to protect a rare and threatened wild land-
scape of international importance. Ted Turner is managing his large
ranches for their natural values and has hired conservation biologist Mike
Phillips to supervise the recovery of endangered species on the Turner
ranches." Wildland philanthropists will use the Wildlands Project and
conservation biologists to identify ecologically important lands for pri-
vate acquisition.
Michael Soul6 and Reed Noss have argued that there have been
three currents in the conservation stream. The first is the traditional wil-
derness movement (beauty, recreation, inspiration).' The second is the
protection of representative ecosystems, hot spots of biodiversity, and
habitats of rare or endangered species."' The third is the application of
island biogeography with the recognition of the need for connectivity
between protected areas.62 Rewilding is a fourth current.' Note that these
are currents in a stream. They most emphatically do not replace one an-
other in a chronological order as values justifying land protection. They
reinforce one another. They are complementary, not contradictory.
It is important to note that the Wildlands Project is not just about
science, but about conservation-the blending of traditional wilderness
values of beauty, inspiration, and recreation with ecological values. As
Sould and Noss clearly stated, "Rewilding with extirpated carnivores and
other keystone species is a means as well as an end. The 'end' is the
moral obligation to protect wilderness and to sustain the remnants of the
Pleistocene-animals and plants-not only for our human enjoyment,
but because of their intrinsic value."
Nonetheless, because of the impression of criticism by conservation
biologists of traditional national park and wilderness area conservation,
some conservationists, like the Sierra Club's Mike McCloskey, have
57. See John Davis, Wildlands Philanthropy: Private Wealth Protecting Public Values, WILD
EARTH, Summer 1998, at 19, 19-22.
58. Seeid at21.
59. See Nancy Plevin, Turner's Plans Rile His Ranching Neighbors-Wolves to Be Released
in New Mexico, SEATLE TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, at A8.
60. See Soul6 & Noss, supra note 1, at 20-22.
61. Seeid. at21.
62. See id.
63. See id at 22.
64. Jd. at 26.
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questioned the turn to a conservation biology approach. McCloskey pre-
sented a paper, Conservation Biologists Challenge Traditional Nature
Protection Organizations,' at a 1995 meeting of the International Union
for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Commission on national parks
and protected areas. His criticisms of conservation biologists included
the following observations:
1. Conservation biologists treat reasons for wilderness other
than biodiversity protection as "secondary, if not trivial and
old-fashioned;"'
2. Conservation biologists criticize existing protected areas,
not in terms of why they were protected when they were
protected, but in terms of "their new biodiversity goals;"
3. "Their disdain for what has been achieved so far is
evident;"
4. "[O]verblown credit [has been] given to the 'worthless
lands' theory propounded by Alfred Runte; '' and
5. Conservation biologists "want to change some of the ways
protected areas are managed""0 and advocate "hands-on
management, ' .. "more intrusiveness than is now authorized
in Wilderness Areas and [a] de-emphasis on recreation,"'
and "vesting more authority in managers.""
Though I think McCloskey misunderstands the position of conser-
vation biologists and the Wildlands Project, he throws out an important
caution to us. When conservation biologists have tried to analyze the
weaknesses of the national park and wilderness area systems from a
standpoint of protecting the whole diversity of life, they have sometimes
failed to make clear the tremendous successes of traditional American
conservation and how an ecological approach is entirely compatible with
a traditional conservation approach.
65. Michael McCloskey, Conservation Biologists Challenge Traditional Nature Protection
Organizations, WILD EARTH, Winter 1996-97, at 67 [hereinafter McCloskey, Conservation Biolo-
gists]. McCloskey continues his critique of the conservation biology approach in this symposium.
See Michael McCloskey, Changing Views of What the Wilderness System Is All About, 76 DENY. U.
L. REV. 369,373-74 (1999).
66. McCloskey, Conservation Biologists, supra note 65, at 67.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 68.
70. Id. at 69.
71. Id.




Criticism by the Wildlands Project and most conservation biologists
is not (nor should be) directed at wilderness areas and national parks, but
at the jolitical process that has shaped them over the last century. It is
true that our wilderness/park system has not protected representatives of
all ecosystems, all native wildlife, and ecological processes. However,
the fault is with American land use history and the political process of
nature reserve designation, not with the idea of wilderness areas and
national parks as means of protection. The extinction crisis is not caused
by a reliance on wilderness areas and national parks. If these areas have
not fully protected biodiversity, it is because of the political forces
working at every step of the way to weaken and pare away at such pro-
posed reserves. The biodiversity crisis is worsening partly because not
enough land has been protected as wilderness areas and national parks.'4
Reed Noss said, "Wilderness recovery, I firmly believe, is the most im-
portant task of our generation."'
Existing wilderness areas and national parks and roadless or lightly-
roaded areas on the public lands are the building blocks for an expanded
ecological nature reserve network. Far from tossing aside existing pro-
tected areas and the National Wilderness Preservation System and Na-
tional Park System, conservation biologists and the Wildlands Project
want to expand such areas and connect them.
While it is historically true that arguments for protecting areas em-
phasized scenic, utilitarian, and recreational values, other arguments
were made from ecological standpoints. Not all national parks were pro-
tected primarily for their scenery. Mt. McKinley National Park was set
aside in 1917 not for its stunning mountain but as a wildlife reserve. Ev-
erglades National Park, finally established in 1947, was specifically pro-
tected as a wilderness ecosystem. Even the Forest Service used ecosys-
tem representation to recommend areas for wilderness in the Second
Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE 11) ' in 1977-79.
Wilderness areas and national parks do protect areas of great value
for biological diversity. McCloskey rightly pointed out that the 1930s
battle for Kings Canyon National Park won an area wanted as a dam site
by Central Valley irrigators and that $1.3 billion of timber went into
Redwood National Park." He further noted that "[w]hile commercial
interests often succeeded in getting some areas they coveted dropped
74. Postmodem deconstructionist critics of the wilderness idea seem unable to understand this
important point. See, e.g., J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson, Introduction to THE GREAT NEW
WILDERNES DEBATE 1, 12-13 Q. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson eds., 1998).
75. Noss, supra note 37, at 10.
76. See FoREsT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RARE 11 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT: ROADLESS AREA REVIEW AND EVALUATION (1979).
77. See McCloskey, Conservation Biologists, supra note 65, at 68.
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from park proposals, this does not mean that conservationists got noth-
ing, or that parks got only worthless lands. ''8
Low elevation valleys in a number of wilderness areas in the
Northwestern United States, along with the Hoh and Quinalt Valleys in
Olympic National Park, are the finest remnants of old growth forest left
in the United States. Conservationists fought hard for these places for
ecological reasons and won over the strident opposition of the timber
industry. The finest and most natural old growth ponderosa pine forest in
the world is protected in New Mexico's Gila Wilderness. State and fed-
eral wilderness areas and parks in the East hold most of the old growth
forest there and much of the best recovering forest-the Five Ponds Wil-
derness in New York's Adirondack State Park has fifty thousand acres of
old growth forest. Some of the best remaining wetlands and even a few
sizable grasslands are preserved in wilderness areas and national parks.
Also, wilderness areas and national parks protect prime habitat (though
not enough of it) for imperiled and sensitive species like wolverine,
fisher, grizzly bear, gray wolf, mountain lion, and bighorn sheep. If it
were not for these areas protected through the blood, sweat, and tears of
recreational wilderness conservationists, these species would be in much
more danger today than they are-if they existed in the lower forty-eight
states at all. Wilderness areas and national parks are prime areas for re-
introduction of extirpated species-the gray, red, and Mexican wolf,
bighorn sheep, mountain lion, woodland caribou, and California condor.
Let me be clear: Explanations for why national parks and wilderness
areas have not fully protected nature in the United States and. elsewhere
are meant to help conservationists add areas to protected status, not to
denigrate the considerable achievements of conservationists in the past.
Ecological values for nature reserves are not meant to replace those val-
ues based on beauty, recreation, inspiration, or existence value, but to
add to them.
CONCLUSION
Over fifty years ago, Aldo Leopold wrote,
One of the penalties of an ecological education is that one lives
alone in a world of wounds. Much of the damage inflicted on land is
quite invisible to laymen. An ecologist must either harden his shell
and make believe that the consequences of science are none of his
business, or he must be the doctor who sees the marks of death in a
community that believes itself well and does not want to be told
otherwise.79
78. Id.
79. Aldo Leopold, Journal Entry, in ROUND RIVER: FROM THE JOURNALS OF ALDO LEOPOLD
165 (Luna B. Leopold ed., 1953).
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Except perhaps in the far north, all of North America has suffered griev-
ous ecological wounds. The Wildlands Project and other conservationists
and scientists must become Leopold's doctor.
Identifying the major ecological wounds to a region allows conser-
vationists to develop clear goals and objectives for a conservation plan.
For example, some of the major wounds in the southwestern United
States include:
1. Extirpation or decline of large carnivores and other key-
stone species through market hunting, poisoning, trapping,
and habitat destruction;
2. Destruction and degradation of riparian areas through over-
grazing and water diversion;
3. Fragmentation of habitat by roads, dams, towns, and agri-
culture;
4. Invasion or deliberate introduction of exotic species that re-
place native species;
5. Elimination or diminution of "keystone" natural processes
such as lightning-caused fire and periodic river and stream
flooding; and
6. Damage to forest ecosystems through logging, fuelwood
collection, and grazing.'
Regional conservation strategies supported by the Wildlands Project in
the southwestern United States have as their goals healing these ecologi-
cal wounds. The approach we are using blends traditional wilderness
area advocacy, focal species planning, and rewilding.
Perhaps more than anything else, conservation is a quest for humil-
ity. Going into the wilderness on foot or by canoe--on the wilderness's
terms-is a pilgrimage of humility. Embracing the need for large carni-
vores in the wilderness landscape is an even deeper step toward humility.
We must ask ourselves, "What kind of people do we wish to be?" Can
we find the generosity of spirit, the greatness of heart to allow self-willed
land, to share our world with wolves and jaguars? Are we wise enough to
understand that wilderness is the arena of evolution?
Reed Noss writes, "We have an opportunity unique to our genera-
tion: to halt a mass extinction."" There is no greater opportunity-nor
responsibility.
80. See Sky Islands Alliance, A Proposal for the Creation and Stewardship of the Sky Is-
lands/Greater Gila Nature Reserve Network (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).






Close your eyes and envision wilderness. If you are fortunate
enough to be able to do so, picture your favorite wilderness. (Mine is the
Oh Be Joyful in Colorado.) What do you see? Does a river run through
it? A cascading mountain brook with an icy breath? Are there cirques full
of everlasting snow dotted in July with vermilion and gold flowers?
Tams of copper green glacial water reflecting white clouds sailing high
overhead? Even if your imagined wilderness is a desert of rose-hued,
striated rock and silent slot canyons or a horizon-reaching expanse of
subtle shades of brown under an immense blue sky; water, or its scarcity,
shapes the landscape, the colors, the wildlife, the experience of the place.
In the desert, heat and light create mirages-the dream of water.
Water is integral to wilderness, essential to sustaining the commu-
nities of life that exist within the boundaries human beings draw around
wild places. Without the full measure of its naturally occurring water, a
wilderness will change; deprived of water it will die.
In contrast to wilderness, law is a creation of human beings, a
framework for decision making, sets of rules and principles for ordering
society and human interactions. It is constructed of rights and obliga-
tions. It determines who may use or consume natural resources, such as
land, minerals, and water. In the western United States, water is essential
not only to sustaining life, but to the development of the region. Water is
the limiting factor for all growth and economic activity. The legal system
of water allocation that grew up in the West emphasizes putting water to
work wherever it is needed, and gives priority in use to those who arrive
first and divert water from its natural courses for application to activities
beneficial to humans. In the West water is separated from the land of its
origins and moved over mountains. Until very recently, water left in
streams for aesthetic or fish and wildlife purposes was viewed as wasted,
and those who wasted water lost the right to use it.
Water and water rights are not the same thing. Wilderness needs
water, but as a consequence of history and law, there is a question of
whether-as a legal matter-areas designated as wilderness by Congress
have rights to the water that arises within and flows through them. Al-
* Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School.
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though thirty-four years have passed since the Wilderness Act of 1964'
created the National Wilderness Preservation System, the issue of wil-
derness water rights remains unresolved. The issue exists because Con-
gress was silent in the Wilderness Act about water rights for the areas to
be included in the Wilderness System.
Until 1988, the prevailing assumption was that congressional desig-
nation of a wilderness impliedly reserved sufficient federal water rights
to fulfill the purposes of the designation. This presumption was based on
the Supreme Court's application of the doctrine of federal reserved water
rights to a variety of federal land systems, although the Court has not
considered the issue of wilderness water rights directly. It was also based
on the consistent position of the Solicitor of the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior that wilderness has federal reserved water rights.2 In
1988, following federal court decisions declaring wilderness to be a res-
ervation carrying with it implied federal water rights, the Solicitor re-
versed the Department's position and decreed that the Wilderness Act
specifically disclaimed the creation of any new water rights Armed with
this Solicitor's Opinion, opponents of wilderness and some members of
Congress claimed that wilderness lacks federal reserved water rights,
and, therefore, any water for wilderness must be expressly provided in
statutory language."
The environmental community was deeply divided about how to re-
spond to these assertions. Some environmentalists argued for the express
reservation of water rights, to assure that wilderness areas designated by
Congress would have the water necessary to their survival. For others,
silence on water rights was golden. These environmentalists were con-
cerned that, by accepting the view that express water rights language was
necessary, they would be supporting the claim that wilderness areas
designated by bills without such language have no water rights. The de-
bate resulted in the defeat of a number of wilderness bills and the passage
of wilderness legislation that include a variety of water rights provisions.
5
Few wilderness areas have been designated since the early 1990s, in
part because of conflicts over water rights. The wilderness bills that
Congress has enacted included express references to water rights.6 In.
1. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994)).
2. See 86 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 553, 563--64 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Solicitor's Opinion].
3. See 96 Op. Solic. Interior Dep't 211, 213 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Solicitor's Opinion].
4. See Janice L. Weis, Federal Reserved Water Rights in Wilderness Areas: A Progress
Report on a Western Water Fight, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 125, 146-48 (1987) (discussing the
legislative reaction to the then pending Colorado wilderness bill and noting legislative opposition to
the claim that wilderness has federal reserved water rights).
5. Cf id. at 146-47 (describing two Colorado water rights bills that "died without passage").
6. See John D. Leshy, Instream Flow Rights: The Private and Public Roles, C616 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 163, 167 (1991).
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1994, the United States Department of Justice directed that the Solici-
tor's Opinion of 1988 be withdrawn pending a reexamination of the pol-
icy it expressed! The withdrawal of the Solicitor's Opinion removed the
bar to federal agency claims of reserved water rights for wilderness in
general stream adjudications. It did not resolve the issue, however, and
the application of the federal reserved water rights doctrine to wilderness
remains unsettled.
This article will tell some of this story. It will analyze the issue of
federal reserved water rights for wilderness, beginning with a bit of his-
tory on the development of the prior appropriation doctrine of water allo-
cation in the West and the relationship between federal and state water
law. It will examine the genesis of the federal reserved water rights doc-
trine and its application by the Supreme Court to a variety of federal land
systems, and discuss the efforts of the Sierra Club to force the Forest
Service to claim water rights for wilderness in stream adjudications in
Colorado.
The article will then review the aftermath of the Sierra Club's effort,
during which the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior repudiated
the Department's long-standing recognition of federal reserved water
rights for wilderness, and members of Congress wrangled over water
rights language for wilderness bills under consideration.
Finally, the article will look at where the issue stands today. The
controversy precipitated by the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion did not last all
that long, yet the implications remain with us. Despite the withdrawal of
the Opinion, states and private parties oppose federal claims to reserved
water rights for wilderness.8 Congress continues to fight about water
rights language in wilderness bills. Because of the uncertainty about
whether wilderness has federal reserved water rights, the question will
reappear each time Congress considers a new addition to the National
Wilderness Preservation System, or whenever the United States seeks to
claim water rights for wilderness in a general stream adjudication.
Whichever approach is taken may affect areas already in the Wilderness
System. Wilderness, therefore, may, or may not, have rights to water.
I. A BIT OF HISTORY
Stephen Ambrose in his riveting account of the Lewis and Clark ex-
pedition said that one might "[als well try to stop an avalanche as to stop
the moving frontier." From the early 1800s on, land-hungry settlers
7. See Water Rights Under the Wilderness Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,692 (1994).
8. Cf Memorandum from Debbie Sease, Sierra Club, and Nancy Green, The Wilderness
Society, to Western Field Representatives of both organizations on Water Rights and Silence 1-3
(Jan. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Sease & Green Memorandum] (on file with author) (describing the need
to include water Tights language in wilderness bills).
9. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER LEWIS, THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST 337 (1996).
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pushed west beyond the confining hills of the Allegheny and Appala-
chian Mountains in an ever-increasing tide. "American immigrants and
emigrants wanted their share of land-free land-a farm in the family-
the dream of European peasants for hundreds of years-the New World's
great gift to the old.""' For nearly a century, but particularly between
1841 and the 1880s, the federal government promoted this settlement as
the basis for national strength and security, by rewarding almost anyone
who undertook the hardships of pioneering with land or natural re-
sources." The federal government made outright land grants to new
states, military veterans and other individuals; promises of land in ex-
change for work were given to homesteaders, ranchers, and miners.'2
Later, Congress gave extensive grants to railroads, reclamation projects,
and timber production.'3 All of this expressed the national policy of dis-
position of the public domain into the hands of the newly created Ameri-
can public.
The people who traveled west to settle and farm the land brought
with them "hopes, dreams, and a totally unworkable system of water
rights-the riparian system."' The riparian system, inherited from Eng-
land, is suited to areas of abundant rainfall and numerous water courses.
In the riparian system, the right to use water is incidental to ownership of
land adjoining a water course. The governing principle is one of reason-
able use. Riparian rights are correlative; each riparian owner has an equal
right to use water and must share in times of shortage. Riparian rights are
not lost through non-use.'"
The arid conditions of the West made water the limiting factor for
all land use and development.'6 Miners struggling to wrest metallic riches
from the earth and irrigators laboring to keep crops and cattle alive in a
region with rainfall of less than twenty inches per year quickly developed
customs and practices that reflected the reality of the climate. " The first
person on a stream to divert the water and apply it to a beneficial use,
such as mining, stock watering or agriculture, established a priority to
10. Id.
11. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
55-58 (3d ed. 1993).
12. See id at 67,79-80, 83, 85,91-93.
13. See id. at97-98, 103-06.
14. Nicholas Targ, Water Law on the Public Lands: Facing a Fork in the River, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 14, 14 (1997).
15. For a discussion of the riparian system, see A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
AND RESOURCES § 3 (1998).
16. See WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN (1954); WALLACE
STEGNER, THE SOUND OF MOUNTAIN WATER 33 (1969). See generally MARC REISNER, CADILLAC
DESERT (1986) (discussing the development of water rights in various Western states); Wallace
Stegner, The Function of Aridity, WILDERNESS, Fall 1987, at 14-21, 34 [hereinafter Stegner, Aridity]
(discussing the effects of inadequate water supplies in the western United States).
17. See DYAN ZASLOWSKY & T.H. WATKINS, THESE AMERICAN LANDS 110, 118 (2d ed.
1994).
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continue that use, even if later arrivals had no water." Water use was not
incident to land ownership; it could not be, since the land was in the
public domain and owned by the federal government. Although a water
right was regarded as a vested property right, a water user could not sit
on the porch and watch water flow by. Water left in a stream was
"wasted" and rights to its use lost."' Court decisions and legislatures sub-
sequently legitimized these customs and practices as the prior appropria-
tion doctrine of water allocation."0
Although it clearly did not need to do so, the federal government
acquiesced in the establishment of water rights in the West through local
customs and state laws. In a series of statutes between 1866 and 1877,21
Congress acknowledged the validity of water rights granted by "local
custom, laws, and decisions of courts."2 The best known of these stat-
utes, the Desert Land Act,' provided that settlers and homesteaders on
the public lands would have rights to water "necessarily used for the pur-
pose of irrigation and reclamation," and that all other unappropriated
water, from whatever source, "shall remain and be held free for the ap-
propriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining, and manufactur-
ing purposes subject to existing rights."'2
The Supreme Court enthusiastically supported federal acquiescence
to state water law. In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
18. See Stegner, Aridity, supra note 16, at 16.
19. See REISNER, supra note 16, at 12. Reisner expressed the idea as follows:
In the West, lack of water is the central fact of existence, and a whole culture and set of
values have grown up around it. In the East, to "waste" water is to consume it needlessly
or excessively. In the West, to waste water is not to consume it-to let it flow unimpeded
and undiverted down rivers.
id.
20. Cf., e.g., TARLOCK, supra note 15, § 5 (describing the loss of water rights through nonuse
and abandonment under the prior appropriation doctrine); Owen L. Anderson et al., Prior Appro-
priation, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, §§ 11-15, 17 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (explaining that
under certain circumstances, water rights may be lost by nonuse).
21. See Pamela Baldwin, Wilderness Areas and Federal Water Rights, Cong. Research Serv.
1, 4 (Jan. 4, 1989). As noted by Ms. Baldwin, the Supreme Court, in United States v. New Mexico,
cited congressional hearings listing 37 statutes "in which Congress has expressly recognized the
importance of deferring to state water law." United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 n.5
(1978) (citing Federal-State Water Rights: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation
and Reclamation of the Senate Comt on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 302-10 (1964));
see Baldwin, supra, at 4.
22. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners Over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1994)).
The provision, which is typical of the statutes noted above, states in full:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural,
manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized
and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and decision of courts, the possessors and
owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same ....
Id.
23. Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321
(1994)).
24. Id. § 1, 19 Stat. at 377.
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Cement Co.,' for example, the Court praised the states' prior appropria-
tion doctrine as essential to "the future growth and well-being of the en-
tire region."' The Desert Land Act, said the Court, "effected a severance
of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from
the land itself."" Thus, "following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-
navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris,
subject to the plenary control of the designated states. ''U
HI. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS DocTRINE
A. Reserved Water Rights for Native American Reservations: Winters v.
United States"
Despite the assumption that state law would govern the appropriation
of water, even on federal lands, the states' right to control water alloca-
tion was, and continues to be, subject to overriding federal power. Under
the Constitution, Congress has the authority to regulate and control navi-
gation2 interstate commerce,3 and the federal lands." Moreover, state
law in conflict with federal law must yield under the Constitution's Su-
premacy Clause." The Supreme Court has consistently held that federal
water rights exist where Congress chooses to preempt state law, and
where necessary, to fulfill federal purposes.' These rights are reserved
from state appropriation and provide for federally controlled and man-
aged water for the public lands.35
Of course, the federal government may apply for water rights under
state law, as any other property owner. There are many occasions, how-
ever, when a right acquired under state law may not adequately serve the
federal purposes.' For example, some state laws require a diversion of
water as a prerequisite to obtaining a water right, which may interfere
25. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
26. California Or. Power, 295 U.S. at 157.
27. Id. at 158.
28. Id. at 163--64.
29. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
30. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,703 (1899); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824).
31. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that water itself is an article of com-
merce and, therefore, is subject to federal regulation. 458 U.S. 941,953-54 (1982)
32. The "Property Clause" authorizes Congress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2. The federal government owns the public domain as both an ordinary proprietor and as sover-
eign. Cf Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (interpreting the federal government's
authority over the public lands as virtually without limitation).
33. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States.. . shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
34. See 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 328,346 (1982); Targ, supra note 14, at 16.
35. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
36. See Baldwin, supra note 21, at 7.
[Vol. 76:2
WATER FOR WILDERNESS
with a federal purpose to maintain an area in a natural condition. Even
those states which recognize instrean flow rights usually severely limit
the quantity of those rights and rank them behind consumptive uses.37
Furthermore, it seems somewhat incongruous for the federal government
to have to go with bucket in hand to the states to ask for water to sustain
the natural resources of the federal lands.9
The Supreme Court first alluded to the existence of federal reserved
water rights in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.9 In
Rio Grande, the Court considered whether an irrigation company, oper-
ating under state law, could be enjoined from diverting water at a rate
that threatened the navigability of a river.' The Court held that the state
law was subject to the federal government's superior authority over
navigable waters:
[I]n the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot by
its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of
lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far
at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government
property...."
The doctrine of federal reserved rights was more fully developed in
Winters v. United States; indeed, it is frequently called the "Winters
Doctrine." The Winters case involved a conflict between claims for water
of Native Americans living on the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana
and upstream settlers using water pursuant to perfected state water
rights. '3 In 1888, the reservation originally set aside for many of the tribes
living in Montana was reduced in size, with the agreement of the Native
Americans." The smaller reservation was thought to be more suitable for
37. See id.; see also A. Dan Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream Flow Rights: New Public
Western Water Rights, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1, 24-2 to -3 (1979) (describing instream
use as vulnerable).
38. The United States does participate as a party in general stream adjudications, which are
proceedings held pursuant to state water law to determine the rights and priorities of all water rights
holders on a stream or stream system. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994),
waives the sovereign immunity of the United States and permits the federal government to be joined
in lawsuits adjudicating all the rights on a river system, including federal reserved rights. See Dugan
v. Rank, 372 U.S. 509, 618 (1963); see also Tarlock, supra note 15, § 7.03 (discussing how admin-
istrative adjudication qualifies for a waiver of sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment
provided there is ultimately a judicial determination of the claims). For a history of the McCarran
Amendment, see John E. Thorson, State Watershed Adjudications: Approaches and Alternatives, 42
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-6 to -7, 22-13 to -19 (1996).
39. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
40. See Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 690.
41. Id. at 703.
42. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
43. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
44. See id. at 575-76.
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promoting an agrarian way of life.' It also permitted the United States to
make the remaining land available for settlement.'
The settlers who moved into the newly opened lands wanted water
for agriculture and domestic purposes. By 1900, upstream settlers began
to appropriate water from the Milk River, diminishing the flow available
to the Native Americans.' The United States, on behalf of the tribes,
asserted a right to the water, based on Congress's purposes in creating
the reservation.'
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Native Americans, finding
that water sufficient to carry out the purposes of the reservation was re-
served when the lands were set aside.' The Court acknowledged that
neither the treaty with the Native Americans establishing the reservation
nor the act of Congress ratifying that treaty explicitly created water
rights." The Court reasoned, however, that Congress intended to reserve
the water simultaneously with the land because, without water, the arid
land would be useless and the purpose of the agreement would be de-
feated." Thus, "[tihe power of the [federal] government to reserve the
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not
denied, and could not be."'5 Winters established that water may be re-
served by implication, notwithstanding state law or the existence of state
water rights conferred after the creation of a federal land reservation. The
Winters Doctrine superimposes judicially created federal water rights on
a state system that bases water rights on prior appropriation.
B. Extension of the Winters Doctrine to Other Federal Land Reservations
For many years, it was assumed that the Winters Doctrine applied
only to Native American reservations.3 The Supreme Court reinforced
this presumption in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co.,' in which the Court reaffirmed the effect of the Desert Land
Act on the water resources of the public domain.' It was not until 1955
that the Supreme Court held that federal reserved water rights are created
by implication when Congress sets aside federal lands other than Native
American reservations. In Federal Power Commission v. Oregon' (Pel-
ton Dam), the Court held that the federal land laws, which had severed
45. Cf. if. at 576.
46. See id. at 568.
47. See id. at 567.




52. Id. at 577.
53. See Baldwin, supra note 21, at 5; Weis, supra note 4, at 131.
54. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
55. See California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 157-58, 163--64.
56. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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water rights from land conveyed to federal patentees, applied only to
public domain lands, not to reserved lands. 7 This meant that state law did
not control the disposition of water on federal reservations. 8
Thirteen years after the Pelton Dam case and fifty-five years after
Winters, the Supreme Court, in Arizona v. California,9 extended the fed-
eral reserved rights doctrine to national recreation areas, national forests,
and wildlife refuges.' Subsequently, the Supreme Court and a number of
lower courts have applied the doctrine to military facilities,' national
monuments,'2 national parks,' subterranean waterholes," and mineral hot
springs.' The cases "put the pieces together into the following rule:"'
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government with-
draws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal
purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water
then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose
of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a reserved
right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reserva-
tion and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation
of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8,
which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Prop-
erty Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of federal
lands. The doctrine applies to [Native American] reservations and
57. See Pelton Dam, 349 U.S. at 444-46. The Court held that the Federal Power Commission
was not required to obtain the consent of the State of Oregon before it permitted a private company
to construct and operate a hydroelectric dam on federal lands, even though, as Justice Douglas noted
in his dissent, the water that would flow through the dam theoretically belonged to the state. See id.
at 452-53 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The decision implied that the licensee was exercising a right of
the federal government to use water reserved at the time the dam site was reserved. See id. at 443-
45; see also 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 213. The Departments of Agriculture and Inte-
rior suspended and subsequently withdrew the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion's decision regarding the
filing of water rights claims for federally designated lands in the National Wilderness Preservation
System. See 58 Fed. Reg. 68,629 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 19,692 (1994).
58. Cf Baldwin, supra note 21, at 5-6.
59. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
60. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601. The Court stated:
The [Water] Master ruled that the principle underlying the reservation of water rights for
[Native American) Reservations was equally applicable to other federal establishments
such as National Recreation Areas and National Forests. We agree with the conclusions
of the Master that the United States intended to reserve water sufficient for the future re-
quirements of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake National Wild-
life Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge and the Gila National Forest.
Id. The Supreme Court considered the question of the extent of the federal reserved water rights for
National Forests in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978).
61. See Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600, 604 (D. Nev. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
62. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976).
63. See United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 30 (Colo. 1982).
64. See Denver, 656 P.2d at 31-32.
65. See id. at 33-34. For a discussion of the application of the reserved rights doctrine to the
various federal land systems, see Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew;
Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1976 BYU L. REv. 639, 641; Targ, supra note
14, at 16-18; Weis, supra note 4, at 130-31.
66. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 6.
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other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable and
nonnavigable streams.67
In sum, the courts recognize that federal reserved water rights may be
inferred from a congressional (or executive) reservation of federal land."
However, simply because Congress has the authority to reserve water
rights for an area set aside for particular purposes does not mean that it,
in fact, has done so.
Four questions arise. The first two are whether Congress's action
with respect to the federal land involved constitutes a "reservation," i.e.,
the dedication of an area of the public domain for specified purposes;'
and if so, whether Congress intended to reserve water rights, either ex-
plicitly or by implication, in the legislation effecting the reservation. In-
tent may be inferred if unappropriated water is necessary to accomplish
the purposes for which the reservation was created.' The third and fourth
questions concern the date on which the reserved rights vest in the
United States, which is generally simultaneous with the reservation of
the land, and the extent of the water rights reserved. The federal reserved
rights doctrine reserves "only that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the [primary] purpose[s] of the reservation, no more."' As the Supreme
Court stated in United States v. New Mexico:
Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a fed-
eral reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the
face of Congress' express deference to state water law in other areas,
that the United States intended to reserve the necessary water. Where
water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, how-
ever, there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, con-
sistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire wa-
ter in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.
67. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138 (citing Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 805 (1976)).
68. In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the State of Arizona argued that an Execu-
tive Order could not reserve water rights. The Court stated:
In our view, these reservations, like those created directly by Congress, were not limited
to land, but included waters as well.... We can give but short shrift at this late date to
the argument that the reservations either of land or water are invalid because they were
originally set apart by the Executive.
Arizona, 373 U.S. at 598.
69. Cf. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 854-55 (discussing the definition of "reserva-
tion" and distinguishing reserved lands from those "withdrawn" from the public domain). For a
discussion of Block and subsequent proceedings, see infra notes 101-57 and accompanying text.
70. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138; see also Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600; Block, 622 F. Supp. at
852-53.
71. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141; see United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,700 (1978).
72. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702. In New Mexico, the Supreme Court ruled that the "outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish" purposes of National Forests identified in
section 528 of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994), are "supple-
mental to" the primary purposes of "improv[ing] and protect[ing] the forest ... securing favorable
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All four of these questions are raised by the issue of federal reserved
water rights for wilderness. Is wilderness a reservation? Did Congress
intend to give wilderness areas water rights? How much water is set
aside for designated wilderness areas? When do the water rights, if any,
vest?
IV. FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR WILDERNESS
A. The Language and Legislative History of the Wilderness Act
The Wilderness Act is silent concerning water rights reserved for the
wilderness areas designated under its authority. The Act does include
two rather cryptic references to water. The first, section 4(d)(4), provides
for the construction of facilities for water diversion or impoundment
within wilderness areas upon the President's determination that such
development is in the public interest.' It was included in S. 1176, the
1957 version of the Wilderness Bill, ' and has never been used."
The second reference to water, section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act,
states, "Nothing in this [Act] shall constitute an express or implied claim
or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from
State water laws."' 6 Section 4(d)(6) first appeared in 1958 in S. 4028.'
conditions of water flows, and... furnish[ing] a continuous supply of timber" set forth in section
475 of the Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1994). New Mexico, 438 U.S. at
713-14. The Court held that the federal water rights reserved for National Forests are limited to
those required to fulfill the primary purposes. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 712-13, 715. This ruling
prompted Justice Powell to doubt that "the forests which Congress intended to 'improve and protect'
are the still, silent, lifeless places envisioned by the Court." Id. at 719 (Powell, J., dissenting). The
Justice further stated:
In my view, the forests consist of the birds, animals, and fish--the wildlife-that inhabit
them, as well as the trees, flowers, shrubs, and grasses. I therefore would hold that the
United States is entitled to so much water as is necessary to sustain the wildlife of the
forests, as well as the plants.
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
73. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4) (1994). The legislative history of
this section indicates that it was intended to allow "minor water resource conservation measures
[and] small watershed developments." John D. Leshy, Water and Wilderness/Law and Politics, 23
LAND & WATER L. REV. 389, 402 n.53 (1988) (construing 109 CONG. REc. 5892 (1963) (statement
of Sen. Frank Church)).
74. See Patricia Byrnes & Burnita A. Bell, The Wilderness Society and the Wilderness Bill, 58
WILDERNEss 4, 4 (1994). The first wilderness bill was introduced in the Senate on June 7, 1956 by
Sen. Hubert Humphrey. It took eight years, 18 hearings, and some 66 versions of the bill before
Congress approved the Wilderness Act of 1964. See id. at 4; see also ZASLOWSKY, supra note 17, at
218-20 (recounting milestones in wilderness legislation since the Wilderness Act).
75. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 402. The most significant attempt to invoke section 4(d)(4)
occurred when the Denver Water Board sought to build a trans-basin diversion in the Eagle's Nest
Wilderness above Vail, Colorado. See id. at 402 n.54.
76. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(7), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6). This section was originally enacted as
section 4(d)(7). See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 211. The Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1650 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994)), repealed former
item (5) of section 4(d) (having to do with the Boundary Waters Canoe Area), and renumbered the
remaining items. Although the reference to section 4(d)(6) is correct, many commentators, courts,
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The provision was included in the bill to respond to concerns expressed
by the California Department of Water Resources expressed during
hearings on S. 1176 in 1957.8 There is also some indication that the sen-
tence was adapted from proposals made by the United States Forest
Service, 9 which steadfastly opposed wilderness legislation throughout its
eight years of consideration by the Congress.
As initially introduced, the provision stated that nothing in the Wil-
derness Act constituted "an express or implied claim on the part of the
United States for exemption from State water laws."' This was changed
to the final "no claim or denial" language."
Little contemporaneous evidence exists as to the intended meaning
of the new language. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report
on Wilderness Areas and Water Rights reviewed what there is, including
the report of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, which
stated, "Federal-State relationships concerning water laws and wildlife
are maintained without change,"'2 and the comment of Senator Hubert
Humphrey, one of the principal sponsors of the legislation, who said of
the new language:
Paragraph 5, the last in this section, contains language vital to col-
leagues from the West. When the first wilderness bill was being dis-
cussed, some of its opponents charged that its enactment would
change existing water laws and would deprive local communities of
water, both domestic and irrigation. Although this was certainly not
the intention of the sponsors, it has seemed necessary to insert a short
sentence to remove any doubts. 3
and the Solicitor of the United States Department of the Interior refer to it as section 4(d)(7). See
1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 219-31.
77. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 221.
78. See Nat'l Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 1176 Before the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong. 286-87 (1957) [hereinafter S. 1176 Hearings] (statement of
William Berry, Chief of Division of Resources Planning, California Department of Water Re-
sources). Apparently, the California agencies were concerned about the effect of decisions, such as
the Pelton Dam case, on state water law. To address their concerns, the agencies proposed an
amendment to S. 1176 to subject all unappropriated water in wilderness areas to appropriation in
accordance with state law. See id.; see also 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 220-26 (ad-
dressing concerns over the extension of the reserved rights doctrine and its potentially overreaching
effect on state water law); Baldwin, supra note 21, at 30-32 (discussing proposed changes in the bill
by the western states to assure the integrity and maintenance of state water law).
79. Cf S. 1176 Hearings, supra note 78, at 286-87 (1957) (statement of William Berry, Chief
of Div. of Resources Planning, Cal. Dep't of Water Resources).
80. Baldwin, supra note 21, at 32.
81. See id. at 32-33; see also 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 224; infra text accom-
panying notes 164-73.
82. See Baldwin, supra note 21, at 28-29 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 87-2521, at 27 (1962)).




Based on an extensive examination of other legislative history of the
Wilderness Act, the CRS concluded that the most probable interpretation
of section 4(d)(6) is that the Wilderness Act is not meant to change ex-
isting state water law, but to acknowledge the existence of both federal
and state water rights." Indeed, the federal government read the section
this way until 1988, when the Interior Department Solicitor issued his
Opinion interpreting the section as expressly disclaiming the creation of
water rights for wilderness."
Although the meaning of section 4(d)(6) is subject to conflicting
interpretations, Congress later used the same language in the National
Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 19666 and the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act of 1968. ' The Refuge System Act does not explain the
provision, and the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California held that fed-
eral reserved water rights exist for National Wildlife Refuges, without
referring to section 4(d)(6)."
Many of the key proponents of the Wilderness Act, including
Senators Humphrey and Kuchel, sponsored the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act of 1968.' In contrast to the Wilderness Act, the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act expressly reserves water rights sufficient to fulfill the pur-
poses of the Act.' It also includes the "neither claim or denial" language
used in the Wilderness Act.9 These facts led the CRS to conclude that the
language indicated Congress's intent to preserve the status quo of water
law, which recognizes both federal reserved and state appropriated water
rights.' Under the status quo, neither the Wilderness Act nor the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act would affect valid existing water rights perfected
under state law or prevent future appropriations unless they impaired
statutory purposes or the administration of the federal statute."
84. See id. at 35.
85. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 213. For discussion of the Solicitor's Opin-
ion, see infra Part V.
86. See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(i) (1994).
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b) (1994).
88. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). In United States v. Vesterso, 828
F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1987), the Eighth Circuit interpreted the claim or denial language as used in the
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act. The court said that the purpose of the provi-
sion was to maintain federal-state relationships concerning water laws without change, to prevent a
general preemption of state water laws as they affected federal easements. See Vesterso, 828 F.2d at
1240. The Vesterso court cited Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985), with ap-
proval. See Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1240.
89. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1994); see Baldwin, supra note 21, at 38.
90. See 16 U.S.C. § 1284(c).
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B. Judicial Consideration of Wilderness Federal Reserved Water Rights
For more than twenty years, the general assumption was that wilder-
ness, like other federal land systems, had federal reserved water rights.
The System grew steadily from its birth weight of 9.1 million acres in
1964, with the addition of new areas within national forests, national
parks, and national wildlife refuges." (The Bureau of Land Management
did not receive a wilderness mandate until the enactment of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,"' and has moved with glacial
speed since that time to evaluate and recommend areas for wilderness
designation.) Between 1964 and 1988, virtually all of the bills creating
wilderness areas said nothing about water rights. A few bills repeated the
language of section 4(d)(6)."
In 1979, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior analyzed the
nature and extent of federal reserved water rights for several federal land
systems, including wilderness. 7 After reviewing the legislative purposes
of "preserving and protecting wilderness in its natural condition without
permanent improvements or human habitation, to fulfill public purposes
of recreation, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historic
use, ' the Solicitor's Opinion concluded that "formally designated wil-
derness areas receive reserved water rights necessary to accomplish these
purposes." Subsequent Solicitors modified this Opinion, but the section
on wilderness was unchanged until 1988."
No court considered the issue of whether designated wilderness has
federal reserved water rights until 1985, when the Sierra Club sued the
United States Forest Service for its failure to claim federal reserved wa-
ter rights for Colorado wilderness areas. In Sierra Club v. Block,'' the
Sierra Club sought a judicial determination that wilderness areas have
reserved rights and that the federal agencies charged with management
responsibility for these areas are obligated to protect them.'"
94. See Margaret Shulenberger, Annotation, Construction and Application of Wilderness Act
(16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131 et seq.) Providing for National Wilderness Preservation System, 14 A.L.R.
FED. 508 nn.5-6 (1973).
95. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 603,43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994).
96. See Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-406, § 101(e)(1), 98 Stat. 1485,
1488; California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, § 304(h), 98 Stat. 1619, 1624 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 543c(h) (1994)).
97. See 1979 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 2, at 553.
98. Id. at 609 & n.104.
99. Id. at 609-10.
100. See CoGGINs, supra note 11, at 386-87, 397.
101. 622 F. Supp. 842,846 (D. Colo. 1985).
102. See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 846. To date, the only other case to consider whether federal
agencies have a duty to protect federal reserved water rights is Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp.
443, 451-52 (D.D.C. 1980), affd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The court concluded that federal agencies have discretion to use whatever methods they choose to
protect wilderness water. See Andrus, 487 F. Supp. at 448.
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As John Leshy observed, the controversy began modestly enough. 3
The states had won "[a] series of bruising battles over the extent to which
the state courts could adjudicate federal Winters rights," and now had the
opportunity in general stream adjudications to quantify the federal right
and fold it into the state water rights system. " In Colorado, the Forest
Service, faced with a deadline to file water rights claims in a stream ad-
judication, refused to assert federal reserved rights for the wilderness
areas affected by the adjudication."3 According to Leshy, the federal
government decided "to relinquish its claim to a valuable property right
by not asserting it in the adjudication. The Sierra Club sued, and the fun
began., ,'6
The defendant-intervenors in the case argued that the Wilderness Act
does not reserve lands. 7 Rather, it reclassifies previously withdrawn and
reserved lands and, therefore, wilderness areas are limited to the water
rights set aside for the land system from which they are created."' The
Wilderness Act is simply a "set of statutory land management direc-
tives.' ' Wilderness purposes are secondary, claimed the defendant-
intervenors, and Congress did not intend to reserve additional water
rights for them."
The defendant-intervenors based much of their argument on the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. New Mexico."' In New Mex-
ico, the Supreme Court held that the additional purposes created by the
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSY)"' for national forests
were supplemental to the primary purposes for which forests were re-
served under the Forest Service Organic Act,"3 and, therefore, did not
provide additional water rights."'
The Block court rejected this argument, based on the language and
legislative history of the Wilderness Act."' The court stated that, al-
though wilderness designation was not the original withdrawal and res-
ervation from the public domain, it does not follow that wilderness is not
withdrawn and reserved."6 In particular, the court noted that wilderness
103. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 392.
104. Id.; see supra note 38 (explaining general stream adjudications).
105. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 392.
106. Id.
107. See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 851.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 855.
110. See id. at 859.
111. 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978).
112. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
113. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551 (1994).
114. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715.
115. See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 855-58.
116. See id. at 857-58. Wilderness areas are created from lands in national forests, national
parks, national wildlife refuges, as well as public domain lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Land Management. See id. at 858.
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areas established pursuant to the Act are withdrawn from use-related
laws that permit activities inconsistent with the preservation of wilder-
ness qualities, and are dedicated for particular federal purposes" 7 These
purposes include their "preservation and protection in their natural con-
dition... to secure for the American people of present and future gen-
erations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness.""8 The legis-
lative history of the Wilderness Act, said the court, reveals that the crea-
tion of a National Wilderness Preservation System was "foremost in the
minds of the members of Congress.""' 9 The court distinguished the Su-
preme Court's analysis of MUSY in New Mexico, ruling that the Wilder-
ness Act does not "constitute an attempt to add to the primary purposes
of existing reservations," but is instead "initial legislation creating an
entirely new reservation of federal lands.' '
After finding that the Wilderness Act effected a withdrawal and res-
ervation of water rights, the court considered the question of whether
Congress intended to reserve unappropriated water for those areas. It
relied on the Supreme Court's rulings in Cappaert and New Mexico that
intent to reserve water rights may be inferred if unappropriated water is
necessary to accomplish the primary purposes for which the reservation
was created.'2' To determine the primary purposes of wilderness, the
court carefully reviewed the statements of purpose contained in the Wil-
derness Act that "wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public pur-
poses of recreation, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and
historical use."'" The court also cited the remarks of various members of
Congress that "the primary motivation of Congress in establishing the
wilderness preservation system was to 'guarantee[] that these lands will
be kept in their original untouched natural state.""'  The court deter-
mined that, unlike MUSY, all of the purposes expressed in the Wilder-
ness Act are primary." Congress, therefore, reserved sufficient water to
fulfill all of them.'" The court emphasized that "water is the lifeblood of
the wilderness areas. Without water, the wilderness would become de-
serted wastelands [and] ... the very purposes for which the Wilderness
Act was established would be entirely defeated. Clearly, this result was
not intended by Congress."'"
Although the court ruled that Congress reserved water rights by wil-
derness designation, it did not find the agency's failure to claim the
117. See id.
118. Id. at 850 (quoting Wilderness Act § 4(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (1994)).
119. ld. at 858.
120. Id. at 860.
121. See id. at 853.
122. Id. at 858 (quoting Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b)).
123. Id. at 850 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 17,448 (1964) (statement of Rep. Cleveland)).





rights to be arbitrary and capricious." Instead, it held that federal agen-
cies have a duty to protect the water resources of wilderness areas, but no
specific statutory obligation to claim federal reserved water rights."
These [Wilderness Act] mandates evince Congress' intent to impose a
duty on the administering agencies to protect and preserve all wilder-
ness resources, including water. Thus, there is a general duty under
the Wilderness Act to protect and preserve wilderness water re-
sources. There is, however, no specific statutory duty to claim re-
served water rights in the wilderness areas even though Congress im-
pliedly reserved such rights in order to effectuate the purposes of the
Act.... [RIeserved water rights is only one of several tools available
to federal defendants to meet their statutory duty to protect and pre-
serve wilderness water resources. '
The government argued that it had alternative ways to protect wilderness
water and did not need to claim federal reserved rights. The court found
the record on these alternative approaches inadequate and remanded the
matter to the Forest Service to prepare a more definite statement of the
agency's plans to protect water in Colorado's wilderness in light of the
ruling that the Wilderness Act reserved water rights.'
Addressing the government's subsequent appeal in Sierra Club v.
Lyng,'3' the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case
because the Forest Service had not prepared its plan and, consequently,
the district court's order was not final and reviewable.' 32
In November of 1986, the Forest Service submitted its report.'3 3 Two
months later, the Sierra Club filed a second lawsuit challenging the suffi-
ciency of the agency's plan for protecting wilderness water in
Colorado.'" The district court reiterated its earlier holding that "federal
127. See id. at 864-65.
128. See id. at 864.
129. Id. at 864-65. The court in Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 448 (D.D.C. 1980),
reached the same conclusion with respect to the protection of water resources for national parks and
recreation areas. At least two commentators argue that the court was mistaken in holding that federal
agencies have discretion to use whatever methods they choose to protect wilderness water. See
Robert H. Abrams, Water in the Western Wilderness: The Duty to Assert Reserved Water Rights,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 395-99 (1986); Jason Marks, Comment, The Duty of Agencies to Assert
Reserved Water Rights in Wilderness Areas, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639, 659 (1987). They also maintain
that both the doctrine of federal reserved water rights and the Wilderness Act indicate that agencies
have an obligation to protect water rights as well as water flows. See Abrams, supra, at 396-99;
Marks, supra, at 659. Only Congress has the authority to designate a wilderness. When it does so,
under the doctrine of federal reserved water rights, it also reserves the water rights necessary to
fulfill the purposes of the reservation. See id. at 639. Reserved water rights are not just one technique
available to the agency; they are the mechanism chosen by Congress. Federal agencies lack discre-
tion to ignore Congress's action. See id. at 655-659, 661.
130, See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 865.
131. 661 F. Supp. 1490, 1492 (D. Colo. 1987).
132. See Lyng, 661 F. Supp at 1492.
133. Seeid.
134. See id. at 1490.
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reserved water rights do exist in previously unappropriated water" in
wilderness areas designated pursuant to the Wilderness Act."' It then
turned to the plan and concluded that the alternatives suggested by the
agency "present[ed] an abuse of discretion under 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A)."'" The court found the Forest Service's plan was "woefully
inadequate and constitute[d] an insouciant disregard of the government's
statutory responsibility to protect wilderness area federal reserved water
rights.'"" It rejected the plan and ordered the Forest Service to try
again.' 8 In doing so, the court recognized that a political agenda was
clearly at work:
[T]he issues in this case are permeated with conflicting philosophical
views and economic interests which properly should be resolved by
the political branches of government.... [However, u]ntil enlight-
ened by a more precise articulation of legislative policy, it is my intent
to enforce with vigor the intent of Congress as I perceive it to be.'"
In the second round of this litigation, the court addressed a new
claim advanced by the defendant-intervenors that the legislative history
of section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act (the "neither claim or denial"
provision) indicated that Congress did not intend to create any new fed-
eral water rights which would interfere with water development by the
states."' The federal government disagreed with the defendant-
intervenors, asserting that section 4(d)(6) and its legislative history re-
flected Congress's intent to be "neutral" on the question of federal re-
served water rights and existing state water law.'
The court declined to "delve into the labyrinthine complexities" of
the parties' arguments and relied instead on the "plain reading" of the
section. 2 The court decided that section 4(d)(6) is "simply a disclaimer,"
expressing Congress's wish to "maintain the status quo of basic water
law.' 41 3 Rather than bolster the intervenors' arguments, said the court, the
section negated them because it does not work any substantive change in
135. Id. at 1492 (quoting Block, 622 F. Supp. at 862).
136. Id. at 1501.
137. Id.
138. A more detailed second report was filed, which again concluded that water for wilderness
could be protected without claiming federal reserved rights. See COGGINs, supra note 11, at 397.
"The Sierra Club did not challenge the substance of this report and the district court entered a final
judgment simply declaring that the Wilderness Act reserved water rights under the Winters Doc-
trine." l; cf Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1422 (10th Cir. 1990) (repudiating the govern-
ment's contention that Forest Service inaction could not be adjudicated in federal court).
139. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1502.
140. See id. at 1492-93.





the rights parties may acquire under the various doctrines of water law,
including the reserved rights doctrine.'"
Again the federal government appealed. This time the Tenth Circuit
vacated the judgment below on the grounds that the case was not ripe for
review. 5 The court of appeals held that the district court erred in grant-
ing a declaratory judgment that the Wilderness Act created federal re-
served water rights.'" The Sierra Club had not established actual or im-
minent harm to any wilderness areas from the agency's failure to claim
water rights, and consequently, the Club's claim for judicial review was
"speculative and contingent."'"
The appellate court did confirm that the Wilderness Act imposes on
federal agencies an affirmative duty to administer wilderness areas so as
to "preserve [their] wilderness character."'4 8 If the Forest Service had
permitted strip mining, road construction, or other activities directly in-
consistent with the Wilderness Act, the court said, it could review that
action.' 9 Otherwise, except in those circumstances where an agency's
action cannot be reconciled with the Act's mandate to preserve the char-
acter of a wilderness area, an agency's decision to use or not to use fed-
eral reserved water rights, allegedly created by the Wilderness Act, is
committed to agency discretion by law."
The Congressional Research Service prepared a detailed analysis of
the Tenth Circuit's opinion.' Its report pointed out that the court of ap-
peals had overlooked the fact that the United States was at the time
joined in Colorado water proceedings, which the Supreme Court has
found to be appropriate for the adjudication of federal reserved water
rights.'52 These proceedings determine the legal rights and priorities of all
persons, including the United States, along various water courses. The
Supreme Court has held that the judgments resulting from these pro-
ceedings are final and binding on the United States.' 3 Thus, the failure of
the Forest Service to claim federal reserved water rights in the adjudica-
tion could result in the impairment or even permanent loss of water
rights. The CRS report stated, "[Q]uite arguably, agency officials would
have a duty to claim federal rights in general water adjudications when
144. See id. at 1494.
145. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1419 (10th Cir. 1990).
146. See Yeutter, 911 F.2dat 1421.
147. id.
148. Id. at 1413 (quoting Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1994)).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1414.
151. See P. Baldwin, Memorandum from American Law Division on Analysis and Implications
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failing to do so would be the equivalent of disposing of the property in-
terests of the United States."'5'
The response to the Sierra Club litigation was swift. The Solicitor
of the Department of the Interior prepared an Opinion repudiating the
whole concept of a wilderness water right.5 On Capitol Hill, Senator
Armstrong of Colorado introduced an amendment to a Colorado wilder-
ness bill that expressly renounced any Winters water right claim, not only
for the areas that the bill would designate, but for areas designated by
previous acts, dating back to 1964.'" When environmentalists opposed
the amendment, Senator Armstrong withdrew his support for the bill as a
whole, and it died.' 7 The Senator's actions set the tone for congressional
debate over water and wilderness for the next several years.
V. THE SOLICITOR'S OPINION OF 1988
In an Opinion, dated July 26, 1988, the Solicitor of the Interior De-
partment decided, "[o]n the basis of a detailed examination of the Wil-
derness Act and its legislative history," that Congress did not intend to
reserve water rights when it provided for the designation of wilderness
areas." This Opinion superseded the 1979 Opinion. It also represented a
reversal of the position taken by the federal government in Sierra Club v.
Lyng'5 ' that section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act reflected Congress's
intent to be "neutral" on the issue of federal reserved water rights and
state water law."w The Solicitor concluded that wilderness is not a pri-
mary reservation;'" wilderness designation simply imposes certain man-
agement restrictions on existing federal reservations." The Solicitor de-
termined that Congress meant wilderness purposes to be secondary to the
purposes of the underlying reservations from which wilderness areas are
created."
The Solicitor interpreted section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act
(which the Opinion refers to as section 4(d)(7))' as specifically dis-
154. Id. For a thorough discussion of the issue of agency discretion not to claim water rights,
see Marks, supra note 129, at 655-59.
155. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 213.
156. See Weis, supra note 4, at 145-46. Section 7 of this proposal stated:
No provisions of this Act nor any other Act of Congress designating areas in Colorado as
part of the National Wilderness Preservation System, nor any guidelines, rules, or regula-
tions issued thereunder, shall constitute the establishment of a right to the use or flow of
water in the Federal Government because of the designation....
S. 2916, 98th Cong. § 7 (1984).
157. See Weis, supra note 4, at 145-46.
158. 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 213.
159. 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987).
160. See Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1493.
161. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 218.
162. See id. at 224.
163. See id. at 234-36.
164. See supra note 76 (explaining the numbering of sections).
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claiming the creation of new water rights, while preserving existing fed-
eral reserved water rights for Native American reservations, national
forests, and national parks.'" According to the Solicitor, the "no express
or implied claim" language of section 4(d)(6) was meant to "alleviate the
concerns of western states" following the Pelton Dam decision holding
that the Wilderness Act would provide the basis for the assertion of ad-
ditional federal reserved water rights.'" In support of his analysis, the
Solicitor referred to various portions of the legislative history, particu-
larly the testimony of the California State Water Resources Department
and the statement of Senator Hubert Humphrey, discussed previously.'67
The Solicitor stressed that while section 4(d)(6) disclaimed the
creation of any new or additional reserved water rights, it retained exist-
ing federal reserved water rights.'" Congress added the "no denial" clause
to the statutory provision "to safeguard federal reserved water rights then
existing for park, forest and [Native American] purposes."'" The "no
denial" language, said the Solicitor, recognized that wilderness preserva-
tion is one part of the programs carried out in national parks, national
forests and Native American reservations, on which federal reserved
rights already exist.70
To confirm his reading of section 4(d)(6), the Solicitor referred to
the State of California's proposal to disclaim in the Wilderness Act all
federal exemptions from state law. Senate bill S. 1176 included Califor-
nia's recommended language in 1957, but subsequently modified the
language by the addition of the "no denial" phrase.'7' Since there is little
Wilderness Act legislative history to explain the reasons the phrase was
added, the Solicitor looked to parallel legislative history of the same lan-
guage used in a bill to overturn the Pelton Dam case." This bill was
heard by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the same
committee that would begin to consider wilderness bills two years later."
California had suggested the following provision be included in the bill
to overturn the Pelton Dam decision:
Subject to existing rights under State law, all navigable and nonnavi-
gable waters are hereby reserved for appropriation and use of the
public pursuant to State law, and rights to the use of such waters for
beneficial purposes shall be acquired under State laws relating to the
appropriation, control, use and distribution of such waters. 74
165. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 219, 223-24.
166. Id. at 219, 222.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 77-85.
168. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 223.
169. Id. at 224.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 224-25.
173. See id. at 220.
174. Id. at 225 (quoting The Water Rights Settlement Act, S. 863, 84th Cong. § 6 (1956)).
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The Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel criti-
cized this language as being overbroad and exposing the United States to
the potential loss of vested water rights on federal lands. "' The Solicitor
stated that it was the "fear" of losing federal reserved water rights that
prompted the Committee to substitute the "no claim or denial" language
for California's "subject to existing rights" limitation, not the desire to
extend the reserved rights doctrine to wilderness. The Solicitor asserted
that "[o]nly if this interpretation of section 4(d)(7) is accepted ... do
subsequent descriptions of 4(d)(7) as a 'disclaimer of any interference
with State or Federal water rights' make sense."'"
As noted above, the Solicitor also insisted that Congress did not
specify preservation of wilderness as the primary purpose of the federal
lands in which wilderness areas are designated. The Solicitor relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. New Mexico, which
distinguished between primary and secondary purposes of national for-
ests in determining the extent of federal reserved water rights created by
the reservations." Section 4(a) of the Wilderness Act, he said, "assigns
wilderness purposes a secondary role to other purposes for which the
lands are administered."'"9 The section states, "The purposes of this
chapter are hereby declared to be within and supplemental to the pur-
poses for which national forests and units of the national park and na-
tional wildlife refuge systems are established and administered. . . ."" In
addition, the Wilderness Act specifies that it is not meant to interfere
with the purposes for which national forests are established or to lower
the standards for the use and preservation of the National Park System
units."' As a consequence of these provisions, and in accord with the
Supreme Court's decision in New Mexico, the Solicitor concluded "there
is no implication that water has been reserved for these secondary
uses."
182
The Solicitor spent appreciable time in his Opinion refuting the
three principal arguments against his conclusion that section 4(d)(6) dis-
claims federal water rights.' 3 These arguments are that (1) the language
preserves the status quo of the relationship between federal and state
water rights; (2) the provision represents a congressional compromise on
the construction of water projects in wilderness areas; and (3) the use of
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 225-26 (quoting the legislative hearings associated with S. 174).
178. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978); see also supra notes 111-14
and accompanying text.
179. 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 235.
180. Wilderness Act § 4(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (1994).
181. See Wilderness Act § 4(a)(1), (3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a)(1), (3); see also 1988 Solicitor's
Opinion, supra note 3, at 236.
182. 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 236.
183. See id. at 227-34.
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the same "no claim or denial" language in the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act proves that Congress did not mean to deprive wilderness of reserved
water rights.'
According to the Solicitor, the theory that section 4(d)(6) maintains
congressional neutrality concerning the doctrine of federal reserved wa-
ter rights, doing nothing more than preserving the status quo, would ren-
der the provision essentially meaningless, violating the principle of
statutory construction that legislative provisions are not to be interpreted
as surplusage. The Solicitor disputed that Congress would have added
the "no denial" language simply to negate the "no express or implied
claim" language.'" Rather, Congress added the "no denial" phrase to
prevent misinterpretation of the "no claim" language.'87 Furthermore, at
the time the language was drafted, Congress was considering legislation
to overturn the Pelton Dam case.'88 As a consequence, said the Solicitor,
it is unlikely that Congress wanted to maintain a status quo that included
expanded federal reserved water rights.'"
The Solicitor found the second argument, that section 4(d)(6) repre-
sents an agreement that Congress would negate the guarantee of state
water rights in exchange for protection of access for water projects, un-
supported by the legislative history of the Wilderness Act, and inconsis-
tent with the subsequent course of the wilderness bills." According to
the Solicitor, if such a compromise had been reached, the proponents of
water rights would have ceased opposing the bill and those not party to
the compromise would have opposed the "sacrifice" of their guaranteed
water rights.'9'
On the third argument, that the language used in 4(d)(6) is exactly
the same as in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, which does reserve water
rights, the Solicitor had two responses. The first was that Congress may
use the same language to mean different things in different statutes, and
the views of a subsequent Congress afford no basis for inferring the pur-
poses of an earlier Congress." His more substantive response was that,
although the "wording employed in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and
the Wilderness Act is the same, the statutory context and stated legisla-
tive purpose are in sharp contrast."'"3 The "claim or denial" language
appears in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act in a subsection entitled
184. Cf id
185. See id. at 227.




190. See id. at 230-32.
191. Id. at 231.
192. See id. at 232.
193. Id.
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"Compensation for Water Rights."'' " The purpose of this section, ac-
cording to the Solicitor, is to ensure that vested water rights are not taken
without compensation. " Based on the legislative history of the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, the Solicitor determined that Congress added the "no
claim or denial" language "to prevent the reserved water rights created in
the Act from eliminating existing rights under state laws that were being
taken and which formed the basis for compensation."''
VI. THE AFTERMATH OF THE SoLIcrrOR'S OPINION
Many of the responses to the Solicitor's interpretation of the Wil-
derness Act have already been considered in the review of the Sierra
Club v. Block and Sierra Club v. Lyng decisions, and in the CRS analysis
of the Opinion. As noted, the Solicitor's Opinion conflicted with the
court's conclusions on the application of the reserved rights doctrine,
whether wilderness is a primary reservation of lands, and the meaning of
section 4(d)(6). It also conflicted with the CRS's evaluation of the Wil-
derness Act's legislative history, and the use of identical language in the
National Wildlife Refuge Act and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Fi-
nally, it conflicted with ninety years of judicial interpretation of the
Winters Doctrine.
Although the Opinion was withdrawn in 1994, its issuance in 1988
had an immediate impact on the management of wilderness by federal
agencies, and on the wilderness debate in Congress. Two days after the
Opinion was released, then Attorney General Meese advised Secretary of
the Interior Hodel that he agreed that the Opinion "properly finds that no
legally sufficient basis exists for an implication of federal reserved water
rights for wilderness purposes."'" Attorney General Meese directed fed-
eral agencies not to claim federal reserved water rights for wilderness in
pending general stream adjudications, but to seek water for wilderness
purposes, where appropriate, under state law.'"
After Attorney General Meese left office, the Sierra Club Legal De-
fense Fund (SCLDF), on behalf of the Sierra Club and The Wilderness
Society, requested Attorney General Thornburgh to reconsider the Meese
decision.'" The general stream adjudication for the Virgin River in Utah
194. 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b) (1994).
195. See 1988 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 3, at 232-33.
196. Id. at 233.
197. Letter from Edwin Meese, Attorney General of the United States, to the Honorable Donald
P. Hodel 1 (July 28, 1988)) (on file with author).
198. See id. Attorney General Meese stated: "Accordingly, in the absence of express statutory
language, we will not assert reserved wilderness water rights under federal law in any further litiga-
tion on behalf of the United States, but will seek water for wilderness purposes where appropriate
under states law." Id.
199. See Letter from Laurens Silver, Esq., Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, to the Honorable
Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General of the United States 2 (Sept. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Silver Letter]
(on file with author).
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was pending at the time and the United States was faced with a deadline
for claiming water rights for the Beaver Dam Mountains Wilderness,' °
which Congress designated in the Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984.2
SCLDF expressed concern that the failure of the United States to assert
water rights for the wilderness would result in the loss of these rights in
the adjudication process.' Since the Beaver Dam Wilderness Area was a
mid-stream and not a headwaters wilderness, the failure of the United
States to claim water rights might have resulted in a lack of water for the
entire area if upstream appropriation occurred. 3
Attorney General Thornburgh did not reverse Attorney General
Meese's position concerning the duty of federal agencies to claim water
rights for wilderness in state proceedings, and it continued to be the pol-
icy of the United States for the next five years.' No water rights were
asserted for the Beaver Dam Wilderness in the adjudication of the Virgin
River.'
The Solicitor's Opinion presented the environmental community
with a significant dilemma: whether to insist that the Opinion was incor-
rect and that the Winters Doctrine assured water rights for wilderness, or
to push for the express reservation of water rights in wilderness bills un-
der consideration by the Congress. Both choices were risky. Silence in a
wilderness bill carried the risk that areas designated would be determined
subsequently to have no water rights. An express reservation of water
rights carried the risk that any wilderness legislation without water rights
language would be read as disclaiming water rights for the areas estab-
lished. Since a significant portion of the National Wilderness Preserva-
tion System was created by the Wilderness Act of 1964 and other legis-
lation without express water rights language, the consequences of the
first choice initially appeared to be greater than those that might follow
an express reservation.'
Members of the 100th Congress tried a number of approaches to
water rights language, some with greater success than others. For exam-
ple, after Senator Armstrong's bill died, Senator Timothy Wirth and
Congressman Michael Strang attempted to develop a wilderness bill for
200. See id.
201. Pub. L. No. 98-406, 98 Stat. 1485, 1492.
202. See Silver Letter, supra note 199, at 3.
203. Cf id.
204. The Federal Register notice announcing the withdrawal of the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion
stated that the Attorney General's concurrence in it was withdrawn as well. See Water Rights Under
the Wilderness Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,692, 19,692 (1994).
205. See Interview with K Jack Haugrud, Assistant Chief, General Legislation Section, Envi-
ronment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice (Oct. 13, 1998)
(hereinafter Haugrud Interview].
206. See Letter from Representatives of The Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, and the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation to Jim Martin, State Director, Office of Sen. Timothy Wirth of Colorado
1-3 (Jan. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Wilderness Society Letter] (on file with author).
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Colorado, using two different strategies for water rights.' Senator
Wirth's bill was silent as to federal reserved water rights; Congressman
Strang's bill directed the Secretary of the Interior to claim minimum in-
stream flows for wilderness areas, pursuant to Colorado law, which per-
mits instream appropriations to "preserve the natural environment to a
reasonable degree."'a However, "Congressman Strang's bill did not use
the language of the Colorado instream statute, but instead [proposed to
limit] federal water appropriations to the minimum amount necessary to
preserve 'aquatic life to a reasonable degree."'" The bill also prohibited
federal water appropriations during "drought events."2 "0 Environmental-
ists opposed both the Wirth and the Strang bills as offering insufficient
protection for wilderness qualities and stream flows.2" No wilderness
legislation was enacted for Colorado until 1993."'
The fight over water rights for wilderness convinced the environ-
mental community that silence was no longer golden. Environmental
groups like the Sierra Club and The Wilderness Society worked to per-
suade members of Congress of the need to expressly preserve water
rights in legislation creating federal reservations. Water language became
as big a battleground as acreage and areas, not just for wilderness, but for
national reserves, monuments, national conservation areas, and other
federal land designations. Although the adopted language varied, no bill
claimed that wilderness was not a reservation or stated that wilderness
had no rights to water. The bills that did deny federal reserved water
rights indicated that the use of such rights was not necessary to protect
the wilderness qualities of the designated areas."3
For example, Congress denied the reservation of water rights in the
legislation creating the Hagerman Fossil Beds National Monument and
the City of Rocks National Reserve, but tied the denial to the "unique
circumstances with respect to the water" found in these areas."' Specifi-
cally, Congress determined that there were no resources in the areas re-
quiring the protection of a federal reserved water right. The legislative
language for the Hagerman Fossil Beds Monument reads:
207. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 413-14 nn.93-97; Weis, supra note 4, at 146-48.
208. Weis, supra note 4, at 147 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973)).
209. Id. (quoting H.R. 4233,99th Cong. § 2 (1986)).
210. Id.
211. See id. at 146-47.
212. Cf. Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-77, 107 Stat. 756.
213. The Congressional Research Service and Debbie Sease, Legislative Director of the Sierra
Club, documented the water rights formulations used in the 100th Congress. See Pamela Baldwin,
Express Language on Federal Water Rights in the 100th Congress, Cong. Research Serv. 1, 1 (Feb.
7, 1989) [hereinafter Baldwin, Express Language]; Memorandum from Debbie Sease, Legislative
Director, Sierra Club, to Water List on Water Rights Language (Jan. 26, 1989) (on file with author)
(discussing the legislative language on water rights existing at the time).
214. Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-696, §§ 202(0, 304, 102 Stat.
4571, 4575-76; see Baldwin, Express Language, supra note 213, at 8.
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Congress finds that there are unique circumstances with respect to the
water or water-related resources within the Monument designated by
this title. The Congress recognizes that there is little or no water or
water-related resources that require the protection of a federal reserve
water right. Nothing in this title, nor any action taken pursuant
thereto, shall constitute either an exressed or implied reservation of
water or water right for any purpose.
Congress seemed most comfortable with an express reservation of
some, but not all of the unappropriated water available in the areas des-
ignated. Section 502 of the Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988, for
example, stated "[s]ubject to valid existing rights, within the areas desig-
nated as wilderness by this Act, Congress hereby expressly reserves such
water rights as necessary, for the purposes for which such areas are so
designated.""2 ' This language modified the original language of S. 2165,
which called for the reservation of all the unappropriated water in the




In section 509 of the El Malpais National Monument, New Mex-
ico-Establishment bill,"8 Congress limited the amount of water rights
reserved to the "minimum" necessary to carry out the reservations' pur-
poses, protected valid existing rights, and declared that it did not intend
to set a precedent for future designations or to affect the interpretation of
any other statute:
(a) Congress expressly reserves to the United States the minimum
amount of water required to carry out the purposes for which the na-
tional monument, the conservation area, and the wilderness areas are
designated under this Act....
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect any existing valid or vested
water right, or applications for water rights which are pending as of
the date of enactment of this Act and which are subsequently granted
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as establishing a prece-
dent with regard to any future designations, nor shall it affect the in-
terpretation of any other Act or any designation made pursuant
thereto.2 9
The environmental community regarded the El Malpais language as a
reasonably good approach.2" The express reservation of water rights as-
215. Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act § 304, 102 Stat. at 4576. The City of Rocks National
Reserve used the same approach, and virtually the same language. See id. § 202(0, 102 Stat. at 4575;
see also Baldwin, Express Language, supra note 213, at 8-9.
216. Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-668, § 502, 102 Stat. 3961, 3968.
217. See Baldwin, Express Language, supra note 213, at 4.
218. Pub. L. No. 100-225, § 509, 101 Stat. 1539, 1549 (1987).
219. Id. § 509(a)-(c), 101 Stat. at 1549.
220. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 415-17. Leshy disagreed with this assessment, calling the El
Malpais language "not a terrible result.... [but]... far from ideal." Id. at 417.
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sured that such rights were set aside for the areas subject to the legisla-
tion. The statement concerning precedent and interpretation left in place
the argument that the Winters Doctrine applied to all wilderness legisla-
tion containing no express reservation of water. The drawbacks to the El
Malpais formula were that only a minimum amount of water was re-
served and protection was extended to pending applications for water
rights, as well as vested rights, considerably expanding the category of
rights with priority over those of the federal reservations."
A number of wilderness bills not only reserved water rights but di-
rected the Secretary of the appropriate federal agency to file claims for
their quantification in an appropriate stream adjudication. This congres-
sional instruction conflicted with Attorney General Meese's order to the
federal agencies not to claim federal reserved water rights in stream ad-
judications.
The Nevada Wilderness Protection Act of 1989,2 for example, re-
served "a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the wil-
derness areas created by this Act ' and commanded the Secretary to
"file a claim for the quantification of the water rights reserved ... in an
appropriate stream adjudication." The United States subsequently filed
claims for all the unappropriated water flows in the wilderness areas cre-
ated by the Act.'
By 1991, the environmental community had decided it was time to
draft "model" water rights language in order to avoid the further prolif-
eration of water rights provisions in wilderness bills. 6 The community
had the help of some of the premier water lawyers in the country, in-
cluding Charles ("Barney") White, Lori Potter, and David Getches.2' The
three basic concepts in the model language were: (1) an express reserva-
tion of, if not full flows, at least sufficient water to fulfill all the purposes
of the reservation; (2) a statement of congressional intent either not to
deny the existence of Winters Doctrine water rights for lands designated
in other legislation or not to imply any interpretation about prior or future
wilderness bills, and (3) a directive to federal agencies to take steps to
protect water rights in appropriate state adjudication!'
221. Seeid. at416.
222. Pub. L. No. 101-195, 103 Stat. 1784.
223. Id. § 8(a), 103 Stat. at 1788.
224. Id. § 8(c), 103 Stat. at 1788.
225. See Haugrud Interview, supra note 205.
226. See Sease & Green Memorandum, supra note 8; Wilderness Society Letter, supra note
206, at 3.
227. Cf Wilderness Society Letter, supra note 206, at 3-4.
228. Cf Sease & Green Memorandum, supra note 8, at 2; Wilderness Society Letter, supra
note 206, at 3.
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The language used in the Arizona Wilderness Act of 19902 came
very close to the model, and was supported by the environmental com-
munity for use in a number of state bills, including Montana, California,
Colorado, and Utah. ' The Act's language reads:
WATER--(1) With respect to each wilderness area designated by this
title, Congress hereby reserves a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill
the purposes of this title. The priority date of such reserved rights
shall be the date of enactment of this Act.
(2) The Secretary and all other officers of the United States shall take
steps necessary to protect the rights reserved by paragraph (1), in-
cluding the filing by the Secretary of a claim for the quantification of
such rights in any present or future appropriate stream adjudication in
the courts of the State of Arizona in which the United States is or may
be joined and which is conducted in accordance with the McCarran
Amendment (43 U.S.C. § 666).
(3) Nothing in this title shall be construed as a relinquishment or re-
duction of any water rights reserved or appropriated by the United
States in the State of Arizona on or before the date of enactment of
this Act.
(4) The Federal water rights reserved by this title are specific to the
wilderness areas located in the State of Arizona designated by this ti-
tle. Nothing in this title related to reserved Federal water rights shall
be construed as establishing a precedent with regard to any future
designations, nor shall it constitute an interpretation of any other Act
or any designation made pursuant thereto.3'
After the furor of 1987-1991, the controversy over wilderness and
water rights died away. The Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993' was the
last major legislative fight. The water rights formulation included in this
Act is unlike any other. The Act does not deny the existence of federal
reserved water rights for wilderness, but expressly disclaimed the need to
use them to protect the wilderness qualities of the areas which it desig-
nated. 3 Congress found that the lands delineated by the Act are princi-
pally headwaters, with few, if any, upstream "water resource facilities,"
and few, if any, opportunities for diversion, storage or other uses of wa-
ter that would adversely affect wilderness values.'3 Congress also found
229. Pub. L. No. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4469.
230. Cf. Wilderness Society Letter, supra note 206, at 3.
231. Arizona Desert Wilderness Act § 101 (g), 104 Stat. at 4473-74.
232. Pub. L. No. 103-77, 107 Stat. 756.
233. See Colorado Wilderness Act § 8(b)(2)(A), 107 Stat. at 762.
234. Section 8(a)(3) of the Colorado Wilderness Act defines "water resource facility" to mean
"irrigation and pumping facilities, reservoirs, water conservation works, aqueducts, canals, ditches,
pipelines, wells, hydropower projects, and transmission and other ancillary facilities, and other water
diversion, storage, and carriage structures." Id. § 8(a)(3).
235. See id. § 8(a)(l)(A).
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that the lands reserved for wilderness by the Act are not suitable for de-
velopment or expansion of water resource facilities.' For these reasons,
Congress determined that "it is possible to provide for proper manage-
ment and protection of the wilderness value of such lands in ways differ-
ent from those utilized in other legislation designating [wilderness ar-
eas]." 7 Accordingly, the Act protects the wilderness qualities and values
of the areas designated "by means other than those based on a Federal
reserved water right."'
To underscore its intention to rely on mechanisms other than federal
reserved water rights to protect wilderness qualities, Congress prohibited
any federal official, agency or court from asserting or considering any
claim for water or water rights in the State of Colorado "which is based
on any construction of any portion of this Act, or the designation of any
lands as wilderness by this Act." 9
Congress attempted to limit the precedential effect of these unusual
water rights provisions by declaring that nothing in the Colorado Wilder-
ness Act "shall be construed as a creation, recognition, disclaimer, relin-
quishment, or reduction" of preexisting federal water rights, ' or an in-
terpretation of any other legislative act or designation, except as related to
the water rights created by the Platte River Wilderness Act?" Furthermore,
Congress stated that "[n]othing in the section shall be construed as estab-
lishing a precedent with regard to any future wilderness designations.""2
The remainder of the water rights-related provisions in the Colorado
Wilderness Act concern development of access to water resources facili-
ties, and the effect of the Act on the Interstate Compact for the North
Platte River.' 3 The President and other federal officials are prohibited
from funding, assisting or approving the development of new water re-
source facilities in wilderness areas designated by the Act, but existing
facilities and access are grandfathered.'" The Act has no effect on the
North Platte River Interstate Compact or equitable apportionment de-
crees that apportion water among Colorado and other states.'
236. See id. § 8(a)(1)(B).
237. Id. § 8(a)(1)(C).
238. Id. § 8(a)(I)(2).
239. Id § 8(b)(1).
240. Id § 8(b)(2)(B).
241. See id. § 8(g).
242. Id. § 8(b)(2)(D).
243. Cf. id § 8(c)-(g) (allowing the Secretary to permit reasonable access to water resource
facilities already in existence).
244. See id § 8(c)-(e).
245. See id. § 8(g).
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VII. STATUS OF THE ISSUE TODAY
A. General Stream Adjudication
Although the congressional controversy over wilderness water rights
dissipated following the passage of the Colorado Wilderness Act, the
substantive question of whether wilderness has implied federal reserved
water rights remains. In 1993, the United States again faced a deadline
for filing claims for federal reserved water rights for wilderness areas,
this time in the Snake River Basin Adjudication.' At issue were three
significant wilderness areas: the Frank Church-River of No Return, the
Selway-Bitterroot and the Gospel-Hump. 7 The legislation creating these
wilderness areas was silent concerning water rights."8
A new Administration had come to Washington, D.C., with a new
perspective on federal reserved water rights for wilderness. On Decem-
ber 8, 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno notified Secretary of the Inte-
rior Babbitt of the Justice Department's intent to reexamine the policy
expressed in the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion. 9 Pending completion of this
review by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, Attorney
General Reno suspended Attorney General Meese's directive to federal
agencies not to claim federal reserved water rights for wilderness areas in
stream adjudications.'
On December 28, 1993, the Departments of the Interior and Agri-
culture, in consultation with the Department of Justice, sought public
comment on the reevaluation of the position taken by the Solicitor in his
1988 Opinion." The Solicitor's Opinion was suspended pending receipt
of comment. 2 Subsequently, the Departments of the Interior and Agri-
culture withdrew the Solicitor's Opinion, as well as Attorney General
Meese's concurrence with it, in a Federal Register notice extending the
comment period. 3 No replacement opinion has yet been issued. With-
drawal of the Attorney General's directive permitted the United States to
file claims for water rights for the three wilderness areas involved in the
246. See Haugrnd Interview, supra note 205; see also In re Snake River Basin Adjudication,
Case No. 39576 (Dist. Ct. Idaho Dec. 18, 1997) (order granting and denying United States' motions
for summary judgment on reserved water rights claims).
247. See Haugrud Interview, supra note 205.
248. The Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness was created by the Wilderness Act of 1964; the Frank
Church-River of No Return Wilderness by the Central Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-312, 94 Stat. 948, and Act of March 14, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-231, 98 Stat. 60 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1132 note); and the Gospel-Hump Wilderness by the Endangered American Wilderness Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-237,92 Stat. 46 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note).
249. See Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt
(Dec. 8, 1993) (on file with author).
250. See id.
251. Cf. Water Rights Under the Wilderness Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,629,68,629 (1993).
252. See id.
253. See Water Rights Under the Wilderness Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,692, 19,692 (1994).
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Snake River Basin Adjudication. These claims were based on the Win-
ters Doctrine.6'
On December 18, 1997, Judge Daniel Hurlbutt, Jr., the judge pre-
siding over the adjudication, granted the United States' motion for sum-
mary judgment on the legal issue of whether the United States was enti-
tled to claim reserved water rights under the Acts creating the wilderness
areas.n The Judge concluded that the United States was entitled to a fed-
eral reserved water right for all the unappropriated flows in the three
wilderness areas.' He found, as a matter of law, that "the entire amount
of unappropriated water constituting the natural flow in each designated
wilderness area is the amount necessary to fulfill Congress's intent to
preserve and protect the wilderness areas for which claims have been
filed in the [Snake River Basin Adjudication]. '
The judge discounted the assertion of the objectors that wilderness is
a secondary purpose, supplemental to the overriding purposes of the land
system from which the wilderness is created.' He stated,
Under the Wilderness Act, Congress intended to create a new cate-
gory of land in which wilderness purposes would be primary and
above all other purposes previously allowed in national forests. These
wilderness purposes would then be permanently protected by legisla-
tive, not executive action.29
The Judge also considered the meaning of the "no claim or denial"
language in section 4(d)(6) of the Wilderness Act.'e He determined that
Congress included the language to maintain the status quo in the law
governing United States water rights." As support for this finding, the
Judge relied on the Wilderness Act's legislative history, in particular the
explanations offered by Senator Humphrey,' and the fact that statutes
like the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act subsequently used the same lan-
guage.' In short, the Judge evaluated the application of the Winters
Doctrine to wilderness areas in the same manner as the court in Sierra
254. See Haugrud Interview, supra note 205.
255. See In re Snake River Basin Adjudication, Case No. 39576, at 2-3 (Dist. Ct. Idaho Dec.
18, 1997) (order granting and denying United States' motions for summary judgment on reserved
water rights claims).
256. See Snake River Basin Adjudication, Case No. 39576, at 16.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 8-9.
259. Id. at 7.
260. See id. at 11-12.
261. See id. at 12.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 12-13 The Judge quoted Senator Church's comments on the meaning of the "no
claim or denial" language in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. See id The Senator stated that "[tihe
whole purpose of the language in the sections to which the Senator has referred... was to maintain
the status quo with respect to the whole complicated structure of water law." 112 CONG. REC. 431
(1966).
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Club v. Block, and reached the same conclusion. Not surprisingly, the
objectors have appealed Judge Hurlbutt's decision to the Supreme Court
of Idaho.'
B. On Capitol Hill
On Capitol Hill, things are relatively quiet where water rights are
concerned. Only a few wilderness areas have been designated since
1993.' The quiet belies congressional resolution of the issue. A signifi-
cant conflict over wilderness in Utah has been brewing for the past sev-
eral years. The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) blocked
wilderness bills proposed by the Utah delegation in the 104th Congress,
in part because the bills expressly disavowed water rights for the areas to
be designated.' SUWA and other groups also opposed a bill for the San
Rafael region of Utah in part because it disclaimed water rights for the
area. ' This bill was defeated in October of 1998.
264. See Idaho Supreme Court Nos. 24545-24548, 24557-24559; In re SRBA Case No. 39576,
Wilderness Reserved Claims, Consolidated Subcase No. 75-13605; Hells Canyon National Recrea-
tion Area Claims, Consolidated Subcase No. 79-13597, Supreme Court of Idaho (1998).
265. The most significant of these designations was made by the California Desert Protection
Act, which established a national park, as well as a number of wilderness areas. The water rights
language in the Act is similar to that used in the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990. It reserves
a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the Act, with a priority date of the enactment
of the statute. The Secretary and other federal officers are directed to "take all steps necessary" to
protect the water rights reserved by the Act, including the filing of claims in stream adjudications.
Nothing in the Act is to be construed as a relinquishment or reduction of any water rights reserved or
appropriated by the United States before the Act was passed. Finally, the California Desert Protec-
tion Act is not to be interpreted as creating any precedent for future designations or for any other
Act. See California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-433, § 706, 108 Stat. 4471. Two
1990 statutes creating wilderness in Illinois and Maine are silent on water and water rights. See
Illinois Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-633, 104 Stat. 4577; Maine Wilderness Act of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-401,104 Stat. 863.
266. See H.R. 1745, 104th Cong. § 4(a) (1995); S. 884, 104th Cong. § 4(a) (1995). Section 4 of
these bills stated that "[niothing in this Act or any other Act of Congress shall constitute or be con-
strued to constitute either an express or implied Federal reservation of water or water rights for any
purpose arising from the designation of areas as wilderness by this Act." Id. The bill further provided
that the United States "may acquire and exercise such water rights as it deems necessary" pursuant to
Utah State law. S. 884 § 4(b).
267. See S. 2385, 105th Cong. § 304(a)-(b) (1998). Section 304 states:
(a) Congress finds that-
(1) The San Rafael Swell region of Utah has a high desert climate with little annual
precipitation and scarce water resources;
(2) in order to preserve the limited amount of water available to wildlife, the State of
Utah has granted to the Division of Wildlife Resources an instream flow right in the
San Rafael River; and
(3) this preserved right will guarantee that wetland and riparian habitats within the
San Rafael region will be protected for designations such as wilderness, semi-
primitive areas, bighorn sheep areas, and other Federal land needs within the San
Rafael Swell region.
(b) No Federal Reservation-Nothing in this Act or any other Act of Congress constitutes
an express or implied Federal Reservation of water or water rights for any purpose arising
from the designation of any area as part of the Conservation Area or as a wilderness or
semi-primitive area under this Act.
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Prospects seemed good for H.R. 1500 during the fall of 1998, but the
congressional session ended without its enactment. The bill expressly
reserved a "quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of this
Act."2' It also directed the Secretary of the Interior and all other officers
of the United States to:
[T]ake all steps necessary to protect the rights reserved.., including
the filing by the Secretary of a claim for the quantification of such
rights in any present or future appropriate stream adjudication in the
courts of the State of Utah in which the United States is or may be
joined and which is conducted in accordance with... the McCarran
Act.
2 9
H.R. 1500 will be reintroduced in the spring of 1999 under a different
number, but the environmental community is not optimistic about pas-
sage of this, or any other Utah wilderness bill during this Congress.
BLM lands remain on the wilderness designation agenda. Only two
of the western states (California and Arizona) have designated BLM wil-
derness. Thus the issue of water rights for wilderness will have to be
addressed for all of the others. BLM lands are often downstream. Al-
though rights for newly created BLM wilderness areas would be very
junior in priority, this will not prevent debate over the effect of federal
water rights on upstream users.
VIL CONCLUSION: IMAGINE WILDERNESS
Some observers may say that there is now little cause for concern
about the legal issue of whether the Winters Doctrine applies to wilder-
ness. The United States has withdrawn the 1988 Solicitor's Opinion and
claimed reserved water rights for wilderness in general stream adjudica-
tions. The presiding judge in the Snake River Basin Adjudication
strongly agreed with the application of the Winters Doctrine to wilder-
ness. The legislation establishing wilderness areas, which was enacted
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, recognized the importance of wa-
ter for wilderness and assured the availability of sufficient water to pro-
tect wilderness qualities, even if federal reserved rights were not the cho-
sen vehicle. Congress has made no declaration that wilderness is not a
reservation entitled to federal reserved water rights to fulfill its primary
purposes.
All of this is correct, but does not mean that the issue is finally re-
solved. Each time Congress considers a wilderness bill, the question of
water rights must be addressed. Each time the United States files claims
for wilderness in a general stream adjudication, objectors will oppose
recognition of those rights. Whether Congress says nothing or expressly
268. H.R. 1500, 104th Cong. § 202(a) (1998).
269. Id. § 202(a)(2).
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reserves water rights, other areas in the System are potentially affected.
The same is true whether the United States files or does not file for wil-
derness water rights in stream adjudications.
Congress could settle this matter, of course, although the maxim
about being careful what you wish for because you might get it does
come to mind. The easiest way would be to amend the Wilderness Act of
1964 to express Congress's intent that wilderness has rights to all the
water flowing in and through it, or at least rights to all the water neces-
sary to fulfill the purposes for which wilderness areas are created. A less
naive suggestion is for Congress to develop and use a model water rights
provision which includes the elements identified by the environmental
community in 1989: an express reservation of all water necessary to ful-
fill all reservation purposes; direction to the federal agencies to take steps
to perfect these rights in appropriate state proceedings; and a statement
that wilderness constitutes a reservation with primary purposes, for
which water rights are implied when legislation is silent. Such model lan-
guage does not threaten state law or valid existing rights. It acknowledges
that wilderness has water rights, but requires that such rights be quantified
in state proceedings. It removes the cloud of uncertainty surrounding wil-
derness areas designated by legislation silent on water rights.
Professor Janice Weis has noted that "[a] uniform, national water
policy for protecting wilderness areas is more desirable than a piecemeal,
state-by-state determination of wilderness water rights."'' She is correct,
but only if the agenda of those opposing water rights for wilderness is
not to prevent additions to the Wilderness System or to fight restrictions
on use of federal lands for non-commodity purposes.
A number of environmentalists and water lawyers have repeatedly
pointed out that wilderness rarely conflicts with the appropriation and use
of water rights."' Wilderness does not consume water, except in its natural
processes. Water flows through wilderness areas, undiverted and unsullied,
available for downstream appropriation. Most wilderness areas are located
at or near the headwaters of streams, so there are few upstream appropria-
tors who must leave water in the stream to fulfill wilderness rights. Fur-
ther, because wilderness is a relatively new legislative creation, most wil-
derness areas are junior in priority. They take their place in line and must
yield to more senior rights, even in times of shortage and drought.
270. Weis, supra note 4, at 150. For Weis's proposed legislative solution, see id. at 148-53.
271. See Leshy, supra note 73, at 395-98 & n.38 (noting that after the initial decision in Sierra
Club v. Block, members of the Colorado congressional delegation asked the Colorado Department of
Natural Resources to report on the conflicts between wilderness water rights and other uses). The
Department concluded that "there is little actual or potential conflict between existing or conditional
water rights and any federal reserved rights that may be established in existing or proposed wilder-
ness areas on Colorado National Forests." Id at 398 n.38 (quoting Letter from David Getches and
Jeris Danielson to Sen. Gary Hart, Rep. Hank Brown, and Rep. Ken Kramer 3 (Feb. 24, 1986)); see
also Weis, supra note 4, at 142-44; Marks, supra note 129, at 651-52 (reviewing the results of the
Colorado Department of Natural Resources Report).
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
About the only potential for conflict between wilderness and water
use is when a senior appropriator proposes to change his point of diver-
sion or place and manner of use in a way that affects stream flows
through wilderness. Under prior appropriation law, a senior appropriator
may not alter any aspect of his water right, including point of diversion,
timing, manner or place of water use, if the change will harm a junior
appropriator.' The United States, like any other junior appropriator,
could block a change that would impair water flows in wilderness.'
If it is true that wilderness poses little threat to appropriators of wa-
ter, why is the antagonism to federal reserved water rights for wilderness
so pronounced? Why does the environmental community insist on the
creation of water rights, when the location of most wilderness areas pro-
tects their water from appropriation? Is this a real fight, or shadow-boxing?
The answer to the question about the hostility to federal reserved
rights brings us back to the early days of the settlement of the West. It
speaks to the significance for Westerners of the right to use water in a
region characterized by aridity. It reflects the idea that water is not to be
"wasted" in a stream, but diverted and applied to economic activity.
Wrapped up in the answer, as well, are anti-federal government senti-
ments, aversion to "tree huggers," and antipathy for outsiders seen as
trying to dictate how life should be led.
The answer to the question about the environmental community's
insistence on water rights has to do with common sense, ecology, and the
future. It is logical to extend the Winters Doctrine to wilderness, as the
Supreme Court extended it to national parks, national wildlife refuges,
national monuments and other reservations of federal lands. It makes no
sense to conclude that Congress created a system of lands retaining their
"primeval character and influence" and managed "so as to preserve
[their] natural conditions"' without providing such a system with water.
In the future, the National Wilderness Preservation System may be ex-
panded to include mid-stream or downstream areas. It will be important
to have agreement on the availability of the water rights needed to sup-
port the communities of life within these areas, to assure that they will be
full partners in the Wilderness Preservation System.
Finally, to make sense, law that impacts the natural environment
must be based on scientifically sound principles. Law may be able to
sever water from land for purposes of allocating rights of use. However,
it cannot sever land from its need for water, or even lessen the critical
role that water plays in sustaining life.
Imagine wilderness without water. Imagine...
272. See TARLOCK, supra note 15, § 5.17[3][a].
273. Cf Marks, supra note 129, at 651-55.
274. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
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"[T]o secure for the American people of present and future genera-
tions the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness," Congress en-
acted the Wilderness Act of 1964.' The Wilderness Act established a
National Wilderness Preservation System, which set aside 9.1 million
acres of federal "wilderness" land' as a "down payment" to secure Con-
gress's commitment to preserve land-unimpaired-for the use and en-
joyment of future generations.! In addition, the Wilderness Act directed
the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to review all the land under
their respective jurisdictions for suitability of classification as new wil-
derness areas within ten years, and to submit their recommendations to
the President.! Today, even after thirty-five years, the Wilderness Act
still stands as one of the most notable expressions of American preserva-
tionist policy.
The Wilderness Act was a product of congressional compromise
between preservationists on the one hand and commercial interests on the
other. The compromise did not come quickly or easily-nine years of
* L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1959; B.A., Harvard College, 1956; partner in the Denver
office of Dorsey & Whitney LLP; specializes in mining and oil and gas law, with an emphasis on
public lands.
** J.D., University of Virginia, 1993; B.A., Duke University, 1985; associate in the Denver
office of Dorsey & Whitney LLP; specializes in natural resources and environmental law, with an
emphasis on public lands.
*** B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1992; third-year law student at the University
of Colorado School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136
(1994)).
2. Beginning in 1929, the Forest Service classified wilderness-type areas into four categories:
primitive, wilderness, wild, and canoe. See Kenneth D. Hubbard, Ah, Wilderness! (But What About
Access and Prospecting?), 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 585, 587 (1969). The Wilderness Act took
the latter three categories and designated them as "wilderness areas." Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16
U.S.C. § 1131(a). Congress excluded "primitive" areas because the characteristics of this classifica-
tion were not specifically defined; however, Congress felt that after a thorough review such lands
would be eligible for inclusion. See Wilderness Act § 3(b), 16 U.S.C § 1132(b).
3. CRAIG W. ALwiN, THE PoLmcs OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION 136 (1982).
4. See Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c). Congress, however, retained the sole
authority to establish new "wilderness" lands. See Wilderness Act § 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b).
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debate and sixty-five revisions preceded the passage of the Act! Al-
though mainly preservation-oriented, the final version of the Wilderness
Act allowed for certain uses of wilderness areas typically considered
incompatible with preservation, including limited mineral exploration
and development.6 As part of the compromise, Congress imposed several
restrictions on mining activities in wilderness areas within national forest
lands, while at the same time establishing protection for certain "valid
existing rights" in designated wilderness areas.7
This article examines the influence of the Wilderness Act on the
treatment of mining claims, including "valid existing rights," located in
wilderness areas. Part I of this article discusses the mining industry's
influence on development of the Wilderness Act during the Act's turbu-
lent nine-year legislative history. Part II examines the Wilderness Act's
impact on mineral exploration and development. Part III analyzes how
the federal land management agencies and courts have applied the con-
cept of valid existing rights to mining claims in wilderness areas. Part IV
discusses current issues relating to mining claims and wilderness that are
likely to continue to fuel debate and legal development.
I. THE MINING INDUSTRY'S INFLUENCE ON THE WILDERNESS ACT
Prior to the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964, preservation re-
mained a secondary concern to the exploration and development of min-
eral deposits within the public domain.! The General Mining Law of
1872' (General Mining Law) allowed mining interests free access to na-
tional forest areas designated by the U.S. Forest Service as "wilderness,"
"wild," "canoe," and "primitive."'" This continued free access under the
mining laws, coupled with limited Forest Service regulation, motivated
preservationists to establish a statutory wilderness system." Preserva-
tionists wanted to pass legislation that would declare large areas of na-
5. See SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY 217 (2d ed.
1980).
6. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(2)-3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2)-(3). The general rule is,
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act, wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public purposes
of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical use." Wilderness Act §
4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b). Exceptions to the general rule can include, in some regulated form or
another, the use of aircraft and motorboats, as well as measures necessary to control fire, insects, or
disease. See Wilderness Act § 2(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1).
7. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3).
8. See generally CHRISTOPHER MCGRORY KLYZA, WHO CONTROLS PUBLIC LANDS?
MINING, FORESTRY, AND GRAZING POLICIES, 1870-1990, at 27-37 (1996) (discussing the ongoing
tension between preservationists and mining advocates); Donna J. Loop, Comment, Claiming the
Cabinets: The Right to Mine in Wilderness Areas, 7 PuB. LAND L. REV. 45, 45-46 (1986) (analyzing
the complex relationship between the Mining Act and the Wilderness Act through a case study of the
Cabinet Mountains in Montana).
9. General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 159, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 30 U.S.C.).'
10. See KLYZA, supra note 8, at 37-38.
11. See id.
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tional lands "wilderness" and make them off limits to all development,
including mining." Strong opposition from mining interests met the pres-
ervation movement, however, because any wilderness law precluding
mining challenged the federal government's nearly century-old policy of
open access to public lands for purposes of mining claim location, dis-
covery, and patent.'3 As the movement to curtail mining on national for-
est lands gained momentum, these divergent philosophies came to a head
in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the battle over the Wilderness Act."
A. Early Legislation
The Wilderness Act's turbulent history began in 1956 when Senator
Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota introduced the nation's first wilderness
bill.'" Shortly thereafter, in June of 1957, the first congressional hearing
on wilderness legislation took place. 6 Senator Humphrey's pro-
preservation bill stated that "no portion of any area constituting a unit of
the National Wilderness Preservation System shall be devoted
to... prospecting, mining or the removal of mineral deposits."'7 Senator
Humphrey and other wilderness backers thus began with a bill that con-
tained no compromises for commercial interests. 8
It was not long, however, before opposition to Senator Humphrey's
bill surfaced. The American Mining Congress (AMC) testified against
the bill at congressional hearings, arguing that the bill hurt both the
mining industry in particular, and the nation as a whole.'9 During the
hearings, the AMC and other mining industry representatives developed
several objections to wilderness legislation that would permeate the en-
tire debate over the Wilderness Act.' Foremost, the AMC argued that the
withdrawal of land from public mineral exploration and development
contradicted the historical policy of free access to public lands." Mining
industry supporters took the position that the Wilderness Act would un-
12. See id. at 38.
13. See id. at 39. Procedures for locating and patenting a mining claim under the General
Mining Law are discussed in Part UI of this article.
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. S. 4013, 84th Cong. (1956).
16. See National Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 1176 Before the Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong. (1957) [hereinafter S. 1176 Hearings]. The hearings cen-
tered on Senator Humphrey's second bill, S. 1176, 85th Cong.
17. S. 1176, 85th Cong. § 3(b) (1957).
18. Senator Humphrey underscored the importance of preservation in commenting on the
pending wilderness legislation, stating:
[The Wilderness Act] will help us insure that these federally owned wilderness
lands.., will be administered in such a way as to leave them unimpaired. And that is the
crucial point, because once an act of destruction occurs in our wilderness areas, it cannot
be undone. Prevention, in the form of a clear national policy, is far better than regret
110 CONG. REc. S20,602 (1964).
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duly burden their ability to develop property rights in mineral deposits-
rights that were expressly granted under the General Mining Law.'
Mining interests also argued that wilderness legislation was not neces-
sary, and that it contradicted the traditional policy of multiple use of
public lands.-
In addition, mining representatives launched effective attacks on
wilderness legislation based on economic development and national se-
curity theories. The central theme of these intertwined theories was the
"immorality of denying anyone the benefits of economic development
simply in order to gratify the aesthetic sense of a few."'2 The mining
community further argued that reducing the land available for mineral
exploration would slow mineral development and make the United States
more dependent on imported minerals.' Tying this point to national secu-
rity, mining proponents stressed the potential catastrophic effects of reli-
ance on imported minerals during a time of war.' The Northwest Mining
Association, for example, testified that "this bill would play into the
hands of our foreign enemies by discouraging discovery and production
of metals necessary to national defense."
As the legislative process continued, preservationists realized that
the mining industry would be a chief obstacle to passage of a wilderness
bill. During late 1958 and early 1959, the Senate conducted hearings
throughout the West seeking input on the proposed wilderness legisla-
tion.' These hearings evidenced little support for any type of wilderness
bill." Mining industry representatives testified against the bill, reiterating
theAMC's economic development and national security arguments."
22. See S. 1176 Hearings, supra note 16, at 328.
23. See AllIN, supra note 3, at 110; KLYZA, supra note 8, at 38. The Forest Service also
objected to early wilderness legislation fearing that the proposed legislation would "undermine
'multiple use' management of federal land." Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managing the
Balances of Nature: The Legal Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 257
(1988).
24. ALUN, supra note 3, at 113. One opponent of the Wilderness Act opined, "when commer-
cial resources are locked up, our economy is deprived of additional tax dollars, pay envelopes, and
needed consumer products. Many, therefore, are deprived of economic sustenance so as to provide a
very limited number of individuals with wilderness pleasures." S. 1176 Hearings, supra note 16, at
152 (statement of A.Z. Nelson, National Lumber Mfrs. Ass'n).
25. The AMC testified, "We in the mining industry are unalterably opposed to the locking up
of natural resources of any kind from development for the public good." S. 1176 Hearings, supra
note 16, at 329 (statement of W. Howard Gray, Chairman, AMC).
26. See KLYZA, supra note 8, at 39.
27. National Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 174 Before the Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong. 368-69 (1961).
28. See KLYZA, supra note 8, at 40.
29. Cf id.
30. For example, the Alaskan Commissioner of Mines asked the Senate panel, "What good are
these resources if they must remain in their natural state?" Id.
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As a result of the strong opposition mounted by the mining industry,
Wilderness Act supporters decided to compromise in hopes of breaking
the logjam. They proposed amendments to the bill aimed at appeasing
mining interests. Although the new amendments still prohibited com-
mercial activity in general, they did allow for presidential exceptions.'
The amended bill authorized the President to allow prospecting and
mining in wilderness areas located in national forests upon the determi-
nation that such uses would better serve the interests of the United
States." These concessions did not achieve their intended result, how-
ever. The AMC and state and local mining groups continued to oppose
wilderness legislation. Mining supporters characterized the presidential
exception as meaningless "because it would lead to little or no [mineral]
exploration in fact.""3 Moreover, the mining industry argued, the presi-
dential exception provided no incentive for exploration because, unlike
the location system established under the General Mining Law, there was
no guarantee that the locator of a valuable mineral deposit would be en-
titled to actually mine it under the proposed Wilderness Act exception?'
The amended bill stalled in committee during the Eighty-Sixth Congress
because mining and preservation interests were still so far apart.
In 1961, the Senate once again took up consideration of a wilderness
bill. Senator Clinton Anderson of New Mexico introduced Senate Bill
174, a bill almost identical to those proposed earlier. Senate Bill 174
continued to prohibit commercial exploration and mining unless author-
ized by the President under the presidential exception!' In July 1961,
Senate Bill 174 made it out of committee with the committee reporting
that "in view of the vast unexploited land areas of the Nation that remain
and the safeguards written into S[enate Bill] 174, the majority of the
committee does not feel that the mining industry will actually be injured
by the bill."37 Although debate on the floor over the mining provisions
was heated, Senate Bill 174 passed easily."
B. The Mining Industry's New Strategy
With the preservationists' victory in the Senate, the mining industry
shifted its strategy as the debate moved over to the House. Although the
mining industry still opposed a wilderness law in general, industry repre-
sentatives concentrated on making wilderness legislation more accept-
31. See id.
32. See National Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 4028 Before the Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong. 22 (1958).
33. KLYZA, supra note 8, at 40.
34. See id.
35. S. 174, 87th Cong. (1961).
36. See ia § 6(a)(2).
37. KLYZA, supra note 8, at 41 & 168 n.34.
38. The final floor vote was 78 to 8 in favor of Senate Bill 174. See 107 CONG. REC. S18,400
(1961).
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able to industry interests. When it became apparent that some form of
wilderness legislation was likely to pass, industry representatives sought
an exemption for mining activities, arguing that mining and wilderness
preservation were not incompatible uses."' Mining industry representa-
tives evidenced willingness to abide by special restrictions, as long as
those restrictions were reasonable.'
As the wilderness bill moved through the House, mining interests
were successful in influencing Congress to adopt a more miner-friendly
bill. The new bill, House Bill 776,"' originally provided for a ten-year
exemption for mining within wilderness areas; ' this exemption was later
increased to twenty-five years. During the exemption period, the mining
laws would, in theory, apply fully to wilderness area lands, with the re-
sult that miners could locate, explore, and mine claims. House Bill 776
also called for periodic mineral reviews of wilderness areas and man-
dated that wilderness areas be reviewed every twenty-five years to de-
termine if the designation was still appropriate." As expected, proponents
of wilderness preservation vehemently opposed House Bill 776, calling it
a "perversion of wilderness preservation." 5 House Bill 776, like many of
its predecessors, never made it to a floor vote before the Eighty-Seventh
Congress adjourned. Mining interests had successfully blocked passage
of a wilderness bill, rendering the preservationists' victory in the Senate
moot."
C. The Final Compromise
In 1963, as the debate over wilderness legislation entered its eighth
year, the Senate overwhelmingly passed another wilderness bill, Senate
Bill 47 which, with respect to mining, was identical to Senate Bill 174.'
Once again the AMC spoke out against any form of wilderness legisla-
tion, while at the same time trying to create a long-term mining exemp-
tion in the event the proposed legislation passed. Like the Senate, the
House overwhelmingly passed a wilderness bill, House Bill 9070."
However, House Bill 9070 differed greatly from Senate Bill 4 in that
House Bill 9070 contained the twenty-five year exemption for mining in
39. KLYZA, supra note 8, at 42.
40. Id.
41. H.R. 776, 87th Cong. (1962).
42. See idU § 2(b).
43. See KLYzA, supra note 8, at 43.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Cf ALLIN, supra note 3, at 127-29.
47. S. 4, 88th Cong. (1963).
48. S. 174, 87th Cong. (1961).
49. H.R. 9070, 88th Cong. (1963). House Bill 9070 passed by a vote of 374 to 1. See 110
CONG. REC. H17,458 (1964).
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wilderness areas" that was added on to the ill-fated Senate Bill 174 two
years earlier. Thus, it was up to the conference committee to broker a
compromise that would be acceptable to both chambers.
Senate representatives and preservationists argued against inclusion
of the twenty-five year mining exemption and sought input from the For-
est Service. The Forest Service indicated it would impose even stronger
regulations on mining activities for the duration of the mining exemp-
tion.' In addition, House negotiators assured the Senate that mining in-
terests did not envision the use of mechanized access or permanent
roadways to carry out their continued mineral exploration and develop-
ment. 2 Based on these assurances, the Senate accepted the mining clause.
In response, the House agreed to lower the time period of the exemption
to nineteen years. Both chambers approved the compromise, putting an
end to the nine year battle over wilderness legislation.' Both sides could
claim victory: preservationists had finally succeeded in passing compre-
hensive wilderness legislation, and the mining industry retained certain
limited rights to explore and develop mineral deposits located in wilder-
ness areas within national forests.
II. THE WILDERNESS AcT's IMPACr ON MINING IN WILDERNESS AREAS
A. Pre-Wilderness Act Acquisition of Mineral Rights
Prior to enactment of the Wilderness Act, the General Mining Law
governed the location and development of hard-rock mineral rights in
wilderness areas." During this period, the mining laws applied to wilder-
ness areas as they did to all other public lands. Citizens were entitled to
relatively unrestricted access to wilderness areas to "search for, discover,
and develop valuable mineral deposits for their personal benefit."'
The general procedure for locating and developing mining claims in
wilderness areas was essentially the same procedure applicable to public
lands in general. Under the mining laws, certain steps must be performed
in order to establish a valid mining claim. These steps derive from state
and local customs concerning the location and recordation of mining





55. The General Mining Law declared that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, all valuable
mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States... shall be free and open to exploration and
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase." General Mining Law §
1, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994).
56. Kathryn Toffenetti, Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas, 20 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 31, 33 (1985).
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claims as refined by judicial decisions and modified by the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)."
The first step toward establishing a mining claim is the discovery of
a valuable mineral deposit." Discovery is followed, at least in theory, by
location." To properly locate a claim, the claimant must monument the
claim's boundaries on-site and record the claim in the appropriate county
land office and state Bureau of Land Management (BLM) office.' Upon
satisfaction of these discovery and location requirements, the claimant
has established an unpatented mining claim and has the right to mine the
deposit.' Once a miner establishes an unpatented claim, the miner may
hold and work the claim by performing at least $100 worth of annual
labor, called assessment work, to further develop the claim. (Currently,
the assessment work requirement has been statutorily replaced by a re-
quirement that the claimant file an annual "maintenance fee" of $100 per
claim).' As long as the claimant has a valid location and discovery, and
has met applicable assessment/maintenance fee requirements, he has the
right to mine his claim, even to exhaustion.' However, if the claimant
wishes to obtain fee simple title to the claim, he must apply for a mineral
patent." The BLM administers the patent process and determines whether
a patent will issue." The BLM requires that a mineral survey and place-
ment of permanent monuments be completed prior to formal submission
of the patent application." Once the BLM issues the patent, the patentee
holds fee simple title to both the surface and subsurface resources.'
57. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.,
16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 40 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.); see Loop, supra note 8, at 48.
58. See General Mining Law § 2, 30 U.S.C. § 23. Some states also have a statutory discovery
requirement covering the extent of discovery work that must be performed. See, e.g., Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 34-43-109 (1998).
59. The mining law seems, on its face, to provide that discovery occurs first and location
second, but as a practical matter, location usually occurs first. See Toffenetti, supra note 56, at 36.
The location, however, is not valid until discovery. See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 344,
346 (1919).
60. See Toffenetti, supra note 56, at 36. Section 3 of the General Mining Law requires com-
pliance with state laws, all of which require recording of claims. See General Mining Law § 3, 30
U.S.C. § 26. Section 314 of FLPMA added the BLM filing requirement. FLPMA § 314,43 U.S.C. §
1744 (1994 & Supp. lI 1996).
61. See Toffenetti, supra note 54, at 40-41.
62. 30 U.S.C. § 28(f) (1994); 43 CF.R. § 3833.1-5 (1998) (implementing regulation for
maintenance fee statute).
63. 30 U.S.C. § 28(f); 43 C.F.R. § 3833.1-5. A small miner may perform assessment work or
file an affidavit of labor in lieu of paying the maintenance fee. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.1-5.
64. See generally 43 C.F.R. pt. 3860 (1998) (setting forth application procedures for obtaining
a mineral patent).
65. See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994); 43 C.F.R. pt. 3860.
66. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3861.1-1 to -2.
67. Clouser, 42 F.3d at 1525 n.2.
[Vol. 76:2
WILDERNESS ACT'S IMPACT ON MINING
B. The Wilderness Act's Impact on Mining Law
Despite the exception Congress built into the Wilderness Act for
commercial mining interests, in practicality the Act severely restricted
hard-rock mining activities on wilderness areas within national forests.'
Although, under section 4(d)(3) of the Wilderness Act, designated wil-
derness areas remained open to mining activity until December 31,
1983,' in reality, locating hard-rock claims in wilderness areas before
1984, and then developing those valid claims after that date was severely
hampered by other restrictions contained in section 4(d)(3): Section
4(d)(3) authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to impose surface resto-
ration requirements and regulate ingress and egress from mining claims
in order to protect the "wilderness character of the land."7' Additionally,
section 4(d)(3) imposed use restrictions on mining locations, limiting the
use of such land solely to "mining or processing operations and uses rea-
sonably incident thereto." Section 4(d)(3) also altered the property
rights associated with a patented mining claim. '3 Under the Wilderness
Act, mining patents only convey title to the mineral deposits located
within the claim, with the government retaining title to the surface
rights.'
Ill. TREATMENT OF MINING RIGHTS UNDER THE WILDERNESS ACT
Lands withdrawn from operation of the mining law under the Wil-
derness Act were no longer subject to the mining laws after December
31, 1983. Therefore, development in wilderness areas after that time
could take place only if the claimant could show his claim qualified as a
valid existing right that predated withdrawal." As a result, despite the
mining industry's hard-fought battle to win special treatment from Con-
68. In contrast, however, the Wilderness Act is more lenient with respect to prospecting,
allowing miners continued access to wilderness lands for the purpose of gathering information about
mineral deposits as long as the activities are compatible with the preservation of the wilderness
environment. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2) (1994). It has been argued that
this disparate treatment was the result of a congressional distinction between exploration and extrac-
tion of minerals. Extractive activity would only be allowed in times of genuine national need, while
exploration would be allowed and encouraged, subject to regulation. Exploration advocates argued
the necessity of continued exploration to determine the extent of mineral deposits which would then
only be used as "bank accounts" in times of national need. See Loop, supra note 8, at 55.
69. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3).
70. See John L Watson, Mineral and Oil and Gas Development in Wilderness Areas and
Other Specially Managed Federal Lands in the United States, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 37, 47
(1983).
71. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3).
72. Id. This section was intended to preclude the practice of locating a mining claim, with no
intention of developing the mineral interests, as a method of obtaining cheap land for use as vacation
property or the like. See Gregory W. Edwards, Note, Keeping Wilderness Areas Wild: Legal Tools
for Management, 6 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 101, 111-12 (1986).
73. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3).
74. See id.
75. Cf. id.; 36 C.F.R. § 228.15 (1998).
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gress, the real issue became the extent to which regulatory agencies and
courts would recognize mining rights within Wilderness Act lands. Thus,
it became apparent that the commercial mining interests' hard fought
victory existed primarily on paper. 6 Indeed, the Wilderness Act's poli-
cies, regulations, and modifications to the mining law all work to restrict
the establishment of valid existing rights of mining claims located in
wilderness areas. To better understand the treatment of mining rights
after the passage of the Wilderness Act, it is necessary to examine each
of these factors in turn.
A. Declared Policies
The Wilderness Act presents wilderness preservation as its primary
purpose, with certain limited allowances for nonconforming uses.' Sec-
tion 2 of the Wilderness Act declares the policy of the United States as
follows:
[Wilderness] areas ... shall be administered for the use and enjoy-
ment of the American people in such manner as will leave them un-
impaired for future uses and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to
provide for the protection of the areas, the preservation of their wil-
derness character, and for the gathering and dissemination of infor-
mation regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness.7
This policy articulates two interrelated yet conceptually distinct purposes
for wilderness preservation. First, Congress wanted "to protect land in its
essentially natural state from 'expanding settlement and growing mecha-
nization."' ' Second, Congress wanted to preserve wilderness areas for
use by future generations.'
Regulations promulgated by the Forest Service and the BLM restate
the dual goals of wilderness preservation, but make clear that preserva-
tion must override human use and enjoyment of wilderness lands. Forest
Service regulations state that "[iun resolving conflicts in resource use,
wilderness values will be dominant."'" Furthermore, case law has rein-
forced the "preservation first" policy. For example, the Tenth Circuit in
76. See KLYZA, supra note 8, at 46.
77. Upon signing the Wilderness Act into law, President Johnson commented that "the
[Wilderness [Act] preserves for our posterity, for all time to come, 9 million acres of this vast
continent in their original and unchanging beauty and wonder." President's Remarks Upon Signing
the Wilderness Bill and the Land and Water Conservation Fund Bill, l1 PUB. PAPERS 554 (Sept. 3,
1964). The inclusion of non-conforming uses suggests that the accommodation of local and com-
mercial interests was an implied purpose of the Wilderness Act. See Rohlf & Honnold, supra note
23, at 257-58.
78. See Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
79. See Rohlf & Honnold, supra note 23, at 255.
80. Id. at 255-56 (quoting Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a)).
81. 36 C.F.R. § 293.2(c) (1998).
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Parker v. United States' described the general purpose of the Wilderness
Act as "simply a congressional acknowledgment of the necessity of pre-
serving one factor of our natural environment from the progressive, de-
structive and hasty inroads of man." 3 A federal district court put it more
bluntly: "When there is a conflict between maintaining the primitive
character of the area and between [sic] any other use... the general pol-
icy of maintaining the primitive character of the area must be supreme."'
B. Regulatory Restrictions
Both the BLM and the Forest Service have regulations in place that
govern surface impacts of mining operations within wilderness areas in
their respective jurisdictions." The wilderness-specific regulations work
in concert with general BLM and Forest Service regulations governing
mining operations within all lands under their respective jurisdictions,
whether designated as wilderness or not. ' Generally, both agencies re-
quire approval of a plan of operations before mining operations com-
mence." The plan of operations is the agency's key tool for causing the
operator to meet the standards articulated in the BLM and Forest Service
wilderness-specific regulations.
The two sets of wilderness-specific regulations contain common
elements. Both reserve to the agency the authority to limit the means of
access to mining claims: the Forest Service regulations limit access to
means "consistent with the preservation of National Forest Wilderness
which have been or are being customarily used with respect to other such
claims surrounded by National Forest Wilderness";8 and the BLM regu-
82. 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971) (upholding an injunction against timber harvesting on
public lands that bordered a wilderness area).
83. Parker, 448 F.2d at 795.
84. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276, 1331 (D. Minn.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976). The Eighth Circuit reversed the trial
court because the region at issue, the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, was not intended by the Wilder-
ness Act to be treated as "pure wilderness area." Butz, 541 F.2d at 1298; see Jennie Bricker, Com-
ment, Wheelchair Accessibility in Wilderness Areas: The Nexus Between ADA and the Wilderness
Act, 25 ENvTL. L. 1243, 1260-62 (1995) (discussing preservation as the primary purpose of the
Wilderness Act).
85. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 228.15 (1998) (containing special standards for mining opera-
tions within national forest wilderness areas); id. pt. 293 (giving general Forest Service regulations
governing activities in wilderness areas); 43 C.F.R. pt. 8560 (1998) (detailing BLM regulations
governing management of wilderness areas); id. § 8560.4-6 (specifying BLM regulations governing
mining operations within BLM wilderness areas).
86. In practicality, the agencies also tend to apply their general mining regulations more
strictly in wilderness areas than in nonwilderness areas. See, e.g., Toffenetti, supra note 56, at 62-
63. The agencies' tendency to do so is to some extent reflected in their guidance policies, but it is
also embodied in subjective decisions made regarding the sufficiency of plans of operations, etc. See
id. at 62 n.217.
87. See 36 C.F.R. § 228.4 (listing Forest Service requirements); 43 C.F.R. pt. 3809 (providing
BLM surface management regulations containing plan of operations requirement).
88. 36 C.F.R. § 228.15(c); cf. id. § 293.13 (giving identically worded access limitation appli-
cable to all "valid occupancies" within national forest wilderness areas).
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lations note that the claimant must comply with all "reasonable stipula-
tions"'  imposed and that "[w]here the use of mechanized transport, air-
craft and motorized equipment is essential, these stipulations shall con-
trol their use."'0 Both agencies impose reclamation requirement"-the
BLM going so far as to require that "reclamation shall restore the surface
to a contour which appears to be natural, although this may not be the
original contour."'' And, both agencies restrict the mining operator's use
of government-owned timber located on the claim to that necessary for
operations if timber is "not otherwise reasonably available."'3
The key difference between the sets of regulations is that the BLM
requires that a BLM mineral examiner assess mining claim validity in
two circumstances: (1) prior to the approval of any plan of operations for
mining activities within a wilderness area, and (2) prior to "allowing
previously approved operations to continue on unpatented mining claims
after the date on which the lands were withdrawn from appropriation
under the mining laws."'4 The mineral examiner is to determine whether
"the claim was valid prior to withdrawal" from appropriation under the
mineral laws, and whether it remains valid at the time of the examina-
tion, and is to produce a mineral examination report containing his con-
clusions as to these matters."
C. Wilderness Restrictions As Affecting Claim Validity
Statutory, regulatory, and policy restrictions specific to mining ac-
tivities in wilderness areas have arguably raised the bar for establishing
the validity of mining claims within wilderness areas in ways neither
wilderness supporters nor the mining industry would have predicted. By
and large, the judiciary has turned a deaf ear to the mining industry's
complaints that these restrictions have unduly heightened the showing a
claimant must make to prove claim validity.
For example, surface use and access restrictions have limited the
ability of miners to do discovery work necessary to validate their claims,
and the courts have refrained from interfering. The recent case of
Clouser v. Espy' provides an illustration. In Clouser, lack of motorized
access to mining claims compromised the three claimants' discovery
89. 43 C.F.R. § 8560.4-6(e) (1998).
90. Id.
91. See 36 C.F.R. § 228.15(d) (stating Forest Service reclamation requirements); 43 C.F.R. §
8560.4-6(f-(g) (stating BLM reclamation requirements).
92. 43 C.F.R. § 8560.4-6(0.
93. 36 C.F.R. § 228.15(e) (detailing Forest Service regulations); 43 C.F.R. § 8560.4-6(i)
(detailing BLM regulations).
94. 43 C.F.R. § 8560.4-6(j).
95. Id.
96. 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994).
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efforts. ' Two of the mining claims were located on Forest Service land
that was subsequently withdrawn from mineral exploration and devel-
opment under the Wilderness Act.98 The Forest Service denied the plain-
tiffs motorized access to these claims." As a result, the plaintiffs either
had to use pack animals or walk to transport themselves and their equip-
ment to the claim.
The plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service decision on the grounds
that the regulation of ingress to and egress from the claims affected the
validity of the claims and, thus, was solely a decision for the BLM,
which is the agency entrusted with determining the validity of mining
claims located on Forest Service lands."' The plaintiffs argued that the
Forest Service regulation materially affected the commercial viability"'
of the claims which, in turn, affected the BLM's legal determination of
whether there was a valid discovery. " A finding of no valid discovery
would prevent the plaintiffs from establishing a valid existing right to
mine the claims. The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the plaintiffs'
claim and held that the Forest Service had authority under the Wilderness
Act to impose ingress and egress restrictions on the plaintiffs' mining
claims despite the "collateral consequences" the decision may have on
claim validity. 3
Another way in which wilderness-specific restrictions can hinder a
mining claimant's efforts to establish its claim stems from the way wil-
derness can impact the "marketability" test for claim validity. As men-
tioned previously, the General Mining Law requires a discovery of
"valuable mineral deposits.""'4 The Mining Act, however, did not define
the word "valuable" in the discovery context. In response to this missing
definition, the Land Department (the precursor to the Department of Inte-
rior) formulated the "prudent man" test in 1894." Under this test a dis-
covery of valuable mineral occurs:
[When] minerals have been found and the evidence is of such a char-
acter that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the
further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable pros-
97. See Clouser, 42 F.3d at 1524. Clouser was the result of the consolidation of three separate
claims brought to challenge Forest Service decisions regarding operating plans. See id.
98. See id. at 1524-25.
99. See i. at 1524.
100. See id. at 1528.
101. The commercial viability of an alleged mining claim is one of the factors that the BLM
considers when evaluating whether a valuable discovery has occurred. See United States v. Coleman,
390 U.S. 599, 602-03 (1968). For a more thorough discussion of the issues raised by Clouser with
respect to the standards for determining a valuable discovery, see Cameron Elliot, Recent Develop-
merit, Clouser v. Espy and the Environmental Regulation of Mining Claims, 19 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REv. 553,564-65 (1995).
102. See Clouser, 42 F.3d at 1528.
103. Id. at 1529.
104. General Mining Law § 1, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994).
105. See Castle v. Womble, 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 455,457 (1894).
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pect of success, in developing a valuable mine, the requirements of
the [General Mining Law] have been met.) 6
In a later case, the United States Supreme Court held that "profit-
ability is an important consideration in applying the prudent-man test."
'' °
The Court went on to fashion what is now called the "marketability" test,
often cited as a refinement of the prudent man test. The marketability test
requires the claimant to show "the deposit is of such value that it can be
mined, removed and disposed of at a profit..' "One of the primary ele-
ments of this rule is the existence of a present market or demand for the
minerals in question."" In determining the marketability of a claim, the
claimant may consider historic trends in prices and costs, and prove
profitability by showing that "as a present fact, considering historic price
and cost factors and assuming that they will continue, there is a reason-
able likelihood of success that a paying mine can be developed.""0
Thus, the Wilderness Act can play an important role in the market-
ability of claims located within wilderness areas as the costs associated
with environmental regulation must be taken into account. The Wilder-
ness Act's surface use and access restrictions and the reclamation re-
quirements all work together to create a higher cost of production than
otherwise would be true for claims located in nonwilderness areas."'
Moreover, a claimant may have difficulty proving that a viable market
exists for minerals removed from a wilderness site due to negative pub-
licity associated with mining in wilderness areas."2 Indeed, in United
States v. Marion,"' the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) found it
significant that a prospective buyer canceled a sale contract upon learn-
ing that the mine was located in a "sensitive area.""' However, despite a
perhaps growing recognition of the extent to which wilderness restric-
tions can impact mining rights, the judiciary and the IBLA have shown
no significant interest to date in blunting that impact.
106. Castle, 19 Pub. Lands Dec. at 457. The "prudent man" test was adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1905).
107. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599,602 (1968).
108. Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (quoting Layman v. Ellis, 54 Interior
Dec. 294, 296 (1933)).
109. Schlosser v. Pierce, 93 Interior Dec. 211, 219 (1986).
110. See In re Pacific Coast Molybdenum Co., 90 Interior Dec. 352, 360 (1983) (addressing the
process of determining a mine's validity).
111. See Toffenetti, supra note 56, at 61.
112. See id. at 64.
113. 37 1.B.L.A. 68 (1978).
114. Marion, 37 I.B.L.A. at 77.
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IV. CURRENT ISSUES RELATING TO MINING AND WILDERNESS
A. Buffer Zones
One issue that has repeatedly arisen in connection with wilderness,
and that has gained increased notoriety as of late, is whether buffer zones
should or can be established, formally or informally, on public or private
lands that surround wilderness areas. The concept is that activities within
the buffer would be regulated based at least in part on the compatibility
of the activities with the character and management of the core wilder-
ness area. In practicality, this means that the buffer zones themselves
might be managed essentially as defacto wilderness. For purposes of this
article, the issues that arise with respect to buffer zones relate to how
mining claims are to be handled in these areas. The most obvious issue is
whether the land management agencies have the authority to establish
buffer zones without express legislative authorization-and even in di-
rect conflict with statutory and policy prohibitions.
Resistance to the concept of buffer zones crystallized in the 1980s
and continues in force. The federal government party line is that there are
no buffer zones and there will be no buffer zones. Congress has routinely
included prohibitions against the creation of buffer zones in enabling
legislation for specific wilderness areas. A quick check of the Westlaw
public laws database turned up some twenty federal laws containing the
following boilerplate prohibition against buffer zones:
Congress does not intend that designation of wilderness areas in the
State of [-] lead to the creation of protective perimeters of
buffer zones around each wilderness areas [sic]. The fact that non-
wilderness activities or uses can be seen or heard from areas within
the wilderness shall not, of itself, preclude such activities or uses up
to the boundary of the wilderness area."'
The stated opposition to establishment of buffer zones has filtered down
to the agency level, as well. The Forest Service has a formal policy pro-
hibiting the establishment of buffer zones;"6 and BLM policy parrots the
congressional boilerplate prohibition."7
Industry and other groups, however, remain unmollified by the fed-
eral government's assurances that wilderness designation will not result
in a sort of "wilderness-plus" that includes generous buffer zones cover-
ing substantially more acreage than Congress intended. As one local
government representative put it:
115. See, e.g., Arkansas Wilderness Act of 1984 § 7, Pub. L. No. 98-508, 98 Stat. 2349, 2352;
Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984 § 9, Pub. L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 299, 305.
116. See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T oF AGRic., FOREST SERvicE MANUAL ch. 2320.3 (1990)
(stating in part, "[d]o not maintain buffer strips of undeveloped wildland to provide an informal
extension of wilderness.").
117. See BLM Notice of Availability of Final Wilderness Study Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 5,098,
5,108 (1981); BLM Final Wilderness Management Policy, 46 Fed. Reg. 47,180,47,187 (1981).
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[I]t is claimed that there will be no buffer zones around wilderness
designated on the BLM land in Utah. ... However, recent Interior
Board of Land Appeals and federal court cases clearly demonstrate
that nonwilderness uses on adjacent nondesignated lands will be gov-
erned and regulated according to what is necessary to protect the ad-
jacent wilderness resources. A rose by any other name can smell as
sweet, and a restriction on adjacent use because of proximity to des-
ignated wilderness has the same effect as a buffer zone, whether it is
called a buffer zone or not.
Again, wilderness proponents claim there will be no buffer zones, yet
in effect there are.... What does that portend for economies in the
areas where vast acreage is proposed for wilderness areas? We don't
know because wilderness advocates, and even the BLM, have denied
that this is going to happen.'"
In practicality, land management agencies clearly take into account
effects on wilderness of activities proposed for adjacent nonwilderness
areas. How can the agencies do this in the face of clear statutory and
policy prohibitions against establishing buffer zones? The answer ap-
pears to lie in the gray area between making management decisions
about a nonwilderness area solely to protect wilderness values on an ad-
jacent wilderness area, and making the same management decisions
based only in part on the adjacent wilderness. Congress routinely states
only that "[t]he fact that non-wilderness activities or uses can be seen or
heard from areas within the wilderness shall not, of itself, preclude such
activities."' Where additional justifications exist, as they frequently do,
for managing adjacent lands in such a way as to protect wilderness val-
ues on the wilderness area itself, the agency is free to make management
decisions intended in part to protect the wilderness area. Thus, for exam-
ple, the Forest Service can close certain forest trails in a nonwilderness
area to off-road vehicle use partly to protect an adjacent wilderness area,
as long as the closure is also justified in part on remediating "user con-
flicts" on the forest trails." Characterizing some management decisions
as only partly based on protecting adjacent wilderness, and therefore
permissible, while characterizing other management decisions as wholly
based on protecting adjacent wilderness, and therefore impermissible,
seems to some extent a distinction without a difference. However, this is
the line that Congress has drawn and that the courts have upheld.'2'
118. Rod Greenough et al., Symposium Panel Discussion, Issues in Wilderness Designation on
the Colorado Plateau, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. REsouRcEs & ENVTL. L. 393, 400 (1993) (statement of
William Howell, Southeastern Utah Ass'n of Local Governments) (alluding to WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2).
119. Arkansas Wilderness Act § 7,98 Stat. at 2352 (emphasis added).
120. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1481 (9th
Cir. 1994).
121. In rejecting challenges to agency approval of resource development activities on lands
adjacent to or near wilderness areas, courts have cited the congressional boilerplate anti-buffer zone
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It remains to be seen how the creation of buffer zones will impact
mining activities on lands adjacent, or near to, wilderness areas or wil-
derness study areas. Issues are likely to arise concerning the inevitable
conflict between mining operations on nonwilderness lands and protec-
tion of wilderness values on wilderness areas or wilderness study areas."
In the Senate Report accompanying the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act
of 1990, '23 the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources at-
tempted to clarify how mining activities adjacent to one wilderness area
should be handled:
[D]esignation of wilderness areas does not imply the creation of
"protective perimeters" or buffer zones around any of the areas. The
Committee is aware that this language may have particular signifi-
cance for the proposed White Canyon wilderness area. The Commit-
tee understands that there is potential for the development of large-
scale mining activities relatively close to the boundary of the pro-
posed wilderness area. The boundary of the wilderness area was
drawn so as to exclude this potential mining area from wilderness
designation. The Committee recognizes that noise, dust, and other
non-wilderness activities may impact the proposed wilderness area if
significant mining operations on adjacent lands proceed. This subsec-
tion clarifies that such mining activities are not to be limited solely
because they can be seen or heard within the White Canyon wilder-
124ness.
Whether this more specific language from Congress is likely to affect
agency management of mining activities adjacent to the White Canyon
wilderness area remains to be seen. The fact that the Senate Committee
sought to prevent limitations of mining activities solely due to effects on
adjacent wilderness suggests that this particular injunctive may not add
much protection to mining operations adjacent to the White Canyon wil-
derness area. However, the Senate Committee's willingness to directly
address the potential conflict between mining operations and adjacent
wilderness signals is at least an acknowledgment of the issue and gives
general direction to the agency on how to approach the issue.
language in the wilderness authorization statutes. See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v.
Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting challenge to Forest Service timber sale based on
Arkansas Wilderness Act's prohibition against creation of buffer zones); Park County (Wyoming)
Resource Council v. United States Bureau of Land Management, 638 F. Supp. 842, 845 (D. Wyo.
1986) (denying application for a preliminary injunction which would restrain oil drilling on federal
lands based on the Wyoming Wilderness Act of 1984 prohibition against creation of buffer zones).
122. Additionally, issues are likely to arise regarding prospectors' rights to continue explora-
tion, location, and discovery activities within the buffer zones and, if these activities are disallowed,
how valid existing rights would be protected.
123. Pub. L. No. 101-628, 104 Star. 4469 (1990) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note (1994)).
124. S. REP. No. 101-359, at 15 (1990) (emphasis added) (interpreting the standard boilerplate
prohibition against the creation of buffer zones).
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B. BLM Wilderness Reinventory
In the 1970s and 1980s, pursuant to the Wilderness Act and
FLPMA, the Department of the Interior (DOI) conducted an inventory of
public lands to identify lands suitable for wilderness designation. In
1980, the DOI completed its task of identifying lands appropriate for
designation as wilderness. Congress still has not approved or disap-
proved the areas proposed as wilderness.
In the 1990s, environmental groups requested the DOI to review its
1980 decisions excluding land in Utah and Colorado from wilderness
consideration. The DOI is doing so in both states. Industry fears that the
reinventory will result in additional lands being included on the list of
lands identified as appropriate for wilderness designation and, therefore,
make them off-limits for resource exploitation. Industry-backed federal
lawsuits in both states challenging the reinventory have to date been un-
successful.'" In Colorado, the DOI went so far as to enter into an official
Memorandum of Understanding with the Colorado Environmental Coa-
lition'" regarding reinventory. This DOI action particularly concerned
industry representatives, who tend to see the reinventory as a direct
challenge to their ability to conduct mining and oil and gas activities on
the subject lands.'" There are signs that the industry's concerns are well
founded. For example, in both states the BLM has held mineral leasing in
abeyance on the public lands at issue.
For purposes of this article, the reinventory raises several issues.
First, real questions exist as to whether the DOI has the power, under
FLPMA, the Wilderness Act, or any other authority, to conduct the rein-
ventory. " So far, the courts have answered this question in the affirma-
tive; however, there may be further legal challenges to the reinventory.
The second question is whether the BLM will attempt to suspend mining
activities in areas covered by the reinventory, as it has done with mineral
leasing. So far, the BLM has not done so. The mining industry is keeping
a careful watch on the agency's actions in this regard. Third, if the rein-
125. See, e.g., Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998) (vacating preliminary injunction
against reinventory in Utah, ruling that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge reinventory, and
remanding to district court for resolution of issue whether DOI is imposing a de facto wilderness
management standard on nonwildemess lands in violation of FLPMA); Marathon Oil Co. v. Babbitt,
966 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Colo. 1997) (granting motion to dismiss Marathon's challenge to DOI's
refusal to make lands subject to reinventory available for competitive oil and gas leasing).
126. The Colorado Environmental Coalition is the leading Colorado environmental group
requesting reinventory.
127. In fact, the most vocal opposition to the wilderness reinventory has come from the oil and
gas industry, as opposed to the mining industry. Although mining interests certainly could be hurt by
designation of additional wilderness areas, the mining industry has taken more of a "wait and see"
approach to the reinventory.
128. See generally H. Michael Anderson & Aliki Moncrief, America's Unprotected Wilderness,
76 DENY. U. L. REV. 413 (1999) (discussing wilderness reinventory in detail and taking the position
that legal authority exists for the reinventory).
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ventory results in additional lands being proposed for wilderness classifi-
cation, it becomes necessary to ask how valid existing rights in mining
claims will be protected.
CONCLUSION
Although the Wilderness Act is now more than three decades old,
numerous issues remain unresolved with respect to its effect on mining
activities in and around wilderness areas. While it is clear that the Act's
impact on the mining industry, through policy, regulation, and judicial
development, has been substantial-probably even more so than either
wilderness supporters or the mining industry expected-it is unclear to
what extent preservation of wilderness values will continue to dominate
over resource development on and around wilderness lands. The answer
may lie in part in how the agency resolves, and the courts interpret, cur-
rent conflicts between mining and preservation of wilderness valuls. Key
among these conflicts are the current debates over buffer zones and wil-
derness reinventory.

THE WILDERNESS ACT AND THE COURTS
H. ANTHONY RUCKEL"
[Wilderness areas] are delicate, sensitive places where the often
mysterious and unpredictable process of nature [is] to be preserved
for the study and enjoyment of mankind. Congress directed that man
must tread lightly in these areas, in awe and with respect.'
September 3, 1964:
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by ex-
panding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and
modify all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving
no lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural
condition, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to se-
cure for the American people of present and future generations the
benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. For this purpose there
is hereby established a National Wilderness Preservation System....
[Flederally owned areas designated by Congress as "wilderness ar-
eas," . . . shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the
American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for
future use and enjoyment as wilderness .... 2
INTRODUCTION
Thirty-five years! Enough time for courts to establish some clear
interpretive trends for the Wilderness Act. Most fundamentally, they
have recognized a classification of lands reserved and dedicated to a
preservation purpose, as opposed to more traditional resource commodity
purposes, and they have vigorously defended the wilderness quality of
those lands from many challenges. They have also had to balance wilder-
ness preservation with conflicting use exceptions contained in the Wil-
derness Act itself or in enabling legislation for individual wilderness ar-
eas. Again, wilderness principles and objectives have come off rather well.
Naturally, legislation of this significance will always be tested in
court, and many chapters will be written in the future. I have arranged my
discussion of existing case law in a manner which I feel comfortably ad-
dresses the issues litigated. I find three broad categories or themes: the
definition of wilderness, the scope or breadth of protection afforded by the
Act, and management questions regarding wilderness areas themselves.
* Attorney; general practice, environmental law. Founded Rocky Mountain Office, Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund in 1972 and served as director for 13 years.
1. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40,43 (DD.C. 1987) (Gesell, J.).
2. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 2(a), 78 Stat. 890, 890 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994)).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I. DEFINITION OF WILDERNESS
The first question is what constitutes wilderness? What kind of land,
precisely, is wilderness? By what values may it be recognized? The op-
erable statutory language is the long definition set forth in section 2(c) of
the Act:
(c) "Wilderness" defined. A wilderness.., is... an area where the
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man.... [It] is
further defined... [as] an area... retaining its primeval character
and influence without permanent improvements or human habitation,
which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural condi-
tions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily
by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially
unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a
primitive and unconfined type of recreation .... .
The first reported case focusing on the definition of wilderness,
Parker v. United States,4 addressed the presence of a road leading into
proposed wilderness, and whether that disqualified the area for inclusion
in a wilderness review and recommendation The court determined that
East Meadow Creek "seems to have significant wilderness resources and
could be determined by the President to be predominately of wilderness
value," that outside of the road, "the area in question is untrammeled by
man," and that "the testimony indicated that due to the dense forest con-
ditions, this road is substantially unnoticeable from approximately 100
yards away." The court went on to note:
East Meadow Creek has outstanding opportunities for solitude and a
primitive and unconfined type of recreation .... [Tihis region is sig-
nificantly interrelated with the Gore Primitive Area. [The road] serves
as an access route .... [Bloth regions are inhabited by deer and
elk.... [D]estruction of the natural state of East Meadow Creek
might have an adverse effect on this wildlife .... [I]t is desirable to
have both alpine and sub-alpine zones within a wilderness area.
In conclusion, we hold that the East Meadow Creek region
meets the minimum requirements of suitability for wilderness classi-
7fication ....
Other courts have spoken in a similar vein. "[T]he term 'wilder-
ness,' as used by Congress, is a technical term which serves to classify
areas containing primitive characteristics."' The district court in Utah
3. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
4. 309F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971).
5. See Parker, 309 F. Supp. at 596.
6. Id. at 601.
7. Id.
8. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276, 1330 (D. Minn.
1975), rev'don other grounds, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
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faced the difficult question of access to exempted land over other land
being reviewed for potential wilderness. The court found that access
could be regulated as to location and mode in order to protect wilderness
characteristics, and cited the statute for the following: "The definition of
wilderness... contemplates that some human activity can take place in
wilderness areas as long as the area, 'generally appears to have been af-
fected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work
substantially unnoticeable."' For example, Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n v. Peterson' noted that a closed-off road track incapable
of being traversed by non-four-wheel drive vehicles and not maintained
by the Forest Service, which over time would be overgrown with vegeta-
tion, may not disqualify an area for wilderness classification."
The courts have adopted a practical definition, recognizing the
primitive, untrammeled nature of wilderness, but acknowledging the
often unavoidable presence of conflicting circumstances or uses. Purist
notions of completely untrammeled, unblemished land have not been
sympathetically received. An important effect of this approach has been
to maximize the availability of lands, some of which may be minimally
impacted by a conflicting circumstance or use, for eventual wilderness
classification.
II. BREADTH OF WILDERNESS PROTECTION
The Wilderness Act is an extremely significant departure from his-
torical practices in the management of the nation's public lands. A pres-
ervation ethic rose to challenge the suzerainty of the traditional com-
modity interests, such as logging and mineral development. While envi-
ronmentally sensitive practices were gradually seeing more application
by 1964 and the Forest Service had begun an administrative process
designating its own wilderness and primitive areas, the Wilderness Act
marked a quantitative leap in the evolution of wilderness protection.
Over the next three decades, millions of acres came before Congress
for wilderness classification. In 1976, Congress brought Bureau of Land
Management lands, the huge remaining reservoir of unclassified public
lands, into the process through the enactment of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976.2 Review and wilderness designation of
significant parts of our national parks and national wildlife refuges con-
tributed to the flow. A rapidly increasing population, enjoying the bene-
fits of an expanding economy and increased leisure time, flooded into
9. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1007 (D. Utah 1979) (quoting the Wilderness Act §
2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994)) (emphasis added).
10. 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd in part, vacated in part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.
1985), affid in part, vacated in part, on reh'g, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
11. See Northwest Indian Cemetery, 565 F. Supp. at 603-04.
12. Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 603, 90 Stat. 2784, 2785 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1782
(1994)).
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many of the existing areas, producing a demand for more. This translated
into the political momentum which Congress needed to dedicate new
areas. And, this continues today.
Inevitably the scope and force of the Act were tested from the be-
ginning, as wilderness preservation clashed with the traditional com-
modity uses. Parker v. United States, involving timber sales and road
building, early resolved that Forest Service management of statutorily
mandated wilderness study areas could not include activities which
would destroy their wilderness character." In the words of the district
court, "it thwarts the purpose and spirit of the Act to allow the Forest
Service to take abortive action which effectively prevents a Presidential
and Congressional decision."'" The court of appeals agreed: "[B]oth the
President and the Congress shall have a meaningful opportunity to add
contiguous areas predominately of wilderness value to existing primitive
areas for final wilderness designation."' 6 The directive in section 3(b) of
the Act to review these contiguous areas amounted to "a 'proceed
slowly' order until it can be determined wherein the balance between
proper multiple uses of the wilderness lies and the most desirable and
highest use established for the present and the future.""
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt8 involved the wilderness
review provisions of FLPMA, governing public lands under the Bureau
of Land Management.'9 The court upheld the Department of the Interior
determination that mineral leasing activities not specifically grandfa-
thered under FLPMA would be regulated so as not to impair a wilderness
study area's suitability for wilderness.' In Getty Oil Co. v. Clark,2' the
court approved federal agency action suspending a proposed oil drilling
operation in a study area pending determination of impacts upon wilder-
ness values.'
Wilderness area designation includes a federal reserved water right.
Winters v. United States and Arizona v. California' established that
when Congress sets aside or reserves land from the public domain, such
reservation includes an implied right to a sufficient quantity of water
13. 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), aft'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971).
14. See Parker, 309 F. Supp. at 599.
15. Id.
16. Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1971).
17. Parker, 448 F.2d at 795.
18. 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
19. See Watt, 696 F.2d at 750.
20. See id.
21. 614 F. Supp. 904 (D. Wyo. 1985).
22. See Clark, 614 F. Supp. at 920.
23. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
24. 373 U.S. 544 (1953).
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needed to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.' Sierra Club v. Blocke
determined that the Wilderness Act established such a reserved water
right for wilderness areas." Moreover, the government must take steps to
protect this right and cannot escape its responsibility by obfuscation and
irresolute declarations.'
One court determined that the congressional direction to protect the
wilderness quality of wilderness areas overrides contrary sections of the
Act protecting preexisting private rights in the subsurface mineral
estate.' Although suggestive, this opinion stands by itself to date. The
fact that the case was decided on other grounds has probably contributed
to its apparent obscurity.
By no means have all cases been resolved in favor of wilderness.
Valid preexisting mining claims will be recognized and their appurtenant
rights protected." Road access will be allowed across wilderness study
lands to private interest or state lands although the route and mode of
access can be regulated.' In Sierra Club v. Hodel,3" widening a county
road even though it would impair an adjoining wilderness study area was
allowed, but it was limited to what was reasonable and necessary with
respect to preexisting uses.33  I
Furthermore, the land manager will have discretion to make the
close calls. Because the Wilderness Act allowed timber management in
the so-called "portal zone" of wilderness portions of the Boundary Wa-
ters Canoe Area, the Forest Service in Minnesota Public Research Group
v. Butz' had discretion to decide a management alternative, logging,
25. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (stating that "[tihe power of the government to reserve the
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be"); see
also Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600 (following Winters). For an examination of federal reserved water rights
in wilderness areas, see Karin P. Sheldon, Waterfor Wilderness, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 555 (1999).
26. 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985).
27. See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 862 (holding that pursuant to the Wilderness Act, federally
reserved water rights exist "in previously unappropriated water"); see also Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661
F. Supp. 1490, 1495 (D. Colo. 1987) (noting the Solicitor General's findings that the Wilderness Act
does not eviscerate the implied reserved water rights doctrine), vacated sub nom., Sierra Club v.
Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1412 (10th Cir. 1990) (pointing out that the Forest Service acknowledges
the existence of federally reserved water rights under the Wilderness Act).
28. See Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1495 (holding that "Congress intended to continue the status quo
which allows for the creation and assertion of reserved water rights on lands withdrawn and reserved
under the Wilderness Act" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. See lzaak Walton League of Am. v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698, 715 (D. Minn. 1973),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974).
30. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Robertson, 824 F. Supp. 947,951 (D. Mont. 1993).
31. See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1009-10 (D. Utah 1979).
32. 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
33. See Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1084-85.
34. 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
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which would arguably cause more wilderness impairment than the plain-
tiffs' alternative, controlled burning."
A number of cases unsuccessfully tried to stretch the limits of the
Wilderness Act. Road construction and timber harvesting on land con-
tiguous to a wilderness study area would not be stopped.' Similarly, a ski
area expansion next to an area recommended for wilderness status by the
President was allowed to proceed.37 Land contiguous to a wilderness
study area where the existing primitive area and certain of its contiguous
lands had been studied and the whole had been submitted to the President
and Congress omitting the subject land, could be involved in a land ex-
change with a private interest.38
Two unusual cases tested the limits of the law. In Brown v. United
States Department of the Interior,9 the special mining provisions of the
Wilderness Act for Forest Service lands could not be stretched to allow
such activity in Buffalo National River managed by the National Park
Service. ' And, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt," unilateral action of
a congressional committee could not prevent mineral leasing in the face
of statutory sections allowing leasing. 2
Obviously, the wilderness review process has been critical to the
eventual decisions of the President and Congress as to what lands would
be dedicated as wilderness areas. Much of this acreage was coveted by
private interests attracted to conflicting uses, such as logging and mining,
activities which had traditionally been allowed. The courts have adopted
a common sense approach, vigilantly protecting wilderness study areas
until the President and Congress make their decisions. However, land
outside the boundaries of formally designated wilderness study areas
does not enjoy such protection. Wilderness areas themselves enjoy the
full protection of the Wilderness Act, including reserved water rights, and
fmn application of the Act's imperatives to protect wilderness quality.
35. See Butz, 541 F.2d at 1295, 1301. For an examination of wilderness issues associated with
the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, see Richard A. Duncan & Kevin Proescholdt, Protecting the Bound-
ary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness: Litigation and Legislation, 76 DENv. U. L. REV. 621 (1999).
36. See Big Hole Ranchers Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 686 F. Supp. 256, 259-60 (D.
Mont. 1988); see also Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 124 (D. Alaska 1971) (holding that
"[s]ince there were no 'primitive' areas in Alaska on September 3, 1964, and it does not appear that
the sale includes any land within a national park, wildlife refuge or game range, the Wilderness Act
has no application").
37. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 751-53 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
38. See National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 343 F. Supp. 696 (D. Mont. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 485 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1973).
39. 679 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1982).
40. See Brown, 679 F.2d at 751.
41. 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981).
42. See Watt, 529 F. Supp. at 1005.
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III. MANAGING WILDERNESS
Today, questions of management of actual wilderness study areas
and designated wilderness predominate in the courts. The Wilderness Act
itself permits some conflicting activities in wilderness areas, while con-
gressional action placing an area within the wilderness system and under
the Wilderness Act's authority, sometimes blesses a particular local con-
flicting use. These contradictory signals have bred much litigation.
Section 5(b) of the Act allows access to valid mining claims within
wilderness areas "by means which have been or are being customarily
enjoyed with respect to other such areas similarly situated."'3 In Clouser
v. Espy," plaintiffs sought motorized access to claims in the Kalmiopsis
and North Fork John Day Wildernesses in Oregon."5 The Ninth Circuit
found that motorized access was not essential, that pack horses could
carry the appropriate equipment, and that this was feasible and custom-
arily done.' The court also noted that abandoned road tracks, now trails,
that the plaintiffs wished to use had been blocked by a gate for several
years, that the trails had not been maintained by the Forest Service, and
that "they [were] returning to a natural condition.' 7 Finally, the court
dismissed plaintiffs' argument that general mining laws of the United
States assured them motorized access, since the Wilderness Act specifi-
cally addressed the issue for wilderness areas.
On the other hand, in Voyageurs Region National Park Ass'n. v.
Lujan,4' where the enabling legislation allowed snowmobiling in the
park, snowmobiling would be allowed to continue in a wilderness study
area.' There was no showing that it would permanently change the area
and preclude its consideration for eventual wilderness status.,"
In Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Robertson,'2 the stat-
ute at issue addressed particular boat portages by name and directed the
Secretary of Agriculture to terminate motorized use, unless he deter-
mined that there was no nonmotorized means of transporting boats across
the portages." In reversing the district court decision approving the For-
est Service determination in favor of motorized access, the appellate
court noted that the evidence demonstrated successful use of portage
wheels, and that in a Forest Service test using different boats and people
of different age groups, twenty-six out of thirty-four teams completed
43. Wilderness Act § 5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b) (1994).
44. 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994).
45. See Clouser, 42 F.3d at 1525.
46. See id. at 1536-37.
47. d at 1537.
48. See id. at 1538-39; see also Wilderness Act § 5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b).
49. 966 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1992).
50. See Lujan, 966 F.2d at 427-28.
51. Cf. id at428.
52. 978 F.2d 1484 (8th Cir. 1992).
53. See Robertson, 978 F.2d at 1485.
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portages without motors.' In Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen,' com-
mercial fishing, although allowed by Glacier Bay National Park's ena-
bling legislation, was prohibited in the designated wilderness area por-
tions of the park under section 4(c) of the Act banning commercial enter-
prises in wilderness areas.'
A series of cases dealing with Forest Service attempts to control
outbreaks of the southern pine beetle in wilderness areas are very in-
structive. Section 4(d) of the Act authorizes the Forest Service to take
"such measures ... as may be necessary in the control of fire, insects,
and diseases, subject to such conditions as the Secretary [of Agriculture]
deems desirable."'7 Sierra Club v. Lynge allowed the Secretary to use
control measures, such as logging, so long as such measures were rea-
sonably designed to restrain or limit the spread of the infestation from
wilderness land to neighboring property to its detriment." Rigorous con-
ditions were placed upon this activity, which was only allowed where the
adjacent land owners were taking equally vigorous efforts and site spe-
cific determinations of specific outbreaks were required.'
Logging for other purposes could not be justified by the need to
control infestation. For example, cutting hardwoods would be prohibited,
because the pine beetle was not found in hardwoods." The method of
cutting the trees must be related to the objective of controlling the infes-
tation, and the use of natural barriers, such as rivers or hardwood stands
where present, may be required to control the beetles, rather than logging.'
Finally, the hard fought case of Stupak-Thrall v. United States" in-
volved the Sylvania Wilderness Area, which includes Crooked Lake with
most of its shoreline within the wilderness. The Forest Service promul-
gated regulations prohibiting the use of houseboats and sail boats and
discouraging the use of electronic fish finders, boom-boxes, and other
mechanized or battery operated devices.' The district court, whose
opinion is controlling here, found the regulations appropriate to preserve
54. See id. at 1485-89.
55. 108 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997).
56. See Jensen, 108 F.3d at 1069 (citing Wilderness Act § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1994)).
57. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1).
58. 663 F. Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1987).
59. See Lyng, 663 F. Supp. at 560.
60. See id.; see also Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.D.C. 1987) (questioning
whether "adjacent properties can be equally well controlled against beetle infestation by measures
taken outside of the Wilderness Areas"); Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 488, 491-92 (D.D.C.
1985) (stating that "[i]f the cutting has a limited or no effect on the number of pine trees lost to
beetle infestations, wilderness area policy might be better served by no control").
61. Cf. Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 134, 139-40 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
62. Cf. Block, 614 F. Supp. at 140.
63. 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994), affd, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996).
64. See Stupak-Thrall, 843 F. Supp. at 328.
65. See id. at 334.
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the wilderness quality of the area. The court further found that the re-
strictions upon the plaintiffs' riparian uses of Crooked Lake, where there
was no historical use of sailboats and houseboats and the mechanical
devices were only discouraged, would only have a minimum impact
upon plaintiffs' riparian rights."
To a heartening degree, the federal courts have worked diligently to
protect wilderness values in wilderness areas and wilderness study areas.
Statutorily excepted uses have generally been put to a rigorous test to
assure that no more wilderness conflicting activity was allowed than that
necessary to honor the specific statutory language.
CONCLUSION
The Wilderness Act has dramatically impacted established uses of
millions of acres of public lands, uses that date back for generations. It
propounded an ethic of preservation of primitive lands, rather than con-
sumption, and instituted a process for their serious review and eventual
designation as wilderness areas. At the same time, bending a bit in ap-
parently necessary political adjustments to the traditional commodity
uses, Congress allowed conflicting activities under certain circumstances
within the very areas it protected.
It has taken strong action by the judiciary to strike the balances and
make the determinations that have ensured that qualifying lands were all
reviewed, and then, when formally dedicated as wilderness, protected.
The courts have succeeded by carefully scrutinizing the facts of the cases
brought before them and vigorously safeguarding wilderness principles
and lands. They have maintained balance and objectivity by recognizing
individual conflicting activities sanctioned by the Wilderness Act itself,
or by specific legislation establishing individual wilderness areas, where
petitioners have met their burden of showing they are clearly proceeding
according to a defined exception and are doing no more than necessary to




PROTECTING THE BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA
WILDERNESS: LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION
RICHARD A. DUNCAN*
KEvIN PROESCHOLDT**
Love of the land is the basis for the unending struggle of those who
really care against those who only see material rewards.
INTRODUCTION
Minnesota's Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness (BWCAW)
is one of the nation's most well-known wildernesses. An original unit of
the National Wilderness Preservation System created by the Wilderness
Act of 1964,' the area received its first administrative wilderness protec-
tions as early as 1926.' A part of the Superior National Forest, this
lakeland canoe country has become the nation's most popular and most
heavily visited wilderness area."
Despite the prominence of the BWCAW, it remains the most em-
battled wilderness in the nation. Conservationists fought for most of
this century to protect the area's wilderness character, gradually elimi-
nating nonconforming uses that threatened it. Presidents signed execu-
tive orders protecting the area, and Congress, on four different occa-
sions, passed major legislation addressing threats to it, each time add-
ing new layers of wilderness protection.6 In 1998, however, legislative
* Partner, Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota. J.D. 1988, Yale University;
B.A. 1985, Yale University.
** Executive Director, Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
B.S. 1977, Iowa State University. The authors wish to thank Lisa Misher, an associate with Faegre &
Benson, J.D. 1995, Northwestern University, and Lisa Hollingsworth, J.D. 1998, University of
Minnesota, for their invaluable assistance on this article. Lisa Hollingswonrh was the 1998 Faegre &
Benson Environmental Law Fellow.
1. SIGURD F. OLSON, REFLECIONS FROM THE NORTH COUNTRY 125 (1976).
2. The wilderness area was originally designated the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA),
which was included in the National Wilderness Preservation System, as established by the Wilderness
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136
(1994)). The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649,
redesignated the BWCA as the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness (BWCAW). Throughout this
article, both terms are used, depending on what period of time is being discussed.
3. Pub. L. No. 88-577,78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994)).
4. See National Ass'n of Property Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223, 1228 (D. Minn.
1980), aff'd sub nom, Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981); see also lzaak Walton
League of Am. v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698, 703 (D. Minn. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974).
5. See Snowbank Enter. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 476,482 (1984).
6. See National Ass n of Property Owners, 499 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
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action for the first time authorized the reintroduction of motorized ve-
hicles into a wilderness area-the BWCAW.7
Historically, wilderness advocates used litigation to protect the
BWCAW, both to enforce existing laws and interpret imprecise or con-
flicting statutes. These advocates have also recently fought legislative
battles on the BWCAW in Congresses hostile to wilderness protection.
This article examines the litigation history of the BWCAW and the re-
cent legislative campaign to protect it from assaults in Congress.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The BWCAW, located in northeastern Minnesota, is an irregularly
shaped area within the Superior National Forest, extending approxi-
mately 110 miles from east to west along the international border with
Canada, and averaging 16 miles from north to south.' It is the only
lakeland canoe wilderness area in the nation, consisting of over one mil-
lion acres and one thousand lakes connected by hundreds of miles of
streams and portages." It complements and adjoins Quetico Provincial
Park on the Canadian side of the border-another one million acres of
lake country wilderness--creating one of only a few international wil-
derness systems.'" Voyageurs National Park includes an additional
218,000 acres of lakes and boreal forest to the west of the BWCAW and
completes the Quetico-Superior Ecosystem.
The BWCAW ecosystem is rich in natural resources. It exists as
"home to hundreds of species of unusual birds, plants and animals set-
tled in scores of ecological communities."" The lakes are filled with
bass, northern pike, pickerel, sucker and lake trout, and the forests har-
bor such wildlife as the bald eagle, osprey, otter, beaver, moose, deer,
snowshoe hare, porcupine, eastern timber wolf, pine martin, fisher, lynx
and loon.'2 The forest combines jackpine and balsam fir with feather
mosses, stunted black spruce, labrador tea, swamp laurel and pitcher
plants.'3 Although much of the region was open to logging in the past,
7. See Inter-modal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) § 1212(v)(1), Pub. L. No.
105-178, 112 Stat. 107, 198 (1998).
8. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz (MPIRG II), 401 F. Supp. 1276, 1285
(D. Minn. 1975), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976); Izaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 700;
see also Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz (MPIRG 1), 358 F. Supp. 584, 594 (D.
Minn. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
9. See Hedstrom Lumber Co. v. United States, 7 CI. Ct. 16, 21 (1984). The area's size prior
to 1978 was 1,030,000 acres; after 1978 the area encompassed 1,087,000 acres. See Hedstrom Lum-
ber Co., 7 Cl. Ct. at 21.
10. See Jzaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 701; Hedstrom Lumber, 7 CI. Ct. at 20-21; see
also Jonz Chr. Norine, Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness: Paradise Doesn't Come Easy, 15
HAMLiNE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 323, 325 (1994).
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over 540,000 acres of virgin forest remained in 1978 when the
BWCAW Act finally ended this practice."4
The BWCAW is one of the largest wilderness areas in the U.S. For-
est Service's portion of the National Wilderness Preservation System,
and the largest wilderness area east of the Rocky Mountains and north of
Florida's Everglades." Sometimes called the "highway of the Voya-
geurs," this area was the preferred route of travel for the fur traders of the
eighteenth century navigating the same water routes pioneered by the
Sioux and Chippewa Indians." "Despite the area's relative isolation, it is
the most heavily visited wilderness area in the national wilderness sys-
tem, and [has been described as] a hauntingly beautiful area of the
United States.'
7
The statutory and administrative history behind the BWCA is
lengthy. The federal government has long recognized the unique quality
of the area, beginning nearly a century ago to set aside federal land along
the Minnesota-Canada border to ensure its preservation." In 1902, 1905,
and 1908, the federal government reserved over one million acres, from
which President Theodore Roosevelt created the Superior National For-
est in 1909.' Additional lands were added to the federal forest in suc-
ceeding years.' On September 17, 1926, in response to controversy over
plans to build a "road to every lake,"'" the Coolidge Administration,
through Secretary of Agriculture William M. Jardine, created the Supe-
rior Wilderness Area in "one thousand square miles of the best canoe
country."' The Agriculture Department's policy placed severe restric-
tions on road construction and commercial logging.' The federal gov-
ernment renamed it the Superior, Little Indian Sioux and Caribou
Roadless Areas in 1939, and promulgated a formal management plan in
14. See id. See generally MIRON HEINSELMAN, THE BOUNDARY WATERS WILDERNESS
ECOSYSTEM (1996) (providing a complete natural history of the area).
15. Snowbank Enter. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 476. 482 (1984).
16. Izaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 701; see also National Ass'n of Property Owners,
499 F. Supp at 1228; Norine, supra note 10, at 325.
17. Snowbank, 6 Cl. Ct. at 482.
18. See Hedstrom Lumber Co. v. United States, 7 C1. Ct. 16,21 (1984); Snowbank, 6 Cl. Ct. at
482. The government acted pursuant to the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, providing that, "The Presi-
dent of the United States may, from time to time, set apart and reserve, in any State... having
public land bearing forests... any part of the public lands ... as national forests... by public
proclamation." Forest Reserve Act of 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103 (repealed 1976); see also
lzaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 702.
19. Cf. Lzaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 703; Snowbank, 6 C1. C. at 482.
20. See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240,1245 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981); Snowbank, 6 Cl. CL at 482.
21. Kevin Proescholdt, BWCA: The Embattled Wilderness, AM. FORESTS, July-Aug. 1989, at 28.
22. Block, 660 F.2d at 1245 n.7. For two, single-volume histories on the campaign to protect
the Boundary Waters and the larger Quetico-Superior Ecosystem, see KEVIN PROESCHOLDT ET AL.,
TROUBLED WATERS: THE FIGHT FOR THE BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA WILDERNESS (1995);
R. NEWELL SEARLE, SAVING QUETICO-SUPERIOR: A LAND SET APART (1977).
23. See MPIRG I, 358 F. Supp. 584,590 (D. Minn. 1973); Snowbank, 6 Cl. Ct. at 482.
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1948.' On January 27, 1958, these roadless areas were renamed the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area.'
Statutory protection has. also long been afforded the area. In 1930,
Congress passed the Shipstead-Newton-Nolan Act,' withdrawing from
public entry or appropriation the public lands in the Superior National
Forest.27 For the purpose of "conserving the natural beauty of shore lines
for recreational use,"' the statute also prohibited logging within four
hundred feet of shorelines and other actions (such as dam building) af-
fecting water levels.' In 1948, in response to the proliferation of resort
openings and the use of float planes, Congress passed the Thye-Blatnik
Act," directing the Secretary of Agriculture to purchase private inhold-
ings scattered throughout the area.3' In 1949, President Truman issued
Executive Order No. 10092 banning airplane flights below four thousand
feet over the roadless areas of the Superior National Forest.32 This air
space reservation effectively ended float plane services to the area's re-
maining resorts." In 1956, Congress passed the Humphrey-Thye-Blatnik-
24. See Izaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 703 n.3.
25. See id. at 703; see also MPIRG 1, 358 F. Supp. at 590 n.6.
26. Shipstead-Newton-Nolan Act, ch. 881, 46 Stat. 1020 (1930) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 577 (1994)).
27. See id. § 1; cf. Block, 660 F.2d at 1245 n.7; Izaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 703. In
1933, Minnesota passed similar legislation in the Little Shipstead Nolan Act of 1933, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 110.13 (West 1976) (repealed 1990), and in 1947, by joint resolution, the state asked Con-
gress to enact laws to preserve the wilderness area. See Izaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 706.
Beginning in the 1920s, the state also opposed a proposed hydroelectric project for the area and the
so-called "Gun Lake" road. See id. at 707. In addition, the state passed the Little Wilderness Act,
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84.43-.52 (West 1976), which limited air and motorboat traffic in the area.
See Jzaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 706. The boundary waters area has also been under inter-
national protection since early in the century. Canada and the United States negotiated the Root-
Bryce Treaty of 1909, establishing joint regulation and limiting use of the waters along the interna-
tional boundary. Also in 1909, the Province of Ontario set aside the Quetico Forest Reserve on the
Canadian side of the border. See Block, 660 F.2d at 1245 n.6. Ontario banned "virtually all motor
vehicles" in Quetico Provincial Park in 1979. Id. at 1247 n. 11.
28. Shipstead-Newton-Nolan Act § 2,46 Stat. at 1021.
29. See id §§ 2, 3; cf Block, 660 F.2d at 1245 n.7; Jzaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 703 n.4.
30. Pub. L. No. 733,62 Stat. 568 (1948) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 577(c) (1994)).
31. See id. § 1, 62 Stat. at 568; cf Izaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 703; Hedstrom Lum-
ber Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 16, 21 (1984); Norine, supra note 10, at 327.
32. See National Ass'n of Property Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223, 1228 (D.
Minn. 1980), aff'd sub nom, Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981); Izaak Walton
League, 353 F. Supp. at 703. The air space reservation survived a constitutional attack in United
States v. Perko, 108 F. Supp. 315 (D. Minn. 1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1953); see also
United States v. Perko, 141 F. Supp. 372 (D. Minn. 1956) (issuing a permanent injunction against
the same defendants); United States v. Perko, 133 F. Supp. 564 (D. Minn. 1955) (issuing a tempo-
rary injunction against defendant resort owners building roads and driving vehicles in the roadless
area, but allowing them to use pack horses); Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl.
1959) (allowing compensation to resort owners denied access to their property in the roadless area).
33. See Norine, supra note 10, at 327.
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Andresen Act,' appropriating $500,000 for the implementation of the
Thye-Blatnik Act."
In 1956, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey introduced the first version
of a bill' that ultimately became the Wilderness Act of 1964."' The Wil-
derness Act expressly designated the BWCA as a wilderness area within
the Act's protection." The purpose of the Act was to preserve and protect
the natural condition of certain unspoiled lands designated as "wilderness
areas" for present and future generations of American people. 9 To this
end, Congress prohibited any commercial enterprise, including logging,
within any designated wilderness area.' This prohibition, however, was
not absolute. Under the 1964 Act, the general prohibition of commercial
activities was "subject to existing private rights" and other exceptions."
Included in these exceptions was one specifically addressing the
BWCA. 2
In response to vociferous protest from commercial timber interests
and other users of the BWCA, Congress- added language specifically
excepting the BWCA from full wilderness status. In particular, section
(d)(5) of the legislation permitted the continuation of "any already estab-
lished use of motorboats" in the BWCA, and allowed commercial log-
ging to continue to the extent it remains consistent with "maintaining...
the primitive character of the area.'' The provision states in full:
Other provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, the
management of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, formerly designated
as the Superior, Little Indian Sioux and Caribou Roadless Areas, in the
Superior National Forest, Minnesota, shall be in accordance with regu-
lations established by the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with
the general purpose of maintaining, without unnecessary restrictions on
other uses, including that of timber, the primitive character of the area,
particularly in the vicinity of lakes, streams, and portages: Provided,
That nothing in this chapter shall preclude the continuance within the
area of any already established use of motorboats."4
34. Pub. L. No. 607, 70 Stat. 326 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 577(d)(1), (g), (h) (1994)).
35. See National Ass'n of Prop. Owners, 499 F. Supp. at 1228; Hedstrom Lumber, 7 Cl. Ct. at 21.
36. S. 4013, 84th Cong. (1956); see also Hedstrom Lumber, 7 Cl. Ct. at 21; Snowbank Enter.
v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 476, 482 (1984).
37. Pub. L. No. 88-577,78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136(1994)).
38. See Wilderness Act § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note.
39. See Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
40. See Wilderness Act § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c); see also MPIRG II, 401 F. Supp. 1276,
1297 (D. Minn. 1975), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
41. Wildemess Act § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
42. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (repealed 1978).
43. Id. The Eighth Circuit determined that "the special BWCA provision was intended to
maintain the status quo with respect to management of the area." MPIRG I1, 401 F. Supp. at 1298.
44. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (repealed 1978). This provision was not
included in Senator Humphrey's original 1956 version of the Wilderness Act. See National Ass'n of
Property Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223, 1229 (D. Minn. 1980).
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In 1965, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture, the BWCA was divided into two zones: an Interior Zone of
about 618,000 acres situated mainly along the Canadian border, where
logging was totally prohibited, and a Portal Zone of about 412,000 acres
generally situated in the southern portion of the BWCA, where logging
was historically permitted and allowed to continue. ' A series of legal
challenges to commercial logging within the BWCA ensued in the
1970s.'
Under Secretary of Agriculture (and former Minnesota governor)
Orville Freeman's 1965 management plan, sixty percent of the BWCA's
surface water (including over 100 lakes) was designated for snowmobile
and motorboat use.'7 The continuation of logging, mining, and motorized
use in the BWCA created fifteen years of public controversy and debate,
ultimately leading to the passage of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area
Wilderness Act (BWCAW Act)' in 1978.
The BWCAW Act extended the boundaries of the BWCA to include
an additional 57,000 acres and redesignated the area as the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area Wilderness.'9 The BWCAW Act ended logging en-
tirely,50 restricted mining' and the use of snowmobiles,"2 and cut motor-
boat use from sixty-four percent to twenty-four percent of the water sur-
face.3 The 1978 Act also repealed section 4(d)(5) of the 1964 Wilderness
Act, the only instance where the 1964 law was amended.'
For the first time, a congressional act "restricted the number of lakes
within the BWCAW upon which outboard motors could be used, ....
[and] imposed maximum horse-power limits... on certain designated
lakes." 3 Nonetheless, the BWCAW Act was compromise legislation.
Although it brought the area more into line with other wilderness areas,
45. See MPIRG I, 358 F. Supp. 584,594 (D. Minn. 1973), affid, 498 F.2d 1314(8th Cir. 1974).
46. As the Eighth Circuit noted, although the BWCA is highly prized by many for its recrea-
tional, scientific, and educational opportunities, it is also "highly regarded by others, like the defen-
dant paper and logging companies, who value the thousands of acres of marketable timber it con-
tains." MPIRG 1, 498 F.2d at 1316-17.
47. National Ass'n of Property Owners, 499 F. Supp. at 1229.
48. Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note
(1994)); see also Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1246 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that the
BWCAW Act was passed "[i]n response to the confusion and litigation generated by the [motorized
use] proviso" in the Wilderness Act); County of St. Louis v. Thomas, 967 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.
Minn. 1997), aff'd in part and revd in part, Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dom-
beck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1999).
49. See Hedstrom Lumber Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 16, 21 (1984); Snowbank Enter. v.
United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 476, 483 (1984); cf BWCAW Act § 3, 92 Stat. at 1649.
50. See BWCAW Act § 6(a), 92 Stat. at 1652.
51. See id. § 11(a) 92 Stat. at 1655.
52. See id. § 4(c) 92 Stat. at 1650.
53. See id § 4(e) 92 Stat. at 1651.
54. See ad § 4(b) 92 Stat. at 1650.
55. Snowbank Enter, v. United States, 6 C1. Ct. 476, 483 (1984).
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special rules still allowed the continuation of activities banned in other
wildernesses. The BWCAW Act, among other things, directed the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to develop and implement quotas for motorboats on
the many lakes where motorized use was still allowed. ' The Act further
allowed trucks and railways to continue moving visitors and gear from
lake to lake at five portages. '
Throughout this century, the United States and the state of Minne-
sota have increasingly sought to preserve the primitive character of the
boundary waters area. 8 Although the 1978 Act was passed to end the
battle between environmentalists and local business interests, "lawsuits,
lingering controversy, and animosity between the competing parties are
still the rule."59 The fight is described as "a classic confrontation between
preservationists and sportsmen, between natural scientists and commer-
cial interests, and sets wilderness advocates against local residents."
This article offers the wilderness advocates' view on the legal and
political battles to protect the BWCAW. Part I surveys the history of
litigation over the management of the BWCAW. Part II describes recent
legislative attacks on the BWCAW by motorized use advocates in the
recent antiwilderness Congresses, and the ensuing congressional battle to
determine the future of the region.
I. BOUNDARY WATERS LITIGATION
A. Mining: Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair
The first legal effort to enforce the protections of the Wilderness
Act in the BWCA related to mining activity.6' In Izaak Walton League of
America v. St. Clair,62 the Izaak Walton League challenged mining in the
56. See BWCAW Act § 4(f), 92 Stat. at 1651.
57. See County of St. Louis v. Thomas, 967 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D. Minn. 1997).
58. See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1981).
59. Norine, supra note 10, at 324.
60. Id. at 323.
61. United States v. 967905 Acres of Land, 305 F. Supp. 83 (D. Minn. 1969), rev'd, 447 F.2d
764 (8th Cir. 1971), was a condemnation action arising out of the creation of the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area. Although the litigation did not directly implicate the Wilderness Act, the court noted
the value of preserving the BWCA in a natural state:
We think that the Congress and the Executive Branch of the Government may properly
conclude that the encroachment of civilization and commercial enterprise upon a wilder-
ness area and the navigable waters found therein militates against the broad public inter-
ests that have been mentioned, and that when the Government commands civilization and
business to retreat from a given area so that it may be preserved in its natural state for the
enjoyment and refreshment of all of us, it may fairly be said that the Government is act-
ing to "improve" the area and the waterways therein.
967.905 Acres, 447 F.2d at 771.
62. 353 F. Supp. 698, 701 (D. Minn. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974).
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BWCA, notwithstanding express provisions in the Wilderness Act per-
mitting mineral exploration.'
In 1969, George W. St. Clair sent crews into the BWCA with per-
mission from the federal government for preliminary non-invasive ex-
ploratory work.' In December of that year, St. Clair filed an application
with the Forest Service to begin exploratory drilling. Unlike his initial
exploratory work, however, St. Clair's proposal involved the use of me-
chanical equipment, access overland (rather than by canoe) and perma-
nent camps.' In response, the Forest Service notified St. Clair that it
needed proof of his claimed rights before any permit could be issued.
The Forest Service further indicated that it would look for any possible
way to keep him from carrying out his planned activities. Before the fed-
eral government took any action on his application, the Izaak Walton
League filed a civil action seeking a declaratory judgment that St. Clair
had no right to enter the BWCA for mineral prospecting purposes and to
enjoin the federal and state defendants from permitting him to begin
drilling.'
The Izaak Walton League argued that Congress had zoned the
BWCA against any sort of commercial activity including mining and
mineral exploration.' St. Clair argued that Congress did not intend to ban
the exercise of mineral rights in wilderness areas and, even if it had so
intended, attempting to do so would constitute a taking of property with-
out due process of law." The federal government generally agreed with St.
Clair's position, but also argued that the Forest Service should have been
allowed to rule on the permit application prior to judicial intervention. '
After a lengthy discussion concerning a governmental body's right
to zone property against certain uses, the district court held that "Con-
gress clearly had the power to zone the BWCA in view of the public pur-
pose to keep it virginal and untrammeled."70 The court then held that wil-
derness values are "plain[ly] and simply ... inconsistent with and an-
63. Section 4(d) of the Wilderness Act provides for mineral exploration that is "compatible
with the preservation of the wilderness environment" and an extension of then extant mineral leases
in wilderness areas through December 31, 1983. Wilderness Act § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (1994).
64. See Izaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 701. Although the federal government owns
over 70% of the land within the BWCA, it owns only 44% of the underlying mineral rights. See id.
The rest is owned by the state of Minnesota (26.3%), the counties in which the BWCA is situated
(1.4%), and private parties (28.3%). See id. The mineral rights in question in this case were situated
in the middle of the BWCA. See id. at 714. Although they were reserved in the 1930s, St. Clair did
not acquire his rights as a lessee until 1969. See id. at 710.
65. See id. at 701.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 707.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 710.
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tagonistic to... any commercial activity such as mining,"' and that both
federal and state law showed an intent to keep the BWCAW free from
such intrusive activities.'
Although the court was aware of provisions in the Wilderness Act
authorizing mining in national forest and wilderness areas," it held that,
"To create the wilderness and in the same breath to allow for its destruc-
tion could not have been the real Congressional intent and a court should
not construe or presume an Act of Congress to be meaningless if an al-
ternative analysis is available."7' The court accepted the League's argu-
ment that the specific provisions of the Wilderness Act concerning man-
agement of the BWCAW overrode the general provisions of the Act,"'
ultimately holding that the BWCA "is a special area and should be
treated separately."' 6 After describing the irreversible effects of mineral
exploration, the court concluded that "the BWCA was established by
Congress to secure for future generations the beauty, pristine quality and
primitiveness of one of the few remaining small areas of this Country.' 7
For these reasons, the court permanently enjoined any mining activity in
the BWCA, refusing even to carve out a "national emergency" exception
to the injunction.'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applied, and
that the district court should have stayed or dismissed the action without
prejudice until the Forest Sprvice took action on St. Clair's mineral pros-
71. Id, at 714. Examining the definition of "wilderness area" in the Wilderness Act, the court
explained why wilderness and mining are fundamentally incompatible:
Wilderness exists because man has not yet intruded upon it. As the United States was
settled and frontiers vanished, wilderness disappeared except for inaccessible or other-
wise then commercially useless areas. As of today but few true wilderness areas remain.
Once penetrated by civilization and man made activities, it cannot be regained for per-
haps hundreds of years. The recovery period is meaningless for generations to come. The
destruction is irreversible. So with mining, logging off and other activities, they are
anathema to all wilderness values.
Id.; see also Wilderness Act § 4(d)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2) (1994).
72. See lzaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 707-10.
73. The court determined that the Wilderness Act and its implementing regulations contained
fundamental inconsistencies. See id. at 714. Referring to the Act's mineral rights provision, the court
noted that "Congress demands that the Wilderness remain inviolate and yet at the same time appears
to allow mineral development." Id. at 715. The court refused to equivocate, reasoning that,
"[m]ineral development... by its very definition cannot take place in a wilderness area; else it no
longer is a wilderness area." Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 712-13. The court went on to suggest that because wilderness and mining "are
anathema each to the other, then it would seem that in enacting the Wilderness Act Congress en-
gaged in an exercise of futility if the court is to adopt the view that mineral rights prevail over wil-
derness objectives." Id. at 715.
76. Id. at 713.
77. Id. at 715.
78. Id. at 716.
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pecting permit application." Despite the lower court's impassioned de-
fense of wilderness values and objectives, the Eighth Circuit determined:
[T]he factual questions regarding the effect of mining activity upon
the wilderness, and whether a permit should issue with restrictions
that would be adequate to protect the wilderness quality of the
BWCA are those types of questions peculiarly within the competence
of the Forest Service, and statutorily delegated to it by the Wilderness
Act.8°
Unlike the district court, the Eighth Circuit refused to hold that mining
activities were necessarily incompatible with wilderness values and ob-
jectives. The appeals court remanded the case, instructing the Forest
Service to build a record for judicial review and holding that the Forest
Service had primary jurisdiction to determine whether to grant the li-
cense for mining activity. Although the Eighth Circuit did not address the
merits of the case or the future of the Boundary Waters, it noted that the
Forest Service's own management plan proposed to prohibit all commer-
cial mining exploration and extraction as far as legally possible because
such activity would "jeopardize the surface resources and wilderness
character of the area."8' The court concluded that judicial review would
be available after final Forest Service action, but no further litigation
resulted. 2
B. Logging: Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz
I
The next two cases testing the applicability of Wilderness Act pro-
tections to the BWCA were both entitled Minnesota Public Interest Re-
search Group v. Butz.83 In both, the Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group (MPIRG) challenged Forest Service proposals to permit extensive
logging in the BWCA, including harvesting of previously unlogged for-
est areas. In MPIRG I, MPIRG sought an injunction against any further
79. See Izaak Walton League of Am. v. St. Clair, 497 F.2d 849, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1974). The
Eighth Circuit explained that primary jurisdiction "comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case, the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views." Izaak Walton League, 497
F.2d at 852. The state of Minnesota also argued that the lands in which St. Clair claimed mineral
rights were fraudulently patented under the federal homesteading laws then in effect, and therefore
that title to these lands remained in the United States. See id. at 850. The district court held that the
statute of limitations barred such a claim. See Izaak Walton League of Am. v. St. Clair, 55 F.R.D.
139, 144 (D. Minn. 1972). The Eighth Circuit likewise declined to address the merits of the state's
argument, thus implicitly affirming the lower court's decision. See Izaak Walton League, 497 F.2d at
852.
80. Id. at 852-53.
81. Id. at 851.
82. Cf id. at 853.
83. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz (MPIRG 1, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn.
1973), aft'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz
(MPIRG I), 401 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Minn. 1975), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
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logging in the BWCA until the Forest Service completed an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) pursuant to the then-new National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)." In MPIRG II, the Sierra Club
joined MPIRG in bringing a claim that the express requirements of the
Wilderness Act mandated a permanent end to logging activities in the
virgin forest areas of the BWCA." Thus, the first round of litigation con-
sidered the NEPA question, and the second addressed the broader ques-
tion of whether logging should be banned entirely as incompatible with
the wilderness values protected by the Wilderness Act.
The Forest Service's logging proposals for the BWCA were
authorized by the special proviso in the 1964 Wilderness Act allowing
commercial logging to continue to the extent consistent with "maintain-
ing ... the primitive character of the area." The BWCA provision di-
rected the Secretary of Agriculture to adopt regulations that would ensure
protection of the BWCA's primitive character, but "without unnecessary
restrictions on other uses, including that of timber.""7 One of the defen-
dants, Consolidated Paper, Inc., argued that this language affirmatively
required the Forest Service to allow logging in the Portal Zone of the
BWCA." Consolidated Paper also argued that MPIRG's request to enjoin
logging within the BWCA was an "unnecessary restriction" under sec-
tion 4(d)(5) of the Wilderness Act." Another defendant, Kainz Logging
Company, argued that MPIRG's actions so wildly disregarded certain
provisions of the Wilderness Act as to be malicious, and, in a precursor
to the SLAPP' suits that became a common tactic of development inter-
ests in the 1980s and 1990s, asserted a claim for damages in the amount
of $200,000."'
The district court held that NEPA allowed it to grant injunctive re-
lief in favor of MPIRG, proscribing all logging in the BWCAW "pending
the Forest Service's completion of its new BWCA Management Plan and
accompanying impact statement." In reaching this decision, the court
closely examined the ecological history of the BWCA and the effects of
84. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994)). At the initiation of
the suit, the private defendants owned eleven active timber sales within the BWCA, consisting of
29,261 total acres, 5275 acres of which remained uncut. See MPIRG 1, 498 F.2d at 1317-18 & n.4.
85. MPIRG 1, 358 F. Supp. at 587-88.
86. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (1964) (repealed 1978); see MPIRG HI,
541 F.2d at 1297.
87. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (repealed 1978).
88. See MPIRG 1, 358 F. Supp. at 588.
89. Id. at 588-89.
90. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. For a detailed discussion on the history
and nature of SLAPP suits, see GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED
FOR SPEAKING OuT (1996).
91. See MPIRG I, 358 F. Supp. at 589.
92. Id. at 630. The court held that the Forest Service's practice of modifying, extending, and
supervising timber harvesting contracts in the BWCA constituted "major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment" within the meaning of NEPA. Id. at 620-22
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1969)).
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logging on the primitive character of the area.9' The court further dis-
cussed the merits of a variety of artificial methods of reforestation, ulti-
mately concluding that the proposed logging would ruin the primitive
character of the BWCA.9' The court determined that logging disrupts the
northern forest ecosystems of the BWCA by removing nutrients and by
leaving tree stumps, logging roads, skid trails and other improvements
that would remain visible for decades.9" On the basis of these factual
findings of injury to the primitive character of the BWCA, the district
court temporarily enjoined the defendants from logging on all or part of
seven active timber sales "contiguous with the main virgin forest areas of
the BWCA" until the required EIS was completed." The court further
held that, despite the defendants' interpretation, nothing in the Wilder-
ness Act, including the "unnecessary restriction" clause, precluded in-
junctive reliefY
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's interpretation
of NEPA, holding that timber sales, because of their adverse environ-
mental effects, triggered NEPA's EIS requirement," and that an injunction
against logging was proper pending completion of the necessary EIS and
Land Use Management Plan for the area." The court declined to address
the defendants' argument that the Wilderness Act specifically authorized
timber cutting within the BWCA, holding that this was the "crucial ques-
tion for determination in the further proceedings in this case. ''
93. See id. at 609-17; see also Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managing the Balances
of Nature: The Legal Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 264 (1988).
94. See MPIRG I, 358 F. Supp. at 611-17.
95. See id. at 610-11.
96. Id. at 630.
97. See id.
98. See MPIRG I, 498 F.2d 1314, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1974). In support of their argument that
the timber sales did not "significantly affect the quality of the human environment," the defendants
argued that "there [was] no evidence showing that human users of the BWCA have ever seen a
timber sale." MPIRG 1, 498 F.2d at 1322. The court rejected the defendants' anthropocentric view of
NEPA:
There has been increasing recognition that man and all other life on this earth may be
significantly affected by actions which on the surface appear insignificant... . Apart from
what may be referred to as "existence value," the evidence indicated that there are direct
effects on the human environment from logging. Logging creates excess nutrient run-off
which causes algal growth in the lakes and streams, affecting water purity. Logging roads
may cause erosion and water pollution and remain visible for as long as 100 years; this
affects the rustic, natural beauty of the BWCA, recognized as unique by the Forest Serv-
ice itself. Logging destroys virgin forest, not only for recreational use, but for scientific and
educational purposes as well. All these are significant impacts on the human environment.
Id. The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the routine extension and supervision of timber sales
did not rise to the level of major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment. See id. at 1325 (Ross, J., dissenting). The dissent found it important that "[tihe total area in
question was less than 1 percent of the BWCA and the location of the areas to be logged was not
adjacent to any portion of the BWCA used for recreational purposes." Id.
99. Id. at 1323-25.
100. Id. at 1325 n.31.
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Upon completion of the EIS, the litigation resumed, with the envi-
ronmentalists arguing that the EIS and accompanying BWCA Manage-
ment Plan failed to comply with the NEPA, and that the Wilderness Act
prohibited logging in the virgin forest areas of the BWCA. °' In a lengthy
opinion, the district court agreed, finding fault with the Forest Service's
EIS and management plan,'" and determined that "the plaintiffs [were]
entitled to an injunction against logging in those areas of the BWCA
which are contiguous with the remaining large blocks of virgin forest"
under both NEPA and the Wilderness Act. 3 Because of this construc-
tion, the district court declared 36 C.F.R. § 293.16, the BWCA regulation
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Wilderness
Act, invalid to the extent such logging was permitted."
In reaching this decision, the district court attempted to reconcile the
Wilderness Act's mandate to preserve the BWCA's primitive character
with the Act's special BWCA proviso, which "contemplate[d] that some
logging will occur within the BWCA.' ' "a The court resolved the inherent
conflict by holding that timber harvesting restrictions are "necessary"
within the meaning of the Wilderness Act "whenever timber harvesting
interferes with the maintenance of the primitive character of the
BWCA.""' Similar to its ruling in lzaak Walton League, the court deter-
mined that wilderness and logging were fundamentally incompatible and,
thus, permanently enjoined existing and future timber sales within or
adjacent to the remaining virgin forest areas of the BWCA.'
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the Wilderness
Act did not prohibit logging in previously unlogged areas of the
BWCAW' and that the EIS and management plan were both substan-
tively and procedurally adequate under NEPA,'" except in failing to pro-
vide criteria for permitting logging in the future."' The court rejected the
environmentalists' argument that the primary purpose of the Wilderness
Act was to maintain the primitive character of the BWCA, holding that
the BWCA "has never been managed as a pure wilderness area," and that
the Act "did not change this management policy.""' The court concluded
that the word "primitive" was not added "to finesse lumbering operations
out of the BWCA.""' 2 The court advised that, "If a substantive policy
101. See MPIRG II, 401 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (D. Minn. 1975), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1976).
102. See MPIRG 11, 401 F. Supp. at 1299-1308.
103. Id. at 1333.
104. See id.
105. ld. at 1332.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 1333.
108. See MPIRG II, 541 F.2d 1292, 1297 (8th Cir. 1976).
109. See MPIRG 1, 541 F.2d at 1299-1306.
110. See id. at 1306-07.
111. Id. at 1298.
112. Id.
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change is to be made with respect to virgin timber cutting in the BWCA,
that decision must come from Congress... not from the courts." 3 Thus,
the MPIRG cases acted as catalysts in generating pressure for further
congressional action to protect the BWCAW."4 In 1978, with passage of
the BWCAW Act, Congress removed the statutory exception to the pro-
hibition of logging in wilderness areas."'
C. Motorboats and Snowmobiles: Minnesota v. Block
Almost immediately after the effective date of the BWCAW Act,
the state of Minnesota and several private groups, in Minnesota v.
Block," challenged the constitutionality of the 1978 Act's controls on the
use of motorboats and snowmobiles on lands and waters not owned by
the United States."7 Block involved three separate lawsuits challenging
the BWCAW Act. The first alleged that the Act's limitations on motor-
boat and snowmobile use deprived them of their "absolute" right to
travel under international treaty between the United States and Canada."'
Among other constitutional claims, plaintiffs in the first suit also alleged
that the Act's motor use restrictions discriminated against disabled per-
sons and persons less physically fit."9
In the second lawsuit, the state of Minnesota, joined by an early
"wise use" group, the National Association of Property Owners, and nu-
merous individuals, businesses and organizations, alleged that Congress
had no power to restrict motorized uses on non-federal lands and waters,
and that the restrictions infringed on traditional powers retained by the
states under the Tenth Amendment."n The State of Minnesota's involve-
ment in supporting a legal challenge to wilderness protection of the
BWCAW ominously presaged twenty years of increasing antagonism of
the state government to wilderness protection, an unfortunate shift in
state policy.
The third lawsuit alleged that implementation of the Act constituted
a "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
113. Id.
114. See Minnesota Fed'n of Ski Touring Clubs v. Knebel, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. 20531 (D. Minn.
Jan. 18, 1977) (challenging snowmobiling in the BWCA). The court's decision in Knebel upheld the
Forest Service's decision to phase out snowmobiling in the wilderness area over a period of several
years, and created momentum for passage of the BWCAW Act. See id. at 20535.
115. See BWCAW Act § 6,92 Stat. 1649, 1652-54 (1978).
116. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), affg sub nom. National Ass'n of Property Owners v.
United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Minn. 1980).
117. See Block, 660 F.2d at 1240.
118. See National Ass'n of Propeny Owners, 499 F. Supp. at 1233.
119. See id. at 1227.
120. Id. The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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environment" within the meaning of the NEPA,'' and that the federal
defendants were required to file an EIS prior to enforcing the Act." Ob-
viously, such claims posed a threat not just to the BWCAW, but poten-
tially to all federal protection of wilderness.
Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
upheld all portions of the Act." Considering two separate groups of ap-
peals from the consolidation of the three cases, the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed.'"' In the first case, the court upheld federal regulation of boating
on state waters. " Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's expansive read-
ing of the Property Clause'" in Kleppe v. New Mexico,'7 the court held
that Congress had the power to regulate conduct off federal land if that
conduct interfered with the designated purpose of the federal land.' Ap-
plying this principle to the question before it, the court determined that,
"If Congress enacted the motorized use restrictions to protect the funda-
mental purpose for which the BWCAW had been reserved, and if the
restrictions... reasonably relate to that end, [it] must conclude that Con-
gress acted within its constitutional prerogative."'' After examining the
legislative history of the motor use restrictions, the court determined that
they were designed to preserve the wilderness character of the area, and
that Congress acted within its power under the Constitution to fulfill that
goal.'
The court also rejected appellants' Tenth Amendment challenge to
the motorized use restrictions, holding that such restrictions do not regu-
late "States as States," but rather regulated the activities of private indi-
viduals both on and off federal land for the purpose of protecting the
federal land. 3' The court pointed out that section 15 of the BWCAW Act
permits Minnesota "to exercise its traditional jurisdiction over the waters
as long as state regulation is not less strict than federal regulation."''
Thus, the court concluded that Congress recognized and demonstrated its
respect for state sovereignty.'33 Block remains the leading modern case on
121. NEPA § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1994).
122. See National Ass'n of Property Owners, 499 F. Supp. at 1227-28.
123. See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1981).
124. Block, 660 F.2d at 1244.
125. See id.
126. The Property Clause provides: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States .... U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
127. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
128. See Block, 660 F.2d at 1249-50.
129. Id. at 1250.
130. See id. at 1251.
131. Id. at 1252.
132. Id. at 1253.
133. See id. The court also noted that "[tihe Minnesota Supreme Court has long recognized the
power of the federal government to displace state regulation of the [BWCAW] under Congress'
commerce clause and treaty making powers." Id. at 1252 n.27 (citing State v. Kuluvar, 123 N.W.2d
699,703 (1963)).
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the federal government's authority under the Property Clause to regulate
activities on non-federal land in furtherance of wilderness protection.
In the second case on appeal, the Eighth Circuit rejected the con-
solidated claims of the National Association of Property Owners.3 First,
the court held that section 5 of the 1978 Act, which gives the United
States a right of first refusal in certain property in the area, did not vio-
late the Takings Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment." Second, the court held that the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of
1842"" and the Root-Bryce Treaty of 1909'3" did not preclude the gov-
ernments of Canada and the United States from enacting reasonable
regulations affecting commerce along the waterways, despite language in
the treaties requiring the border waterways to remain "free and open."' 3'
Finally, the court held that implementation of the BWCAW Act did not
trigger the requirements of the NEPA.'
D. Motorized Portages: Friends of the Boundary Waters v. Robertson
Following the successful defense of the 1978 Act's motorized use re-
strictions, a coalition of environmental groups in Friends of the Bound-
ary Waters Wilderness v. Robertson"'" sued to enjoin the continued use of
motorized portages within the BWCAW."'' Section 4(g) of the BWCAW
Act allowed three motorized portages in the BWCAW-Prairie Portage,
Trout Lake Portage, and Four Mile Portage-to continue operating until
January 1, 1984, at which time they were to be closed unless no other
means of transporting boats was feasible."2 When 1984 came, the truck-
134. See id. at 1253-54.
135. See id. at 1255-56; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation" (Takings Clause)); id. ("No person shall ... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." (Due Process Clause)). Appellants
argued "that the statute ... creates a cloud on the title of any property affected, and that the one
hundred day waiting period... serves to diminish the value of the land by deterring potential buy-
ers." Block, 660 F.2d at 1255. The court held that "the mere conditioning of the sale of property, as
done with section 5 ... cannot rise to the level of a taking." Id. at 1256. The court explained that the
right of first refusal provision "does not interfere with the owner's use or enjoyment of his property"
and that any diminution in value would be minimal. Id.
136. Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 572 (setting up boundaries between the United States
and Britain's land in North America).
137. Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448 (relating to the demarcation of boundary waters
between the United States and Canada).
138. Block, 660 F.2d at 1257-58 (noting that Canada similarly banned motor use of the water-
ways along much of the border).
139. See id. at 1259.
140. 770 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Minn. 1991), rev'd, 978 F.2d 1484, 1485 (8th Cir. 1992).
141. See Robertson, 770 F. Supp. at 1386; see also Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v.
Thomas, 53 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 1995) (granting plaintiffs attorney fees on the motorized portage issue).
142. The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness legislation states:
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to require the termination of the existing operation of
motor vehicles to assist in the transportation of boats across the [Prairie Portage, Four
Mile Portage, and Trout Lake Portage] during the period ending January 1, 1984. Fol-
lowing said date, unless the Secretary determines that there is no feasible non-motorized
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driven portages, operated by outfitters in the Ely, Minnesota area, were
not closed. After three years of administrative proceedings, the Forest
Service conducted tests on the feasibility of non-motorized portaging on
all three portages." Although the tests proved that it was possible to suc-
cessfully portage by non-motorized means, the Chief of the Forest Serv-
ice issued a final agency decision determining that non-motorized port-
aging was not "feasible," and allowed continued motorized operation.'"
The resolution of the case turned on the meaning of the term "feasi-
ble" as used in the BWCAW Act. 5 The Friends argued that the
BWCAW Act, the legislative history of the Act, Supreme Court prece-
dent and agency precedent conclusively established that "feasible" meant
"physically possible."'" The Forest Service, on the other hand, argued
that Congress intended the word "feasible" to mean "reasonable," "prac-
ticable" or "likely,"' 7 and that prohibiting motorized portages would pre-
vent many people, particularly older people, from enjoying the area.'" As
a fall-back position, the Chief of the Forest Service argued that "the stat-
ute [was] ambiguous[, and] the Chief's decision [was] based on a per-
missible construction of the Act."'49
The district court upheld the Forest Service's decision, but the
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that feasible means "physically possi-
ble,"'" and that the Forest Service erred in ordering the portages to re-
main motorized.'"' In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit relied on
the purposes behind the BWCAW Act and the Wilderness Act.'52 Noting
that the BWCAW Act was passed to prevent "further road and commer-
cial development and restore natural conditions to existing.. . roads in
the wilderness," the court determined that Congress intended to discour-
age motorized uses, even though some motorboats were allowed on the
lakes at issue.' 3 The court held that the Forest Service's definition of
"feasible" was overly restrictive and contrary to clear congressional in-
tent and the plain meaning of the word "feasible."''
means of transporting boats across the portages to reach the lakes previously served by
the portages listed above, he shall terminate all such motorized use of each portage listed
above.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness § 4(g), 92 Stat. 1649, 1651 (1978).
143. See Robertson, 770 F. Supp. at 1387.
144. See id.
145. See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Robertson, 978 F.2d 1484, 1484 (8th
Cir. 1992).
146. Robertson, 978 F.2d at 1486.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1489.
149. Id. at 1486.
150. Id. at 1487-88.
151. See id. at 1488.
152. Id. at 1487,
153. Id. (quoting BWCAW Act § 2(5), 92 Stat. 1649, 1649).
154. See id.
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E. Restrictions on Visitor Use: County of St. Louis v. Thomas
In 1992, the Forest Service recommended measures to reduce visitor
use of the BWCA. The Forest Service's proposed restrictions reignited,
the battle between advocates of development and preservation.
County of St. Louis v. Thomas " involved two separate challenges to
the BWCA Wilderness Management Plan and Implementation Schedule
(Plan), a Forest Service plan to counter the adverse effects of high visitor
use on the wilderness. The Plan imposed a number of measures to reduce
visitor use. These measures included: (1) reducing maximum party sizes
from ten to nine; (2) limiting each party to four watercraft; (3) reducing
the percentage of camp sites available for occupancy in designated travel
zones; (4) eliminating about 200 camp sites; (5) reducing overall visitor
entry point quotas, day use motor permits, and overnight motor permits;
(6) eliminating "overbooking," a practice by which the Forest Service
issued more permits than there were available slots to account for poten-
tial visitors who secure, but ultimately do not use, issued permits; (7)
reducing BWCA maintenance; (8) eliminating canoe rests; (9) requiring
removal and storage of motors by visitors leaving motorized zones; and
(10) defining "guest" as one who stays overnight at a host's home or
commercial lodging."
County of St. Louis demonstrated, once again, the chronic manage-
ment problems and dissatisfaction wrought by compromise legislation.
The Forest Service found itself in the middle of a fierce battle between
local economic interests and wilderness advocates. On one side, a coali-
tion of northern counties and outfitters argued that the restrictions on
access and usage were too prohibitive. On the other side, the Friends of
the Boundary Waters Wilderness and a coalition of preservation groups
argued that the new restrictions were not stringent enough." The ques-
tion, not surprisingly, centered on the appropriate level of motorized use
in the BWCAW.
The first case, brought by the outfitters, claimed that the "newly
imposed restrictions on visitor use unduly limit[ed] access to the BWCA,
in violation of the [BWCAW] Act."'"8 The second case, brought by the
environmentalists, claimed that the same restrictions allowed too much
motorized access to the BWCAW, also in violation of the BWCAW
Act.59 Ultimately the district court denied both sides relief, upholding the
Forest Service's Plan."w
155. County of St. Louis v. Thomas, 967 F. Supp. 370,370 (D. Minn. 1997).
156. See County of St. Louis, 967 F. Supp. at 373-74.
157. See id. at 372.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 379.
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In addition to their "undue restriction" argument, the outfitters ar-
gued that the measures in the Plan violated the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 (ADA)'6' and a specific provision in the BWCAW Act
directing the Forest Service to "provid[e] opportunities for a wide range
of outdoor experiences for disabled persons."'"2 The district court dis-
missed the outfitters' ADA claim on the ground that the ADA does not
provide a cause of action against the federal government. The court
also rejected the outfitters' claim that the visitor use reduction plan vio-
lates the BWCAW Act's directive to provide outdoor opportunities for
persons with disabilities. The court found that such persons "are no more
affected by the Plan's visitor restrictions than are any others,"'" and rea-
soned that the Plan "reduces access to the BWCA for all visitors, re-
gardless of the physical abilities of any particular visitor."'65 The court
also determined that the Forest Service fulfilled its mandate under the
BWCAW Act, noting that it adopted a plan in 1981 to provide accessible
camp sites, barrier-free recreation sites, and educational programs con-
cerning these sites.'" The court further noted that the BWCAW Act "ex-
plicitly directs the Secretary of Agriculture to develop programs for dis-
abled persons that are 'consistent with the purpose of the Act,"' and that
"one such purpose is to 'protect and enhance the natural values and envi-
ronmental quality' of the BWCA wilderness area."'67
Finally, the court held that the outfitters lacked standing to bring a
NEPA claim, holding that the NEPA provides no relief for economic
injury.'" Focusing on their motivation for bringing the lawsuit against the
Forest Service, the court held that "[b]ecause [the outfitters] raise no
environmental concerns as part of their NEPA claim, the Court finds
their asserted interests lie beyond the zone of interests protected by the
statute."'169
In early 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court in part, and reversed in part.' The ap-
pellate court generally affirmed the district court's findings that the new
BWCAW Management Plan's restrictions on visitor use were not arbi-
trary and capricious, in light of evidence that the wilderness qualities of
the area were threatened by heavy visitor use.7' The Eighth Circuit re-
161. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
162. County of St. Louis, 967 F. Supp. at 376 (quoting BWCAW Act § 18(d), 92 Stat. 1649,
1658-59 (1978)).
163. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
164. County of St. Louis, 967 F. Supp. at 376.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. Id. (quoting BWCAW Act § 2(2), 92 Stat. 1649, 1649).
168. See id. at 377.
169. Id. (citing Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
170. Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1999).
171. Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 164 F.3d at 1131.
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versed the district court's finding that the outfitter groups did not have
standing under NEPA to challenge the adequacy of the Forest Service's
EIS, but then found the EIS adequate, upholding the Forest Service plan-
ning process."
The Eighth Circuit also reversed the district court on one issue ap-
pealed by the environmental group plaintiffs. The appellate court held
that, under the plain language of section 4(f) of the BWCAW Act, home-
owners and resort owners on lakes within (or partially within) the wil-
derness were entitled to motor use exempt from the statutory quota sys-
tem only on lakes directly abutting their property.'73 The Eighth Circuit
held that the Forest Service's twenty year practice of allowing such users
to motor through entire chains of lakes exempt from the quota system
contradicted the language and purpose of the BWCAW Act. The appel-
late court reiterated what it had held in its earlier Minnesota v. Block and
Friends v. Robertson decisions: "The premise of the BWCA Wilderness
Act of 1978 is that motorboat use is prohibited in the wilderness area,
except to the extent that Congress specifically authorized motorboat use
on specifically designated lakes, portions of lakes, and rivers.""7 Despite
this clear statement that Congress intended to minimize motor use in the
wilderness by the BWCAW Act, as this article goes to press the Forest
Service has announced that it will initiate an administrative process to
consider raising motor quotas to appease cabin owners and resort owners
unhappy that they can no longer motor freely through wilderness lakes.
II. RECENT LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGN
The year after the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of
certiorari in the truck portage litigation, the Republicans swept into
power in both houses of Congress with the 1994 election. This change of
power placed many antiwilderness ideologues such as Alaska members
Representative Don Young (R-AK) and Senator Frank Murkowski (R-
AK) in key positions of power. The appointments of these Alaskans as
chairs of the House Resources Committee and the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Committee, respectively, unleashed a nationwide as-
sault on wilderness areas, " and the Boundary Waters Wilderness, un-
fortunately, quickly became a target.
A. 1994 Congressional Elections
In Minnesota, the race for the open U.S. Senate seat being vacated
by David Durenberger (R-MN) pitted long-time Democratic state legis-
lator Ann Wynia (D-MN) against freshman U.S.. Representative Rod
172. Id. at 1127, 1129.
173. Id. at 1124-25.
174. ld. at 1124.
175. See, e.g., The Multiple Assault on Alaska's Wilderness, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at
B4 (reporting on Young and Murkowski's assault on Alaska's wilderness areas).
[Vol. 76:2
BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA WILDERNESS
Grams (R-MN). Grams, a former news anchor at a Twin Cities television
station, had the support of the far right political and social conservatives
on such issues as abortion, gun control, and other so-called "family val-
ues."'76 He made a conscious attempt to use these issues and his opposi-
tion to the BWCA Wilderness, and Voyageurs National Park to divide the
traditionally strong Democratic vote on northeastern Minnesota's Iron
Range."
Grams sought and received support for his political plans in north-
eastern Minnesota from some nominally Democratic state legislators.'
State Senator 'Bob Lessard (D-MN) of International Falls, for example,
long an opponent of federal public lands, crossed party lines and even
publicly endorsed Grams for the U.S. Senate seat as a result of their pact
on wilderness and national parks.' Grams' political strategy succeeded,
and he carried Lessard's County of Koochiching, and cut into the vote in
traditionally Democratic St. Louis County, the heart of the Iron Range, in
the general election, helping to account for his margin of victory state-
wide.'"m
Nationally, the Republican surge brought the G.O.P. to power in
both the House and the Senate for the first time in four decades. Geor-
gian Newt Gingrich, architect of the "Contract with America," became
Speaker of the House, and Senator Bob Dole took over as Senate Major-
ity Leader. As noted earlier, Don Young and Frank Murkowski of
Alaska, legendary for their opposition to wilderness and parks, took over
from George Miller (D-CA) and J. Bennett Johnston (D-LA) as chairs of
the key policy committees in the House and Senate.
B. Congressional Field Hearings
In March 1995, Lessard appeared before Don Young's committee in
Washington."' Young was looking for new wilderness targets to attack,
and Lessard helped provide them.' 2 Lessard suggested downgrading Vo-
yageurs National Park into a state or county park, and turning it over to
local control. He suggested doing the same with the BWCA Wilderness.'83
176. See Sharon Schmickle & Dennis J. McGrath, Meet the Candidate, STAR-TRIB., Aug. 25,
1994, at IB (profiling U.S. Senate candidate, Rod Grams).
177. See Carol Byrne & Dean Rebuffoni, Voyageurs' Future a Litmus Test for Parks Regula-
tion, STAR-TRIB., Aug. 23, 1995, at 1A.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Dane Smith, Winds of Changes Blow Softly in Minnesota, STAR-TRIB., Nov. 10, 1994,
at IA.
181. See Kris Henry, Voyageurs National Park Could Become State's, STAR-TRIB., March 3,
1995, at 10A.
182. Cf. id.
183. See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Voyageurs Park and BWCA W Attacked!,
BWCA WtuDERNEss NEWS, Winter 1995, at 4; see also Richard Chin, Lawmaker Wants to Ease
Restrictions on Voyageurs, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 3, 1995, at IC.
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Shortly after his testimony, Lessard and seven other northern Min-
nesota legislators (including state senator Douglas Johnson (D-MN),
another parochial antiwilderness Democratic demagogue who has made a
career out of fighting against the BWCA Wilderness) sent a formal letter
to the Minnesota congressional delegation requesting field hearings "to
address the issue of regulation of federal lands in northeastern Minne-
sota.'" Grams only too willingly complied with this request, and sched-
uled a joint Senate-House field hearing for International Falls in August
of 1995. Representative James Hansen (R-UT), the new chair of the
House National Parks and Lands Subcommittee and an ardent opponent
of wilderness in his own state of Utah, agreed to chair the hearing.
The antipark and antiwilderness agitators believed, with some justi-
fication, that the field hearing was a slam dunk. International Falls was a
hotbed of antipark and antifederal sentiment, located at the far northern
edge of Minnesota, a six-hour drive from the Twin Cities where many
wilderness and park supporters live. Antipark agitators tried to ignite the
interest of the local populace, predicting a massive turn-out of nearly five
thousand people.' Propaganda sheets published in the local newspaper
made wild claims, calling National Park Service rangers an "armed fed-
eral police force" who "carry automatic weapons" when they invade park
campsites "brandishing their guns" to terrorize innocent visitors.'"
The actual hearing was far less tumultuous than anticipated. The
environmental community worked hard to turn out wilderness and park
supporters. Though the hearing was predictably raucous, only 1000 to
1100 people actually attended, with wilderness and park supporters ac-
counting for forty to fifty percent of the crowd. The congressional panel
consisted of James Hansen, who chaired the hearing; Grams; Represen-
tative Jim Oberstar (D-MN), who nursed a grudge against the BWCA
Wilderness dating back to 1978 when Congress over-rode his plan to
dismantle the BWCAW by passing prowilderness legislation;' Repre-
sentative Bruce Vento (D-MN), who helped pass that legislation and who
for a decade chaired the subcommittee now chaired by Hansen; and U.S.
Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN), who would run for reelection the fol-
lowing year and who felt split between some of his northern Minnesota
labor supporters who wanted more motors, and wilderness supporters
from throughout the state. Consequently, Wellstone, according to one
184. See Letter from Minnesota State Senator Bob Lessard et al. to U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone
(March 30, 1995) (on file with authors).
185. See Letter from Don Carey, Spokesman, Citizen's Task Force on Alternatives for Voyageurs
National Park, to International Falls Chamber of Commerce (June 19, 1995) (on file with authors).
186. GREATER NORTHLAND CoALmON, CASE FOR TRANSFERRING VOYAGEURS NATIONAL
PARK TO THE STATE OF MINNESOTA AND/OR THE COUNTIES OF ST. LOUIS AND KOOCHICHING
(1995).
187. For more information on the politics and passage of the 1978 BWCA Wilderness Act, see
PROESCHOLDT Er AL., supra note 22.
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account of the hearing, "resembled a driver weaving back and forth
across the center line."'
The BWCAW witnesses included a number of antiwilderness
speakers. State Senator Johnson angrily proclaimed that, in 1978, the
"so-called Friends of the Boundary Waters won for their friends, and
[my] friends lost."'89 Johnson wanted to "see returned some of the eco-
nomic and recreational opportunities that they lost."" He then went on,
though with a transparent denial that he .was not really after such things,
to describe the economic opportunities he sought:
[C]ould you imagine if you could go log the Boundary Waters and
the Voyageurs? Could you imagine if you could go mine the Bound-
ary Waters and the Voyageurs? Could you imagine if you could go
and build resorts and cabins in the Voyageurs and the Boundary Wa-
ters, the tremendous economic boom?...
Todd Indehar of Conservationists with Common Sense (CWCS), an
antiwilderness wise use group based near Ely, continued with Johnson's
theme. Though Indehar proclaimed initially that CWCS was "not advo-
cating the rollback of wilderness in the BWCAW,"' he then went on to
describe how it would like wilderness rolled back, including allowing
trucks and jeeps on wilderness portage trails, and opening all the interna-
tional boundary lakes in the wilderness from Lac La Croix to Saganaga
to motorboats and snowmobiles. 93
Wilderness proponents also spoke, including Sawbill Canoe Outfit-
ters owner Bill Hansen. Hansen referred to the area as "a crucial part of
the northeastern Minnesota economy."'9 ' Echoing Hansen's sentiments
was Ely business owner and arctic explorer Paul Schurke, who spoke of
the marketing edge that Ely has "as the principal gateway to the largest
wilderness without motors found north of the Everglades or east of the
Rockies."'"
Grams only wanted to hold the International Falls hearing. At the
request of the environmental community, however, Vento and Wellstone
188. Wellstone Walks Thin Line, McAllister Drops the Bomb, ELY ECHO, Aug. 21, 1995, at 5.
See generally Dean Rebuffoni, All Sides Are Passionate About Future of Wilderness, STAR-TRIB:,
Aug. 19, 1995, at IA (discussing testimony given by Minnesota state representatives and senators at
the congressional field hearing in International Falls, Minnesota).
189. Federal Land Management of Voyageurs National Park and Boundary Waters Canoe
Area: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcom. on National Parks, Forests, and Lands of the
Comm. on the Resources and the Subcomm. on Parks, Historic Preservation and Recreation, 104th
Cong. 70 (1995) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings] (statement of Sen. Douglas Johnson, Minnesota).
190. Id.
191. Id at79.
192. Id. at 243 (statement of Todd Indehar, Chairman of the Legislative Committee, Conserva-
tionists with Common Sense).
193. Id. at 242-50.
194. Id. at 258 (statement of William F. Hansen, Owner, Sawbill Canoe Outfitter, Inc.).
195. Id at 262 (statement of Paul Shurke, Citizen Spokesman for Ely, Minnesota).
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insisted on holding a second field hearing in the Twin Cities. Despite the
opposition of Grams and Oberstar, the hearing was scheduled for a Sat-
urday in October at the St. Paul Central High School auditorium.'
The hearing garnered a large crowd estimated at over 1200 at-
tendees, 1100 of which were wilderness and park supporters. A rally of
wilderness supporters was also held outside the school just prior to the
hearing. Several dozen canoes portaged down Lexington Avenue and
ended at the high school, at which time Representatiye Vento exhorted
the crowd to continue the fight for wilderness. Inside; the crowd was so
large that the fire marshal stopped the hearing in mid-testimony to chase
out people who had jammed into the aisles and stairs. The best that the
outnumbered antiwilderness and pro-motor contingent could do was to
parade several members in black-and-white striped pajamas as "prison-
ers" of federal regulations, and send a semi-truck loaded with Polaris
snowmobiles driving past the school."
At the hearing, Oberstar angrily told the audience not to call his
constituents "jack pine savages," although he was the only one to do
so.'" Bill Erzar of CWCS made the claim of "broken promises" to justify
more motorboat routes and a locally dominated management council.'"
Bruce Vento urged Congress not to micro-manage, but to protect the
areas because "Minnesotans want our children and our children's chil-
dren to hear the cry of the loon in the stillness of the wilderness."' John
Galland, a wheelchair user and nationally recognized expert on wilder-
ness accessibility for people with disabilities, spoke in favor of protect-
ing the BWCAW. He described the area as "a gem" which is "such an
available and accessible area" for him." ' Expressing the concerns of wil-
derness advocates everywhere, Becky Rom of the Boundary Waters Wil-
derness Foundation asked the panel, "Where will the canoeists, hikers
and skiers go if the motor and local control advocates prevail? There is
nowhere else."' 2
196. See Philip Brasher, Over Wellstone's Objections, Senate Committee Opts Not to Attend
Voyageurs Hearing, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Oct. 24, 1995, at 2B. Technically, the Senate com-
iuttee pulled out of the St. Paul hearing due to Grams' objections, but the hearing occurred anyway
under the auspices of the House committee. See id.
197. See Dennis Lien, Second Hearing on BWCAW Is Again Divisive, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PREss, Oct. 29, 1995, at IB; see also Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Congressional
Field Hearings Focus on BWCAW, Voyageurs, BWCA WILDERNESS NEws, Autumn 1995, at 1, 1-3;
Dean Rebuffoni, Future of the Wilderness Still on Shaky Ground, STAR-TRIB., Oct. 29, 1995, at lB.
198. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 189, at 110 (statement of Jim Oberstar, Minnesota
State Representative).
199. Id. at 116 (statement of Bill Erzar, Member, Conservationists with Common Sense).
200. Id. at 108 (statement of Bruce Vento, Minnesota State Representative).
201. Id. at 124 (statement of John Galland, Citizen Spokesman for Minneapolis, Minnesota).
202. Id. at 127 (statement of Becky Rom, Spokeswoman, Boundary Waters Wilderness
Foundation).
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C. Grams and Oberstar Bills
Despite the strong showing by the environmental community,
Grams and Oberstar proceeded to draft legislation attacking both the
Boundary Waters and Voyageurs Park. By April of 1996, they were
ready to launch their assault. Vento and the environmental community,
however, also prepared to respond. 3
In late April, Oberstar introduced new bills for both the BWCA
Wilderness and Voyageurs National Park. His Boundary Waters bill
would place trucks back on the contested portages, dramatically open up
the amount of water surface area within the wilderness to motorboat use,
and create a locally-dominated management council to dictate policies to
the U.S. Forest Service. '
The first week in May brought an onslaught of reaction to Ober-
star's attack on wilderness. That Monday, Bruce Vento announced his
Boundary Waters and Voyageurs Park bill. The Vento bill would close
three wilderness lakes to motorboat traffic (Jackfish Bay of Basswood
Lake, Loon Lake, and Lac La Croix) and add about 14,000 acres to the
Boundary Waters in nineteen key wilderness additions.'
The next day, Paul Wellstone announced that he would throw this
political hot potato to a federal mediation process in an attempt to bring
Minnesotans together to solve the issue outside of the legislative proc-
ess.' And, on Wednesday, Rod Grams announced his BWCAW bill, a
companion bill to Oberstar's legislation.'
D. Minnesota Wilderness and Parks Coalition
The environmental community began working together in early
1995 to meet the threat to the Boundary Waters and Voyageurs Park
posed by Grams, Oberstar and the new Republican Congress. The or-
ganizations formed the Minnesota Wilderness and Parks Coalition to
combat the detrimental legislation. The members of the coalition in-
203. See Dane Smith & Robert Whereatt, Battle Joined over Wilderness, STAR-TRIB., May 7,
1996, at IA.
204. See H.R. 3297, 104th Cong. (1996) (providing for motorized access to and use of the
BWCAW); H.R. 3298, 104th Cong. (1996) (providing for the establishment of the Voyageurs Na-
tional Park Intergovernmental Council); see also Dean Rebuffoni, Whose Wilderness Is It?, STAR-
TRIB., Apr. 24, 1996, at IB; Tracey A. Reeves, Bills Would Relax Limits at BWCAW, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 24, 1996, at IA.
205. See H.R. 3470, 104th Cong. (1996); see also Bill Salisbury, Bill Would Expand Wilderness
Area, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 7, 1996, at BI; Smith & Whereatt, supra note 199, at IA.
206. See Bill Salisbury, Mediators to Tackle Parks Issue, Congressman's Dueling Proposals
Personify a Decade-Long Feud, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 8, 1996, at Al; Dane Smith &
Robert Whereatt, BWCA Mediation Sought, STAR-TRIB., May 8, 1996, at IA.
207. See Bill Salisbury, Grants Floats BWCA W Plan, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 9, 1996,
at Al; see also S. 1738, 104th Cong. (1996) (providing for motorized access of the BWCAW); S.
1805, 104th Cong. (1996) (providing for the management of Voyageurs National Park); Tracey A.
Reeves, Grams, Oberstar: BWCA Allies, DULUTH NEws TRiB., May 9, 1996, at Al.
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cluded large national environmental organizations (such as the Sierra
Club, The Wilderness Society, and National Parks and Conservation
Association), regional conservation organizations (such as the Friends of
the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Minnesota Center for Environmental
Advocacy, and Superior Wilderness Action Network), and public interest
organizations such as MPIRG.' The coalition eventually grew to include
more than thirty organizations and a combined membership of over three
million Americans. '
The coalition conducted a series of public demonstrations, events
and rallies to attract media attention and to educate the broader public of
the dangers posed by Grams and Oberstar. These activities included
demonstrations outside Grams' senatorial office, a rally at the State
Capitol in St. Paul, a rally and demonstration outside the St. Paul high
school and an innovative "21 canoe salute" on the Mississippi River."' In
conjunction with the Voyageurs Senate hearing on July 18th, the Coali-
tion's national member organizations also staged a canoe portaging rally
in Washington up the Mall to the steps of the Capitol building.
In the spring and summer of 1996, Coalition member organizations
also began to lobby more aggressively in Washington, D.C., to broaden
the awareness of the threat to a more visible national level. The coalition
raised money to help wage the campaign and hired a coalition staff di-
rector to help coordinate work on it. The coalition also brought dozens of
citizen lobbyists to Washington to help lobby the issue and reach scores
of congressional offices. During one week alone, nearly forty prowilder-
ness volunteers roamed the halls of Congress making lobby visits.
E. Washington Hearings
Grams and Oberstar scheduled hearings in Washington on their bills
during a one-week span in July 1996. Grams arranged Senate subcom-
mittee hearings for the BWCA Wilderness on July 11, and for Voyageurs
Park on July 18. '" Oberstar scheduled a House subcommittee hearing for
both areas on July 16.2
208. See Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Accessibility and Partnership Act of 1996:
Hearing on S. 1738 Before the Subcomm. on Forests and Pub. Land Management of the Senate
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 104th Cong. 102 (1996) [hereinafter S. 1738 Hearings]
(statement of Becky Rom, Spokeswoman, Boundary Waters Wilderness Foundation).
209. See Dean Rebuffoni, Sweeping BWCA Changes Proposed: Attorney's Plan Calls for
"Swapping" Two Parts of Popular Basswood Lake, STAR-TRiB., Nov. 19, 1996, at lB.
210. See Bei Hu, U Canoe Enthusiasts Protest BWCA Changes, MINN. DAILY, July 1, 1996, at
1; see also Canoeing to Congress?, ROLL CALL, July 22, 1996, at 1; Friends of the Boundary Waters
Wilderness, Congressional Field Hearings Focus on BWCAW, Voyageurs, BWCA WILDERNESS
NEWS, Autumn 1995, at 1, 1-3; Dean Rebuffoni, Environmentalists, Snowmobilers Hold Competing
Rallies at Capitol, STAR-TRIB., Oct. 8, 1995, at BI; Karen Winegar, Can-too Spirit, STAR-TRm.,
Aug. 28, 1997, at 16A.
211. See Carol Byrne, Managing the Wilds, STAR-TRtB., July 11, 1996, at IA.
212. See id.
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The Senate hearing on the Boundary Waters occurred on July 1 Ith.
The appearance of certain public officials and citizen witnesses was
similar to the earlier field hearings. State Senator Doug Johnson, Lake
County Commissioner Sharon Hahn, and Ely Mayor Ed Steklasa sup-
ported the Grams bill. State Representatives Dee Long (D-MN), Spencer
Black (D-WI), and Bill Witt (D-IA) testified against Grams. Bruce Ker-
foot, Gary Gotchnik, and Mike Madden testified in favor of the Grams
bill on the citizens panel. Bill Hansen, Becky Rom, and Kevin Pro-
escholdt all testified against it. Gray Reynolds of the U.S. Forest Service
also testified in opposition to the Grams bill, firmly establishing the po-
sition of the Clinton Administration."'
What made the hearing most interesting were the statements and
testimony of the other Senators present. All of the Democratic members
of the full committee attended the hearing and fiercely opposed the
Grams bill, in part because of its bad policy and in part because of the
Republicans' use of it to sabotage Wellstone in his reelection bid."" Of
particular note were two additional prowilderness Senators, Russ Fein-
gold (D-WI) and Tom Harkin (D-IA), who testified against the Grams bill
and evidenced some of the national opposition to Grams' legislation."'
The House hearing on July 16th covered both the BWCAW and
Voyageurs."" Representative Jim Hansen again chaired the subcommittee
hearing. Representative Helen Chenoweth, a member of Hansen's sub-
committee, set the tone for the majority of legislators on the panel. She
asked Paul Schurke, the Ely Arctic explorer and wilderness adventure
businessman, "Mr. Schurke, are you an eco-terrorist?
' '217
The Boundary Waters panel proffered the expected testimony. Paul
Schurke of Ely, Maggie Wille of Wilderness Inquiry, and former U.S.
Senator Gaylord Nelson of The Wilderness Society testified in favor of
wilderness protections; state Representative Tom Bakk, Gunflint Lodge
owner and CWCS spokesperson Bruce Kerfoot, and Adena Cook of the
Blue Ribbon Coalition (one of the national antiwilderness organizations
in the Wise Use movement) favored Oberstar's legislation. Gray Rey-
nolds of the U.S. Forest Service testified against the Oberstar bill as he
had against the Grams bill in the Senate.
213. See S. 1738 Hearings, supra note 208, at 37 (statement of Gray Reynolds, Deputy Chief,
National Forest System, U.S. Forest Service).
214. See Bill Salisbury, Senators Say BWCAW Bill Will Not Pass, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
July 12, 1996, at IA.
215. See S. 1738 Hearings, supra note 208, at 3-9 (statements of Sen. Russ Feingold, Wiscon-
sin, and Sen. Tom Harkin, Iowa); see also Carol Byrne, Democrats Say Grams' BWCA Bill Is Dead,
STAR-TRIB., July 12, 1996, at lB.
216. See Voyageurs National Park.- Hearings on HR. 3297, 3298 & 3470 Before the House
Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks, Forests and Lands, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter H.R. 3297 Hearings]
(not included in CIS microfiche; available at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>).
217. Id.
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Two other members of the Minnesota delegation also testified
against Oberstar's bill at the hearing. Representative Jim Ramstad (R-
MN) testified that "the original compromise of the 1970s that created
Voyageurs and the BWCA should be preserved."2 '8 Representative David
Minge (D-MN) told the panel "I support non-motorized, low-intensity
use. I do not support the bill of my colleague, Mr. Oberstar. '
The Senate hearing on Voyageurs Park proceeded in similar fashion
to the hearing on the Boundary Waters. Of note, however, is that, in
conjunction with the July 18 hearing, a new poll was released showing
overwhelming support for protecting the BWCA Wilderness.'n The non-
partisan Minnesota Poll showed that seventy-four percent of Minneso-
tans opposed legislation to further motorize the BWCAW, and sixty-nine
percent favored legislation that would increase wilderness protections for
the Boundary Waters."' This new poll followed three other statewide
polls showing similar strong support for protecting the canoe country
wilderness.'2
F. Session-Ending Fireworks
Grams and Oberstar had little time remaining in the legislative ses-
sion before Congress adjourned to go home and campaign. Just prior to
the August recess, Oberstar announced a modified version of his bill in
late July and boldly pronounced-incorrectly-that his new bill satisfied
the concerns of the Clinton Administration.' " Oberstar's "modification"
only slightly expanded the membership on his proposed local control
committee to represent interests broader than just the local area. Ulti-
mately, local interests would still dominate the council. '
Running out of legislative time to pass their wilderness motorization
bills, Grams and Oberstar attached the truck portage provisions as a rider
to an unrelated legislative vehicle, the Omnibus Parks bill.' The mas-
sive parks bill encompassed 500 pages and contained many provisions
that both the environmental community and the Administration wanted.
Senator Murkowski, the committee chair and author of the parks bill,
218. Id. (statement of Jim Ramstad, Minnesota State Representative).
219. Id. (statement of David Minge, Minnesota State Representative).
220. See Dean Rebuffoni, Most Favor Mediating Wilderness Dispute, STAR-TRIB., July 18,
1996, at lB [hereinafter Rebuffoni, Mediating Wilderness]; see also Jim Ragsdale, 70% Favor
Same, Tougher Limits for BWCA, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESs, May 22, 1996, at IA; Dean Rebuffoni,
Opposition Deep to Park Proposals, STAR-TRIB., Sept. 27, 1995, at IA.
221. See Rebuffoni, Mediating Wilderness, supra note 220, at IB.
222. See id.
223. Cf Carol Byrne, Oberstar Alters BWCA Proposal, STAR-TRIB., July 26, 1996, at 1B
(explaining and discussing Representative Oberstar's new bill).
224. See H.R. 3880, 104th Cong. (1996); see also Byrne, supra note 223.
225. See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Oberstar, Grams Blocked in Congress,
BWCA WILDERNESS NEWS, Autumn 1996, at 1.
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added the Boundary Waters truck provisions as a section at the very end
of the bill." 6
The antiwilderness legislators, however, underestimated the resolve
of both the environmentalists and the Clinton Administration. Represen-
tatives of the national environmental community, including the Friends
of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, met with Administration officials to
discuss Murkowski's bill. They unanimously identified the BWCAW
truck portage provision as one of the unacceptable riders. 7
Two days later, the Clinton Administration issued a formal re-
sponse, stating that the President would veto the entire parks bill if it
contained either the Boundary Waters truck provision or another provi-
sion dealing with Alaska's Tongass National Forest.' Murkowski im-
mediately dropped both sections, and the bill passed. The Boundary
Waters escaped unharmed from the notorious 104th Congress!
Grams and Oberstar were left livid and fuming over the outcome.
"It is absolutely outrageous that the people of northern Minnesota have
become the victims of a last-minute, backroom sabotage by the high roll-
ers in the preservationist movement and their friends in Congress," 22
Grams said, denouncing the very tactics he himself had used in attaching
his truck portage provisions to the conference committee bill. Oberstar
angrily spoke that his hope to motorize the portages had been "buried
under a White House veto threat and a promised Senate filibuster. '
G. Mediation and Wellstone
Paul Wellstone's reelection bid overshadowed the attempt at federal
mediation of the Boundary Waters/Voyageurs Park issue from the very
start. Jim Oberstar and Rod Grams sought to damage Wellstone with this
issue and continually undercut the mediation process. Noting Well-
stone's obviously divided interests, Oberstar, for example, ruthlessly
gloated at the CWCS annual meeting in August 1996, that "I'd love to
see Wellstone have to vote on [Gram's Boundary Waters] bill."' Todd
Indehar and Bruce Kerfoot, the Republican leaders of CWCS, also
sought to defeat Wellstone over this issue by refusing to participate in the
process and attacking it from the outside."2
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See Letter from Franklin D. Raines, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to U.S.
Senator Frank Murkowski, and U.S. Representative Don Young (Sept. 20, 1996) (on file with
authors).
229. See Carol Byrne, Grams Concedes BWCA Fight, for Now, STAR-TIRB., SepL 26, 1996, at lB.
230. See Carol Byrne, "Horse Trading" Commences in BWCA Talks, STAR-TRIB., Sept. 27,
1996, at 3B.
231. D.C. Sorensen, Event Brings Out Politicians, ELY ECHO, Aug. 26, 1996, at 1.
232. See Robert Whereatt, Major Group Won't Attend Wellstone's BWCA Talks, STAR-TRIB.,
May 11, 1996, at IA.
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The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) conducted
the mediation. The process began in August 1996, and immediately
broke into two parallel mediations, one for the Boundary Waters and one
for Voyageurs. Selecting the participants to sit at the mediation table
significantly affected the ensuing process.
FMCS staff screened applicants for the mediation table, trying to
represent all significant interests with those they selected. Critics of the
process, however, alleged that the BWCAW panel contained mostly
Wellstone supporters who merely wanted to delay the public and con-
gressional debate until after Wellstone's reelection bid in November.
Many participants did have Wellstone ties, including AFL-CIO labor
leader George Sundstrom, AFSCME labor representative Mitch Brunfelt,
Ely residents Paul Forsman and Barb Berglund, and St. Louis County
lobbyist John Ongaro (all of whom caucused with the pro-motor caucus).
The wilderness caucus included such Wellstone Democratic partisans as
Duluth environmentalist and Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) party
activist Alden Lind (a former college professor of Wellstone's), and ca-
noe outfitter Bill Hansen (also a DFL party activist)."3
The Minnesota Wilderness and Parks Coalition also participated,
though with trepidation-wilderness advocates had no choice politically
but to participate. While the environmental community generally ex-
pressed a willingness to discuss the issues, its leaders held out little hope
that the mediation process would reach a settlement. Brian O'Neill,
Chuck Dayton, and the author Rick Duncan, long-time environmental
attorneys, represented the coalition at the table.
The Boundary Waters mediation panel embarked upon an ambitious
schedule, meeting for two-day sessions every two weeks. By election day
in early November, no agreements on major issues were in sight. Well-
stone breezed to a surprisingly easy reelection over former Senator Rudy
Boschwitz. The Boundary Waters dilemma had not significantly harmed
Wellstone on the Iron Range, demonstrating the lack of true popular sup-
port even in that Democratic stronghold for antiwilderness policies.'
The mediation continued through the fall and winter. In late No-
vember, the Ely representatives ultimately rejected a proposal forwarded
by the environmental caucus, and in April, the wilderness coalition re-
jected a proposal to open two portages to truck traffic.- Motor propo-
nents never demonstrated any real reason why trucks should return to the
wilderness portage trails, especially when hundreds of motorboat parties
233. See FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERv., BoUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA
WiLDERNESS: FINAL REPORT OF THE MEDIATION PANEL § 3 (1997).
234. Cf Dean Rebuffoni, Wellstone Has a Solid Lead on Iron Range, STAR-TRIB., Oct. 20,
1996, at IA.
235. See Dean Rebuffoni, BWCA Negotiators Nix Each Other's Plans, STAR-TRIB., Jan. 16,
1997, at 7B.
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traversed the trails each year without trucks. 6 The mediation process
ended in late April amid high acrimony after a frenzied day of proposals
by the wilderness coalition that were all rejected by the motor caucus.
In a prepared statement, Wellstone blamed the wilderness coalition
who, from his perspective, "scuttled" one tentative proposal. "7 In refer-
ence to the mediation panel not resolving the most contentious issues,
Wellstone stated, "I deeply regret that." The wilderness coalition, how-
ever, could not compromise its wilderness values for political expedi-
ency, particularly when motor proponents failed to demonstrate any need
for the trucks. Still, Wellstone indicated that he would move ahead and
begin to craft legislation regarding one of the proposals favored by motor
advocates but rejected by the wilderness coalition."5
H. New Bills
As noted previously,239 Oberstar and Grams continued to undercut
the mediation process throughout the period it took place. Both made
pointed announcements in local northeastern Minnesota newspapers that
they would introduce truck portage legislation, in effect telling motor
advocates not to give up anything in mediation because the legislators
would give them trucks and motorboat lakes through Congress.2' Once
mediation concluded, they struck again, introducing new versions of
their old bills in the 105th Congress."
Oberstar and Grams scaled back their attack on the wilderness with
their new legislation. For example, they dropped their demand for the
local control management council, as well as the list of wilderness lakes
they would open to motorboats. Instead, their new bills addressed only
opening wilderness portage trails to truck and jeep traffic, and eliminat-
ing the phase-out of motorboat use for Seagull Lake that Congress had
scheduled as part of the 1978 BWCA Wilderness Act.)2
Representative Vento responded in kind in July with a scaled-back
version of his prowilderness Boundary Waters bill. 3 The new Vento bill
would close parts of three lakes to motorboats, add about 7000 acres to
236. See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Fact Sheet: The Need for Truck Port-
ages, BWCA WILDERNESS NEWS, Autumn 1997, at 6.
237. Dean Rebuffoni, Wellstone Vows "Common Ground" BWCA Plan, STAR-TRIB., Apr. 30,
1997, at 2B.
238. See id.
239. See supra Part II.G.
240. Cf., e.g., Tom Coombe, Grams Traverses Trout Lake Portage, ELY ECHO, Nov. 4, 1996, at
1; Grams Plans Portages Bill, MESABI DAILY NEwS, Jan. 11, 1997, at A9; Charles Ramsay, Ober-
star Makes Rounds, MESABI DAILY NEws, Dec. 16, 1996, at Al.
241. See H.R. 1739, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 783, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Friends of the
Boundary Waters Wilderness, Boundary Waters Threatened Again in Congress!, BWCA
WILDERNESS NEws, winter 1997, at 1, 1-2.
242. See H.R. 1739, 105th Cong.; S. 783, 105th Cong.
243. See H.R. 2149, 105th Cong. (1997).
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wilderness in fifteen separate parcels, and eliminate all towboat use
within the wilderness.'
I. Senate Action
Grams moved quickly to schedule a Senate hearing on his BWCAW
legislation. The hearing occurred in late June 1997. Greg Lais of Wilder-
ness Inquiry, Bill Reffalt of The Wilderness Society and David Jenkins
of the American Canoe Association testified against Grams' bill; Bob
LaTourell, Jr., of the Prairie Portage concession, former Ely Mayor
Frank Salerno, and Guy Holmes of CWCS testified in favor of the bill.'
Senator Paul Wellstone testified against the measure, while an-
nouncing that he would draft his own compromise legislation.' Lyle
Laverty of the U.S. Forest Service also testified against the Grams meas-
ure, again establishing the Clinton Administration as squarely in opposi-
tion to truck portages and increased motorboat use in the canoe country
wilderness.' 7 Senator Russ Feingold of neighboring Wisconsin also
strongly opposed the Grams bill, saying "[w]e need to protect the wilder-
ness character of this spectacular area" not add "motor use to the area
called within Wisconsin 'the canoe country.""
By the end of July, Murkowski scheduled a mark-up session for the
full Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on Grams' Bound-
ary Waters bill. As expected, the committee approved the Grams bill on
an 11-9 party-line vote on July 30th.'
Wellstone finally announced the introduction of his own BWCAW
bill just prior to the senate committee vote. His legislation called for
opening two of the three contested portage trails to truck and jeep traffic,
increasing motorboat quotas on Basswood Lake, allowing a motorized
piston bully to groom a ski trail within the wilderness, and lending sup-
port for a new snowmobile trail in the Echo Trail corridor along the edge
of the wilderness.' The positive aspects of Wellstone's bill included
closing small Canoe Lake to motorboat use, eliminating towboat use on
Basswood Lake, and adding about 21,000 acres to the wilderness (though
allowing timber access roads in these wilderness additions)."
244. See id.; see also Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Fact Sheet: Comparison of
Existing Law to New Legislation, BWCA WILDERNEsS NEws, Summer 1997, at 5, 5; The Three
Bears, STAR-TRIB., Sept. 7, 1997, at 24A.
245. See Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness: Hearings on S. 783 Before the Subcomm.
on Forests and Public Lands of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 105th Cong.
(1997).
246., See id. at 9.
247. See id. at 22 (statement of Lyle Laverty, U.S. Forest Service).
248. Id. at 19 (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Wisconsin).
249. See S. Rep. No. 105-80, at 3 (1997).
250. See S. 1085, 105th Cong. §§ 2-4 (1997).
251. See id.; see also Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, supra note 244, at 5.
[Vol. 76:2
BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA WILDERNESS
The Senate committee did not consider the Wellstone bill, nor did it
play a role in subsequent Senate action. None of the major players in the
BWCAW dispute endorsed the Wellstone bill; the wilderness community
opposed it, and CWCS condemned it. Wilderness supporters, however,
continued to work with Wellstone in opposing Grams' bill, which Well-
stone vowed to block.
J. House Action
On the weekend just prior to the Senate committee action, in late
July 1997, Representative Helen Chenoweth (R-ID) set the stage for the
forthcoming House action on Oberstar's legislation. Chenoweth, a right
wing, antiwilderness conservative with close ties to the wise use an mili-
tia movements, chaired the new House Subcommittee on Forests and
Forest Health. "2 Chenoweth announced an official subcommittee tour to
the Trout Lake portage arranged not by the U.S. Forest Service, but by
Oberstar, CWCS and a local county land commissioner with ties to the
Wise Use movement, a loose national antienvironmental movement to
which CWCS belonged." Chenoweth, Grams, Oberstar, and Vento vis-
ited the Trout Lake Portage where they found a heavily loaded motorboat
(with three outboard motors) waiting for them. CWCS expected them to
be unable to push the boat across the portage on portage wheels. Despite
the heavy load, however, and in large part due to Vento's energetic ef-
fort, the congressional delegation pushed the boat across the portage with
relative ease.' Following the motorboat, wilderness advocates easily
transported an extra-long 26-foot voyageur canoe on portage wheels
across the portage to Trout Lake to demonstrate the ease of portaging
even big boats without trucks in the wilderness.
Later that afternoon, Chenoweth held a town hall listening session at
Lake Vermilion, not too far from Trout Portage, where CWCS had hoped
to dominate the event. Local prowilderness residents also turned out,
however, accounting for about one-third of the crowd. Still, Chenoweth
used the weekend as a pretense for holding hearings in her subcommittee
on Oberstar's BWCAW legislation in Washington.
Chenoweth scheduled her subcommittee hearing on BWCAW leg-
islation for early September. In preparation for the hearing, the Boundary
Waters received significant new help from two other members of the
Minnesota congressional delegation.
252. See Jim Oberstar, Press Release, Oberstar, Chenoweth to Visit BWCAW, June 19, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4434087.
253. Id.
254. See Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness: Hearings on H.R. 1739 and H.R 2149
Before the House Subcomnt on Forests and Forest Health, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Sen.
Helen Chenoweth, Idaho) [hereinafter H.R. 1739 Hearings] (not included in CIS microfiche; avail-
able at <http:llweb.lexis-nexis.comlcongcomp>).
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Representatives Jim Ramstad and David Minge circulated a "Dear
Colleague" letter to fellow House members in opposition to the Oberstar
bill.' They quickly garnered thirty signatures on this letter, mostly from
Republican members, as a strong show of opposition to Oberstar's leg-
islation from the majority party. Ramstad, a member of the moderate
proenvironment House Republican block, brought his group's influence
to bear on the Boundary Waters; Minge, who has personally visited the
BWCAW, brought his ties with moderate House Democrats. This letter
took some political courage, since Oberstar, as the ranking Democrat on
the House Transportation Committee, sat in a powerful position to re-
ward friends or punish enemies with transportation projects on the mas-
sive Inter-modal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA)' which
was working its way through committee. Still, both Minnesotans felt
strongly enough about protecting the BWCAW to initiate the Dear Col-
league letter.'
Both Ramstad and Minge formally testified against Oberstar's leg-
islation at the hearing, further heightening their opposition to the meas-
ure. 8 John Galland, Pam Leschak of Northeastern Minnesotans for Wil-
derness, Becky Rom, and Carl Zichella of the Sierra Club all testified in
favor of Vento's bill and in opposition to Oberstar's bill.' Guy Holmes,
veterinarian Edward Pavek, Seagull Lake resident Ardis David, Tom
Bakk, and long-time Ely wilderness foe John Smrekar all testified in
favor of Oberstar's bill.' No votes on Oberstar's bill were held during
the subcommittee hearing in September. The votes would not occur until
a subcommittee mark-up session in October.
Chenoweth's subcommittee met on October 7th to mark up Ober-
star's bill. Vento's Boundary Waters bill was not used as a vehicle for
the mark-up session. Representative Vento, a member of the subcom-
mittee, vigorously objected to the Oberstar bill and offered several
amendments. These amendments were all defeated, however, mostly on
party-line votes controlled by Chenoweth," Though not a member of the
panel, Oberstar was allowed to participate and debate Vento as if he was
255. See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Congressional Motor Bills Still Threaten
Boundary Waters in 1998, BWCA WILDERNESS NEWS, Winter 1998, at 1.
256. Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998).
257. See Letter from Rep. Jim Ramstad (R-MN) and Rep. David Minge (D-MN) to Colleague
(Sept. 4, 1997) (on file with authors).
258. See H.R. 1739 Hearings, supra note 245 (statements of Rep. Jim Ramstad, Minnesota, and
Rep. David Minge, Minnesota); see also Gregg Aamot, 2 Congressmen Want BWCA Rules Left As
Is, STAR-TRIB., Sept. 10, 1997, at 3B.
259. See H.R. 1739 Hearings, supra note 245.
260. See id.
261. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-500, at 3-4 (1998).
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a member of the subcommittee. 2' Oberstar's bill was approved and
passed on to the full committee.'
On October 22nd, Don Young's full Resources Committee ap-
proved Oberstar's bill on a 22-7 vote. ' Chenoweth put forward a pack-
age of Vento's amendments that she had helped defeat at the subcom-
mittee, which were approved. Chenoweth's package included, for exam-
ple, a provision forbidding any direct or indirect federal subsidy for port-
age operations.'
Oberstar again was allowed to sit and debate the issue as if a mem-
ber of the full committee. He had embraced many of the other antienvi-
ronmental bills pushed by Young, Chenoweth, and other right-wing Re-
publicans in order to advance his own legislation,' literally kissing Che-
noweth to thank her for her support after the final committee vote.' 7
The Resources Committee vote came the day after The Wilderness
Society released a new nation-wide survey showing huge opposition to
increasing motorized uses in the BWCAW.' By nearly a five-to-one
margin (74%-15%), Americans indicated that they opposed increasing
the use of motorized boats, trucks, and jeeps inside the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area Wilderness.'
Congress did not take up the BWCAW motorization bills again in
1997, since the first session of the 105th Congress adjourned in Novem-
ber. Just prior to adjournment, however, the Clinton Administration re-
leased a new Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) showing strong
opposition to the Grams and Oberstar legislation, stating: "The quality of
the wilderness setting has improved by the portages' closure."'
262. See Philip Brasher, House Committee Clears BWCA Portage Bill, Assoc. PRESs, Oct. 22,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2556812.
263. See id.
264. See H.R. Rep. 105-500, at 7.
265. See d at 5.
266. See H.R. Rep. 105-500; see also BWCA W Portages Bill Cleared by House Panel, MESABI
DAILY NEws, Oct. 23, 1997, at Al. Oberstar took a number of bad environmental votes on such
issues as forest road subsidies, limiting national monuments, grazing, and more, and his environ-
mental voting record from the League of Conservation Voters plummeted from a score of 80 percent
in the 103d Congress to just 31 percent in the first sessions of the 105th Congress. See League of
Conservation Voters, 1998 National Environmental Scorecard (visited Nov. 13, 1998)
<http://scorecard.lcv.org/member.cfm?id=3693>; League of Conservation Voters, 1994 National
Environmental Scorecard (visited Nov. 13, 1998) <http://www.lcv.org/lcv94/House/oberstar.html>.
267. See Brasher, supra note 262.
268. See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, National Poll Shows 5-1 Opposition to
More Motors in Boundary Waters Wilderness!., BWCA WILDERNESS NEWS, Autumn 1997, at 5, 5
[hereinafter National Poll]; see also Wilderness Society Press Release, By Five-to-One Margin,
Americans Oppose Increase of Motorized Activities in Boundary Waters Wilderness, Oct. 21, 1997.
269. See National Poll, supra note 268, at 5.
270. Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Clinton Administration Steps Up Opposition
to Grams, Oberstar Bills, BWCA WILDERNSS NEws, winter 1998, at 3, 3.
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K. The Inter-modal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA)'
Congress reconvened for its second session in late January 1998.
Action on the Grams and Oberstar bills did not occur early in the session,
as some wilderness advocates had feared. The opposition to this legisla-
tion from the Administration, the moderate House Republicans, individ-
ual Senators and others, all helped to slow down any momentum for the
bills.
Opposition to the legislation surfaced in other ways around the na-
tion, particularly in various magazines and newspapers. The Washington
Post ran a front-page story on the day of the House committee vote, and
magazines like Audubon, Canoe & Kayak, Paddler, and others ran arti-
cles or updates on the Boundary Waters controversy.Y Even the vener-
able National Geographic reported on the conflict.273
The environmental community had long feared that the massive
$200 billion ISTEA transportation bill would give Oberstar his opportu-
nity to pass his Boundary Waters motorization bill. But still, as the spring
progressed and as ISTEA passed the House and Senate, nothing appeared
in ISTEA related to the BWCA Wilderness.
Finally, in May 1998, as the House and Senate finished final nego-
tiations in the ISTEA conference committee, Oberstar (one of the three
House conferees) saw his opportunity. When the lead Senate conferee
opened the way for unrelated riders on the conference committee bill,
Oberstar struck.
Even with his considerable clout on the pork barrel bill, however,
Oberstar knew he could not automatically attach his Boundary Waters
bill to ISTEA. He therefore approached Representative Bruce Vento, his
long-time adversary on the BWCAW, to see if he could work out a com-
promise. Vento feared that Oberstar might sooner or later pass the entire
bill and reluctantly agreed. The compromise opened two of the three
contested portage trails (Prairie and Trout Portages) to motor vehicle use,
and closed two small lakes in the eastern BWCAW (Canoe and Alder
Lakes) to motorboat traffic.27' The phase-out of motorboat use on much
271. Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107(1998).
272. See, e.g., Kevin Proescholdt, Boundary Waters Wilderness Attacked in Congress, WILD
EARTH, Spring 1998, at 54; Kevin Proescholdt, Extremists Threaten Boundary Waters, CANOE &
KAYAK MAGAZINE, May 1998, at 38; Kevin Proescholdt, Minnesota's Boundary Waters Wilderness
Threatened in Congress, PADDLER MAGAZINE, June 1998, at 51; Karl Vick, Ripples of Discontent:
Fight Resurfaces over Motorboat Access in Minnesota Wilderness, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1997, at
AI; Ted Williams, Compromising Wilderness: Incite, AUDUBON, Sept. 19, 1996, at 28.
273. See, e.g., Paddles or Propellers?, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, May 1998, at 139.
274. See Bill Salisbury & John Myers, Legislators Reach Deal on BWCA, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PREss, May 19, 1998, at IA.
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of Seagull Lake that Oberstar had earlier tried to eliminate remained un-
affected and in place.'
The environmental community strongly opposed the Oberstar-Vento
compromise for allowing truck and jeep traffic in the wilderness, as did
Minnesota's leading newspaper. "6 Representatives Ramstad and Minge
fought it as well, as did Senators Feingold, Wellstone, Harkin, and oth-
ers, but with Vento's acquiescence, could not prevail. Oberstar suc-
ceeded in attaching his rider to ISTEA in the conference committee, and
both the Senate and House passed the bill on May 22nd. ' President
Clinton signed the measure into law in early June, but not without men-
tioning his opposition to the Boundary Waters rider.278
L. The Future
Passage of the BWCAW rider on the ISTEA transportation bill did
not end the debate over the Boundary Waters, the nation's most embat-
tled wilderness. Within weeks of the passage of ISTEA, for example,
The Wilderness Society listed the BWCA Wilderness as one of the fif-
teen most endangered wildlands in the nation, threatened by continued
motorboat and truck access.279
In the short-term, the struggle continues over the implementation of
the new amendment. The language of the amendment allows motor vehi-
cles on the wilderness portage trails, but does not require the trucks and
jeeps.' The U.S. Forest Service, to its credit, announced that in imple-
menting the new amendment, the agency will consider a range of op-
tions, including motorized and non-motorized alternatives. The environ-
mental community continues to advocate implementation strategies that
favor non-motorized over motorized uses, and those that have the least
impact on wilderness values. As this article goes to press, however, the
Forest Service has amended its Superior National Forest Plan to allow
motorized use of the Prairie and Trout Lake portages, and is expected to
award motorized concessions for summer 1999.
In the long term, wilderness supporters recognize that the existence
of continued motorboat and truck access to the Boundary Waters Wil-
derness will always engender further conflict and controversy while con-
275. See id.; see also Greg Gordon & Tom Hamburger, Oberstar, Vento Strike Compromise on
BWCA, STAR-TRIB., May 19, 1998, at IA.
276. See Truck Portages, STAR-TRIB., May 21, 1998, at 24A.
277. See ISTEA § 1212, 112 Stat. 107, 198 (1998).
278. See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Oberstar Deal with Vento Allows Trucks
on Two Wilderness Portages!, BWCA WILDERNESS NEWS, Spring/Summer 1998, at 1, 1-2.
279. See The Wilderness Society, Report: 15 Most Endangered Wildlands (visited Dec. 16,
1998) <http:// www.wilderness.org/standbylands/15most/>.
280. The amendment reads: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent the operation of
motorized vehicles to transport boats across the portages between the Moose Lake Chain and Bass-
wood Lake, Minnesota, and between Vermilion Lake and Trout Lake, Minnesota." ISTEA § 1212,
112 Stat. at 198.
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tinuing to degrade and cheapen the wilderness character of the canoe
country. Supporters believe the ultimate destiny of the BWCA Wilder-
ness is a full, complete wilderness, a true wilderness free from all motors
and all other uses incompatible with wilderness.
After the ISTEA amendment appeared, for example, long-time wil-
derness attorney Brian O'Neill predicted, "[We] will embark on a 10-
year campaign to get every single motor out of the Boundary Waters."'
Advocates like O'Neill want to finally pull the Boundary Waters com-
pletely into the National Wilderness Preservation System and eliminate
all current exceptions to the standards of the 1964 Wilderness Act. They
will not rest until that protection is achieved and true wilderness is pre-
served for future generations as a priceless legacy, an "enduring resource
of wilderness."'
281. See Greg Gordon, Vento: Making BWCA Deal Was Painful, STAR-TRIB., May 20,1998, at 3B.
282. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
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NOTE
DEFINING WILDERNESS: FROM MCCLOSKEY TO
LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
PARADIGMS
INTRODUCTION
Wilderness does not exist because Nature created it as such; it exists
solely because man has not yet intruded upon it.'
Following two hundred years of American pioneering in agricul-
tural, industrial and urban development, very little remains of the Ameri-
can wilderness.2 In response to growing environmental awareness, Con-
gress enacted the Wilderness Act of 1964,' promulgating policy intended
to secure the resources and attributes of wilderness areas for future gen-
erations! The Act established the National Wilderness Preservation Sys-
tem (NWPS), composed of federally owned lands designated as wilder-
ness by Congress The language of the Act requires that wilderness areas
be "administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in
such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment
as wilderness."6 The purpose of the Act is to insure that in years to come,
people can enjoy wilderness areas in their natural state.7
In 1966, Sierra Club Chairman Michael McCloskey published an
article entitled The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and
Meaning' which traced the changing notions of wilderness in America
from the time of the early North American explorers. The article pro-
vides unique insight into the legislative history of the Wilderness Act and
analyzes the statute, highlighting the shortcomings of the Act's language
and describing foreseeable conflicts arising from them. Most impor-
tantly, McCloskey exposes subtle ambiguities in the Act's language.
1. McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1965).
2. See Ray Wheeler, The BLM Wilderness Review (visited Sept. 14, 1998)
<http:lwww.suwa.orglWATElreview.html>; see also GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE
EARTH, 11 (1995) (noting the sentiments of Aldo Leopold who said that "[wIilderness is a resource
that can shrink but not grow"). See generally RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN
MIND (3d ed. 1982) (tracing changing attitudes of Americans toward wilderness); MAX
OELSCHLAEGER, THE IDEA OF WILDERNESS: FROM PREHISTORY TO THE AGE OF ECOLOGY (1991)
(offering a historical perspective on the development of the idea of wilderness).
3. Pub. L. No. 88-557, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136
(1994)).
4. See Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (a).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See H.R. REP. No. 88-1538, at 8 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3615, 3617.
8. Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 OR. L.
REV. 288 (1966).
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McCloskey's article identified several ambiguous elements of the
wilderness act, including the prohibition of incompatible uses in wilder-
ness areas,9 installations," nonconforming equipment and facilities," and
nonconforming measures to control fire, insects and disease.'"
McCloskey also pointed out ambiguities regarding limitations on graz-
ing,'" the role of the President of the United States in designating wilder-
ness areas,14 access to inholdings in wilderness,"' and the size of the wil-
derness system." This Note comments on McCloskey's concerns re-
garding the Act's definition of "wilderness" and describes legislative,
administrative, and judicial reaction to parts of the Act.
Part I describes the Act's history, providing an overview of the Wil-
derness Preservation System and the exclusive statutory authority Con-
gress reserved to itself to designate wilderness areas. It reviews
McCloskey's concerns regarding the question of whether Congress in-
tended to establish an exclusive statutory system for reserving "wilder-
ness-type" areas on federal land. Part [I examines the definition of wil-
derness developed through congressional, agency, and judicial applica-
tion of wilderness designation guidelines. In analyzing the definition of
wilderness, this Note pays particular attention to McCloskey's recogni-
tion of the definition's elasticity, and describes his prediction of conflicts
surrounding the definition of wilderness. Part III concludes that while
notions of wilderness encompass a range of ideas, pragmatism correctly
qualifies idealized views of wilderness.
I. OVERVIEW
A. The Path of Wilderness
The Property Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the power
to make all necessary rules and regulations respecting territory or other
9. Section 2(c) of the Wilderness Act states:
Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and subject to existing private
rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilder-
ness area designated by this chapter and, except as necessary to meet minimum require-
ments for the administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter (including meas-
ures required in emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area),
there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or mo-
torboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no structure or
installation within any such area.
Wilderness Act § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
10. See McCloskey, supra note 8, at 308.
11. See id. at 309.




16. See id. at 314.
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property belonging to the United States." Congress exercised this power
in 1964 when it adopted the Wilderness Act, creating the National Wil-
derness Preservation System.'" Prior to 1964, national forest primitive
areas were established and managed by forest administrators rather than
by statute.'9 With the promulgation of the Act, Congress officially
charged the federal land agencies of the executive branch with managing
designated wilderness areas.' Congress, however, did not create or des-
ignate any single agency to manage wilderness areas.2 ' By giving wilder-
ness management authority to a variety of agencies, Congress opened the
door to a variety of wilderness policies which reflect a long history of
debate regarding what constitutes wilderness.
The recognition of the unique place of wilderness within nature may
have originated with the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry
David Thoreau.' .Spearheading a philosophy of wilderness,' Emerson
and Thoreau influenced the way many Americans view nature.' Al-
though their statements are sometimes amorphous, one should not pre-
sume political naivet6.'
The philosophies of Emerson and Thoreau spurred legislative mo-
mentum for wilderness preservation that culminated in the late-
nineteenth century when Congress selected public lands for protection
17. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State."). The house report on the Wilderness Act states that "by
establishing explicit legislative authority for wilderness preservation, Congress is fulfilling its re-
sponsibility under the U.S. Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the public lands." H.R. REP No.
88-1538, at 12 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3615, 3621.
18. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, A WILDERNESS BILL OF RIGHTS 98 (1965). Congressional
creation and regulation of wilderness areas for public recreational purposes has since been well
established. See McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1965); Izaak Walton
League of America v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698, 710 (D. Minn. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 497
F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974); Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593, 598 (D. Colo. 1970).
19. See Mitchel P. McClaran, Livestock in Wilderness: A Review and Forecast, 20 ENVTL. L.
857, 860 (1990). Primitive areas are defined in part as "[a]ll areas so designated by the Secretary of
Agriculture on the effective date of the Wilderness Act and that have not yet been permanently
designated as wilderness or to other use by act of Congress." FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
FOREST SERVICE MANUAL ch. 2320.5(6) (1990) [hereinafter FOREST SERVICE MANUAL].
20. Congress may delegate the power to manage federal lands to the Executive. See, e.g., Best
v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963); see also Alva W. Stewart, Wilderness
Protection: A Bibliographic Review 4 (Vance Bibliographies Pub. Admin. Series: Bibliography #P
1642) (noting that the National Wilderness Preservation System is composed of lands under the
jurisdiction of the National Forest Service, the National Park Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the Bureau of Land Management).
21. See Interview with Federico Cheever, Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver
College of Law, in Denver, Colo. (Oct. 5, 1998).
22. See DANIEL G. PAYNE, VOICES IN THE WILDERNESS 29-54 (1996).
23. Cf. MICHAEL FROME, THE FOREST SERVICE 175 (2d ed. 1984); NASH, supra note 2, at 84-95.
24. See PAYNE, supra note 22, at 29.
25. See id. at 30.
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from uncontrolled development.' The movement for wilderness preser-
vation achieved practical results with the establishment of the world's
first national parks at Yosemite in 1864 and Yellowstone in 1872.7 Wil-
derness preservation advanced further when Congress established na-
tional forests in 1891 under the Forest Reserve Act (FRA).' The impetus
for this legislation was the need to effectively manage watersheds and
protect timberlands from the fraudulent private acquisition of woodlands
that accompanied the nation's westward expansion. 9 The FRA marked
the beginning of a national preservation system, authorizing the President
to designate public lands as "forest reserves."'
National forest management was based primarily on property and
resource values until the early 1900s.' The Forest Service in 1924 desig-
nated the first reservation of federal land as "wilderness" when it estab-
lished the Gila Wilderness in New Mexico.'2 A landmark in wilderness
history, the reservation was significant because it signaled to Congress
that the Forest Service would unilaterally preserve wilderness type areas.
The move toward the protection of wilderness in national forests through
legislative action began as early as 1948 when Congress first asked the
Library of Congress's Legislative Reference Service to study the "desir-
ability" of a federal policy and program of wilderness preservation.3
Prepared and issued to Congress in 1949, the resulting report compiled
data on wilderness preservation policies and agency views?' It proposed
the launching of wilderness preservation programs in recognition of the
26. See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AN ENDURING RESOURCE OF WILDERNESS
(1989) [hereinafter FOREST SERVICE, ENDURING RESOURCE].
27. See McCloskey, supra note 8, at 295 & n.29. See generally C. FRANK BROCKMAN,
RECREATIONAL USE OF WILD LANDS 259 (1959) (discussing the establishment of wildland recrea-
tional areas throughout the world); CHAS. E. DOELL & GERALD B. FTzGERALD, A BRIEF HISTORY
OF PARKS AND RECREATION IN THE UNITED STATES 12-22 (1954) (reviewing park development in
foreign countries); Lee Marriman Talbot, Wilderness Overseas, in WILDLANDs IN OUR
CIVILIZATION 75-80 (David Brower ed. 1964) (discussing the worldwide trend of providing recrea-
tional.wildemess areas, a trend which stemmed from the establishment of the first American national
parks).
28. Law of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.) (repealed 1976); see HEROLD K. STEEN, THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: A
HISTORY 26 (1991).
29. See GuNDARS RUDZmS, WILDERNESS AND THE CHANGING AMERICAN WEST 23 (1996).
30. See MICHAEL FROME, BATrLE FOR THE WILDERNESS 227 (1997); Richard Bury & Gary
Lapotka, The Making of Wilderness: Land Use and the National Forest System, 21 ENV'T 12, 13
(1979).
31. See Federico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and National Park Service: Para-
doxical Mandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74 DENy. U. L.
REV. 625, 628 (1997) (providing a historical background on the Forest Service within a discussion of
the National Park Service).
32. Cf FROME, supra note 30, at 228 (referencing the Gila designation as "one manifestation
of [Aldo] Leopold's lifelong call for a 'land ethic' and 'ecological conscience"').




devastation caused by "man's exploitation" in other parts of the world."
The conservationist movement strengthened in 1951 through the efforts
of The Wilderness Society leader Howard Zahniser.' Along with David
Brower of the Sierra Club, Zahniser called for the establishment of a
movement to enlist public support and congressional action in the crea-
tion of a national wilderness preservation system.3"
In 1956, Democratic Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and
Republican House Representative John P. Saylor of Pennsylvania intro-
duced the first wilderness bill.' Between June 1957" and May 1964,
eighteen hearings, six hundred witness appearances, sixty-six rewrites
and over six thousand pages of testimony were documented on the wil-
derness proposal in both Washington D.C. and the West.' On September
3, 1964, the Wilderness Act of 1964 became law.
The Act assured that continued settlement and development did not
"occupy and modify all areas within the United States ... leaving no
lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural condi-
tion ..... " One goal of establishing a system of protected lands is to
give the American people the opportunity to use and enjoy the wilder-
ness in a manner consistent with recreational, scenic, scientific, educa-
tional, conservation and historic use benefits.'3 The Act brought all fed-
eral public lands with the wilderness designation under the umbrella of
the NWPS," thus ensuring that the lands remained off-limits to any de-
35. Id
36. See LLOYD C. IRLAND, WILDERNESS ECONOMICS AND POLICY 31 (1979).
37. Cf FROME, supra note 23, at 181.
38. SeeS. REP. No. 88-109, at 7.
39. The first hearings were conducted by the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee on June
19 and 20, 1957, under Senator James E. Murray's chairmanship. See S. REP. No. 88-109, at 7.
40. See Ralph Swain, USFS Region 2 Wilderness Specialist, The Wilderness Act Revisited 5
(presentation document prepared for wilderness managers, specialists and non-agency wilderness
conservationists) (on file with the author).
41. See Pub. L. No. 88-557, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131!-1136
(1994)).
42. Brian T. Hansen, Note, Reserved Water Rights for Wilderness Areas-Current Law and
Future Policy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423,423 (1990) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1988)). The original
intent of the Wilderness Act was to designate some 14,000,000 acres of wilderness. See Colloquy,
Issues in Wilderness Designation on the Colorado Plateau, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 393, 398 (1993). In 1993, there were 93,000,000 acres of designated wilderness in the
United States. Nationally, this figure represents approximately four percent of the total area of the
country. See id at 395. Much of this area is concentrated in the West with wilderness designations
covering 1.5% of Utah, 7.5% of Idaho, 9% of Washington, and more than 15% of Alaska. See id.
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (stating that the purpose of national parks is to conserve and
protect them, but allowing use which will leave them "unimpaired"); 43 C.F.R. § 8560.0-2 (1997).
44. The term "umbrella" represents the idea that the NWPS has no real authority. Rather, the
system exists as a concept created in section 2(a) of the Wilderness Act under which a variety of
administrative agencies including the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, National Wild-
life Preservation System, and the Department of the Interior operate. See DYAN ZASLOWSKY & THE
WILDERNESS SOCIETY, THESE AMERICAN LANDS 234-40 (1986) (arguing that the word "system" is
misleading when the term articulates the notion of a broad and clearly articulated network, and
arguing that the NWPS is woefully inadequate).
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grading development or activity. Today, the NWPS is composed of lands
under the jurisdiction of four government agencies: the Forest Service,
National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Bureau of
Land Management. ' The Department of Agriculture's U.S. Forest Serv-
ice and the Interior Department's National Park Service administer more
than three-fourths of the System.' Agencies which administer wilderness
areas in the NWPS began management in 1964 of a total area of 9.1 mil-
lion acres; '7 and today this management responsibility has increased to
over 104 million acres"5 of designated wilderness at 474 locations. '9 With
these areas a mere five percent of the United States' land base has wil-
derness protection.'
The establishment of statutory wilderness designation in the Act
was the result of nearly eight years of congressional debate,"' and public
debate about it has continued since its inception.'2 One example of the
arguments made against the establishment of wilderness areas is that it
prohibits certain uses within those lands designated as wilderness. Spe-
cifically, debate centers on the conflict between multiple use and single
use paradigms of preservation." Multiple use refers to a balancing of
conservation principles and commercial enterprises. ' It is the manage-
ment of all renewable surface resources of the national forests, a harmo-
nious combination of uses not necessarily based on economic return."3
45. See Stewart, supra, note 20, at 4.
46. See id.
47. See FROME, supra note 23, at 183.
48. See Implementation of Wilderness Act: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l
Parks and Public Lands and the Subcomm. on Forest and Forest Health of the Comm. on Resources
House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Rep.
Hansen, Chairman, Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks and Public Lands).
49. See FOREST SERVICE, ENDURING RESOURCE, supra note 26.
50. See The Wilderness Society, Stand by Your Lands, American Wilderness: The Future of
Wilderness (visited Sept. 16, 1998) <http://www.wildemess.org/standbylands/wilderness/future.htm>.
51. See S. REP. No. 88-109, at 7 (1963).
52. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 48; To Amend the Wilderness Act of 1964: Hear-
ing on S. 1010 Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels and the Subcomm. on Public
Lands of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. (1973). As stated in the Oversight
Hearing:
We will hear testimony today which should amaze the members of this committee.
We will hear of people being punished for trying to save their own lives, of property
rights being violated, of Boy Scouts being excluded from Wilderness Areas, of wildlife
being allowed to perish and people simply being excluded from the "use and enjoyment"
of our wilderness areas.
Oversight Hearing, supra note 48, at 1-2 (opening statement of Rep. Hansen, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Nat'l Parks and Public Lands); see also Kenneth R. Sheets et at., The Tug of War Over Use of
Federal Land, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 8, 1982, at 57-59 (discussing the battle over
federal land classification among developers, environmentalists, ranchers, and tourists).
53. For a discussion of the variables which make up the multiple use concept, see DOUGLAS,
supra note 18, at 87-97; RUDZrTIS, supra note 29, at 28-30.




The single use paradigm resists the potential for a free-wheeling
practice of putting every section of the public domain to all possible
uses.' Critics of the Wilderness Act claim that preservation in a manner
consistent with the Act is contrary to multiple use goals,57 that wilderness
is a single use concept that excludes enterprises such as commercial for-
estry. 8 Proponents, however, point out that wilderness is an interdepend-
ent piece of a larger picture, and that wilderness as defined in the Act
allows for multiple uses. 9
At the forefront of the wilderness preservation movement, The Wil-
derness Society (TWS) believes that wilderness designation is consistent
with multiple use both in fact and in law.' TWS notes that not only does
the Act allow multiple uses such as watershed management and ecologi-
cal stabilization,6' multiple uses are consistent with public land multiple
use principles established by the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of
1960.' TWS points out that existing law provides significant outdoor
recreation opportunities in protected areas, including hunting, fishing,
hiking and camping.' In other words, the Act does not prohibit all uses
and all purposes contrary to the preservation of wilderness itself. Rather,
its goal is to limit activities degrading to the preservation of wilderness
values.'
56. See DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 97. The words of Henry David Thoreau reflect the basic
premise of the single use concept: 'This curious world which we inhabit is more wonderful than it is
convenient; more beautiful than it is useful; it is more to be admired and enjoyed than used." FROME,
supra note 23, at 174 (quoting Thoreau).
57. See Dan Goldman, Land Use: The Multiple Use Concept, 23 ENV'T 4 (1981).
58. See id. at 5.
59. See id. at 4 (arguing that the concept of wilderness is not contrary to multiple use).
60. See The Wilderness Society, Stand by Your Lands (visited Sept. 16, 1998)
<http.//www.wilderness.org/standbylands/wilderness/wildemessfaq.htm>.
61. See id.
62. See id. (referring to 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994), which states that it is congressional policy
"that the national forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range,
timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes").
63. See id.
64. Values include the perpetuation of high quality areas representing natural ecosystems,
providing an environment for indigenous plants and animals, including those threatened or endan-
gered, maintaining watersheds and airsheds in a healthy condition and maintaining the primitive
character of wilderness as a bench mark for ecological studies. See FOREST SERVICE, ENDURING
RESOURCE, supra note 26. Other philosophies include more ethereal wilderness preservation values.
The Forest Service of the Rocky Mountain Region, for instance, has expressly directed the preserva-
tion of values such as the "the wilderness experience," and emphasizes the themes of education,
freedom, solitude, simplicity, aesthetic and mystical dimensions. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION 4 (1989).
Other values recognized by the Forest Service include a mental and spiritual restoration in the ab-
sence of urban pressures, and the scientific benefits obtained through this undisturbed setting. See id.
See generally IRLAND, supra note 36, at I (developing a detailed framework of balancing utilitarian
objectives, such as scientific and economic values with non-utilitarian objectives, such as cultural
and ethical concerns, including "man's relationship to the natural world, his ability to foresee future
needs, and his ability to restrain short-term activities that threaten long-term values"); RODERICK
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B. The Power to Designate Wilderness
A discussion of the definitions of wilderness logically begins with a
review of the authority vested in Congress to designate wilderness lands
and the effect of this strictly circumscribed power on public land man-
agement agencies. Section 2(a) of the Wilderness Act expressly states,
"No Federal lands shall be designated as 'wilderness areas' except as
provided for in this chapter or by a subsequent Act."' Specifically, the
law directs the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior
to identify primitive areas and to report to the President within ten years
of designating a primitive area whether that area is suitable for wilder-
ness designation.' The President then submits his recommendation to
Congress,' a public hearing is held," and Congress decides whether to
designate the lands as wilderness. ' If Congress approves the designation,
the areas remain roadless in perpetuity."
Because several federal land management agencies set aside areas
with wilderness values subsequent to the passage of the Act,7
McCloskey questioned whether Congress intended to limit the designa-
tion of wilderness lands to those created expressly by congressional ac-
tion.' McCloskey noted that "[n]owhere does the act actually preclude
the administrative reservation of areas for wilderness purposes. The Act
merely bars assignment of the label 'wilderness area' by other than
[clongressional authority.""' McCloskey is correct in his conclusion that
the exclusive power of Congress is "crystallized" by this language.' The
term "wilderness" is only vested with meaning and authority under the
Act when Congress expressly designates land as such. McCloskey, how-
ever, based his concern on the fact that administrative agencies define
wilderness areas not designated as such by Congress." Although agencies
generally welcome congressional mandates that relieve agency decision
makers of negative fallout from politically sensitive decisions, agencies
have nevertheless asserted their autonomy in setting aside areas with
FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1989) (discuss-
ing the movement away from utilitarian values).
65. Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
66. See Wilderness Act § 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b).
67. See Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
68. See Wilderness Act § 3(d)(l)(B), 16 U.S.C. § ! 132(d)(1)(B).
69. See Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
70. Perpetuity is implied by section 2(a). See Wilderness Act § 2 (a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
However, the modification or adjustment of boundaries is permitted by section 3(e). See Wilderness
Act § 3(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(e).
71. See McCloskey, supra note 8, at 305.
72. See id
73. Id at 306.
74. Id,
75. See id. at 305.
76. Cf. Robert L. Fischnan, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park Establishment
Legislation and Its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 779, 804 (1997).
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wilderness values."' There can be discrepancies, however, between the
quality of wilderness in areas designated by Congress and by agencies
because Congress, federal agencies, and the judiciary have varying inter-
pretations regarding just what values define wilderness.
II. THE STRICTNESS OF THE QUALIFYING DEFINITION OF
"WILDERNESS"
The definition of "wilderness" adopted by Congress in the Wilder-
ness Act states:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where
the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where
man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness
is further defined to mean in this chapter an area of underdeveloped
Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without
permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) gener-
ally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature,
with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has
outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined
type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of
sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an
unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geologi-
cal, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical
value.7'
In reviewing the language adopted by Congress, McCloskey ad-
dressed a major ambiguity regarding the statutory definition of "wilder-
ness." The issue, simply stated, is by what criteria will agencies evaluate
areas for potential congressional designation as wilderness, and will such
criteria compromise wilderness preservation values? In his treatment of
this question, McCloskey cited two points of concern. First, he pointed
out that the Act's definition itself requires further congressional explana-
tion following Congress's unqualified use of the terms "untrammeled,"'
,undeveloped," "retaining," and "primeval."' Second, he found that
"[t]he wording of section 2(c) vacillates between an ideal of complete
naturalness and recognition that some impairment may be accepted.""
Most problematic in deriving a generally acceptable definition of
wilderness is, the subjectivity of its characteristics. Some view wilderness
as the invincible and enduring western high country, adorned with ma-
77. See McCloskey, supra note 8, at 305.
78. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
79. The term "untrammeled" refers to an area "where human influence does not impede the
free play of natural forces or interfere with natural processes in the ecosystem." IbREST SERVICE
MANUAL, supra note 19, at ch. 2320.5.
80. See McCloskey, supra note 8, at 307.
81. Id.
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jestic peaks, colorful meadows and pristine evergreen forests. 2 The his-
tory of the West influences this aesthetic perspective with its images of
migrating Ute tribes and mountain men while modem day fisherman and
backpackers augment this perspective." Still others see wilderness in
concrete terms, without roads, untouched by pollution, structures or other
marks of civilization, a labyrinth of downed trees, meadows and swamps
as they existed prior to human effects on the land.' The divergence of
views on the issue of what is wilderness is not a contemporary develop-
ment.
Prior to any statutory definition, definitions of wilderness included
terms which expressed two extremes. Some are pejorative, such as "un-
cultivated or barren" 5 and "pathless waste."' Others are laudatory
phrases describing wilderness as "a garden left to nature"' and "devoted
to wild growth."' Appropriately, however, descriptions of wilderness
include the terms "multitudinous and confusing collection,"'' "a large,
confused mass or tangle of persons or things." This common thread of
confusion lends perspective to the slew of proposals and responses to the
legislative definition of wilderness set forth in the Act.
A. Congressional Interpretation
Statutory interpretation requires analysis based on the plain meaning
of the language, particularly when Congress prescribes the definition of a
term.9"' Section 2(c) of the Act defines wilderness as "[a]n area where the
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man him-
self is a visitor who does not remain.... [It is a]n area of underdeveloped
82. See BRIAN Lrrz & LENORE ANDERSON, WILDERNESS WAYS, THE COLORADO OUTwARD
BOUND SCHOOL GUIDE FOR ENViRONMENTAL SOUND BACKCOUNTRY TRAVEL 17 (1993).
83. See id.
84. See DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 29.
85. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2713
(1933) [hereinafter FUNK & WAGNALLS].
86. WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2926 (2d ed.
1937) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. Colonial settlers in the seventeenth century described wilderness as
a hideous and desolate place representing "a wild and savage hew." DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 30
(quoting Nathaniel Morton, secretary of the Plymouth Colony, in a statement made in 1620). In fact,
Daniel Webster himself, over a century prior to the passage of the Act, objected to the annexation of
the Oregon, an area now comprising seventeen states. On the floor of Congress Webster asked,
"What do we want of that vast and worthless area... ? To what use could we even put those endless
mountain ranges... ? What could we do with the western coast of 3000 miles, rockbound, cheerless,
and uninviting?' S. REP. NO. 88-109, at 37 (1963) (quoting Daniel Webster).
87. FUNK & WAGNALLS, supra note 85, at 2713.
88. WEBSTER'S, supra note 86, at 2926.
89. FUNK & WAGNALLS, supra note 85, at 2713.
90. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2092 (Encyclopedic ed. 1977).
91. See United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 417 (1938); Columbia Water-Power Co. v.
Columbia Elec. Street-Railway Light & Power Co., 172 U.S. 475, 491 (1899); Arthur v. Morrison,
96 U.S. 108, 111 (1877); Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 347-48 (1875).
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Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence. .... " On its
face, this language suggests that wilderness exists before any of its wil-
derness quality is reduced or subtracted; it is "an ideal concept of wil-
derness areas."'4 Although these concepts have been criticized as nebu-
lous and high sounding," they have in common the idea of an absence of
human intervention.'
This idealized treatment by Congress, as McCloskey noted, is quali-
fied by subsequent language.'7 The Act describes wilderness as:
[W]ithout permanent improvements or human habitation, which is
protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and
which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the
forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unno-
ticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive
and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres
of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation
and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain eco-
logical, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic,
or historical value."
In response to these qualifications, McCloskey observed:
(1) the land apparently can have temporary improvements on it; (2)
the land only has to appear generally to have been affected primarily
by the forces of nature; and (3) the imprint of man's work merely
need appear substantially unnoticeable. These qualifications would
appear to vitiate the force of the preceding general characterizations
of wilderness. How far can these qualifications go in this process of
vitiation?"
92. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
93. See DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 29.
94. S. REP. NO. 88-109, at 7 (1963).
95. See id.
96. See Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The Legal
Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 EcoLoGY L.Q. 249, 254-55 (1988).
97. See McCloskey, supra note 8, at 307--08.
98. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994). In the same poetic vein, in February,
1963, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, Stewart Udall, recited what he considered "a
very forceful statement of the case for wilderness legislation." National Wilderness Preservation
Act: Hearing on S. 4 Before the Comm on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 19 (1963). Sec-
retary Udall read from an article written by the chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Henry M. Jackson:
There is a spiritual value to conservation and wilderness typifies this. Wilderness is a
demonstration by our people that we can put aside a portion of this which we have as a
tribute to the Maker and say, "This we will leave as we found it."
Wilderness is an anchor to windward. Knowing it is there we can also know that we
are still a rich nation, tending to our resources as we should, not a people in despair
searching every last nook and cranny of our board or cupboard for a blade of grass or a
tank of water.
ld. at 18-19 (quoting Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs).
99. McCloskey, supra note 8, at 307.
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McCloskey was concerned that the Act's language would not re-
solve the historical tension between the idea of wilderness as pristine and
undefiled and the practical acceptance that wilderness is affected by hu-
man contact. Wilderness advocate and member of the Forest Service,
Robert Marshall, however, presented a thread of principles in his own
definition of "wilderness" which later would run through the statutory
definition codified in the 1964 Wilderness Act." Like the Act, Marshall
began with idyllic prose, stating, "'Wilderness areas' are regions
which ... are sufficiently spacious for a person to spend at least a week
of active travel in them without crossing his own tracks."'' Marshall did,
however, set out two specific attributes of wilderness. First, visitors to
the wilderness must depend solely on their own efforts for survival."l
Second, the areas must preserve as nearly as possible the features of a
primitive environment." These attributes require that wilderness areas be
without roads, settlements and mechanized transportation, but not to the
extent that areas with trails and temporary shelters existing prior to the
advent of the "white race" be excluded."'
Passage of the Act did not result in a unified concept of wilderness.
In a 1965 speech at the Soil Conservation Society of America, Associate
Chief of the Forest Service Arthur Greeley implicitly acknowledged the
varying concepts of wilderness in his attempt to guide wilderness man-
agement. He said, "Wilderness areas have different characteristics. They
are not all alike. Some differences are the products of nature. Others are
the result of human attitudes or of traditional patterns of use of a par-
ticular area."'"5 Cognizant of the variations in agency-prepared field
regulations and guidelines, Greeley clearly identified the difficulty
precedent to management: defining the characteristics of wilderness.
Congress has demonstrated the tension McCloskey and Greeley
pointed out. In legislation, Congress has adopted qualifications beyond
those prescribed in the statute. In fact, Congress has shown that it will
designate an area a "wilderness area" notwithstanding its failure to sat-
isfy the definition of wilderness." The Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975"0
is representative of Congress's use of its discretion to revise its applica-
tion of the definition of wilderness. Recognizing the populous element of
100. For background information on Robert Marshall, see ZASLOWSKY & THE WILDERNESS
SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 209-12.
101. ROBERT MARSHALL, THE PEOPLE'S FORESTS 177-78 (1933).
102. See id. at 178.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. FRoME, supra note 23, at 184-85 (quoting from a speech delivered before the annual
meeting of the Society on August 22, 1965).
106. See 2 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 14B.02(1)(a)(iii) (Release #12, Feb. 1996).
107. See Pub. L. No. 93-622, 88 Stat. 2096 (originally codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131 note, 1132
note, and subsequently eliminated).
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the eastern half of the United States, Congress was concerned that large
scale industrial and economic growth and development were threatening
the protection of wilderness-type areas.'" As a result, Congress accepted
fifteen new eastern areas into the NWPS,' many with characteristics
clearly evidencing the effects of man's influence, such as areas previ-




The definition of wilderness Congress included in the Wilderness
Act serves as a template for the rules and regulations used by the various
agencies charged with evaluating potential wilderness areas. Although
the Act vests Congress with exclusive authority to designate wilderness
areas, the Secretary of Agriculture is directed to recommend "primitive"
areas to Congress for such designation."' Under the auspices of the Sec-
retary, the Forest Service is required to protect the character of areas it
recommends until further designation. Therefore, using the statutory
definition of wilderness as the foundation of agency policy, the Forest
Service Manual and Handbook represent examples of attempts to recon-
cile inconsistencies between the statutory approach to wilderness and
notions of pure wilderness by establishing general wilderness designation
principles."2
As the guidebooks by which the Forest Service evaluates wilderness
characteristics for recommendation to Congress, the Manual and Hand-
book provide insight into the process of wilderness designation. The
Manual states that, in absolute wilderness, human influence prevents an
area from "retaining its purest natural form," and it characterizes abso-
lute wilderness as being untrammeled by human foot and absent the ef-
fects of pollution."3 The Forest Service Manual admits that few places, if
any, exist which conform to these criteria."" In fact, the Manual states
that the Act defines wilderness to be "at some point below absolute wil-
derness.""' The question remains, at what point?
108. See Eastern Wilderness Act, § 2(a)(1), (3), 88 Stat. at 2096.
109. See id. § 3(a)(l)-(15), 88 Stat. at 2097-98.
110. See Interview with Ralph Swain, Regional Wilderness Specialist, United States Forest
Service, in Lakewood, Colo. (Oct. 1, 1998); cf infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing
the flexible standard by which areas with a potential to return to a natural condition are assessed).
111. Wilderness Act § 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1994).
112. See FOREST SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 19, ch. 2320.6; FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK ch. 7.11 (1992) [hereinafter FOREST SERVICE
HANDBOOK].
113. FOREST SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 19, ch. 2320.6.
114. See id.
115. Id.; see Videotape: Wilderness Colorado's Enduring Resource (U.S. Forest Service, Re-
gion 2 (Colorado)) (on file with the University of Denver Law Library) (emphasizing the character-
istic of wildness, where cycles and processes are the way of the earth).
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Despite ambiguities regarding the pristineness necessary to establish
an area as wilderness, Congress has continued to designate wilderness
areas." ' Attempting to deal with these ambiguities, the Forest Service
seeks to establish the level of acceptable human influence in wilderness
areas." 7 Ultimately, the balance between human influence and nature
represents a pragmatic acceptance of wilderness characteristics some-
where between absolute wilderness and non-naturally occurring condi-
tions on the land."' To strike this balance, the Forest Service sets out a
specific inventory for the evaluation of potential wilderness." '
The inventory process for identifying and evaluating potential wil-
derness areas is set forth in the Forest Service Management Handbook."
The Handbook provides a checklist of criteria used by Forest Service
officials to evaluate specific areas for wilderness designation.' The goal
of the agency regulations is to effectuate the ideal of wilderness set forth
in section 2(c) of the Wilderness Act.'" Foremost in the Forest Service's
evaluation of potential wilderness is the identification and inventory of
all roadless areas. In order to receive a roadless classification, the area
must be undeveloped and satisfy the definition of wilderness provided in
section 2(c).' After having received a "roadless area classification" pur-
116. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note (Supp. I 1997) (listing all designated wilderness areas).
117. See FOREST SERvICE MANUAL, supra note 19, ch. 2320.6.
118. See id. chs. 2320.2 to .3, 2323.11 to .12. (establishing objectives and policies of the Forest
Service that cause confusion in the same manner as the statutory definition of wilderness by quali-
fying the definition with provisions contradictory to wilderness values).
119. See id chs. 7.1-.11(b) (identifying the procedures for obtaining public review and com-
ment upon proposed wilderness).
120. See id.
121. See id. chs. 7.2-.23(b).
122. See id. ch. 7.1.
123. See id. The analysis for wilderness protection originally involved two stages. In 1971, the
Forest Service initiated its own study known as RARE I. See Bury & Lapotka, supra note 29, at 14.
Under RARE I the Forest Service recommended to Congress three kinds of allocations of National
Forest lands. See id. Some were labeled multiple-use, available for timber harvesting and mineral
extraction. See id. Others were recommended for wilderness designation, and still others were with-
held from final disposition through designation as a wilderness study area. See id. Ultimately, RARE
I recommended 12.3 million acres for wilderness designation, double the current total. See id. In
response to President Jimmy Carter's commitment to an expanded wilderness system, the Forest
Service in 1977 initiated a nationwide program called RARE II. See id. at 15. Its purpose was to
accelerate additions to the National Wilderness Preservation System and simultaneously clarify the
role of commercial interest in National Forest lands. See id. Ultimately, RARE II identified 62
million acres as meeting the threshold requirements for wilderness designation. See id.; see also
Douglas E. Booth, Timber Dependency and Wilderness Selection: The U.S. Forest Service, Con-
gress, and the RARE II Decisions, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 715, 719 (1991) (describing an empirical
analysis of wilderness selection under RARE U1).
124. Cf. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994); BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK: POLICY, DIRECTION,
PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING WILDERNESS INVENTORY ON THE PUBLIC LANDS 5
(1978) [hereinafter WLDERNESs INVENTORY HANDBOOK] (defining "roadless" as "the absence of
roads which have been improved and maintained by mechanical means to insure relatively regular
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suant to section 2(c), the undeveloped area must also satisfy one of sev-
eral criteria to qualify for wilderness designation.'" The area must con-
tain 5000 acres or more.'" If the area cannot satisfy this requirement, it
may qualify if it is a "roadless island of public land.""' Alternatively, an
area may be considered if it is contiguous with another federally man-
aged wilderness or potential wilderness area, or the public has indicated
strong support for wilderness study in an area where such study is practi-
cable, or the area is contiguous with another federally managed area
subject to study and preservation such that the combined acreage of the
two areas is greater than 5000 acres."
and continuous use," and stating that "[a] way maintained solely by the passage of vehicles does not
constitute a road").
125. See WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at II -14.
126. See id. at 12. Many areas designated as wilderness are actually less than five thousand
acres, such as: Maurelle Islands, Alaska (4,937 acres); Bogoslof, Alaska (175); Chamisso, Alaska
(455); Forrester Island, Alaska (2,832); Hazy Island, Alaska (32); Saint Lazaria, Alaska (65); Babo-
quivari Peak, Arizona (2,040); Big Lake, Arkansas (2,144); Havasu, California (3,195); Farallon,
California (141); Ishi, California (240); Machesna Mountain, California (120); Saddle Peak Hills,
California (1,440); Santa Lucia, California (1,733); Trinity Alps, California (4,623); Platte River,
Colorado (743); Leadville, Colorado (2,560); Little Lake George, Florida (2,833); Cedar Keys,
Florida (397); Florida Keys, Florida (1,900), (2,019) and (2,278); Island Bay, Florida (20); J.N. Ding
Darling, Florida (2,619); Lake Woodruff, Florida (1,066); Passage Key, Florida (36); Pelican Island,
Florida (6); Big Frog, Georgia (83); Ellicott Rock, Georgia (2,181); Blackbeard Island, Georgia
(3,000); Frank Church-River of No Return, Idaho (720); Bay Creek, Illinois (2,866); Burden Falls,
Illinois (3,723); Clear Springs, Illinois (4,730); Garden of the Gods, Illinois (3,293); Lusk Creek,
Illinois (4,796); Panther Den, Illinois (940); Crab Orchard, Illinois (4,050); Beaver Creek, Kentucky
(4,791); Lacassine, Louisiana (3,346); Moosehorn, Baring Unit, Maine (4,680); Moosehorn, Birch
Islands Unit, Maine (6); Moosehorn, Edmunds Unit, Maine (2,706); Monomoy, Massachusetts
(2,420); Horseshoe Bay, Michigan (3,949); Nordhouse Dunes, Michigan (3,450); Round Island,
Michigan (378); Huron Islands, Michigan (147); Michigan Islands, Michigan (12); Agassiz, Minne-
sota (4,000); Tamarac, Minnesota (2,180); Leaf, Mississippi (994); Rockpile Mountain, Missouri
(4,131); Fort Niobrara, Nebraska (4,635); Arc Dome, Nevada (20); Currant Mountain, Nevada (3);
Great Swamp, New Jersey (3,660); Bisti, New Mexico (3,968); Fire Island, New York (1,363);
Ellicott Rock, North Carolina (4,022); Pond Pine, North Carolina (1,685); Chase Lake, North Dakota
(4,155); West Sister Island, Ohio (77); Wichita Mountains, North Mountain Unit, Oklahoma (2,847);
Menagerie, Oregon (4,800); Red Buttes, Oregon (3,750); Oregon Islands, Oregon (480); Three Arch
Rocks, Oregon (15); Hells Canyon, Oregon (1,038); Oregon Islands, Oregon (5); Allegheny Islands,
Pennsylvania (368); Ellicott Rock, South Carolina (2,809); Hell Hole Bay, South Carolina (2,180);
Wambaw Creek, South Carolina (1,937); Wambaw Swamp, South Carolina (4,767); Bald River
Gorge, Tennessee (3,721); Cohutta, Tennessee (1,795); Gee Creek, Tennessee (2,493); Joyce Kil-
mer-Slickrock, Tennessee (3,832); Little Frog Mountain, Tennessee (4,684); Unaka Mountain,
Tennessee (4,700); Big Slough, Texas (3,455); Beaver Dam Mountains, Utah (2,600); Bristol Cliffs,
Vermont (3,738); Little Dry Run, Virginia (2,858); Little Wilson Creek, Virginia (3,613); Peters
Mountain, Virginia (3,328); Shawyers Run Virginia (3,665); Thunder Ridge, Virginia (2,344);
Glacier View, Washington (3,123); Wonder Mountain, Washington (2,349); San Juan Islands,
Washington (353); Washington Islands, Washington (60), (125) and (300); Mountain Lake, West
Virginia (2,721); Porcupine Lake, Wisconsin (4,446);- Wisconsin Islands, Wisconsin (27) and (2).
See KENNETH A. ROSENBERG, WILDERNESS PRESERVATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 167-86
(1994).
127. WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 12.
128. An exception is made for those areas east of the 100th meridian because of the abundance
of roads across otherwise qualifying areas, thus allowing at least some contiguous preservation in the
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Qualifying the "roadless" criterion is a lengthy series of exceptions.
Exceptions to roadless classification include presence of airstrips, heli-
ports, plantations, electronic installations,' areas with evidence of his-
toric mining," certain mineral leases,'3' National Grassland areas, 32 areas
with only seventy percent federal ownership, minor structural improve-
eastern United States. Chapter 7.11(b) of the Forest Service Handbook establishes criteria for
roadless areas in the East:
National Forest System lands in the eastern United States have been acquired over time
from private ownership. Criteria for inventorying roadless areas in the East recognize that
much, if not all of the land, shows some signs of human activity and modification even
though they have shown high recuperative capabilities. Roadless areas east of the 100th
meridian qualify for inventory as potential wilderness if:
1. The land is regaining a natural, untrammeled appearance.
2. Improvements existing in the area are being affected by the forces of nature
rather than humans and are disappearing or muted.
3. The area has existing or attainable National Forest System ownership patterns,
both surface and subsurface, that could ensure perpetuation of identified wilder-
ness values.
4. The location of the area is conducive to the perpetuation of wilderness values.
Consider the relationship of the area to sources of noise, air, and water pollution,
as well as unsightly conditions that would have an effect on the wilderness expe-
rience. The amount and pattern of Federal ownership is also an influencing factor.
5. The area contains no more than a half mile of improved road for each 1,000
acres, and the road is under Forest Service jurisdiction.
6. No more than 15 percent of the area is in non-native, planted vegetation.
7. Twenty percent or less of the area has been harvested within the past 10 years.
8. The area contains only a few dwellings on private lands and the location of these
dwellings and their access needs insulate their effects on the natural conditions of
Federal lands.
FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra note 112, ch. 7.11(b). The Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975
recognized that in the "more populous eastern half of the United States there is an urgent need to
identify, study, designate, and preserve areas for addition to the National Wilderness Preservation
System." Pub. L. No. 93-622, § 2(a)(l), 88 Stat. 2096, 2096 (originally codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1131
note and subsequently eliminated). For a discussion of wilderness in the East, see FROME, supra note
23, at 187-92; IRLAND, supra note 36, at 36-38. For a conservationist essay on eastern wilderness,
see MICHAEL FROME, CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIONIST: SELECTED ESSAYS 81-102 (1989).
129. See FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK,supra note 112, ch. 7.1 l(a)(l)-(3); see also 47 C.F.R.
§§ 1.1301-1319 (1997) (providing Federal Communication Commission procedures implementing
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 with regard to exposure limits of transmitters, facili-
ties and operations).
130. See FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra note 112, ch. 7.1 1(a)(4). The section states:
Do not include areas of significant current mineral activity, including prospecting with
mechanical earthmoving equipment. The inventory may include areas where the only
evidence of prospecting is holes that have been drilled without access roads to the site.
Inventoried roadless areas also may include:
a. Areas that otherwise meet inventory criteria if they are covered by mineral leases
having a "no surface occupancy" stipulation.
b. Areas covered by minerals leases that otherwise meet inventory criteria only if
the lessee has not exercised development and occupancy rights. If and when
these rights are exercised, remove the area, or portion affected, from the inven-
tory unless it is possible to establish specific occupancy provisions that would
maintain the area in a condition suitable for wilderness.
Id.
131. SeeMi.
132 See id at ch. 7.1 l(a)(5). The area may include structures or evidence of past vegetative
manipulation, vegetation reverting to its native characteristics, and less than one mile of interior
fence per section. See id
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ments such as fences and water troughs, recreational improvements such
as hunting and outfitter camps, areas of historical timber harvest, ground-
return telephone lines, and watershed treatment areas absent evidence of
mechanical equipment.'33 These exceptions reflect the administrative re-
sponse to the need to balance the ideal of wilderness with human de-
mands on the land, and they reflect the basis of McCloskey's concerns
over the Act's ability to effect true wilderness protection,
Forest Service Specialist, Ralph Swain, suggests that the Act's defi-
nition of wilderness comprises two main elements. First, wilderness re-
quires a balance between what is wild and what commercial commodities
can be extracted from the land." It requires "a balance, a harmony of
using the land and protecting the land.""'3 The quantifiable percentage of
this harmony, however, is the foundation of debate.' " The second ele-
ment, according to Swain, is "restraint."'37 Recognizing that man has the
technology to modify every landscape on earth, Swain cautions that eco-
systems are directly influenced by the balance of uses and protection;
urging confinement of our desire to compromise the inherent qualities of
wild lands.'38
2. Bureau of Land Management
Following in the footsteps of the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, in its Wilderness Inventory Handbook (WIH), also pro-
vides policy, direction, procedures, and guidance for the inventory por-
tion of the wilderness program. "9 The WIH employs the language of sec-
tion 2(c) and sets out a detailed explanation of how the definition's re-
quirements are weighed against the characteristics of an area. As with the
Forest Service analysis, the BLM analysis begins with a review of
roadless areas. This review focuses on three key factors: size, natural-
ness, and the outstanding opportunity for solitude or primitive
recreation.'" First, with regard to size, the area must be at least 5000
contiguous roadless acres of public land.' As with Forest Service quali-
fications, however, if the area is geographically distinct and manageable,
a wilderness area of less than 5000 acres is acceptable.' 2
133. See id atch. 7.11(a)(6)-(l1).
134. See Interview with Ralph Swain, Regional Wilderness Specialist, United States Forest





139. See WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 4-6.
140. See id. at 6.
141. See id.
142. See id. The BLM requires an area of public land under 5000 contiguous roadless acres to
be either:
1. Contiguous with land managed by another agency which has been formally deter-
mined to have wilderness or potential wilderness values, or
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Second, naturalness exists where the imprint of man's work is sub-
stantially unnoticeable.' 3 An evaluation of human effects often involves
an evaluation of livestock management facilities and mining debris.'"
Fences and vehicle routes do not necessarily preclude recognition as a
wilderness study area."5 The BLM evaluates vehicle routes based on their
cumulative effect on wilderness, making a distinction between a road and
a two-wheeled track known as a "way. ' ' 46
The third and most problematic of the criteria is that the land under
consideration must either provide an "outstanding" opportunity for soli-
tude, or an outstanding opportunity for a primitive and unconfined type
of recreation. "7 Interpretation of the word "outstanding" fuels debate
regarding this element of wilderness evaluation. Because interpretation
of the word is subjective, determination of whether an area qualifies for
wilderness study often hinges upon an evaluator's notion of what "out-
standing" means. More problematic, however, is the question of whether
satisfaction of the requirement to be "outstanding" is based on national
significance or regional criteria.' There is no answer to the question
whether a national or regional standard applies. For instance, BLM desert
lands in Arizona may be designated for wilderness study based on differ-
ent criteria from those used in classifying BLM mountain lands in Colo-
rado.' 9 Concerns over regional significance are also well founded where
a regional inventory may compare one area to another in the same re-
gion, thus allowing for adoption of a wilderness study area that on the
whole is incompatible with national wilderness values."
The final criterion the BLM considers is "supplemental values."''
This broad category includes considerations of "ecological, geological,
2. Contiguous with an area of less than 5,000 acres of other Federal lands administered
by an agency with authority to study and preserve wilderness lands, and the com-
bined total is 5,000 acres or more, or
3. Subject to strong public support for such identification and it is clearly and obviously
of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired
condition, and of a size suitable for wilderness management.
Id.
143. See id. at 12.
144. Interview with Eric Fmstick, Officer in the Colorado Office of Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, in Lakewood, Colo. (Sept. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Finstick Interview].
145. See id.
146. See id. The BLM defines a "way" as "[a] two-wheel track created only by the passage of
vehicles. A 'way' is not a road." BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT (COLORADO), U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, INTENSIVE WILDERNESS INVENTORY: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC COMMENT AND FINAL
WILDERNESS STUDY AREAS 16 (1980) [hereinafter INTENSIVE WILDERNESS INVENTORY].
147. See WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 13.
148. See Finstick Interview, supra note 144.
149. See WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 13.
150. See Finstick Interview, supra note 144.
151. See INTENSIVE WILDERNESS INVENTORY, supra note 146, at 19. As a reference and not a
criterion, ecosystems are often used in recommending the designation of wilderness areas to Con-
gress. See Interview with Eric Finstick, Officer in the Colorado Office of Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, in Lakewood, Colo. (Sept. 22, 1998). For instance, because many BLM lands are of lower
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or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value."'52
Although the presence or lack of supplemental values will not determine
whether an inventory unit becomes a wilderness study area, the presence
of supplemental values is often beneficial because they contribute to op-
portunities for primitive recreation. '
In addition to the foundational characteristics of size, naturalness,
solitude, or recreation, the BLM also considers areas that have the po-
tential to return to a natural condition.'" The criterion by which "return"
is judged is that the land will return to a state where human imprint will
be "substantially unnoticeable."" By this standard, if a portion of an
inventory unit contains an imprint substantially noticeable, yet the unit is
capable of returning to a substantially unnoticeable condition by natural




Judicial interpretation of the definition of wilderness is limited and
very mixed. In 1970, a federal district court in Colorado decided one of
the two leading cases interpreting the scope of wilderness designation. In
Parker v. United States, plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the Secretary
of Agriculture and the Forest Service from selling timber from the East
Meadow Creek area near Vail, Colorado."w The court specifically re-
jected the government's contention that the condition of the land fore-
closed the possibility of wilderness classification of this area.'' The court
found that the construction of an access road, the existence of mining
claims, and a Denver Water Board survey for a potential water diversion
project did not preclude wilderness designation.62 Rather, the court held
the issue of suitability must be left open until the President and Congress
were able to review the area's characteristics.'6" The Tenth Circuit Court
elevation than other wilderness areas in Colorado, a designation of BLM lands as wilderness study
areas would double the number of species protected. See id.
152. INTENSIVE WILDERNESS INVENTORY, supra note 146, at 19.
153. See id. at 19.
154. See WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 14.
155. Id.
156. This determination is dependent on factors such as the kind of imprint, the topography, the
vegetation, the amount of rainfall, and so forth. See INTENSIVE WILDERNESS INVENTORY, supra note
146, at 20.
157. See WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 14. The BLM handbook
states that "where imprints of man require artificial rehabilitation by the use of power machinery to
return them to a natural condition ... [the area] will not be considered as meeting wilderness char-
acteristic criteria." Id
158. See id.
159. Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970).
160. See Parker, 309 F. Supp. at 594.
161. Seeid. at600-01.
162. See id. at 596, 601.
163. See id. at 601.
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of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that deferring wilderness
designation to the President and Congress is in full accord with the Act
and Forest Service Manual section 2321 .'"
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit, in Sierra Club v. United States De-
partment of Agriculture," addressed whether the Forest Service violated
a settlement agreement by failing to designate an area in Illinois for wil-
derness study.'" Basing its decision on a Forest Service Environmental
Impact Statement (FSEIS), the Forest Service had decided not to recom-
mend it as a wilderness study area. Relying on the findings set forth in
the FSEIS, the court cited a regional forester's justifications for declining
the wilderness designation. 7 The forester pointed to characteristics of the
area which militated against a wilderness study area designation: the
existence of a dense system of improved and unimproved roads; the need
for extensive burning, shade removal, and vegetation management; the
presence of non-native pine plantations; and the potential for fluorspar
mining.9  As a result of the presence of these characteristics, the court
found that the Forest Service decision not to classify the area a wilder-
ness study area was not arbitrary or capricious.'
The courts have been justified in limiting their interpretation of the
definition of wilderness derived from the Wilderness Act. As the Ninth
Circuit stated, "The choice of what shall be preserved is an administra-
tive choice in which geographical and topographical considerations are
certainly germane but hardly are subject to judicial review."'70 Though
judicial deference to agency authority appears to drive these cases, courts
in different regions may be more or less inclined to decide questions of
wilderness study designation.'' One cannot, however, speculate with any
164. Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793,797 (10th Cir. 1971).
165. No. 96-2244, 1997 WL 295308 (7th Cir. May 28, 1997).
166. See Sierra Club, 1997 WL 295308, at *29-'31.
167. See id. at *29.
168. See id. at *30. (stating that "[filuorspar is classified as being of compelling domestic sig-
nificance by the U.S. Bureau of Mines and production of fluorspar is important to the local economy").
169.; See id. at *31.
170. McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283,286(9th Cir. 1965).
171. One may argue that regional paradigms for defining wilderness are the catalysts for judi-
cial decisions. The court in Parker was seated in Colorado, a state rich in preservation tradition, even
in the midst of strong commercial resource interests. The court in Sierra Club, however, was seated
in the Seventh Circuit, which is composed of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana-an area that does not
contain large tracts of public lands and that has very few areas of wilderness. The language of the
Tenth Circuit in Parker reveals regional sensibilities. Preceding the court's citation of section 2(c) of
the Act, the court uses a preservationist tone. Recognizing the purpose of the Act, the court states
that "[the Act] is simply a congressional acknowledgement of the necessity of preserving one factor
of our natural environment from the progressive, destructive and hasty roads of man, usually com-
mercial in nature." Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793,795 (10th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
Though the foundation of both the Tenth and Seventh Circuit decisions is agency discretion,
both cases, read together, imply a stronger sense of preservation in the West than in the Great Lakes
Region. Whether this apparent bias for preservation leads to a willingness of western courts to accept
areas as wilderness that do not meet wilderness criteria is unclear based on such limited case law.
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certainty about the motivation of courts to refrain from deciding such a
thorny issue by examining just two cases.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Wilderness is defined on many levels. Basing decisions on idealized
notions or pragmatic considerations, those who are charged with apply-
ing the definition Congress incorporated in the Wilderness Act seem
incapable of achieving a common interpretation. Though the statutory
definition attempts to exclude the imprint of man from wilderness, the
very process of deciding what wilderness is, and how to manage it, is one
which imposes the imprint of man on nature. In the end, we trust our
legislatures, federal agencies and the judiciary--composed as they are of
individuals with their own ideas of the character of wilderness-to make
decisions guided by a compromise made thirty-five years ago. Wilder-
ness may be an ideal which excludes the role of men, but the process by
which men define wilderness is necessarily humanistic and pragmatic.
As Roderick Nash once wrote, "The emphasis here is not so much what
wilderness is but what men think it is."'" Our challenge is to temper our
traditionally dominative thoughts of nature, preserving our threatened
lands and their indefinable characteristics.
Matthew J. Ochs*
The temporal difference between the cases may also be significant. Parker was decided by the trial
court in 1970 and on appeal in 1971, just six years after the passage of the Act, Sierra Club was
heard in 1997, thirty-three years after the Act was enacted. One must wonder, Does the timing of
these cases mean that contemporary courts are more stringent in their definition of wilderness? Does
the fact that over 104 million acres of designated wilderness already exist compel courts to discour-
age designation?
172. NASH, supra note 2, at 5.
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